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ABSTRACT 
This study in the doctrine of God, with special reference to 
the thought of John Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne, addresses 
the issue of the relational problematic and suggests a potential 
resolution. 
The 'Relational Problematic' focusses on the notion of aseity 
and the doctrine of the Trinity. It concerns the ontological 
conundrum posed by, on the one hand, the insistence that the external 
relations God has are of no ontological consequence to him, together 
with, on the other hand, the witness of the Christian tradition that 
suggests such relations are not, in fact, inconsequential for the 
being of God. The task of constructing a resolution begins with the 
ontology of the early Heidegger which is implicitly relational. Thus 
'relational ontology' furnishes a hermeneutical key whereby a 
'Relational Theology' may be developed. 
This development inVOlves, first, the analysis of John Macquarrie's 
existential-ontological theism, which concludes that to speak of God 
in the language of 'Being' is to speak of the relational being of 
God. Second, and alongside this, is placed the analysis and discussion 
of the neoclassical theism of Charles Hartshorne: the pluriform 
language of Becoming by which God is conceived in process thought has 
at its base the perception of the essential relatedness of God. But 
both Macquarrie and Hartshorne have as a common problem the question 
of the "entitative status" of God. The solution is suggested by way 
ii 
of conceiving God as "Relational Entity" . The 'Being' and the 
'Becoming' of God are manifest in ad extra relatedness: such 
relationality forms the fundamental ontological motif in the 
conception of God. 
This relational perspective frames the resolution to the 
relational problematic. Aseity is reinterpreted in the light of 
the relational context of God: God is existentially prior, but not 
relationally self-sufficient. Trinity is interpreted in terms of 
relational identity: the necessary ad extra relatedness of God is 
manifest in three particular patterns of relating. 'God' is thus 
ontologically conceived as singular relational entity manifesting 
threefold relational identity. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central task of theology is the formulation 
of a doctrine of God. 
John B. Cobb, God and the World, p.19 
The purpose of this thesis is to address that task. Specifically, 
I shall focus on the 'relational problematic'in the doctrine of God 
and, in the context of seeking to address that issue, examine the 
concept of God as propounded by John Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne. 
By 'relational problematic' I mean those implications for the 
concept of God which arise from the understanding that God relates 
himself to humanity, indeed to the whole of the created order. Either 
such relating ad extra is intimately involved in the concept of God -
and is therefore central to the understanding of who God is in himself -
or it is not. If not, then any understanding we have of God is 
severely limited: that for which the sine qua non of existence is to 
exist in, of, and for itself is, ipso faoto, both conceptually and 
existentially remote. 
Now 'relationship' is a key word in understanding what Christian 
faith is about. God first and foremost is encountered as the Covenant 
God. The biblical witness to God's activity in history is a witness 
to the activity of establishing, maintaining, severing and reconstruct-
ing relationship between himself and his people. This being so, the 
question that springs to mind is this: Could it be that who God is in 
himself is who he is in and through these relationships? In other 
2 
words, is it not possible that how we conceive God is not to be 
isolated from these relationships by which he is experienced and 
known? 
Thus the issue to which I shall address myself is that of the 
extent to which "ad extra re1ationali ty" is necessary and central in 
formulating a concept of God. The raising of such an issue implicitly 
challenges the notion of God's aseitas, and also the traditional 
understandings of the Trinity. For instead of conceiving God as 
existing essentially in and of himself, I will endeavour to show that 
the Christian concept of God may intelligibly and coherently incorporate 
relatedness-to-other as a sine qua non of the being of God. 
The impetus for exploring such a relational approach to the 
doctrine of God is grounded, in broad terms, in the modern apperception 
of the relational nature of reality.1 The theologian Ronald Gregor 
Smith described reality in terms of the relational complex "I-with-
the-other-in-a-world".2 This re1ationality is the "giveness" of 
reality, and Gregor Smith holds that the giveness of faith is also 
b d ' h 1 ' l' 3 oun up 1n suc re at10na 1ty. Indeed, a not uncommon summary 
expression of the content of Christian faith would be to say that it 
1. e.g. Keith Ward speaks of science "as a creative exploration of 
reality ... [that]: .. deals with relationships". (The Concept of 
God, Oxford: Bas1l Blackwell 1974, p.90). P. CliFford in a 
contemporary discussion of metaphysics, notes the expectation "to 
find in the principle of interaction a clue to the way everything 
is held together" (Interpreting Human Experience, London: Collins 
1971, p.l04); and Dorothy Emmet asks whether the concepts and 
symbols by which religion tries to express metaphysical truth "are 
expressing the character of some actual relation". (The Nature of 
Metaphysical Thinking, London: Macmillan 1953, p.113). 
2. R. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, London: Collins 1970, p.128. 
3. ibid., p.72. 
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is a matter of "personal relationship to God in Christ".4 The form 
of this relationship is love; the focus of it is the God of love. 
This implies an understanding of God not in terms of "the cold, remote 
vocabulary of immutable Being" but rather that "the very meaning of 
God's kind of being must be defined in terms of his totally related, 
self-giving, creative-centred concern".5 
Martin Buber is also one who portrays reality as relational. He 
speaks of "turning towards the other" as the "basic movement of the 
life of dialogue".6 There is a relational matrix which constitutes 
human existence and necessarily includes relationship to that which 
"the believer calls God".7 Buber's distinctive position, writes 
Macquarrie, "consists in a frank acceptance of that personal form of 
being for which man is destined, a being which lives in dialogue or 
in person-to-person relations with that which stands over against it".8 
It is the "I-Thou" encounter that arises out of this relational 
interpretation of existence that gives further impetus towards a 
concept of God which embraces this very relationality. Certainly 
Macquarrie himself thinks that Buber is pointing to a new and fruitful 
possibility in this direction. 9 
4. R. Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarenden Press 
1977, p.6. 
5. F. Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, London: Geo. Allen 
and Unwin 1967, p.4l5. 
6. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, London: Kegan Paul 1947, p.22. 
7. ibid., p.177. 
8. John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, London: 
SCM 1976, p.196. 
9. ibid., p.349f. 
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It could be said that, in general terms, contemporary trends 
in metaphysics, in science, as well as in theology point to 
"relationali ty" - i. e. the taking ontological cognizance of inter-
relationships within the world along with the essential relational 
nature of existence as such - as the primary focus for understanding 
the reality of the created order. This, in turn, implies a concomitant 
understanding of the Creator. For God is known in and through the 
relational reality of the world. lO 
The link between theology and ethics provides yet another impetus 
for devising a relational theology. Morality is seen to originate 
in "interpersonal relationships".ll Righteousness, the term most 
appropriate for describing the biblical orientation with regard to 
the moral sphere, is itself a matter of "right relationships". The 
God of the Hebrew tradition is pre-eminently the God who is known 
only in and through his relationships with creation,12 and this 
perspective is at the heart of the gospel of Christ. 13 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
cf. Ward, The Concept of God, p.80. Ward "rules out all confident 
ontologising statements about the inner life of God" in favour of 
speaking of God in terms of ad extra relations: ibid, p.171. Jean 
Wahl notes that Kierkegaard, who holds that the "very being as an 
existent individual" of the human person is dependent on relation-
ship to God, also suggests the corollary that God "owes his being 
to this relationship with the existent individual". (Philosophies 
of Existence, London~RKP 1969, p.19). W.N. Clarke, The Christian 
Doctrine of God, Edinburgh: T and T Clark 1909, also placed stress 
on the ad extra relationality of the being of God. cf. pp.25, 64, 
83, 86 and 165. 
Clifford, Interpreting Human Experience, p.156 cf. p.163. 
cf. Ward, The Concept of God, p.131. 
cf. Clifford, Intehireting, p.238. See also W.R. Matthews, God 
in Christian Thoug t and Experience, London: Nisbet and Co.,-r935, 
p.186. 
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Clearly 'relation' and 'relationship' are key terms in under-
standing and explicating Christian faith. The term "Relational 
Theology" reflects the centrality of the relational motif. In 
particular it will be used to denote an understanding of God based 
on analysis of the ad extra relatedness in which God is perceived 
to be engaged. That is to say, the external relations which God has, 
namely relations to humanity, to creation as such, to that which is 
not identically himself - relations which traditionally have been 
viewed as gratuitous - are to be viewed as, in some sense, 
"constitutive" of the Divine Being. I would contend that God is who 
he is in and through these relations: they are not accidental, but 
are essential to the very being of God. In this sense, to-be-in-
relation (with that which is other than himself) is the key to 
understanding the being of God. 
It is my view that a study of the concept of God in the 
existential-ontological theism of John Macquarrie and the neo-classical 
theism of Charles Hartshorne suggests a particular relational under-
standing of God which is itself a development of, and yet incorporates, 
the work of both. In his Being and in his Becoming God may be 
conceived as fundamentally relational. To properly describe and 
determine this relationality is to describe and determine the very 
nature of God. 
Accordingly, in the first chapter I shall discuss the relational 
problematic by focussing on the interrelated notions of aseity and 
Trinity. I shall also discuss the particular hermeneutical key by 
which a resolution may be attempted. In Parts One and Two I shall 
6 
examine and discuss the doctrine of God in, respectively, the thought 
of John Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne. Finally in Part Three I 
shall draw together, in Chapter Six, the work on Macquarrie and 
Hartshorne, and, in Chapter Seven, address the issues raised in 
Chapter One. Thus I shall conclude the work of this thesis by 
endeavouring to formulate a resolution which will both respond to 
the specific issues of the relational problematic as such and also 
address the criticisms that emerge in the course of my analysis and 
discussion of Macquarrie and Hartshorne. 
7 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE RELATIONAL PROBLEMATIC IN THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 
I. THE RELATIONAL PROBLEMATIC 
The God of Christian faith is a relating God: in creation and 
in revelation God is encountered within the context of relationships. 
1 In the biblical witness, God reveals himself as a Covenant God, one 
who seeks relationship with created human-kind. The advent of Christ -
Emmanuel, 'God is with us' - is the incarnational act of God-in-
relationship: Christ is the concrete manifestation of the God who 
loves the world he created. The proclamation of salvation is the 
call to right relationship.2 Implicit in the response to this call 
is the sense that, for God, such responsive relationship is indeed 
appropriate - perhaps even necessary - to his being. However, the 
Christian concept of God hinges, for the most part, on two doctrines: 
that of the Trinity, and that of aseity. Aseity affirms God's 
independence, the sense of being wholly 'other than'. This means 
also his not "needing" any other save himself for his existence and 
life. The doctrine of Trinity expresses both the threefold way by 
which God reveals himself to humankind - the 'economics ' of God's 
immanence - and also serves to account for relationality within the 
life of God. This leaves unthreatened God's status of existing a se . 
.I 
1. cf. W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2 vols., trans. 
J.A. Baker, London: SCM 1958. 
2. cf. J.A. Ziesler, "Salvation Proclaimed", Exp T 93, September 
1982:356-359. 
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Now, the paradox that God engages in relationships, yet is 
untouched by such relating because the internal relations are 
sufficient, constitutes the relational problematic. There is an 
issue of ontological consistency to be resolved. Reconciling the 
conception of God as 'He who relates' with the conception that God 
is yet 'other than' the temporal order in which such relating takes 
place, is thus the nub of the relational problematic. 
A concept is needed which will express the 'otherness'- the 
sense of real identity-in-distinction - of the divine existence that 
impinges on us from beyond our own experience, while at the same 
time it embraces our experience of God, giving an explanation for 
his relational character. Is there not a way of taking full 
cognisance of the relationality of God as implied by his real 
relationships with the world, such that it does not threaten his 
being but rather enhances our understanding of it? 
The key philosophical notion that has long undergirded thinking 
about God has been the concept of substance. On the one hand, it 
is generally taken to denote a primordial and static 'stuff' - that 
ens or quiddity which forms the bedrock of classical metaphysical 
d . 3 Iscourse. On the other hand, there are differing views concerning 
the understanding of 'substance', even to the point of suggesting 
that it may yet denote a more dynamic ontology than is normally 
3. cf. M. King, Heidegger's Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1964, 
p.23: "According to Aristotle only 'substance' is (exists) in the 
primary and independent sense of to be". -
9 
associated with it. 4 Whilst to comprehend the notion of substance 
5 
requires a comprehensive explicatory ontology, G.C. Stead, in his 
very thorough study, concludes that the identification of 'substance' 
with an unknown, primary, and unjustified substratum "is beyond 
defence".6 He notes that although there is an acknowledgement of 
its limitations and some hesitancy in applying the term to God, there 
is, nonetheless, "no question of God's being described as a quantity, 
a quality, or a relation".7 Rather these categories are regarded 
as inherent in the primary substance. "Divine Substance" affirms 
that God is substantial entity . "He who Is" is some 'thing'; an 
identity non-reducible to the relations it has; an entity conceptually 
and existentially distinguishable from all other entities. 
Following Stead I would ask: Are the properties or qualities 
that inhere to the substance so distinguishable from the substance 
itself, so 'accidental', that they make no difference to it? Wherein 
would lie the reality of God - in the 'untouchable' substance, or in 
the interactive qualities and attributes? Or does God's reality 
somehow transcend that division? Traditionally, God's action on 
4. As, for example, expressed in: R.W . Clark, "The Bundle Theory of 
Substance", N. Scho1, L, Autumn 1976:490-503; M.S. Gram, "Two 
Concepts of Substance", N. Scho1, LI, Winter 1977:75-89; 
J. Gruenenfelder, "Is Substance Relevant to Contemporary Concern 
with the Person?", N. Schol, XLI, Autumn 1967:489-505; R. Moloney, 
"The Notion of Substance in Philosophy: An Examination of Some 
Current Views", Hey J, XVI, January 1975:36-50. 
5. cf . D.M . Mackinnon's remark to this effect in praise of Professor 
G.C. Stead's Divine Substance, London: Oxford 1977 in Scot J Th, 
32 (1979):272. 
6. Stead, Divine Substance, p . 23 . 
7. op.cit., p.162. 
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and within the world has been generally ascribed "to energies, powers, 
or intermediaries distinguishable from his substance".8 God defined 
in terms of substance is God defined as other-than the relations and 
qualities whereby he encounters, acts, and interacts with his creation. 9 
Now God is, at the very least, identified as that which is 
worshipful: worthy of praise, adoration and respect; that which 
elicits a devotional response . Stead notes: 
... it then occurs to us to wonder what comparisons 
will enable us to understand what we worship. God 
is love; but is this to be understood as a quality, 
or a relation, or a substance, a loving being? By 
saying that God is a substance, we may be claiming 
that God is a reality in his own right, and not 
just a creation of our fancy ... But this brings us 
to another problem. If we say 'God is [a] substance', 
are we not thereby assigning God to a class of beings 
and so infringing his uniqueness? (10) 
The problem is not easy to resolve. The temptation is to reject the 
notion of substance as applied to God in favour solely of a conception 
that arises out of the human experience of God. But this opens the 
door to reductionism. The characterisation of God in terms of 
substance at least has the effect: 
8. op.cit., p.166. 
9. op.cit., p.267. 
10. op.cit., p.27l 
11 
.•. to stake a claim against reductionist theories 
which in effect represent God as dependent on the 
human experience which he is invoked to explain ... 
[and] to claim that God is not limited or prescribed 
by our experience of him, but exists in his own 
right. (11) 
In the end, God is God. The substance approach roundly affirms 
that. But it remains unsatisfactory as an explanation of the real 
nature of God, for the conceptual base for understanding God has 
changed, and continues to change: 
Whatever may have been assumed in the past, we are 
now becoming more and more aware that we are confronted 
with what is dynamic rather than static. No longer 
is man able to think of himself as standing over 
against a universe which can be held sterile in his 
intellectual grasp, waiting to be analysed by the 
patient investigator. He is in rapport with an 
environment which is constantly acting and re-acting 
upon him. (12) 
The category of the dynamic is in the ascendancy, The terms 
and concepts with which we now discuss the nature of reality are 
those of relationship, relativity, mutuality and reciprocity. The 
being of God is intimately related to the being of humanity: 
11. op.cit., p.273. 
12. Paul R. Clifford, Interpreting Human Experience, London: Collins 
1971, p.26. 
12 
. f G d d d . f h b' 13 conSCIousness 0 0 eman s consCIousness 0 uman elng . 
Conceptual models which once lay at the foundation of the traditional 
14 
concept of God have been superseded . The contemporary need is to 
discern a conceptual base "which seems to be the central clue which 
15 God has planted". 
The doctrine of God is fundamental for all of theology. 16 
Theological reflection, according to Anne Carr, has of recent times 
been engaged in "the search for a conceptuality which, without 
denying the transcendence of God, clearly affirms God as involved in 
this world's human experience" 17 Over against views of God which 
imply non-re1ationa1ity as the essence of his being - e.g . the 
Aristotelian Unmoved Mover18 or the idea of God as beyond description 
19 and knowledge - lie concepts of God implying a more central position 
for the notion of relationality in any ontological description. Such 
is the case with the views of John Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne 
to be examined below. For the moment I note e.g. the discernment of 
the relationality of God in the Old Testament's use of the personal 
13. cf. F.D.E. Sch1eiemacher, On Religion, New York: Harper and Row 
1958, pp.71f. See also p.112, Note 14. 
14. cf. J.H. Gill, "Transcendence: An Incarnational Model", Encount. 
39, Winter 1978:39-44. 
15. F. Sontag, "God", S.E. Asia J.Th. 21, 1980:10-15. 
16. cf. S. Ogden, The Reality of God, London:SCM 1967, p.l "It is 
the only problem there is". 
-I 
17. Anne Carr, "The God Who Is Involved, Th. Today 38, October 1981:314. 
18. cf. Stead, pp.89ff. 
19. e.g. As discussed by W.D. Hudson in "The Concept of Divine 
Transcendence", ReI. St. 15:197-210. 
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name 'Yahweh,20 and claims such as that compassion, feeling and 
responsiveness are not inappropriately ascribed to God. 2l The problem 
is to conceive God as both existentially 'independent' of human 
experience yet responsively affected by human experience and interaction. 22 
The concern to resolve the relational problematic runs counter 
to the traditional understanding of God for which self-existent being 
and a wholly non-necessary non-reciprocal relation with the world are 
primary tenets. 23 Traditional theism holds that God is transcendent 
to the world and immanent in it: God is in no way re1ationa11y affected 
by the world; the world is utterly dependent on God for it's very 
b . 24 emg. This is not to say that God is unconcerned, such as would 
be the case with the extreme view of transcendence. 25 Neither does 
it allow for the pantheistic outcome of a wholly immanentist approach. 26 
But it does raise the question of how it is that God is related to 
the world yet supposedly not relational in his being with regard to 
20. D. Clines, "Yahweh and the God of Christian Theology", Theo1 83, 
September 1980:323-329. "The Yahweh of the Old Testament is not 
a static, timeless being; he is in constant interaction with his 
people and with world events; he has a history, a biography, a 
futurity, a past ... his changelessness so-called is simply his 
faithfulness to his promises, for he does change in response to 
the conversion of the Ninevites or the repentance of Israel. 
He is acted upon and reacts". p.326. 
21. F. Sontag, "The God Behind the Gospels", Encount. 42, Winter 
1981:45-47. 
22. cf. J.B. Cobb, God and the World, Philadelphia: Westminster 1969, 
p.60. 
23. cf. E.L. Masca11, He Who Is, London: Longmans 1945, p.ix. See 
also A. Farrer, Finite and Infinite, London: Dacre 1959. 
24. cf. Masca1l, pp.96 and 126. 
25. op.cit., p.127. 
26. op.cit., p.132. 
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any such relationships ad extra . The traditional view effectively 
implies that God engages in relationship with the world without any 
ontological base for doing so. Relations with the created order are 
wholly external and gratuitous. God's existential independence is 
'demanded' by the existential dependence of creaturely being. 27 But 
by what understanding of the being of God can God's relating not be 
a part of his being? How can God be the necessary 'ground' of 
creaturely existence without there being an ontological implication 
for the being of God? 
E.L. Mascall rejects any notion that the being of God is in some 
way determined or affected by the being of the created world. 28 He 
argues for a relation between God and the world which is unique, 
completely sui generis. But such a one-sided relation is really no 
relation at all. As David Tracy comments: 
In the classical view, creatures are really related to 
the world and to God. God, as purely and wholly 'absolute', 
is related to creatures only externally or nominally. Yet 
that concept, for any thinker who recognizes internal 
relationships as intrinsic to all reality, cannot but 
strike one as incoherent in itself and as not in harmony 
with the rest of experience. (29) 
27. op.cit., p.95. 
28. op.cit., p.97. Mascall rejects Hegel, Whitehead and Tennant who 
each affirm a necessary relation between the being of the world 
and the being of God. 
29. D. Tracy, Blessed Rage For Order, New York: Seabury 1975, p.l80. 
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He asks: 
Is not the God of the Jewish and Christian scripture a 
God profoundly involved in humanity's struggle? .. Can 
the God of Jesus Christ really be simply changeless, 
omnipotent, omniscient, unaffected by our anguish and 
our achievements? .. Can Christians mean the most funda-
mental religious affirmation of Christian self-understanding 
if they simultaneously affirm the usual understanding of 
classical Christianity that God is the self-subsistent, 
changeless, omniscient, all-powerful one who is not 
really [reZatio entis] but only notionally [reZatio 
reZationis] affected by human actions? (30) 
Tracy's questions focus the issue of the relational problematic. 
For this issue concerns the conceptual foundation for the doctrine 
of God. The claim which I am making in this study is that the implicit 
relatedness that is discerned, for example, in the reality of creation, 
or in the testimony of the biblical witness, or even as expounded in 
reflection on Christian faith and doctrine,31 points to the possibility 
of a relational concept of God. 
Langdon Gilkey has remarked that: 
The active relatedness of God to the changing events 
of history is ... perhaps the central characteristic of 
30. op.cit., p.177. 
31. See, for example, H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, Grand Rapids: 
Wm B. Eerdmans 1979. 
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Jahweh, of the 'biblical' conception of God. That this 
conception should have been rendered problematic ... by 
the philosophical definition of God as changeless being, 
is, therefore, one of the ironies of Christian theological 
history; and it is to the credit of the many forms of 
contemporary theology ... that this 'attribute' of God, 
namely, his essential relatedness to the changing events 
of history, has now come to the fore. (32) 
Theology cannot avoid the issue of God's relationship of the 
world and the concomitant implications concerning the relationality 
of God, i.e. the implication for the reality of God viz a viz the 
ontological basis of relating as such. By and large, the traditional 
response to the issue has been that of the doctrine of the Trinity, 
although other doctrines such as atonement, salvation, or incarnation 
obviously also treat of the relationship between God and creation to 
a greater or lesser extent. For the purposes of this thesis I shall 
limit myself to the doctrine of the Trinity, along with aseity, as 
the foci of the relational problematic. 
In addressing the issue of relationality with respect to the 
doctrine of God, I use the term 'relational' and its derivatives, 
unless otherwise indicated, to refer to the capacity to engage in 
relationship with another: i.e. ad extra is always implicit. 
32. L. Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind, New York: Bobbs Merrill 1969, 
p.4l3, Note 30. 
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II. ASEITY 
Aseity is a key concept within the traditional doctrine of God. 33 
It acts as a guarantor of autonomy; it secures a sense of anonymity: 
God is beyond final noetic grasp . Aseity affirms God's unique 
otherness, yet this otherness is of such a radical nature that 
difficulties arise in accounting for any relationship between God 
and the world. Aseity denies any form of dependence upon another -
hence any genuine mutality or reciprocity of relationship - so far 
as the being of God is concerned. 
In the classical theism which we have inherited, God 
has been seen as related to the world only in the sense 
that he is its creator and governor. But that world 
makes no difference to him, since by definition he is 
taken to be complete, perfect in the sense of changeless 
or immutable, unable to experience suffering ... Thus the 
God-creation relationship is one-sided: God influences 
and affects the world but the world in no way influences 
and affects him. (34) 
Philosophically, aseity has functioned as the technical term 
for the judgement that God's existence is necessary.35 In denoting 
the concept of an eternally independent being it functions as a kind 
of "conceptual fulcrum".36 Theologically, it distinguishes God as 
33. cf. Hartshorne's acknowledgement that the dogmatic definition of 
God focuses on the issue of aseity, Man's Vision of God, New York: 
Harper 1941, p.85. 
34. N. Pittenger, "Picturing God", ReI. Life, Summer 1980:174. 
35. Van A. Harvey, A Handbook of Theological Terms, London: Geo. Allen 
and Unwin 1966. 
36. A.G. Nasser, "Divine Independence and the Ontological Argument", 
ReI. St., 15, September 1979:394. 
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Creator, from the world and humanity as created. The doctrine of 
aseity summarizes and undergirds the concept of the being of God as 
Absolute, Uncaused, and Unrelated to any other. Such a God exists 
purely in, for, and to himself. Thus the notion of God's aseity lies 
at the root of the relational problematic. 
God is known only within the context of relationships.37 We 
cannot, in order to know God, remove ourselves from the context of 
our existence. We cannot ignore the context of interrelationship as 
such, and also the relational activity which is fundamental to human 
being. Yet, the concept of aseity is the chief stumbling block to 
any serious recognition that this relational context has direct 
relevance for the being of God. It precludes knowing anything of 
G d th th h G d h · If h . 11 38 o a er an w at 0 1mse c oases to g1ve or a ow. 
It means that the God-human relation is totally one-sided because 
Creation by God - even the creation of man - means the 
institution of an existence really distinct from the 
existence of God. Between God and man, as between God 
and the creature in general, there consists an 
irrevocable otherness. (39) 
40 The neo-orthodox insistence on aseity as expressed by Barth 
37. cf. H.P. Owen, The Christian Knowledge of God, London:Athlone ]969. 
38. cf. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics vol. II/I, Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 
p.69. God is knowable "only by the grace of God". 
39. op.cit., CD II/I, p.l89 . 
40 . Von Balthazar notes that Barth ' s theological method highlights 
the aseity of God. The Theology of Karl Barth, New York: Holt 
Rinehart and Winston 1971, p.70. 
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is matched by the similar neo-Thomist emphasis expressed by E.L. 
Mascall, for whom the five ways of Aquinas point toward a "transcend-
ent self-sufficient creative cause".4l For Mascall, the"ipswn esse 
suhsistens is pregnant with all the fullness of Christian faith" . 42 
Self-existent Being is the only possible foundation for those beings 
not themselves self-existent. 43 Mascall's stress on the "absolute 
necessity of the conception of the entire independence of God" is 
.. 44 
uncomprom1s1ng. 
It would seem that the notion of aseity is unassailable. Yet 
even though Mascall insists that "man is totally dependent for his 
existence on the incessant creative activity of the self-existent 
God,,45 he also holds that "God and Man are personal beings and there-
fore can enter into that intimacy of self-communication and mutual 
. h . " 46 posseSS10n t at 1S proper to persons . 
The insistence on aseity results in a paradox. God is conceived 
in terms of personal being, which implies a certain kind of relatedness, 
yet he is unrelated with regard to his essential self-existence. The 
problem of this paradox concerns the confusion of existence, or ontic 
reality, with being, i.e. ontological reality. The paradox may be 
resolved if a distinction is clearly made between the being of God, 
41. E.L. Mascall, The Openness of Being, London: DLT 1971, p.6l. 
42. Mascall, He Who Is, p.82. 
43. Mascall, Openness, p.117. See also pp.120ff. 
44. Mascall, He Who Is, p.96. 
45. Mascall, Openness, p.150. 
46. op.cit., p.152. 
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understood as the reality of the nature of God ~ God, and the 
existence of God as a matter of existential fact. The concept of 
aseity upholds quite clearly that God exists , as a matter of fact, 
necessarily and not contingently. What aseity also is t aken to imply 
is that it is of the reality (or being) of God to be essentially 
unrelated to any other save himself. Thus relations of fact - e.g. 
creator-creation - are wholly gratuitous: they have no ontological 
bearing on the reality, or being, of God. 
The notion of aseity is a crucial element in the issue of the 
relational problematic. On the one hand God is understood to relate 
to the world in that he does actually love the world freely. But is 
his love impartial in its freely-given status? Can love be impartial? 
Barth, for example, would insist that the love of God for or toward 
humanity is but an instance of God's gracious condescension, in no 
way resting upon or fulfilling any need within God himself. 47 God's 
love cannot be viewed as a response: it is totally impartial as far 
as Barth is concerned. "God is the Lord, above whom there is no 
other person or thing, beside whom ... there is no other person or thing 
conditioning Him, standing in relation to Him. God is a se".48 Thus 
even with respect to thinking about the being of God in terms of the 
love he manifests toward creation, "God would be none the less God 
if he had not created a world and man".49 For Barth, God i s majestic 
in his aseitas. 
47. Barth, CD 1/1, p.158. 
48. CD 1/1, pp.178f. 
49. CD 1/1, p.lS8. 
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If, with Barth, we affirm that God's being is indeed his loving50 
then either we must qualify this affirmation with the notion of 
aseity - which is what Barth does - or else we must accept that the 
activity of loving is indeed an outward-moving activity, which is 
the fundamental mode of all relating ad extra . Yet with God, the 
traditional priority given to aseity restricts the sphere of relating 
to that of internal relationships within the Godhead. 5l However, if 
we can show that there are good grounds for saying that by God's 
loving is meant necessarily his relational activity outward from 
himself as expressive of the essence of his nature or being, then 
clearly the notion of aseity stands questioned, and the possibility 
of taking 'relationality' as a fundamental motif of the being of God 
is raised. 
According to traditional views, the fundamental mode of any 
relationship between God and the world, would be that of condescenion. 
This reflects the understanding that God "owes nothing to any counter-
52 
part". Yet, f or example, Barth holds that God's relating himself 
53 in love, grace, and mercy is real and not illusory or perfunctory. 
Insofar as there is an implicit acknowledgement of the role of 
responding-to-the-other in God's so relating then the prospect of 
recasting our thinking on the ontological nature of God's relating 
50. CD II/I, p.351. 
51. See below for further discussion, Section III. 
52. CD II/I, p.355. cf. also R. Brown, "On God's Ontic and Noetic 
Absoluteness: A Critique of Barth", Scot. J.Th. 33, 1980:535. 
53. cf. CD II/I, p.369. 
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is opened up. Perhaps the sense of 'response' is not merely gratuitous 
but is indicative of a necessary mutality in God's relationship with 
the world. Yet to suggest that is to run counter, for instance, to 
the Barthian stress on God's freedom. 54 Such freedom is that which 
is "to be grounded in one's own being, to be determined and moved by 
oneself. This is the freedom of the divine life and love". 55 It is 
the freedom of aseity, the freedom whereby God is "unlimited, 
unrestricted and unconditioned from without", a freedom from external 
relationship such that "within the sphere of His own being He can live 
56 
and love in absolute plenitude and power". 
But must the concept of God's freedom require aseity as it's 
guarantor of authenticity? Might not the freedom of God be a freedom 
to authentically engage in relationship? Clearly Barth is one who 
views God's engagement in relationships from the perspective of God's 
prior and utter distinctiveness, self-sufficiency, and absolute 
. d d 57 ln epen ence. God is understood as ontologically sui generis. 
He enters into particular relationships of fact, but engagement in 
relational activity bears no import on the being of God as such. 58 
54. cf. CD II/I, pp.297ff. 
55. CD II/I, p.30l. 
56. ibid. 
57. cf. CD II/I, p.303. It would appear Barth wants to have it both 
ways~ he does not relinquish aseitas as a fundamental element, 
yet he obviously wants to take cognizance of God's ad extra 
relationships, e.g. He claims that "God must not only be uncon-
ditioned but, in the absoluteness in which He sets up this 
fellowship, He can and will also be conditioned". 
58. cf. CD II/I, pp.3llf. 
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In turning to Barth and Mascall I am not setting out to expound 
fully their perspectives on the doctrine of God, but rather to 
demonstrate and underscore the centrality of aseity in the doctrine 
of God. 59 Aseity underlies particular aspects such as Infinity,60 
and also governs the understanding of Transcendence. 6l Similarly, 
it is determinative for the notion of Perfection. It is only that 
which is conceived to exist in sheer independence from the created 
order that can bear the weight of Perfection in contrast with the 
perceived imperfection of creation. 62 Aseity also undergirds such 
63 
ascriptions as 'Absolute' and 'Immutable'. That God is known in 
and through his self-disclosure, yet remains hidden such that he is 
finally not knowable is a viewpoint that is sustained only by appeal 
to aseity.64 Yet there is also the view that there is a knowledge 
of God, founded in experience, which is spoken of in terms of 
° ° k d f d h h 1 ° h O 65 encounter: 1t 1S nowle ge 0 , an t roug , re at10ns Ip. 
The discussion thus far has served simply to demonstrate the 
centrality of the notion of aseity. Necessity, Otherness, Infinity, 
59. See also, for example, C.A. Beckwith, The Idea of God, London: 
Macmillan 1923, p.7; W.N. Clarke, The Christian Doctrine of God, 
Edinburgh: T and T Clark 1909, p.273; R. Swinburne, The Coherence 
. ·of ·Theism, Oxford: Clarenden 1977, pp.245f.; K. Ward, 'The Concept 
of God, O~ford: Basil Blackwell 1974, p.146. 
60. cf. C.A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, London: Allen and 
Unwin 1957, p.264. 
61. cf. Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thirtking, London: 
Macmillan 1953, p.102. 
62. cf. The linking of aseity and Perfection as derived from Plato 
and Aristotle, Beckwith, p.40. 
63. See also Barth's discussion on immutability, CD II/I, pp.493f. 
64. cf. CD II/I, p.342. But cf. W.R. Matthews, God in Christian 
Thought and Experience, London: Nisbet 1935, p.137. God is 
knowable but incomprehensible. 
65. cf. Beckwith, pp.70f.; also M. Buber, I and Thou, 2nd ed., 
Edinburgh: T and T Clark 1966. 
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Transcendence, Perfection, Immutability, Absoluteness, Unknowability 
- all these elements of the doctrine of God rest on this notion. 
This is also reflected in the creedal confessions?6 
Whilst the biblical witness points to a God whose being i s 
. t" t I b d " h h" I" 67" h b h I h 1n 1ma e y oun up W1t 1S re at1ng, 1t as een,nonet e ess, t e 
notion of aseity that has held sway for the theological understanding 
of God . However, there have been, and still are, many challenges 
mounted against it. 
The concept of a simple, perfect, infinite, immutable, 
eternal and necessary God can exercise a great attraction . 
It presents one with a picture of a majestic and unlimited 
plenitude of being ... But the picture lives and exercises 
its fascination precisely by its vagueness and incomprehen-
sibility. When the speculative philosophy upon which it 
is based is examined closely, it begins to crumble . .. (68) 
So whilst aseity undergirds the traditional doctrine of God, it 
yet poses some difficulties. If the being of God is grounded in 
absolute otherness and independence then there is a problem of how to 
take adequate cognizance of ad extra relationships viz a viz what 
such relating may imply for our understanding of God . The root issue 
concerns the question of how it is that God can exist both a Be and 
66 . cf. Matthews, p . 89, with respect to the Articles of Religion of 
the Church of England and the Decrees of the Vatican Council. ~ 
Also p.I06 for similar observations on Calvinism. 
67 . Swinburne, p.214: " ... the God of the Old Testament, in which 
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity have their roots, is a God in 
continual interaction with men, moved by men as they speak to 
him, his action being often in no way decided in advance". 
68. Ward, pp.132f. 
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also in relation to that which he has created as other-than himself. 
How is God both absolutely transcendent and yet related to his creation? 
Keith Ward expresses it this way: 
The demands of intelligibility require the existence of 
a necessary, immutable, eternal being. Creation seems 
to demand a contingent, temporal God, who interacts with 
creation and is, therefore, not self-sufficient. But 
how can one have both? (69) 
Ward himself opts for a revision of the traditional doctrine of 
God, "utilizing an idea of infinity which may be called that of 
'dynamic infinity', a move which requires the admission of potency 
and temporality in God ... God is the one self-existent being in whom 
creation and necessity originate and in whom they are reconci1ed".70 
Ward's thorough-going work is, in part, suggestive of some of 
my own thinking. I wish to claim that ad extra relations denote a 
relationa1ity fundamental to the being of God. Such a viewpoint 
challenges the notion of aseity as a primary motif. It also raises 
questions with respect to the trinitarian understanding of God. 
II 1. TRINITY 
The Christian doctrine of God is, in essence, the doctrine of 
h T ·· 71 t e nnlty. The centrality of the doctrine, whether as foundational 
69. K. Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell 1982, p.3. 
70. ibid. 
71. cf. Ward, Concept, p.180; cf. Matthews, p.85. 
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72 dogma, or as a summar y of God's self-revelation, is well attested. 
Ward succinctly states the situation thus: 
The Christian concept of God has been de f initively 
formulated as the concept of the Trinity, three persons 
in one substance, co-equa l and co-eternal, not confused 
with one another, and yet not three Gods but one God. 
The Son is begotten by the Father, and the Spirit proceeds 
from the Father and the Son (except for the Orthodox 
Churches), and yet no person is before, after, greater 
or less than another. (73) 
It is not my intention to address the doctrine of the Trinity in 
order to embark on a full-scale critical exposition. Rather I shall 
be addressing the doctrine in general terms with the aim of discussing 
in further detail the relational problematic in the doctrine of God, 
and also in order to set the scene for developing a resolution to this 
problematic. 
The doctrine of the Trinity admits of a variety of interpretations 
and has had a chequered career throughout the history of theological 
72. cf. Barth, Owen et al. Also C. Stead "The Origins of the Doctrine 
of the Trinity", Theol. LXXVII/652 and 653, October and November 
1974. 
73. Ward, Concept, p.212. 
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thinking. 74 It is a doctrine which has been particularly influenced 
by the ties between political persuasion and theological judgement. 75 
It . db" h d' .. . f J ,, 76 s rlse was prompte y t e lVlnlzatlon 0 esus. It has 
developed from the initial distinction between God the Father and God 
the Son, a distinction concerning the inherent "paradoxical nature of 
God": God perceived as both "absolutely above and beyond, and yet at 
th . d . II 77 e same tlme near an lmmanent. The doctrine of the Trinity 
endeavours to comprehend both the inner being of God, and how it i s 
that God engages in relational activity whilst yet preserving his 
aseity. 
The concept of the Trinity may be said to owe its origins to the 
biblical witness,on the one hand discerned in terms of triadic patterns 
74. cf. e.g. N.H.G. Robinson, "Trinitarianism and Post-Barthian Theology" 
J. Th. St. ns XX, April 1969:186-201. See also:G. Bromiley, 
Historical Theology, Edinburgh: T and T Clark 1978, especially 
Part I; J.L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought vol.I, 
Nashville: Abingdon 1970; J .N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 
London: A and C Black 1968, especially Chapters IV, V and X; E.J. 
Fortman, The Triune God, London: Hutchinson 1972. Recent discus-
sions of the Trinity include: R.S. Franks, The Doctrine of the 
Trinity, London: Duckworth 1953: L. Hodgson, The Doctrine of the 
Trinity, London: Nisbet 1944; R.W. Jenson, The Triune Identity, 
Philadelphia: Fortress 1982; E. Jungel, The Doctrine of the 
Trinity, Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans 1976; G. Lampe, God as Spirit, 
London: SCM 1983; J.P. Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as 
Trinity, London: SCM 1983; J. Mo1tmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom 
of God, London: SCM 1981;C.G. Richardson, The Doctrine of the 
Trinity, Nashville: Abingdon 1958; J.L. Segundo, Our Idea of God, 
Maryknoll: Ordbis 1974; P. Toon (ed), One God in Trinity, London: 
Samuel Bagster 1980; C. Welch, The Trini ty in Contemporary 
Theology, London: SCM 1953. 
75. See T. D. Parker, "The Political Meaning of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity", J. ReI. 60, April 1980:165-184; cf. e.g. Kelly, Early 
Christian Doctrines, pp.252ff. 
76. Mackey, God as Trinity, p.3l. 
77. Richardson, Trinity, p.2l. 
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78 
and formulae, on the other hand, interpreted in terms of the three-
fold movements of revelation79 or the threefold act of God in history . 80 
It is a central doctrine of the Christian faith: in one way or another 
it has exercised the minds of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church 
down through the centuries. In the second century 'fatherhood' 
denoted God as creator rather than the first person of the Trinity . 8l 
By the third century the terminology of ' person ' and ' substance' was 
used to express, respectively, "the principle of plurality in the 
Christian notion of the Godhead" and "the companion tenet of unity in 
the Christian God".82 The fourth and fifth centuries saw the doctrine 
of the trinitarian God "poised between the bare monotheism of Judaism 
83 
and the polytheism of the Greeks. 
The endeavour to comprehend the subtleties of the doctrine has 
always posed special problems and has taxed theological language and 
inventiveness to the limit. From pictorial images84 to complex 
conceptual nuances,85 from being the "systematic formulation of what 
the revelation in Christ involves for our understanding of God" ,86 
78 . cf. Fortman, Triune God, pp . 15-32. 
79. A.B. Come, An Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers, 
London: SCM 1963, pp.90ff . cf . CD 1/1 pp . 339ff. 
80. cf. R.S. Franks, Trinity. 
81 . cf. W. Schoedel, "A Neglected Motive for Second-century 
Trinitarianism", J. Th. St. ns XXXI, October 1980:356. 
82 . L. B. Porter, "On Keeping ' Persons' in the Trinity", Th. St. 41, 
September 1980:530 . 
83. Schoede1, p.367. 
84. See, e.g. G.R . Evans, "St Anselm's Images of Trinity", J. Th. St. 
ns XXVII, April 1976:46-57. 
85. For example, that of ousia and homoousios. See Stead, Divine 
Substance, pp.190ff. 
86 . L. Hodgson, "The Doctrine of the Trinity: Some Further Thoughts", 
J. Th. St . ns V, April 1954:50. 
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to sowing the seeds of discord and division in its creedal expression,87 
the doctrine of the Trinity has figured prominently in the systematic 
reflection on the Christian faith . Confused usage of terminology and 
subtle shifts of meaning have beleaguered discussion throughout its 
history. 
Whereas the Apostolic Fathers evince no awareness of trinitarian 
doctrine or problems, the Apologists generally held a belief "in the 
88 
uni ty of God and a trinity of divine 'persons "'. But what consti t-
uted the 'three' of Trinity? What was the conceptual context of 
'person'? According to Fortman, Origen, for example, held that "each 
of the three is a distinct hypostasis, an individual existent from 
89 
all eternity and not just as manifested in the economy . The later 
Athanasius, defender of the Nicene answer to the Arian question of the 
relationship of Christ to God, produced a trinitarian doctrine which 
nonetheless "left unsolved many questions about the divine persons, 
their definitions and distinctions and relation to one another and to 
the Godhead".90 It was the Cappadocian contribution of one ousia 
and three hypostaseis that gave to orthodoxy its "most successful 
formula". 91 But this also set the scene for much debate and discussion 
that was to corne. 
87. On the issue of the filioque, see: E. Every, "The Filioque Question" 
Sobornost 1, 1979:42-49; A.I.C. Heron, "'Who Proceedeth from the 
Father and the Son": The Problem of the Filioque", Scot. J. Th. 24, 
1971:149-166; A.E.J. Rawlinson, "The Filioque Clause", Scot. J. Th. 
10, 1957:166-173; and also L. Vischer (ed), Spirit of God and 
Spirit of Christ, Geneva: WCC 1981. 
88. Fortman, p.50. 
89. op. cit., p.58. 
90. op. cit., p.75. 
91. Mackey, p.124; cf. Fortman, pp.75-83. 
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One of the chief problems of trinitarian debate has undoubtedly 
been in the area of the definition of 'person' or 'hypostasis,.92 
The fundamental resolution has been to treat them as relationally 
distinct. But that has not been without its problems, as, e.g. with 
the Cappadocian Fathers themselves for whom the three hypostases, or 
persons, "were not merely relationally distinct metaphysical realities 
who were one identical God; they were also three really distinct 
subjects of divine life, who know, love, live, and operate divinely".93 
Within the substantial unity of God there appears a plurality of 
identity. How is this maintained? Geoffrey Lampe points out that, 
for the Cappadocian Fathers, this unity of the Trinity is actually 
based on a "total identity of operation". That is to say: 
Each Person operates the operation of the Trinity ... 
there is no difference between the Persons except in 
respect of relationship ... The three are one in deity; 
the one is three in personal distinctions - that is to 
say, in distinct relations. (94) 
Thus there is no distinction in essence, viz, deity. There is likewise 
no distinction in operation - opera ad extra sunt indivisa - hence 
there is external, or presentational, unity. Therefore the trinitarian 
distinctions are wholly inner-relational: the Father is distinguished 
by the relations of ingeneracy and paternity; the Son by generation 
92. cf. the illuminating discussion in C.C.J. Webb, God and Personality, 
London: Geo. Allen and Unwin 1918. 
93. Fortman, p.81. 
94. Lampe, p.225. 
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. . . d. . 95 and fillatl0n; the Spirit by processl0n an splratlon. However, 
Lampe himself suggests that 
the identification of the Persons with the relations 
offers no satisfactory way out of the difficulty of 
stating in what respect the Persons are differentiated 
from each other . If there are relations there must be 
entities t hat are related; but in this case the only 
entities are the abstract notions themselves of paternity, 
filiation, and procession . (96) 
Lampe goes to the heart of the relational problematic as posed by 
the Trini t y; the 'Persons ' are not to be thought of psychologically, 
yet they cannot but be thought of "entitatively" . 97 
Augustine had a similar stress on the unity of operation: his 
particular view came to dominate the West . 98 The three trinitarian 
names refer to t hree " somethings" so named because of the essential 
1 . d d d b f . 1 . 99 re atlon enote, an not ecause 0 some substantlve qua lty. 
Thps for Augustine , 
the three are ' three somethings', three ' someones', or 
to use a later terminology they are t hree subjects of 
one divine activit y who are only relationally distinct, 
95 . op . cit. , p . 226. 
96. op . cit . , p . 226 
97. See further discussion below, Chapter Seven. 
98. cf. Fortman , pp.l40-l43. 
99 . op. cit . , p.l44. 
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of three relationally distinct subsistents in one 
intellectual divine nature. (100) 
Orthodoxy finally found an answer to the perplexing question of 
the definition of 'person' in the Boethian dictum that a person, or 
hypostasis, within the Trinity, is "an individual substance of rational 
101 
nature". This definition became widely influential .and accepted, 
at least until the modern period. l02 
As far as any substantial development in trinitarian thinking is 
concerned, the Middle Ages saw the rise of the filioque issue, 
together with further consolidation of the classical terminology and 
speculation on the intimate life of the Godhead. The Reformation 
did not challenge the classical Western position and it was not until 
the Seventeenth Century, with its motif of experience as a theological 
category and the emergence of "self-consciousness" as the definitive 
motif of 'person' that there was any possibility of a new contribution 
being made. l03 
Claude Welch, in his notable study of the Trinity,l04 draws 
attention to the way in which the doctrine was reduced to 'second 
100. op. cit., p.152. 
101. op. cit., p.163. 
102. Webb, p.5l: "hypostasis ... had come to imply the individual 
subsistence not of any nature but only of a rational nature, 
pe~Bona was from the first obviously inappropriate to any but 
a rational nature". 
103. cf. Fortman, pp.243-245. 
104. Welch, Trinity. 
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rank' status during the course of the Nineteenth Century. He discusses 
attempts at reconstruction of the doctrine that have taken place, at 
least during the first half of this century, together with the attempts 
to dispense with the doctrine altogether. He notes the tendency to 
monarchian and modalist approaches to the Trinity, and the tendency to 
"accept a concept of ' economic' Trinity, or Trinity of manifestation 
or experience, combined with a great hesitation regarding any notion 
of 'essential Trinity ' or 'Trinity of Being", . lOS 
Now one modern interpretation of the doctrine has been to say 
that the term 'Father' "stands for God in his beyondness", and the 
term ' Son ' "for God in his relatedness".106 This is a binitarian 
answer to the basic question . Richardson, for example, takes this 
distinction as the central issue concerning the doctrine of the Trinity . 
He concludes that the doctrine, as such, is non-necessary, even confus-
ingly superfluous. This is because he takes as absolute and unchallenged 
the distinction between the relations of God ad extra and the being of 
God . l07 Thus, ' Father ' , ' Son ' , and 'Spirit' are symbols that have 
relational import, yet cannot finally or fully describe the being of 
God . He states: 
I DS. 
106 . 
107 . 
108. 
op . 
Fatherhood hints at God ' s transcendence and power, as well 
as denoting his love and discipline . Yet the term Father 
cannot fully express God ' s absolute transcendence, primarily 
because it is a term of relationship . (108) 
cit . , p .S6. 
Richardson, p.23 . 
op. cit. , p.134 . 
op. cit . , p.143. 
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The term 'Son' ,for Richardson, denotes an incarnational 
relation: it is "not a term of dependence" but rather is "expressive 
of God i n his relations with the world".109 Richardson does not 
hold to an ontological trinitarianism, but then neither is he modal-
ist. Rather he holds that the terms 'Father' and 'Son' inadequately 
express an otherwise "essential distinction" within the Godhead 
110 
"between God as absolute and God as related". However, 'Spiri t' 
is taken to refer to"God's dynamic action". He states: "We think 
of God's creative energy as it manifests itself in various ways and 
as he himself is present in his world. The Spirit is ... God hims el f 
at work".lll Furthermore, 
Particularly as God makes himself known within us and 
imparts himself to us so that we respond to his call 
and affirm his revealing acts which confront us, we 
think of him as Spirit ... we are not amiss in thinking 
of God as responding in us to his revelation in Christ, 
when we speak of the Spirit. (112) 
The paradox is inescapable. The 'persons' of the Trinity are 
conceived in their relational fecundity: yet the "being" of God 
remains relationally sterile! Clearly there is recognition of the 
relationality of God by Richardson. The difficulty in accounting 
for this, with respect to the being of God, rests with the prior 
109. op. cit., p.144. 
110. ibid. 
111. Richardson, p.145; cf. Lampe, p.208. 
112. ibid. 
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distinction between God as absolute and God as related, Both are 
essential aspects , according to Richardson, but he awards ontological 
" h f 113 prlorlty to t e ormer, 
Similarly with Emil Brunner there is the tension between a 
recognition of relationality and the demands of aseity implicit in 
his doctrine of the Triune God, 
God as he is by and in himself , in his unfathomable 
mystery, is none other than he who has manifested 
himself in his revelation in Jesus Christ as the Lord 
and as the loving Father , The doctrine of the Trinity, 
the doctrine of the everlasting love of the Father for 
the Son and of the Son for the Father through the Holy 
Sp'rit, attacks the notion that God as he is 'by himself ' 
is another than God as he is ' for us ' in his reve1a 'on,(11 4) 
The doctrine of the Trinity is seen primar'ly ' n terms of the r 1at'ons 
understood to subsist with'n the Godhead, such relations being attest d 
to by the concomitant ad extra relationships, But these external 
relationships are not themselves integral to the being of God: they 
occur ' in parallel' as it were to the inner-trinitarian relations, 
which are the only relations that are ontologically constitutive of 
the being of God, God ' s relating to the world is real for the world, 
but not ' real ' for God: that's, of no contributive value for his 
being as such . Now this is the nub of the relational problematic in 
113. cf . Richardson, p.146 . 
114. E. Brunner, Truth as Encounter , London : SCM 1964, p.141 . 
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the doctrine of God . Surely all of God ' s relating must be in this 
sense ' real ' for God? 
Karl Rahner, noting the tendency to dogmatic isolation that 
befalls the doctrine of the TrinityllS seeks to determine whether 
there is, in fact, a "real ontological relation, something more than 
mere appropriation" that holds between humankind and the persons of 
th T · · 116 e rlnlty. He argues that the "economic" Trinity is the 
II' " T . . d' 117 lmmanent rlnlty, an Vlce versa. The reality of who God is in 
himself is none other than the reality of who he is in his relations 
with humanity and with the world . Rahner opposes, at least implicitly, 
the scholastic metaphysics that holds that God has no "real relations" 
. h h 118 Wlt t e world. 
The relationality of the Trinity, according to Rahner, issues 
in "three self-communications' ... of the one God in the three relative 
ways in which God Subsists" . Thus, 
God relates to us in a threefold manner, and this three-
fold, free, and gratuitous relation to us is not merely 
a copy or an analogy of the inner Trinity, but this 
Trinity itself, albeit as freely and gratuitously 
communicated . (119) 
Rahner endeavours to account for relationality, but he is nonetheless 
115. Rahner, Trinitl::, p . 14. 
116. op . cit. , p.lS. 
117 . cf. Rahner, pp . 22, 3lf . , 82ff. , 99ff . 
118 . op . cit. , p.24. 
119. op. cit. , p. 35. 
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tied to aseity as the foundational concept within the doctrine of 
God. 120 However, the stress on the self-communication of God does 
at least allow for the possible recognition of creation as in some 
way onto1ogica11y necessary for the being of God: To engage in 
relation with an other, e.g. by self-communication, requires the 
existence of an other (to whom the self communicates).121 
Mackey, on the other hand, thinks that the distinction between 
an immanent and an economic Trinity is a red-herring in the first 
122 place. In his opinion it is not the business of trinitarian 
theology to speculate on the self-differentiation of God: "Economic 
123 trinities .•. are the only ones we possess". It would appear that, 
for Mackey, the Trinity amounts to the relating of the One God in 
. h· f h d· d' f 124 var10US manners, t e exper1ence 0 t e one Go 1n 1verse orms. 
Notwithstanding Rahner's refreshing affirmation identifying the 
economic with the immanent Trinity, we are faced with the tradition 
that distinguishes between God-as-he-appears-to-us, and God-as-he-is-
in-himself. Those aspects or functions of God that denote relationship 
lie with the former, whilst the being of God itself - that is, the 
'reality' of the true God as such - is securely aloof and not directly 
involved in such relating. The heart of the problem lies in the 
apparent dichotomy between the being-of-God, and God-in-relation. 
120. op. cit., p.84. 
121. op. cit., pp.88ff. 
122. Mackey, p.235. 
123. op. cit., p.241. 
124. cf. Mackey, pp.242-244. See below, Chapter Seven, for further 
discussion on Mackey. 
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a 
Welch succinctly states that "unless there i s /subject-object 
relation within God, then the creation is the necessary object of 
h d " 1 d " 125 t e 1V1ne ove an act1v1ty. Traditionally the latter has been 
held to be unacceptable, therefore there is no option but to accept 
and assert the former. At best, the relation of God to the world is 
h 1 f h " fl" f G d t ' 1 l' l' 126 seen as t e resu tot e over ow 0 0 s 1nterna oV1ng re at1ons. 
Because God must exist a se~ then it follows that relation to anything 
else other than himself is of a secondary or derived order, not 
directly expressive of the reality of his being as such. Welch holds 
that the foundation of the doctrine is God's threefold revelation of 
himself and it is this that prompts the question of the nature of God 
h ' 'h' If 127 as e 1S 1n 1mse . He notes the doctrine of the Trinity is 
fraught with terminological difficulties128 although he finds Barth's 
129 language of "modes of being" the most helpful. The threefoldness 
of God's own life is thus the "ontological foundation" for his love 
to and for creation, whilst in himself his love and personality is 
quite independent of creation. 130 Welch wants to say that love-of-
the-other (viz. creation) is both the reality of God's being-as-love, 
yet also quite independent, indeed irrelevant, for the being of God. 13l 
In the end Welch is caught on the horns of the theological dilemma: 
God's relationality ad extra and the being of God as a se. 
125. Welch, p.56. 
126. cf. D. Braine, "Observations on the Trinity", Theol. LXXVIII/658, 
April 1975: 190. 
127. Welch, p.2l9. 
128. cf. Welch, pp.272ff. 
129. op. cit., p.276. 
130. op. cit., p.286. 
131. ibid. 
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The need to maintain the sense of personal being of the three 
persons of the Trinity is noted by L.B. Porter. By 'personal being' 
he means "a complexity of self-relatedness in the Godhead quite 
1 · k h' . h' h b' f h ." 132 un 1 e anyt 1ng W1t 1n team 1t 0 uman exper1ence Internal 
relatedness within the being of God is affirmed and aseity is 
preserved. But can 'personal being' be recogni zable as such without 
ad ex t ra relationship as an integral element? The trinitarian concept 
claims to express the personal character of God more adequately than 
h . 133 b . . 11 d t t f 1 monot e1sm per se, ut 1S 1t conceptua y a equa e 0 orec ose 
on relation-with-other and thus limit the notion of divine personality 
h h h f . . .. l' I? 134 as suc to t e sp ere 0 1nner-tr1n1tar1an re at10ns a one 
One interpretive analogy that has been applied has been the 
social analogy of which Leonard Hodgson has perhaps been the most 
t bl . 135 no a e expos1tor. For Hodgson, because the life of Christ was 
that of "self-giving in response to the Father's love, through the 
Spirit" then 
The doctrine of the Trinity is the projection into 
eternity of this essential relationship, the assertion 
that eternally the Divine Life is a life of mutual 
self-giving to one another of the Father and the Son 
through the Spirit who is ... the bond between them. (136) 
132. Porter, p.530. See also Footnote 82. 
133. cf. J .M. Lochman, "The Trinity and Human Life", Theol. LXXVIII/ 
658, April 1975:177. 
134. See Section III, Chapter Seven, below for discussion on 
personality and Trinity. 
135. L. Hodgson, Trinity. See especially pp.29ff. and 133ff. 
136. op. cit., p.68. 
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I , 'G d" 1 I' f 137 Persona Ity In 0 ImplIes a p ura Ity 0 persons. The truly 
personal life consists of inter-personal relations, yet "the created 
universe is not necessary to the being of God", therefore this can 
only mean that 
The doctrine of the Trinity implies that in the eternal 
being of God, quite apart from creation, there exists 
all the elements necessary for a fully personal life. (138) 
Although creation, and therefore relationship with it, is not seen 
to be of central interest for the being and life of God, yet Hodgson 
wants to affirm the reality of "God's love and care for man".139 
However, his insistence on conceiving the being of God as independent 
of ad extpa relationships, whilst at the same time seeking to affirm 
the reality of relationship between God and creation, results in a 
theological conundrum. 
The Thomist response would be to simply deny the reality for 
God of relationship between God and the world: there is no real 
relationship of God to creation. Rather, when it comes to real 
relationships, they are "as far as God is concerned, ... all within 
the divine nature".140 Nonetheless, for St Thomas, the operations 
of God upon the world are real enough, and are, indeed, indivisible 
so far as Trinitarian dogma is concerned. Is this an answer to 
Hodgson? I think not, for it begs the question of the nature of 
137. op.cit., p.190 
138. ibid. 
139. ibid. 
140. Mackey, p.182. 
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divine operation: is the operation of God with respect to creation 
a non-relational event? Is the activity of loving and caring non-
relational? How can love within the Trinity be relational, whereas 
love toward creation be simply operational? Lovingness toward 
creation may indeed be indivisible, but it would seem odd to call it 
non-relational, i.e. of no relational consequence for the One who 
purportedly loves and cares for creation. 
Of 1 . . h h' 1" . 141 course, ana ogles are not WIt out t elr ImItatIons. 
Migliore, noting that the social analogy complements the psychological 
analogy states: 
In distinction from the psychological analogy which 
focuses on the dynamic unity of psychic activities, the 
social analogy looks to the phenomenon of persons in 
relationship for a clue to the mystery of the divine life. 
(142) 
Migliore sees in the relationality of the Trinity "the foundation of 
1 1 · f . . II 143 persona I e In communIty. But this can only be the case, I 
would argue, if such trinitarian relations really do extend beyond 
the Godhead, ontological1y, rather than simply analogously. Thus 
would it be possible to affirm with Crawford a "processive" view of 
141. cf. B. Hebblethwai te, "Perichoresis - Reflections on the Doctrine 
of the Trinity", Theol. LXXX/676, 1977:255-261. 
142. D.L. Migliore, "The Trinity and Human Liberty", Th. Today XXXVI, 
January 1980:494. 
143. ibid. 
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the Trinity whereby "God grows in experience through Hi s relation to 
the world".144 This does not contradict God's 'sameness ' as attested 
to in the biblical record, for if ad extra relationality i s legitimately 
inherent in the being of God, then God most certainly r emains himse l f 
in the exercise of such r elationality. 
R.C. Neville, noting that God is the creator of all that has 
determinate identity, asks what this might entail for the character, 
or being, of God. 145 Whilst he notes that creation presupposes "the 
146 independent reality of the Creator yet he would argue that "the 
connection between God and the world is internal to God ... The persons 
of the Trinity are taken to be eternal, relative, and connected with 
creation. 147 J.M. Lochman also affirms the relationality of God and 
sees the trinitarian concept as expressive of that: 
In its trinitarian concept of God Christian faith is 
referring to the 'relational God! God in relation. God 
is no 'relationless' God. 'God relates' - and indeed 
not only to the world outside, but also within himself ... 
His personal activity is not merely an 'accident' but His 
revealed 'essence'. He cannot be conceived in impersonal 
re1ationless terms. (148) 
144. R.G. Crawford, "Is the Doctrine of the Trinity Scriptural?", 
Scot. J. Th. 20, September 1967:292f. 
145. R.C. Neville, "Creation and the Trinity", Th. St. 30, March 
1969:5. 
146. ibid. 
147. op. cit., p.18. 
148. Lochman, p.178. 
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Lochman suggests that God is characterised not so much by aseity as 
. ,,149 Th 
"prose 1 ty . us, 
The trinitarian understanding of God expresses the 
constitutive com-passion of the biblical God ... the One 
who goes with and suffers with his people ... If a concept 
of God is not capable of expressing this constitutive 
compassion of God, it is disqualified as a Christian 
concept of God. (150) 
Of course the trinitarian doctrine has embraced an understanding 
of God in terms of "a community of being that reaches out beyond the 
inner life of God to include creatures,,15l and it has affirmed that 
God as he is by and in himself, in his unfathomable 
mystery, is none other than he who has manifested 
himself in his revelation in Jesus Christ as the Lord 
and as the loving Father. (152) 
Indeed, Brunner speaks of the doctrine of the Trinity as bridging the 
gulf between our experience of God and the assumption of aseity. It 
"attacks the notion that God as he is 'by himself' is another than 
d h ·, f ,. h' 1'" 153 Go as e IS or us In IS reve atlon . The ontological re1e-
vance of God's ad extra relating is at least implicitly recognized. 
But the fundamental dichotomy is not resolved: the issue of the 
relational problematic remains. 
149. op . cit., p.l 79. 
150. op. cit., p.l8l. 
151. Parker, p.l77. 
152. Brunner, p.141. 
153. ibid. cf. Rahner's identification of Economic Trinity with 
Immanent Trinity. 
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A.B. Come notes that Karl Barth, for whom the priority of God's 
aseity is so important, regards the Trinity as 
the way in which the concrete, historical, and existential 
relationship that God establishes with man is rooted and 
grounded in the eternal self-being of God in himself ... 
The Trinity is God himself precisely in the relationship 
he establishes with us. 154 
Now Barth explains this grounding in terms of the anaZogia peZationis. 
However, inasmuch as he affirms that God is who he is in the relation-
ships he establishes ad extpa~ then it is my contention that we can 
go beyond the analogy, as it were, and take 'relation ' as a significant 
ontological motif of the being of God. lSS The Trinity is uncomfortably 
juxtaposed with aseity . Rather than God's relations to the world 
being secondary to, and based upon, the inner-trinitarian relations, 
it may well be that, as appears suggested by many of the thinkers 
noted above, the fact of God's relation to and with the world could 
become the primary data in conceiving the reality of the being of God. 
The concepts of aseity and Trinity have formed the groundwork and 
provided the parameters in which theology has traditionally endeavoured 
154. Come, p.78. 
155. There has been much work on the Trinity recently that is suggestive 
to a greater or lesser extent of the approach I am seeking to 
explicate. See, e . g. J . Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of 
God", Theol. LXXVIII/666, December 1975:632-646; The Trinity and 
the Kingdom of God; E. Jungel, God's Being is in Becoming; J.L. 
Segundo, Our Idea of God . 
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to work out the ontology of the Godhead. There has been a sharp 
divide between the threefold relationality of God's self-revelation 
(economic Trinity) and the understanding of the threefold being of 
God (immanent Trinity). That the ontological and the ad extra 
relational aspects of the trinitarian motif have been so conceptually 
distinct is largely due to the priority given to aseity in the doctrine 
of God. To formulate an understanding of the being of God based on 
the trinitarian relations to the world has been rejected, traditionally, 
on the grounds that this would make God dependent upon the world as 
such for his own being. Yet there has been little hesitation in 
speculating on the ontological construction of the 'inner' life of 
God based on the three modes of his being encountered in revelation 
and experience. The effect of aseity coupled with the concept of 
Trinity has been to reinforce the assumption that external relationship 
so far as God himself is concerned is ontologically unnecessary. 156 
IV. TOWARD A RESOLUTION: "RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY" 
It is my contention that to understand God as "He-Who-Is" is 
to understand God as "He-Who-is-in-relation". This motif does not 
refer simply to 'relation-to-himself', as in the doctrine of inner-
trinitarian relations. Rather it is meant in the sense that the 
relations in which God is engaged with the world and with humankind 
are not merely accidental or gratuitous but do, in fact, manifest the 
reality of the being of God. The point is, we can only speak of 
relations that we directly observe or of which we form one term. 
156. cf. Masca11, He Who Is, p.l86. 
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157 Therefore to talk of God being "relational through and through" 
must address the relations in which we participate or which we 
directly perceive. Our relating to God, and He to us, and our knowing 
of God in and through his relation to the world, allows us to conceive 
God as relational. Therefore, I contend that this ad extra re1ation-
I , , 'd d k d d' h G d' 158 a lty lS, ln ee , a ey to un erstan lng WOOlS. 
In order to expound this relational approach it is necessary to 
bring to the task a particular hermeneutic. This is required, on 
the one hand,to review critically the work of John Macquarrie and 
Charles Hartshorne on the doctrine of God, and, on the other, to 
delineate, by way of an outcome of that review, a resolution to the 
relational problematic. The interpretive fulcrum for my thesis on 
the re1ationa1ity of God is what I would call an"onto1ogica1-
relational" hermeneutic, which I derive primarily from the work of 
Martin Heidegger. This relational hermeneutic understands being . 
such that 'to be' means 'to be related' or 'to be in relation'. 
This're1ationa1ity' is that of a two-way relatedness, a necessary 
mutuality and reciprocity, as opposed to a wholly internal (Trinitarian) 
re1ationality or the relationality of one-way action. It is the 
relationality of ontological relatedness whereby that to which it 
applies must, by virtue of its being, engage in external relationships. 
157. O. Cairns, God Up There?, Edinburgh: St Andrew 1967. 
158. cf. R.C. Roberts, Rudolph Bultrnann's Theology, London: SPCK 1977, 
p.247, re comment that for Bu1tmann "God has his reality in 
relation to men". See also Taylor, J.A.A.R. XLVI, p.46, where 
he argues that "God and the world cannot exist apart from one 
another". 
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Now, although Heide gger is often referred to as being an exist-
entialist, he is, in fact, primarily a philosopher of being. He asks 
the question of the meaning of Being. 159 The question of being as 
. d b A' 1 160 1 d h . f h d" 1 1 ralse y rlstot e e to t e rlse 0 tetra ltlona onto ogy 
of substance metaphysics. In order to circumvent the pitfalls and 
criticisms of the "substantive rendering of being" of the traditional 
approach, Heidegger posed the 'Seinsfrage' by "asking about the Being 
of the question, that is to say, about the way the question presented 
itself and showed itself to be" .161 Hence the focus on human being 
as that which raises the question of being. 
Heidegger sought to clarify the concept of Being. It is not 
itself some entity - it is not 'a' being. 'Being ' is not some thing 
which may be described and defined. Yet it may be understood, and 
the understanding to which Heidegger points is implicitly relationa1. l62 
As Michael Gelven comments, the 'to be' is not an object but a 
"process". 163 By unfolding the structure of human being, or Dasein, 
164 Heidegger seeks to understand the 'to be' of the process. Being 
is revealed in and as it is, viz, not nself a thing, but the very 
'to-be-ness' by which any entity is. Heidegger uses the term 'Dasein' 
in a technical sense whereby the constituent elements 'Da' (there) and 
159. See D.F. Krell (ed), Martin Heidegger Basic Writings, London: 
RKP 1978, p.6, [italics mine]. See also J. Macquarrie, An 
Existentialist Theology, Pelican 1973, p.29; L.M. de Kuyer, 
"Martin Heidegger 1889-1976", Colloquium 9, October 1976:5-8. 
160. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 3, 1028b, quoted in Krell. 
161. Krell, p.19; cf. Heidegger, Being and Time trans. J. Macquarrie 
and E. Robinson, London: SCM 1962, p.2l. 
162. See Heidegger Being and Time, pp.22f.; also T.J. Wilson, "The 
Text-model: A Key to Heidegger's Thought", LT.Q. 47, 1980:292. 
163. M. Ge1ven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, New York: 
Harper and Row 1970, p.24. 
164. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.22; cf. L. van de Water, "Being 
and Being Human", I.P.Q. XIII, September 1973:392-402. 
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'Sein' (Being) are highlighted. Dasein is seen as the "tentre of 
man", though not "identified in an unqualified fashion with man as 
h" 165 suc . 
Dasein is inconceivable without a world: the formal constitution 
of Dasein is "being_in_the_world".166 But not only is Dasein's 
primordial way that of "to-be-in-the-world", it has also, and as a 
corollary to that way, the aspect of "being-with-others". The being 
of Dasein is that of "to-be-in" and "to-be-with". Thus the 'being-
there' of human being is not passive location but rather re l ational 
'in' and 'with,.167 Together the relations 'being-in ' and'being-
. h' 1 . 11 . t' f D . 168 I d d h W1t are onto og1ca y const1 ut1ve 0 ase1n. n ee tea 
priori possibility of interrelationship between human beings is the 
ontological grounding of 'being_with,.169 
The term 'being' is thus incomplete if it stands alone: it is 
the relational prepositions that supply the content. The meaning 
of 'Being ' is to be found primarily in the 'being-relations': ontology 
is properly "relational ontology". That this finding is central to 
Heidegger's uncovering of Being may be seen further in the notion he 
165. W. Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1962, p.154. 
166. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.78. 
167. J.M. Demske, Being, Man and Death, Kentucky 1970, p.19. 
168. M. King, Heidegger's Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1964, 
p.l06. See also J. Wahl, Philosophies of Existence, London: 
RKP 1969, p.22. 
169. Gelven, p.68. 
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expotmds of the Being of Dasein categorised as "Care".170 Heide gger 
formally constitutes "Care" by the threefold structure of possibility, 
facticity and fa11eness. Possibility is the analysis of Dasein as 
ahead-of-itself; facticity is Dasein as a1ready-in-the-world; and 
f . f .. . ld 171 alleness - or 'be1ng allen' - 1S Dase1n as close to 1ts wor . 
Care, as the formal "existential totality of Dasein's ontological 
structural whole" is defined by Heidegger in terms of the Being of 
Dasein as "ahead-of-i tself-Being-a1ready-in- (the -world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-world),!l72 So Care, then, 
is the mode of existence that best describes Dasein as Dasein. The 
relationality of Care summarises the relationality of the Being of 
Dasein, and thus of Being as such so the question of Being is 
resolved in the answer of relational ontology. 
The Heideggerian analysis of Being and Time lays bare the relat-
ionality of "Being". Human being, as Dasein, is the 'understander' 
of Being, and the understanding of Being is discerned in the under-
standing of the relations in which Dasein stands in its own Being. 173 
"Being" is understood in terms of constitutive onto10gical-relationality: 
b · bId 174 to e 1S to- e-re ate . 
170. See Ge1ven, pp.1l1f.; Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.225ff.; 
also W. Biemal, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, London: 
RKP 1977, p.34; V. Vycinas; 'Earth and Gods, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff 1961, pp.32f. 
171. J. Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, London: Lutterworth 1968, p.27. 
172. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.237. 
173. Vycinas, pp.23f.; cf. H-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
California 1976, p.215f. 
174. cf. M.C. Taylor, "Toward an Ontology of Relativism", J.A.A.R. 
XLVI, p.31. In this tightly reasoned article Taylor stresses 
the veracity of what I would call the ",ontological-relational 
hermeneutic". 
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With regard to the question of God and the relational problematic, 
the hermeneutic that is suggested by this discussion of Heidegger's 
ontology applies not only to the understanding of the relationality 
of Being, but also, and mutatis mutandis~ to the interpretation of 
the Being of God. It is therefore a primary tool in fashioning and 
undergirding the particular relational approach to the doctrine of 
God which I am seeking to propound. As I define it the "ontological-
relational hermeneutic" states that the concept of "Being" is not the 
concept of any thing or entity, but rather the concept of the related-
ness by which any thing or entity is what it is. It is therefore an 
a priori tool of analysis. Such a notion of relationality provides 
a means of critically approaching the work of Macquarrie and Hartshorne. 
It also presents a possibility for a fresh viewpoint vis a vis the 
metaphysics which undergirds, and gives conceptual form to, theological 
discourse on God. A metaphysic which has as its key conceptual refer-
ence the notion of "relation" may serve the work of the theologian 
far more appropriately than a metaphysic that has, for instance, the 
notion of "substance" as its centrepoint. 
V. RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY 
The resolution to the relational problematic will be derived 
primarily from the work of Macquarrie and Hartshorne. However, this 
approach is also suggested by the work of others. In particular the 
philosophical writings of Martin Buber175 and John Macmurrayl76 have 
175. See especially I and Thou, trans. R. Gregor Smith, Edinburgh: 
T and T Clark 1966; Between Man and Man, trans. R. Gregor Smith, 
London: Kegan Paul 1947. 
176. See especially Persons in Relation, London: Faber and Faber 1967; 
The Self as Agent, London: Faber and Faber 1968. 
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focussed on the centrality of 'relation' as a motif for comprehending 
the nature of reality, if not God. Buber "seeks to communicate the 
177 
reality of relationship as the basis for a new kind of knowledge". 
It is in the 'between ', the relational encounter of the 'I' and the 
178 
'Thou', that the heart of reality may be found. Buber speaks of 
relation with God as essential for true authentic humanity. God 
himself cannot be found in the abstract, but only in "the concrete 
relations of everyday life".179 For Buber the sense of God as being 
"wholly other" remains as a given. 180 He does not embark upon an 
analysis of relationality in order to re-examine the concept of God 
as such. Rather he affirms that the reality of who God is can be 
known only in relational encounter. Hartshorne calls Buber's discus-
sion of the relations between creation and creator "among the most 
inspired ever written".18l It is the centrality of the dialogical 
principle as the prime hermeneutic that is important for Buber. That 
this may have import for the concept of God as such is not directly 
pursued by him. Nonetheless, his work remains suggestive of the 
possibility of a relational approach to the being of God. 
177. D.A. Jones, "The Third Unrealized Wonder: The Reality of Relation 
in D.H. Lawrence and Martin Buber", ReI, Life XLIV, Summer 1975: 
178-187. 
178. op. cit., p.184. 
179. J.W. Walters, "Martin Buber's Philosophy of Relationality and 
Mysticism", Encount. 39, Spring 1978: 189-201. 
180. L.J. Thomas, "Martin Buber's Doctrine of God", Encount. 35, 
Summer 1974:184-203. 
181. in P.A. Schlipp (ed), The Philosophy of Martin Buber, Open 
Court 1967, p.693, quoted in Thomas op.cit. 
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Likewise John Macmurray holds that interrelationship is constit-
. f l' . 11 . h 1 l' 182 ut1ve a rea 1ty, espec1a y W1t respect to persona rea 1ty. 
For Macmurray it is the category of the personal which is primary: 
relatedness as such is subsumed under it. Thus the "acting Self" 
comes to the fore in the discussion of the nature of reality.183 
Macmurray's alternative to the Cartesian cogito is "I act, therefore 
I ,,184 am . Being is to be found in doing . His thesis is that 
the Self exists only in dynamic relation with the Other ... 
the Self is constituted by its relation to the Other; that 
it has its being in its relationship; and that this relat-
ionship is necessarily personal. (185) 
Macmurray's analysis of the relational context and content of 
human existence is very thorough. Like Buber he has not set out to 
do this as a means of rethinking the concept of God, but his analysis 
of the relationality of the Self most certainly is suggestive of an 
analogous relationality in the selfhood of God. 
The recent work of the theologian Geoffrey Wainwright provides 
more directly suggestive support for an ontological-relational 
approach to the doctrine of God. 186 He speaks of worship as the 
"proper relationship between creature and Creator".187 He explores 
182. cf. D.O. O'Connor, "John Macmurray: Primacy of the Personal", 
I.P.Q. IV, September 1964:464-484. 
183. cf. L.J. White, "John Macmurray: Theology as Philosophy", 
Scot. J. Th. 26, 1973:71-84. 
184. R.J. Blaikie, "Being, Process, and Action in Modern Philosophy 
and Theology", Scot. J. Th. 25, 1972:149. 
185. Macmurray, Persons, p.17 
186. G. Wainwright, Doxology, London: Epworth 1980. 
187. op. cit., p.16. 
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the relationality of worship in order to explicate the nature of 
188 the relationship that holds between God and man. In grounding 
his approach to theological issues in the liturgical context he 
continually touches on relationality as a fundamental doctrinal 
motif. He welcomes moves to understand God in an overtly relational 
manner. He states: 
It seems to me the appropriate speculative counterpart 
to the liturgical datum of a worship whose proper address 
is to 'Abba'. This address expresses the proximity 
between God and humanity in terms of a personal 
relationship. (189) 
He concludes his work with the comment that 
A reciprocal relationship between God and humanity is 
both the condition and the content of Christian worship. 
Once God, by an irreducible act of will and for the 
irreducible motive of love, brings a responsive creature 
into being, he is seeking to draw such a creature into 
a communion with himself which will be both the creature's 
salvation and the realization of his own purpose. (190) 
What is required now is to recast our thinking about God such as to 
reflect the veracity of this statement. 
188. op. cit., p.37. 
189. op. cit., p.35l. 
190. op. cit., p.462. 
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One way or another a relational approach is suggested by both 
theological and philosophical writers ,1 9l although this approach is 
. h· d .. 192 not W1t out 1tS opponents an cr1t1CS. However, the question of 
the degree and nature of God's relation to the sphere of created 
human existence is undoubtedly central to the contemporary task of 
193 
rethinking the concept of God. Hendry notes that co-existence is 
the distinguishing mark of creaturehood, and this co-existence is not 
to be limited to the created realm but also embraces a co-relationship 
with God. 194 He notes that "the existence of the creature is incom-
195 
mensurate with the being of the Creator". But this is to confuse 
existential with ontological terminology. I would suggest that 
whereas a comparison of the existence of the creature with that of 
the Creator will reveal an incommensurate difference, an ontological 
comparison, i.e. the 'being' of human being with the 'being ' of God, 
will produce a more commensurate result. Creation in God's image 
does not mean created to exist as a god; it may mean created in the 
"image", or pattern,of the ontological structure of the divine. 
191. See above , plus also, e.g. S.A.R. Zaidi, "Toward a Relational 
Metaphysics"; 'R: 'Met. XXVI, March 1973 :412-437; K. Wojtyla, 
"The Person: Subject and Community", R. Met. XXXIII, December 
1979:273-308; Bland Blanshard, "Internal Relations and Their 
Importance to Philosophy", R. Met. XXI, December 1967:227-236. 
192. cf. H.B. Kuhn, "Relationalism: Principle or Slogan", Chr. T., 
February 28, 1975:49f.; D. McKenzie, "Pannenberg on God and 
Freedom", J. Re 1. 60, J1., 1980: 32 3f. 
193. cf. F. Sontag, "Is God Really in History?", ReI. St. IS, 
September 1979:303-316. 
194. G.S. Hendry, "On Being a Creature", Th. Today 38, April 1981: 
60-72 . 
195. op. cit., p.68. 
ss 
T.E. Pollard addresses the tension between identity qua auton-
omous individual and identity qua being-in-relationship.196 He 
elucidates the threefold relational structure of the Covenant as 
relationship with God, with Community, and with fellow-humanity. He 
notes that "relationality" is both a basic contribution of Jewish 
anthropology197 and is central to Pauline thought. 19B The picture 
of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, he notes, has a central feature of 
the idea of relationality, not as an abstract 
'theologoumenon', but as the portrayal of the concrete 
relationships in which Jesus makes known the reality of 
his humanness and offers to men and women the gracious 
possibility of themselves coming to fullness of humanness 
in their relationship to him. (199) 
Pollard suggests that fullness of humanity is re1ationa1ity, and 
h l 'k' h h . f . f d' h 200 t at 1 eW1se t e uman1ty 0 Christ 1S to be oun In t ese terms. 
Such an approach to Christo1ogy cannot but suggest a concomitant 
approach to the doctrine of God as such. 
Paul Tillich wQu1d perhaps stand out as the most notable exponent 
196. T.E. Pollard, Fullness of Humanity: Christ's Humanness and Ours, 
Sheffield: Almond 1982. See especially pp.25ff. 
197. op. cit., pp.39 and 57ff. 
198. cf. Pollard, p.70. 
199. op. cit., p.57. 
200. e . g. Pollard notes that for Sobrino "the key to understanding 
the person of Jesus is to be found in this relationa1ity attested 
to by the New Testament". Pollard, "Exit the Alexandrian Christ", 
Colloquium 13, October 1980:16-23. 
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of onto-theology. For the purposes of this thesis I have chosen 
to examine the ontological perspective of John Macquarrie, who has 
been no less intentional in fashioning a concept of God by using 
the language of Being. 
My reasons for this choice are simple. Macquarrie bases his 
work on Heidegger, which makes him all the more amenable to the 
relational hermeneutic likewise derived from Heidegger's work. Also, 
I have been hard pressed to find any substantial work on Macquarrie's 
concept of God: at least to that extent my own focus on him should 
be comparatively novel. Tillich, on the other hand, although 
influenced to some extent by Heidegger, is eclectic in his approach 
and also in his formative influences. 20l Researchers have beaten a 
well worn path to his door, and the results in terms of material 
201. "Tillich himself stands in a tradition of German mystical and 
Romantic philosophy, into which has come an admixture of some 
of the scholastic language of Being and Essence via Heidegger, 
and of depth psychology via above all Erich Fromm. The 
inspiration of his way of thinking is not Hegel but Schelling". 
D. Emmet, "The Ground of Being", J. Th. St. XV, October 1964: 
280-292. See also J.W. Rathbun and F. Burwick, "Paul Tillich 
and the Philosophy of Schelling", I. P. Q. IV, September 1964: 
373-393; T. O'Keeffe, "Tillich, Ontology and God", I.T.Q. 49, 
1982:26ff. 
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available to the potential student of him would be something of a 
theological minefield. 202 
Taking cognizance of the ontological perspective is but one half 
of the overall approach that I am suggesting will lead to a specifically 
'relational theology'. "Being" may be conceived in static terms, or 
it may well be conceived in terms of, or at least in affinity with, 
"Becoming".203 There is a tension between the concepts 'being' and 
202. Dewart suggests Tillich's doctrine of God is ambivalent and that 
his ontological concept of reality amounted to a "philosophical 
prejudice", The Future of Belief, London: Burns and Oates 1967, 
p. 40. McCullough claims that "Tillich' s ontology eventuates in 
the dissolution of biblical personalism", Scot. J. Th. 15, 
September 1962:267. The addressing of the question of Being 
does, for Tillich, raise the question of God, but does not answer 
it - cf. O'Keeffe, p.20. Tillich's approach to the question of 
Being arises from the existential context of the "shock ~l ; of 
non-being: O'Keeffe, p.20. See also A.M. Macleod, Paul Tillich, 
London: Geo. Allen and Unwin 1973, p.l03. And O'Keeffe notes 
an essential difference between Tillich and the Heidegger of 
Being and Time: Tillich's "being itselfll is "a metaphysical 
principle in a way in which Heidegger's Sein clearly is not: 
O'Keeffe, p.32. Doubtless it would be possible to examine 
Tillich's doctrine of God with a view to drawing out its rel-
ational import. Indeed, if it is correct that ontological-
relationality is a significant and necessary theological motif, 
then it could be reasonably expected to have applicability to 
Tillich. Certainly Tillich's focus on the polar elements of 
individuality and participation is suggestive of amenability 
to the relational hermeneutic: cf. McCullough, p.275. See 
also J.W. Nelson, "An Inquiry Into the Methodological Structure 
of Paul Tillich's 'Systematic Theology'''; 'Ertcount. 35, Summer 
1974 :171-183. 
203. See, e.g. J. Etzwiler, "Being as Activity in Aristotle: A Process 
Interpretation", I.P.Q. XVIII, September 1978:311-334; J.W. 
Felt, "Philosophic Understanding and the Continuity of Becoming", 
I.P.Q. XVIII, December 1978:375-394; P.T. Raju, "Being: How Known 
and How Expressed?", I.P.Q. XV, June 1975:161-180; R. Bolton, 
"Plato's Distinction Between Being and Becoming"; 'R. Met. XXIX, 
September 1975:66-95. ' 
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'becoming' . Is one prior to the other? Does one include or exclude 
the other? These two concepts, and this tension between them, are 
playing an ever increasing important part in reformulating the doctrine 
of God . Langdon Gilkey, for example, argues that "Being is temporality, 
process" and holds that being is discovered in emerging becoming. 204 
Process theology understands God to be "the principle of limitation, 
. . d h d h' h f b ." 205 g1v1ng or er to t e cosmos an s ap1ng t e process 0 ecom1ng . 
For process theologians "God cannot be conceived of as existing 
concretely other than with respect to some actual contingent world",206 
and with respect to the relationship God has to the cosmos "he is 
1 . . d h . d d . t,,207 supreme y respons1ve to 1t an to t at extent 1S epen ent on 1 . 
Clearly the process perspective is relational to the extent that it 
endeavours to take serious cognizance of the relationality t hat holds 
between God and his creation . But this approach is not without 
criticism . Shaw notes that process theology has the effect of: 
blurring the distinction between Creator and creature, 
t hat is t o say as so stressing t he intimacy of the relation-
ship between God and his creatures and the creative role 
of agents other than God that the idea of the transcendence 
of God (but not his superiority) is in danger of being 
diss olved into the process of creation itself. (208) 
204. L. Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind, New York: Seabury 1976, 
p . 30lf . cf. Message and Existence, New York: Seabury 1979, 
p .94f . 
205. D.W . D. Shaw , "Process Thought and Creation", Theol . LXXVIII / 661, 
Jl, 1975: 346 . 
206 . op . cit . , p . 350 . 
207. op . cit. , p . 352. 
208. op. cit . , p . 354 . 
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Although the process perspective contests the notion of aseity 
by virtue of the concept of dipolarity, Wells asks "How is God 
simultaneously relative and absolute, finite and infinite, necessary 
d . ?" 209 an contlngent .. And Kelly raises the question of process 
theology that: 
In seeking to establish God in a real relationship to 
the universe, does it not neglect a reality of relationship 
that is a natural part of Christian thought, and as the 
price of this neglect, finish in subjecting God to the 
world? (210) 
Basically this perspective takes the classical doctrine of God and 
adds to it those aspects of relativity and relatedness that orthodoxy 
denies as appropriately applicable to God. Put otherwise it: 
incorporates both God's active involvement in the world 
of human experience and all the metaphysical attributes -
immutability, impassivity, eternity - of classical 
theism. (211) 
David Tracy endorses this approach. He states: 
209. D.F. Wells, "George Tyrell: Precursor of Process Theology", 
Scot. J. Th. 26, 1973:82. 
210. A.F. Kelly, "Trinity and Process", Th. St. 31, September 1970: 
413. 
211. Anne Carr, p.323. Carr also notes recent Christologica1 dis-
cussions which have been suggestive of "the centrality of God's 
involvement in human experience and, on that basis, reformulat-
ions of the concept of God". She notes in this regard the 
names of Kung, Mo1tmann, Schi1lebeeck~, and Segundo. p.326. 
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The central categories of (modern) metaphysics - process, 
becoming, relation, sociality, and temporality - are 
articulated in direct dependence upon the metaphysical 
analysis of the experiencing self as the paradigm case 
of all reality ... even God is to be understood not as an 
exception to these categories but rather as the chief, 
indeed, the constitutive exemplification of the categories 
themsel ves. (212) 
To adumbrate a "relational" approach to the doctrine of God 
cannot but take account of the process perspective and the criticisms 
made of it. Charles Hartshorne, as the foremost proponent of neo-
classical theism, is the most suitable representative of the process 
approach to the doctrine of God with which to work for the purposes 
of this thesis. Whitehead's genius was in laying a new metaphysical 
base; Hartshorne has built upon that and developed his own theological 
h d d" 1 213 met 0 accor Ing y. By examining Hartshorne's doctrine of God 
212. Blessed Rage for Order, New York: Seabury 1975, p.174. Note 
Tracy's summary of the process position, p.176. cf. A.N. 
Whitehead, the father of the process approach, asserts that 
"God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical 
principles invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief 
exemplification", Process and Reality, Cambridge: CUP 1929:521. 
213. To be sure, Whitehead's work poses a challenge to classical 
theism. See W.J. Stokes, "Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic 
Realism", N. Schol. XXXVIII, Januaryl~64:l:-2l. See also M.S. 
Gram, "Two Concepts of Substance", N. Schol. Ll, Winter 1977:75 
for a rebuttal of Whitehead's attack on the notion of substance; 
D. L. Schindler, "Whitehead's Challenge to Thomism on God and 
Creation: The Metaphysical Issues", I.P.Q. XIX, September 1979: 
285-300 for a more general discussion from the Thomist position, 
and also in Mascall, Qpenness, pp.17lff., and "He Who Is, pp.187f. 
For Whitehead, reality "is process, a flux of events rather than 
the endurance of substances which undergo changes". Gilkey, 
Reaping, p .1l0. 
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I would hope to show how this perspective contributes to the relational 
approach I seek to expound. Thus in working toward a resolution of 
the relational problematic it is necessary to take account of both 
the ontological perspective and the process perspective. Macquarrie 
will 'represent' the former; Hartshorne the latter. 
Now, to speak of God as "relational" is not thereby to identify 
the being of God with any relationship or set of relationships per se. 
God is not reducible to the relations in which he is engaged, and by 
214 
which he is conceived, experienced or known. Nonetheless, a 
"relational" approach to the concept of God seeks to affirm that ad 
extra relationships are ontologica11y necessary to the being of God. 
To talk of relations is to talk of two things - the 'relators' and 
that which takes place between them, viz, the particular relationship. 
Inasmuch as we recognize God as a 'relator', that is as one who does 
in fact engage in relationships with other relators, e.g. humankind, 
then we must acknowledge that as a genuine relator God does have 
identity as 'other-than' humankind. Real relationships require real 
relators who have distinct identity from one another. But, equally, 
such relators have their identity '~ relators only by virtue of 
engaging in relationships which realize their being as relational. 
Whilst this is distinctiveness of identity, t here is also a commonness 
214. cf. H. Go1lwitzer, The Existence of God, London: SCM 1965, p.50. 
Gollwitzer argues that the being of God "does not become ident-
ical to the relation between him and man ... ". He is critical 
of approaches to understanding God which rest simply in terms 
of human existence, i.e. which talk of one pOle, or term, of 
a relation simply in terms of the other. However, this is not 
the approach I wish to take in terms of my own particular 
exposition of a Relational Theology. 
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of ontological structure, viz, the relationality whereby relationship 
as such is a possibility. 
The premise on which my thesis is based is that there is 'real 
relationship' between God and his creatures, and that therefore both 
God and the creature are co-equally 'real relators'. To explore the 
ontological import of this for the concept of God means it is neces-
sary to elucidate the Otherness of God. The identity of God as 
"Other" must be taken into account in any relational viewpoint. 
Along with 'otherness', account must be taken of the motif of 'presence'. 
Insofar as God does indeed relate to the world then he is present to 
and with it. Insofar as, in and through history, God is understood 
to be "bound-up" in relation to humankind, then he is present to and 
with humanity. An understanding of the relational import of the 
presence of God will therefore contribute to an understanding of 
the relationality of God. 
With respect to God's activity, tradition acknowledges that God, 
as "Creator" and "Sustainer", continues to act within the world. God's 
activity is not haphazard, nor would we assume that it is without 
direction and purpose. The 'activity' of God bespeaks God's taking 
the initiative. There is a relational import to this activity which 
also contributes to the understanding of the being of God. Furthermore, 
the aspect of 'responsiveness', which may be understood as a counter-
balance to 'activity' - much as 'presence' counterbalances 'otherness'-
is that aspect of the doctrine of God which most obviously suggests 
the possibility of a relational conceptuality. Responsiveness is 
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"responsiveness-to". It presupposes a relation, or at least the 
possibility of relation, in and through which one relator responds 
to another. It is the vehicle of sensitivity. Insofar as the capacity 
to respond presupposes the ability to engage in relationships by which 
responding may take place, then understanding the nature of God's 
responsiveness will help in understanding the relationality of God. 
These four aspects - 'otherness', 'presence', 'activity' and 
'responsiveness' - will give a particular orientation to the analysis 
of the thought of John Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne. In examin-
ing the doctrine of God in the work of these two theologians I shall 
endeavour to determine how the "ontological" and the "process" 
perspectives give ground for formulating a "relational" approach to 
the being of God which is other than the relationality implicit in 
either of them, yet which is suggested by both of them together. On 
the one hand the key term with respect to the "ontological" perspective 
is "Being", interpreted not as static substance but as the dynamic 
ground of existence: a "ground" that "lets-be" - to juxtapose the 
thought of Ti1lich and Macquarrie. On the other hand, for the "process" 
perspective, the key term is "Becoming", which is the chief category 
in the interpretation of the nature of both the world and God. Here 
there is an even greater explicitness in conceiving God in relational 
terms than in the ontological perspective. I intend to show that, 
together, "Being" and "Becoming" will yield a particular relational 
understanding of God along the lines I have indicated and this will 
resolve the relational problematic. 
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My task will be to make this explicit and to discuss implications 
with respect to the understanding of God as a se and as Triune. The 
relational approach to the doctrine of God that I seek to explicate 
affirms that the relationship between God and the world is necessary. 
By this is meant that relation-to-world as such is necessary, not that 
this particular world is necessary. It affirms that the relational 
nature of human existence and personality do, in fact, mirror the 
relational being of God. To say God is personal is to say that he 
requires to exist within a matrix of ad extra relationships; that the 
relationship between humankind and God tells directly of God himself; 
that in his Being and Becoming God is pre-eminently relational. 
PART ONE 
GOD AND BEING 
THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN MACQUARRIE 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL THEISM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Macquarrie's creative theological work began with his Existent-
1 ialist Theology in which he juxtaposed the thought of Bultmann and 
Heidegger. Following Bultmann, Macquarrie holds that "the knowledge 
2 
of God offered in the Bible is existential knowledge". Indeed the 
bible is "concerned with ourselves as existing in some relation or 
other to God, either alienated from God or as reconciled to Him".3 
The existential focus highlights the centrality of relationship in the 
biblical view of God. Whilst the bible is about God, yet it is 
"oriented to human experience,,4 for this is the arena of encounter 
with, and knowledge of, God. 
However, Macquarrie is no doctrinaire Bultmannian. He endorses 
Bultmann's existentialist approach but he does not fully agree with 
his theological standpoint. S He cricises Bultmann's idea of God as 
too situational, as yielding no satisfactory ontological account, He 
1. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, Pelican 1973. 
2. H.G. Wood, review of An Existentialist Theology by J. Macquarrie, 
in Exp.T. 67, February 1956. 
3. ibid. 
4. J. Macquarrie, "Christian Existentialism in the New Testament", 
Exp.T. 71, March 1960:177-180. 
5. cf. H.P. Owen, review of The Scope of Demythologizing by J. 
Macquarrie,in J.Th.St. 12, October 1961:406-7. 
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argues for the possibility of an ontological theology that would 
avoid "that illegitimate kind of objectifying which Bultmann justly 
fears".6 
Macquarrie's own doctrine of God is expounded chiefly in his 
7 Principles of Christian Theology, in which he attempts "to restate 
Christian theism in terminology derived from existentialism in 
general and the philosophy of Heidegger in particular".8 Macquarrie's 
dependence on Heidegger is two-fold: he follows Heidegger methodolo-
gically, and he uses Heidegger's language of Being in fashioning the 
content of his own doctrine of God. As with Heidegger he embarks 
upon a comprehensive existential analytic and then proceeds to an 
analysis of the meaning of Being. His two-fold analysis of human 
existence on the one hand and the idea of Being on the other forms 
the basis of his "existential-ontological" theism. Thus the questions 
raised by the analysis of human existence can be met only by the 
revelation of God understood as "Being" or, more specifically, as 
"Holy Being".9 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
J. Macquarrie, "Bultmann's Understanding of God", Exp.T. 79, 
September 1968:360. 
London: SCM 1966. Revised Edition 1977. All references will be 
to the Revised Edition. Macquarrie's 1983-84 Gifford Lectures, 
delivered at the University of St Andrews, will not be published 
before I have completed this thesis, therefore I am not in a 
position to take his most recent thinking into account. 
H.P. Owen, conceh~s of Deity, London: Macmillan 1971, p.lSS. J.N.D. 
Kelly notes of t 1S "one volume Stirilma" the particular feature of 
"its ingenious and highly successful restatement of traditional 
Christian beliefs within the framework of a new-style natural 
theology inspired mainly by the writings of Martin Heidegger", 
J.Th.St. 29, October 1978:617. 
op. cit., p.1SS. 
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Theologians who have made use of existential analyses, may be 
broadly divided into two groups according to Macquarrie. On the one 
hand there are those whose focus is the question of "man in his 
historical existence", and, on the other hand, "those who have moved 
b 10 eyond this towards an existentially based ontology". For the 
former group - among whom Macquarrie includes Bultmannll 
- the idea 
of God is rather elusive. The focus of this group is not so much God 
but rather the structure of human existence itself. However, the 
latter group, represented most notably by Tillich and by Macquarrie 
himself, engages in an explicit ontological development of the idea 
of God, albeit a development that has roots in the analysis of the 
human situation. Of his own approach Macquarrie writes: 
It is 'existential' because it takes its departure 
from man's self-understanding, as analyzed and expounded 
in current philosophy. It finds man to be concerned, 
whether explicitly or not, with the question of being -
not with the question of another being beyond the world 
(the discredited deus ex maahina) but with the Being 
that is present and manifest in the beings, that is to 
say, the beings that constitute the world and of which 
man himself is one. Insofar as man experiences this Being 
as holy, then he rightly calls it 'God'. (12) 
10. J. Macquarrie, God and Secularity, London: Lutterworth 1968, p.97. 
11. cf. Macquarrie, "Bultmann's Understanding of God", Exp.T. 79, 
September 1968:356-360. 
12. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.99. 
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Thus Macquarrie's existential-ontological analysis leads to the 
f ormulation of his concept of God which rests on the response of one 
particular being, viz, human being, to the experience of "Being" as 
holy. So it is that Macquarrie applies to the analysis of Being all 
the traditional marks of 'holiness' in such a way as to transpose the 
divine attributes from 'deity ' to 'Being' .13 He concludes that 'God' 
may be described as 'Holy Being'. However, he also says that his 
concept of God is not based on an analogy of "inert thinghood".14 
Does this mean that his doctrine of God is based, even implicitly, 
on some notion of 'dynamic' thinghood? Or is it based on something 
other than "thinghood" altogether? Certainly he denies that God may 
d . h b' 15 be thought of as any'thing': Go 1S not anot er e1ng. 
The existential analysis leads to an understanding of "Being" 
as not of the same order as the beings which exist. Yet "Being" is 
itself nothing apart from the beings, and the beings are nothing 
apart from "Being". That is to say, "Being" is not some thing which 
exists as such, and beings are those things that do exist, yet only 
so by virtue of the "Being" that lets them to be. There is, in other 
words, a unique reciprocal relation in which Being and the beings 
stand, revealed by Macquarrie's analysis. 
16 Thus Macquarrie seeks to propound a "new style Natural Theology". 
13. cf. Macquarrie, Principles, p.ll6: "In Heidegger's own philosophy, 
being tends to replace God and draws to itself the attributes 
traditionally assigned to God". 
14. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.99. 
15. cf. Macquarrie, Principles, p.117. 
16. op. cit., p.54. 
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He notes that "a philosophical theology beginning from the analysis 
of human existence finds within that existence itself the question 
of being, and the development of this question leads in turn into a 
17 descriptive natural theology". He begins with the question of 
existence: he is lead inexorably to the question of Being. It is 
therefore in the light of existence and being that theological 
problems and issues are to be approached. 
Belief in God, for Macquarrie, means faith in Being: that is, 
"faith in that wider Being, in whom myself and all other men live and 
move and have our limited being". 18 Such belief is a matter of "Having 
faith" in the relational context of existence. For the "Being" that 
Macquarrie here refers to is the 'ground', the 'that in which', human 
being and existence occurs. And such existence, such being, occurs 
not as isolated, inert thinghood, but as dynamic interrelated activity.19 
Further, he states that theistic belief "is the faith that there is a 
context of meaning and value that transcends our human life, a context 
that we do not create and in which we find ourselves".20 What is the 
nature of this context? "The believer commits himself to Being that 
transcends his own being, Being that is not tyrannous but creative 
and that sets his life in a context of grace and judgement".21 Thus 
the essential relatedness of existence-as-such clearly undergirds 
17. op. cit., p.184. 
18. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.99. cf. his Thirtkirtg 'About 'God, 
London: SCM 1975, p.87. 
19. Macquarrie, Principles, pp.66f. 
20. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.107. 
21. op . cit., p.1 08. 
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Macquarrie's ontological perspective. To what extent does this 
relatedness appear in his idea of God? 
A"genuine theology", writes Macquarrie, "speaks always of God 
and man together, and not either of them in isolation".22 Clearly 
Macquarrie holds a basic notion of God as identifiable in distinction 
from human being, or created being. Yet he acknowledges that the 
'being' of this God is bound up in some profound way with the being 
of human being. Thus talk of God necessarily involves talk of human-
kind. Analysis of the being of human being will yield knowledge about 
the being of the divine. Thus the end result of his analysis of human 
existence and the meaning of Being is to have a groundwork laid for 
. . I . 1 h' 23 eXlstentla -ontologlca t elsm. Macquarrie is attempting to forge 
a new and more direct apprehension of the relation between humanity 
and God, between the human and the divine, creation and Creator. 
For the purpose of this thesis I shall endeavour to analyse 
Macquarrie's doctrine of God with the question always in mind: What 
relational implications does it present? At what points, and in what 
ways, does Macquarrie's understanding of God lend support to the notion 
of the ontological relationality of God? Does Macquarrie's doctrine 
in the end yield an understanding of God as essentially and ontolog-
ically "one-who-is-in-relation-with ... "? For, although he has used 
22. Macquarrie, Thinking, p.lO. cf. Secularity, p.87, God "does not 
dwell apart, but takes the risk of meeting man in the midst of 
the world". 
23. cf. T.W. Ogletree, "A Heideggerian Theology II", Interp., July 
1967:337-344. 
71 
Heideggerian thought to give fresh understanding to traditional theism, 
he has been insufficiently radical, in my judgement, in his application 
of the early Heideggerian relational ontology to the doctrine of God. 
In the end his use of Heidegger is more for the purpose of theological 
interpretation of traditional concepts rather than a new conceptual-
isation as such. The name changes, but the issue of a proper 
ontological description or definition of deity remains. 
II. THE EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL ANALYTIC 
In this section I shall outline and discuss the content of 
Macquarrie's existential-ontological analytic under the headings of 
"Human Being", "Revelation", "The Meaning of Being", "Linguistic 
Context", and "Being and God". 
(a) Human Being 
As noted above, the starting point of Macquarrie's theological 
. h h . f h . 24 programme IS t e p enomenologlcal analysis 0 uman eXIstence. 
Human being is understood by Macquarrie as relational "being-in-the-
world".25 The relatedness of existence within community, indeed of 
the "whole range" of "existing in a world",26 together with the 
individual's sense of self-relatedness,27 ' form the existential aware-
ness of being, and the concomitant conception of "relatedness" as 
fundamentally constitutive of 'being'. 
24. Macquarrie, Principles, p.58. See also his Studies in Christian 
Existentialism, London: SCM 1965, p.4. 
25. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.96. 
26. Macquarrie, Principles, p.60. 
27. op. cit., p.6l. 
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Macquarrie's statement that human being is set within the context 
of "wider being" does not refer to passive, locative placement, but 
rather acknowledges the 'relational matrix' in which the human self 
finds its being. For Macquarrie states: "Any human existence constit-
utes itself and realizes its possibilities only in interaction with 
other human existents".28 
Macquarrie's understanding of selfhood thus yields to a relational 
analysis. Human existence "fulfil s itself in selfhood".29 He asserts 
30 
"there can be no selfhood apart from the world .and other selves". 
Further, "there can be no wholeness for individuals apart from their 
fellows and apart from supportive social structures,,3l and he states 
that the term "person" is not used by him to mean an "invisible, 
intangible and immaterial soul-substance, but always an embodied self 
in the world".32 Neither the notion of the self, nor indeed the 
concept of person, has to do with the individual in isolation. Nor 
is it about an intangible facet of the individual (soul) which may 
be identifiable apart-from bodily existence. The self, the person, 
is constituted in some real sense by the fact of physical embodiment 
and real inter-relationship. In other words, the self is revealed 
28. op.cit. , p.66. 
29. op. cit. , p.74. 
30. op. cit. , p. 75. 
31. op. cit. , p.68 
32. op. cit. , p. 75. 
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as "being-in-the-world" and "being-with-others". These ontological 
relations are necessary constituents of selfhood. 33 
Thus Macquarrie would hold that the individual human person 
exists not primarily as an isolated individual who then happens to 
engage in social intercourse, but rather as one whose very being is 
caught up in, and involves, a matrix of relationships. This does not 
itself detract from the reality - even necessity - of privacy and 
individuality as real factors in human life. The point is that, 
ontologically, viz, in terms of what it means to be human, the related-
ness revealed in the existential analytic would indicate that 'to be' , 
as such, means 'to-be-related'. 
To counter the traditional philosophical and theological descript-
ion of the self as "immaterial substance" on the model of "inert 
thinghood",34 Macquarrie proposes that the appropriate model for 
understanding the sel f is "temporality". This concept , derived from 
Heidegger, embraces past, present and future: "What constitutes the 
self is a strange and complex time-relationship in which past, present 
and future are somehow brought into a unity".3S The self, then, is 
33. For Macquarrie the "full range of what is implied in being a self-
in-the-world" is caught up in the expression "total existence" by 
which "the self and the world are expressed together, as the 
inclusive situation where the self finds itself in its world". 
God Talk, London: SCM 1973, p.68. The 'total existence' in which 
the self finds itself refers to the interrelation of the self with 
"wider being". The self, the 'being' of human being, is set 
within this wider context, viz, the relational matrix of existence, 
and is thus itself defined in relational terms. 
34. cf. Macquarrie, Studies, pp.S9f.; Principles, p.7S. 
3S. Studies, p.63; cf. Principles, p.76. 
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conceived as relational in terms of its ontological structures both 
with respect to its existence within the world and with others, and 
with respect to temporality as the interrelation of past, present, 
and future. 
Macquarrie's analysis embraces also the negativities of existence -
its "disorders" or "imbalances",36 by which also the relational struct-
ure of the "being" of human being may be discerned. For example, the 
way in which "fallenness" may be conceived as a process of "falling 
short of", rather than a state of "fallen from". Or the sense in 
which "alienation" is essentially from one's self - i.e. from one's 
own being - which as a consequence leads to a distancing from others . 
These two examples imply the fundamental relationality of human being: 
"fallenness" is the negative qualifier of the manner of relating -
the drawing back from authentic relationships. "Alienation" is the 
truncating of the ability to relate. Macquarrie's equating of "sin" 
with "lostness" is also of relational significance. Lostness is "the 
sense of being cut off", that is, from relationships as such. In 
religious terms it is "separation from God".37 The so-called state 
of sin is the state of continued severance of relation, of continual 
"turning away from" genuine relationship. "Sin" thus denotes a 
warping of the fundamental ontological element of "being-with-(others)" 
in the structure of human being. 
Christian life and faith provide an example of Macquarrie's 
relational understanding of existence. He states: 
36. Principles, pp.68f. 
37. op. cit . , p . 72 
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Although every individual person has his own unique 
being, not one of us lives in isolation ... Our lives are 
set in the context of the Christian community, in the 
body of Christ. (38) 
Thus to be a Christian is to be with others within a particular com-
munity. It is a way of being human, a way of "being-with-others" and 
"being-in-the-world" . It is a particular expression, or instantiation 
in fact, of the fundamental ontological relatedness of human existence. 
It is not possible, therefore, to be a Christian in isolation, though 
the individual may indeed worship in private. Macquarrie makes the 
point that "since no man lives to himself, and since no one can be a 
person except through his relations to other persons, the life of the 
d ( . f . II 39 individual must be enhance not stl led) by the life of the communlty . 
Furthermore, private devotions are "no substitute for common worship".40 
Thus, by consideration of the communal nature of the Christian life, 
exemplification is given by Macquarrie to his overall finding that 
the "being" of human being is pre-eminently relational. 
(b) Revelation 
Revelation, for Macquarrie, is "the primary source of theology 
and is also a basic category of theological thinking".4l Macquarrie 
rejects an appeal to "special revelation" with respect to the claim 
of faith and the knowledge of God, yet he does not reject all revel-
atory experience as such. 42 The distinctive characteristic of 
38 . J. Macquarrie, Paths in Spirituality, London: SCM 1972, p.20. 
39. Macquarrie, Paths, p.4l . 
40. ibid . 
41. Macquarrie, Principles, p.7. 
42. cf. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.87; Principles, pp.7f and 84ff. 
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revelation is the sense of "initiative" that attends to what is known 
or revealed within the revelatory experience . Macquarrie ' s existent-
ial analysis constitutes for him an exploration into "the human side 
of the revelatory situation".43 Human existence poses the question 
of itself to itself : a question which is implicit in the existential 
mood of anxiety and which in turn constitutes the "capacity for 
" . . 44 
receIvIng revelatIon" . 
Macquarrie states that faith "is primarily an existential 
attitude".45 Within the Christian context, "faith is made possible 
by the initiative of that toward which . .. faith is directed".46 The 
religious ' quest' is met by a 'gift ' experienced as ' coming' from 
beyond the self , yet which 'meets' the self solely within its exist-
ence. Taking his cue from Heidegger ' s analysis of truth as aZetheia 
Macquarrie writes: "Revelation suggests some kind of unveiling, whereby 
what has hitherto been concealed from us is now opened up" . 47 What 
is revealed, in broad terms, is the "quest for man to which experience 
of grace and revelation bear witness, a quest that is initiated out-
"d f d "b d h" 48 Sl e 0 man an remaIns eyon IS control". Revelation involves 
the coincidence of the two way quest of humanity for God and God for 
humanity . However, at this stage of the existential-ontological 
analysis Macquarrie avoids using the word 'God ' and argues that the 
content of that which "confronts us and reveals itself" is Being . 49 
43 . PrinciEles , p.86. 
44. op. cit . , p . 87. 
45 . op . cit . , p.85. 
46 . op . cit. , p.84. 
47. op. cit . , p.85. 
48. op. cit. , p.87. 
49. ibid. 
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The point is, however, that revelation does not denote a passive 
experience. Rather, the structural constitution of revelation is 
seen to be that of a relational event. Revelation, as the point of 
meeting between two "questors" is thus the initial point of relationship. 
That which uncovers itself to the awareness and presence of humanity 
enables relationship to be established: it reveals itself as that 
which desires relation and that to which the individual may relate 
him- or herself. Revelation is the establishment of the possibility 
of relationship. 
Macquarrie's approach is to describe revelation in a "general and 
50 formal" way. Any actual revelatory experience is particular, con-
textual, and involves specific symbolism. He endeavours to discern 
the ontological content and context of revelation. He notes that 
revelation is not a special or esoteric experience as such: rather it 
is a perspective, an insight. It involves a way of viewing the world. 
In terms of external data there is nothing that the 'recipient' of 
revelation receives that is not at the same time open to the 'non-
recipient'. The difference, according to Macquarrie, is that the 
recipient "becomes aware of the being that is present and manifest 
in, with, and through" the given data of the public event as such. sl 
This means the context of the revelatory event is the relation in 
which the recipient stands to that which is revealed through the 
event. The general revelatory content is 'wider being', viz, that 
"Being" in which particular existents stand. The formal content is 
thus the formal ontological description of the context. It involves 
50. Principles, p.BB. 
51. op. cit., p.B9. 
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the perception of the interrelatedness of the data of the event, 
together with that which is revealed through that data, and also the 
structural relatedness of that which is itself so revealed. Of this 
disclosure in and through the revelatory event, Macquarrie writes: 
We cannot think of being as something that is, because 
more basically still it is the condition that there may 
be anything of which we can say that it is ... Whereas our 
knowledge of particular beings comes through the intel-
lectual appropriation of what is given in perception, 
our knowledge or awareness of being ... is more broadly 
based. It arises out of the total range of our existence 
in the world, and not out of perception and intellection 
alone. It is only through our total experience of being 
in the world that we reach any understanding of being ... 
Being, then, gets disclosed in existing. But existing is 
not just behOlding or contemplating or perceiving, for it 
is also concerned with involvement and participation. (52) 
Macquarrie admits that 'Being" cannot be studied objectively: it 
is not a category amenable to scientific theorising or investigation. 53 
Neither is 'Being' something encountered as in a person-to-person 
relation, although he makes the point that this would be "closer to 
the revelatory experience than a subject-to-object relation to 
52. op. cit., p.97 
53. op. cit., p.IOS. 
79 
. . b'" 54 1nan1mate e1ngs . The revelatory event has a relational structure, 
and within that event what is revealed is not some 'thing' to which 
the human being may relate as such, (because 'being ' is not some 
'thing'), but rather the relational context or ground of existence. 
Nevertheless, Macquarrie notes that: "revelation is not primarily 
given in the form of statements, but is rather the self-giving or 
self-communication of being" . 55 We may say that, for Macquarrie, the 
content of revelation is disclosed as the relationality of being. 
But we are left with his crucial question: 
How are we to determine the meaning of the word ' being', 
how are we to show that it has an intelligible use in 
the contexts where we are employing it, and how precisely 
do we propose to relate it to the traditional religious 
word ' God'?" (56) 
We turn now from the consideration of the key factors in Macquarrie's 
existential analysis to his ontological analysis. 
(c) The Meaning of Being 
Macquarrie's existential analysis leads him to the question of 
the meaning of Being. In response to this question, his ontological 
analysis involves stating, firstly, what ' Being' is not, then 
adumbrating the "positive characteristics" of Being, and finally 
formulating his own statement as to the meaning of Being. 
54 . op. ci t . , p . 106 . 
55. op . cit., p.l04 . (Italics mine). 
56. op. cit . , p . l07 . 
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Firstly, then, Macquarrie states that 'Being ' does not corne 
into the category of "something that is" . 57 Neither is it a property 
58 
of things that are, nor is it a class . Being is not another term 
for "substance" - that "substratum supposed to underlie the phenomena 
characteristic of beings" . 59 Finally, Being is not the absolute. 60 
Obviously, to begin to comprehend what "Being" might mean could well 
require a different way of perceiving the nature of reality than the 
way normally associated with philosophical discussions of Being. 
Macquarrie effectively hints as much. As we shall see, he poses his 
own alternative understanding of Being in which he acknowledges the 
dynamic aspects of reality along with the static, and suggests that 
likewise "being" has a double referent or meaning, namely, "the act 
or energy of existing and also the existent entity in which this act 
expresses and manifests itself" . 61 
The three distinctions often made between ' being' and some other 
concept provide, for Macquarrie, three "positive characteristics" for 
the concept of Being. The first distinction, or contrast, is between 
"being" and "becoming".62 The incompleteness of the "not yet" that 
comprises the sine qua non of "becoming" is traditionally contrasted 
with the supposed sense of static fullness of being. Macquarrie 
argues that "In so far as what becomes is, then becoming must be 
included in being as well as distinct from it", so therefore "being 
57. ibid. 
58 . PrinciE1es, p.108. 
59. ibid. 
60 . PrinciE1es, p . 109. 
61. ibid. 
62. PrinciEles, p .111. 
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cannot be identified with a static, changeless, undifferentiated 
ultimate" and "becoming is unintelligible apart from some conception 
of being, in which becoming is included". In other words, rather 
than acting as an antonym contrasted with 'being', the notion of 
'becoming' illuminates the idea of being, highlighting the dynamic 
element that must be incorporated into the concept of being. 
The second distinction is between 'being' and 'appearance'; 
between "what is actually the case and what appears to be the case".63 
Macquarrie argues that the appearance itself is something and not 
just of something. Thus 'being ' is presented even in appearances; 
indeed, 
Being is nothing apart from its appearances. So by 
'being' we most decidedly do not mean some invisible, 
intangible realm that is supposed to be back of the 
appearances, as a world of 'things-in-themselves'. 
Being gives itself in and through its appearances and 
nowhere else. (64) 
The third distinction is that between 'being' and the ' ideal ', as, 
e.g. between an actual instantiation of something and the concept 
of it, or between the moral 'is' and 'ought' . Macquarrie writes: 
63. ibid. 
The distinction seems to call attention to different 
levels or ... to different degrees of plenitude, not so 
much in being itself as in the manner in which being is 
64. Principles, p.112. 
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present and manifest in the beings, or in the states of 
affairs which these beings constitute. It seems that 
the presence and manifestation of being can be impeded 
or distorted, and with such a state of affairs we contrast 
an 'ideal' condition in which the fullness of being can 
manifest itself in and through some particular being or 
group of beings. (65) 
This distinction is thus not so much of absolute contrast as a matter 
of degree. Along with the other two distinctions this contrast is 
shown by Macquarrie to give positive characterization to 'being'. 
So Being is characterized by the dynamic of 'becoming'; by its 
manifestation in 'appearances'; and by the sense of authentic rep-
resentation denoted by the 'ideal'. 
The characteristic, or element, that Macquarrie suggests is of 
fundamental significance for understanding 'being' is "letting-be". 66 
His ontological analysis has led him to conclude that Being is incom-
parable in that it lies outside all usual categories of thought. It 
is "a "ttartScendens which must remain mysterious, and yet is not just 
a blank incomprehensible. Macquarrie notes that to "let-be" usually 
means to "leave alone". It has a decidedly passive connotation. 
However, Macquarrie infuses this phrase with dynamic import such 
that to "let-be" is understood as an active "enabling to be", or an 
"empowering to be", or perhaps a "bringing into being". 
65. ibid. 
66. Principles, p.113. 
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Clearly this approach suggests a close affinity with the notion 
of God as Creator, for the activity of the Creator is to '~ring into 
being" that which he wishes to create. In terms of the ontological 
analysis it avers that "Being" means that which "lets-be" the beings: 
that which is the very basis or 'ground' without which nothing could 
exist. Indeed it is not the case that that which exists springs from 
this ground of enabling empowerment called 'Being', but rather that 
Being is the very 'empowering' function enabling anything to exist . 
It is the 'springing forth' as such, the 'standing-aut-from' that 
is the existence of beings as such. Existence is a standing out not 
from the ground of being, but from the threat of non-being, the pos-
'b'l' f h' 67 Sl 1 lty a not lngness. 
So the concept of 'letting-be' includes a causative element, but 
the 'letting-be' as such is not exhausted by the single act of causing 
something to be. It is the very 'power' sustaining the 'being' of all 
beings that exist. "Letting-be", as causative enablement and sustain-
ing empowerment, is the essence of Macquarrie's understanding of Being. 
In moving to an understanding of God in terms of 'Being' he draws 
overt links between the concept of "letting-be" and the faith-event 
of grace. He states that the character "of this essentially mysterious 
letting-be" is fotmd in the sense of "presence" and "manifestation" 
in and through the beings that are let_be. 68 He thus concludes that 
'Being' may be conceived as "the incomparable that lets be and that 
is present and manifests itself in and through the beings".69 
67. cf. Tillich, passim. 
68. Macquarrie, Principles, p.114. 
69. op. cit., p.llS. 
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(d) The Linguistic Context 
For Macquarrie the desire to find a language relevant to human 
existence which also conveys the truth of the gospel is an evangelical 
tool . 70 It is a means of casting fresh light on that truth, a means 
of finding a way into contemporary theological discourse . 
Having introduced the notion of "letting-be" as the key concept 
for understanding the meaning of Being, the question is raised concern-
ing the nature of the "language of Being" with particular reference 
to theological discourse . 7l Macquarrie holds that "Being" is the 
ultimate referent of theological language. However, since theology 
does not speak of Being as if it were an object that 
could be subjected to rational investigation, as in a 
metaphysical theory, but only of Being as known in the 
revelatory experience, then it talks always of Being as 
it relates itself to us. In theology, we talk of Being 
only as we ourselves are embraced by Being and have 
recognized its holiness . (72) 
Now language of Being is 'odd' language, or at least involves an 
odd usage of language. However, despite such linguistic limitation, 
Macquarrie justifies using the "language appropriate to beings" in 
talking of Being on the grounds that "Being is present and manifest 
in the beings and that indeed it is only in and through beings 
(including our own being) that we can have any understanding of Being". 73 
70. cf. Secul ari tl::' pp.86f. 
7l. PrinciEles, pp .126ff. 
72 . op. cit . , p . 128 . 
73. op. cit. , p.129. 
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Language is not only referential, it may also have an evocative 
power or function enabling us to see something of the nature of Being 
that is present yet hidden within "total existence".74 Lying at the 
heart of theological language is "the understanding of Being that has 
been appropriated in the attitude of faith" . 75 Thus theological 
language is rooted in, and expressive of, the relational matrix of 
being-in-the-world, whereby Being may be encountered and understood. 
Theological language succeeds in its task according to how well it 
refers to, illuminates, and communicates Being . For Macquarrie the 
task of theological language is to "represent" the revelatory 
t . h B' 76 encoun er W1t e1ng . 
A discussion of theological language and the language of Being 
necessarily raises the issue of symbol and symbolism. Theological 
and ontological terms are pregnant with symbolism : the chief problem 
they share is the difficulty in finding an alternative, and more 
direct, mode of discourse. Macquarrie defines ' symbol' as that which 
"is presented to the mind as standing for something else" . 77 He 
suggests that an interpretation of symbols is no more than the process 
of illuminating one set of symbols by the use of another set. 78 
Now this is a very telling comment. Clearly in his own theolog-
ical work Macquarrie is doing just that - engaging in the re-
interpretation of symbolic language. He takes one set of symbols -
74. Macquarrie, God-Talk, p . 79. 
75 . PrinciEles, p.129 . 
76 . GOd-Talk, p.83. 
77 . PrinciEles, p . 135. 
78. op . cit., p . 137 . 
86. 
the theological - and re-interprets it in terms of another set, viz, 
his "existential-ontological" language. However, Macquarrie claims 
the validity of any such inter-symbolic interpretation is found in 
the move from "the less widely to the more widely received symbols". 
Hence he focusses on the language of existence and being, "for this 
is something like a universally communicable language, arising as it 
does out of existential structures and experiences common to all 
human beings".79 Thus, existential-ontological language describes 
"universal structures and experiences of the human existent" and 
this serves "as the interpretative parallel for the symbolic language 
of a particular revelation" . 80 
Symbolism is considered by Macquarrie on the basis of the anaZogia 
entis, that is, on the one hand "from the side of the particular 
beings looking toward Being" and on the other "from the side of Being 
81 
as it is present and manifest in the beings that it lets-be" . From 
within this dual perspective he analyses the twofold function of 
symbols . First, that: "they open up Being to the beings" and second 
that they "open up the beings in the light of Being" . 82 This recip-
rocal analysis is illustrated with reference to the symbol of 
' fatherhood' . Macquarrie states: 
We can use the human relation of fatherhood to illuminate 
God, and yet understand this human relation itself to be 
illuminated and judged by the ultimate relation to God. (83) 
79 . ibid. 
80. Principles, p.184 . 
81. op . cit. , p.138. 
82. ibid . 
83. ibid. 
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Now on this analysis Macquarrie shows, first , that symbols may 
"illuminate" Being on account of the "existential response" they 
evoke . Indeed, "the existential response is an essential part of the 
84 symbol's status as a symbol" . This response involves "particular 
beings which can arouse in us the kind of response that is aroused 
by Being itself", which means "there are things, persons, qualities, 
and so on that awaken in us such affective states as awe, reverence, 
loyalty; and it is in these states that Being discloses itself to us" . 85 
The second point that Macquarrie shows is that symbols "illuminate 
B " f . ' 1 ' fl'" 86 b h' h h h elng ln terms 0 Slml arlty ~ re atlon, y w lC e means t e 
similarity "between a relation of beings and a relation of Being to a 
being". This similarity of relation is an analogy of proportionality 
which does not disclose Being "as it is in itself" but "Being as 
related to us".87 In any similarity of relation "attention is directed 
to the actual structure or situation in which man relates to Being",88 
which is, says Macquarrie, basically the relation of dependence. The 
third point concerns symbols indicative of God or Being as having 
properties. Macquarrie asks if any sense can be made of God "under-
stood as Being , and hence neither a thing nor a person, and so 
apparently disqualified from having ' properties ' attributed to him".89 
His answer is to say that Being is neither a being '~ a property. 
It is, however, the "prior enabling condition" such that "there may 
be any beings or properties at all".90 
84 . PrinciEles, p . 139 . 
85 . ibid. 
86 . PrinciEles, p . 140 . 
87. op. cit. , p.141. 
88. op. cit. , p.140. 
89. op. cit . J p.141 
90. ibid. 
• 
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So, then, under the first perspective - that of "beings looking 
toward Being" - symbols are seen to have an "opening-up" or illumining 
function. With respect to the second perspective - that of Being 
disclosing itself in beings - we may obtain another view as to how 
symbolism in theological discourse is to be understood. Macquarrie 
states: "Being manifests itself in the beings not because they are 
like Being ... but because they express Being and participate in Being".91 
Thus, 
The test of a symbol is its adequacy in lighting up 
Being, and one symbol or set of symbols may be preferred 
to another on the ground that it is more adequate. This 
adequacy, in turn, may be considered in relation to the 
range of participation in Being which belongs to the 
entity that is to serve as a symbol. (92) 
Macquarrie then goes on to expound a three-tiered ontological structure 
of the created order whereby each successive level includes all that 
has gone before. However, the distinctive feature of the third and 
highest level is personal being. He comments that this "is the widest 
range of being that we know, and therefore symbols and images drawn 
from personal life have the highest degree of adequacy accessible to 
93 
us. Therefore the most adequate mode of understanding Being is to 
be drawn from personal being - and this is supremely relational: the 
being of personal being is relational being: we know no other. 
91. Principles, p.142. 
92. op. cit., p.143. 
93. ibid. 
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(e) Being and God 
Having expounded the meaning of Being in terms of enabling 
'letting-be' Macquarrie has reached the point where he is prepared 
to conjoin this key-word of ontology with the key-word of religious 
faith, viz, God . 94 Now Macquarrie does not hold that 'God ' and 'Being' 
are interchangeable terms. The word ' Being' is a neutral term; ' God' 
is not. The word ' God ' , he points out, "carries important existential 
connotations of valuation, commitment, worship and so on" . 9S Indeed 
this existential response is incorporated into the very meaning of 
the term ' God ' . Therefore, in order to relate 'God ' to 'Being ' the 
ontological denominator must be existentially qualified. Thus 
Macquarrie holds that the phrase "Holy Being" may indeed be synonymous 
with "God" . 96 
By ' Holy Being ' Macquarrie means "Being that impinges on our 
beings, demanding, judging, and sustaining , and Being to which in 
turn we give our allegiance" . 97 It would appear the distinctive 
conceptual content of the notion of Holy Being, as the apposite 
synonym for Go~is the relational matrix in which God is experienced 
and known. It resides in the relationships in which beings stand to 
Being . Specifically, it resides in the relationships in which the 
believer stands to God . As Holy Being, God is He-Who impinges, 
demands, judges, sustains and so on. That is, God is He-Who-relates-
himself-to his people. And the people respond by, and in, relating 
themselves to God by way of giving allegiance, worship, and so forth. 
94 . PrinciEles , pp . llSff. 
95 . op . cit. , p . llS. 
96. op. cit. , p.llS . 
97 . op . cit . , p . 186. 
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Thus, for Macquarrie, 'God' has a two-fold meaning: " an onto-
logical meaning, in so far as the word denotes being, and an 
existential meaning, in so far as it expresses an attitude of 
commitment to, or faith in, being".98 To speak of God in terms of 
Being is to necessarily include existential reference, for it is the 
existential element that leads Macquarrie to designate "Being" in 
conjunction with the qualifier "holy". The reason that 'Holy Being' 
is the apposite ontological designation for God is that the adjective 
'holy' "introduced the dimension of our own relation to Being".99 
The ontological category, so qualified, then becomes the way to 
. h' f G dIDO lnterpret t e meanlng 0 o. 
In his attempt to re-think the concept of God in terms of Being, 
Macquarrie believes that "without diminishing the holiness or reality 
of God" he has nonetheless "escaped the crude supernaturalism of 
supposing God to be a kind of deus ex maahina". 101 He has attempted 
to secure a concept of a God who is intimately bound up with the 
world, although not identical with it. He affirms both transcendence 
and immanence as marks of this God. His existential-ontological theism 
portrays a God who is dynamically active. God, as Holy Being which 
lets-be, 
is not indeed one being among others, or even one being 
above others or the supreme being ..• to call God ens 
realissimum is so to distinguish him from all finite 
98 . op. ci t ., p. 121; c f. p. 127 . 
99. Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.lOl. · 
100. cf. T.W. Ogletree, "A Heideggerian Theology II", p.342. 
101. Macquarrie, Principles, p.155. 
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being (entia) that we see that God is not finally an ens 
at all, for a qualitative leap has taken place and God 
is seen to be esse, the very act of being which is prior 
to all beings and emerges in, with and through every 
particular being. (102) 
Yet Holy Being is more than mere 'relational context'. God has 
always been called by name, even the name most suggestive of an onto-
theology. Macquarrie writes: 
The Zocus cZassicus to which the biblical and Christian 
revelation traces back its apprehension of God as Being ... 
is that celebrated theophany of the Old Testament when 
God appears to Moses in the burning bush and reveals to 
him his name: I AM WHO I AM. (103) 
The tradition of speaking of God in terms of 'being' is indeed a 
venerable one stretching from the Fathers to the present day.l04 
Whilst there have been difficulties in reconciling this tradition 
with the biblical idea of God,lOS this Old Testament theophany none-
theless not only affirms the link between the idea of God and the 
idea of being, but may indeed offer fresh insight into both. l06 
The salient theological point, Macquarrie notes, is that "the name 
of Yahweh becomes associated with the Hebrew verb hyh or hwh, 
meaning 'to be,,,.107 However, 
102. Macquarrie, Thinking, p.l06. 
103. Principles, p.196. 
104. Thinking, pp.106ff. 
105. op. cit., p.107. 
106. ibid. See also Principles, pp.196ff. 
107. Principles, p.196. 
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It is often pointed out that the Hebrew verb hyh had a 
more dynamic sense than 'to be', meaning something more 
like 'to become', so that the expression I AM WHAT I AM 
is misleading if it suggests an immutable principle of 
being. We have already seen ... that any adequate not i on 
of being includes becoming, so that not only Hebrew thought 
but sound ontology demands a dynamic element in the inter-
pretation, and thus the expression I AM WHAT I AM would 
refer to the ongoing process of being, or to being in 
. d h' h h . b' 108 tIme an Istory rat er t an to statIc elng. 
Macquarrie's conclusion is that, in terms of his analysis of being, 
the "Qui Est" would be rendered "I let be what I let be".109 This is 
what he understands by "transcendent Being": this is the content of 
Holy Being. 
Macquarrie's argument for an ontological understanding of God 
takes the form of a simple syllogism: "God's essence is Being, and 
Being, in turn, is letting-be. So it is of the essence of God to let 
be".110 But is it God-as-Being that Macquarrie is here discussing, 
or is he really talking about the being-of-God? To what extent is 
he engaged merely in symbolic re-interpretation of God as Holy Being? 
Or is it the case that 'Holy Being' is ontologically descriptive of 
the reality of God? In other words, is Macquarrie working with a 
108. ibid . 
109. Principles, p.197. 
110. op . cit., p.200. 
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notion of God such that the notion of Being may illuminate, but not 
finally supplant? Is God yet something other than 'Being', however 
'Being' is understood? Or is there still an implicit openness in 
Macquarrie's conceptualisation such that a review of the understanding 
of Being may yet revi se his doctrine of God? 
In order to pursue the understanding of Macquarrie's doctrine of 
God as Holy Being, and to investigate its implicit relationality, we 
turn to his discussion of the trinitarian concept of God. 
III. HOLY BEING IN TRINITARIAN FORMULATION 
Macquarrie acknowledges the centrality of trinitarian thought in 
Christian theism, and develops his own existential-ontological under-
standing of the trinitarian understanding of God. Accordingly, I 
shall examine his exposition under the sub-headings of "Being and 
Trinity", "Being and Father", "Being and Son", and "Being and the 
Spirit". 
(a) Being and Trinity 
Macquarrie's approach to the Trinity is more are-interpretation 
of traditional Christian dogma in ontological - or rather "existential-
ontological" - terms than it is a reappraisal of that dogma on the 
basis of a radical re-understanding of "Being". He has expounded the 
notion of Holy Being to explicate the general idea of God: now he is 
faced with the task of marrying this exposition with the distinctively 
orthodox Christian concept of God as a Tri-unity. This doctrine, notes 
Macquarrie, is "the very heart of the Christian faith".ll1 It is "the 
111. op. cit., p.188. 
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most inclusive doctrine": it gathers up the findings of Macquarrie's 
philosophical theology "and forms a close bond between the exposition 
112 
of philosophical and symbolic theology". Indeed he states that: 
if one is to think at all of holy Being in dynamic rather 
than inert terms, as both transcendent and immanent and 
not just one or the other, as the mysterium that is both 
tremendum and fasainans, then if God had not revealed 
himself as triune, one would need to have invented the 
idea of his three-in-oneness, or at least something like 
it. (113) 
Macquarrie sees the doctrine of the Trinity as a symbol, an 
expression of the Christian community's experience of God. It is an 
existentially rooted symbol born of the manifold relations in which 
God is experienced by humankind. 114 But it is not viewed as just a 
symbol. Theology endeavours to make direct ontological statements 
about God as three-in-one, and Macquarrie wishes to engage in that . 
The value of trinitarian language and formulation is that it 
alerts us to the breadth, complexity and inclusiveness that must 
attend any conceptualization of God. However, as Macquarrie notes, 
"the formula of one substance and three persons constitutes an inter-
pretation that has ceased to communicate".115 His own desire is for 
d f 1 · 116 d h h' h· a new an contemporary ormu at1on, an e sets out to ac 1eve t 1S. 
112 . ibid . 
113 . ibid. 
114 . PrinciEles, pp . 19lf. 
115. op. cit . , p.192 . 
116 . ibid. 
95 
The movement and dynamic inherent in the traditional views of 
the Trinity Macquarrie denotes as 
the movement of Being from its primordial source 
through its expression in creation to its unitive 
action in building up the Kingdom of God. (117) 
He suggests that this threefold movement or dynamic activity may 
furnish preferable symbols of God's tri-unity than the term 'person ' .118 
The classic terms of the trinitarian formulation - 'procession ', 
'generation', 'spiration' - denote "an understanding of God as dynamic 
119 in the highest degree". The doctrine of the Trinity implies a 
dynamic ontology of the Godhead. On his own analysis of God as Being 
Macquarrie argues for"a highly dynamic understanding of God/~ 120 
Macquarrie argues for a convergence of his existential-ontOlogical 
concept of God with the concept of the Trinity. He claims that if 
it is the case that 
the doctrine of the Trinity safeguards a dynamic as 
opposed to a static understanding of God, and if in turn 
the Hebrew understanding of being was dynamic (that is to 
say, included becoming), then there is already an intrinsic 
connection between the thought of God as triune and the 
thought of God as Being. (121) 
Alongside this convergence of ontological and trinitarian concepts 
117. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.l13. 
118. PrinciEles, p.l93. 
119. op. cit. , p.195. 
120. ibid. 
121. Princi E 1 es • p.197. 
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Macquarrie places the convergence of "the understanding of God that 
belongs to philosophical theology and the understanding of him that 
belongs to the specific Christian revelation,.,122 Thus he perceives 
a "continuous line" from the concept of Holy Being derived from his 
philosophical theology "to the full Christian doctrine of God as 
t . ,,123 rlune . Trinitarian symbolism is thus the appropriate and proper 
mode of expressing the God who is Holy Being: existential-ontological 
theism emerges in a trinitarian formulation of God. 
The trinitarian symbols of Father, Son and Holy Spirit denote the 
ways in which Holy Being manifests itself. They are the modes in and 
through which the community of faith knows Holy Being. As such, the 
symbols are not mere 'signs' but participate in that which they symbol-
ise. 124 Therefore the symbols themselves may be subjected to 
ontological analysis to discover what they truly represent of Holy 
Being. So it is that Macquarrie links his analysis of the three 
persons of the Trinity with the three movements of Being, giving a 
specific ontological designation for each of the symbols. The symbols 
thus represent the movements, or 'moments', of the letting-be that 
pre-eminently constitutes Holy Being. 
Macquarrie's starting point for a devclopingChristian theology 
is the trinitarian doctrine of God. This doctrine, reinterpreted in 
the light of the existential-ontological analysis, proclaims a God 
122. op. cit., p.198. 
123. ibid. 
124. cf. Tillich, various. 
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constituted by the re1ationa1ity of letting-be conceived in terms of 
the three interrelated modes of primordia1ity, expressiveness and 
unity. God, for Macquarrie, is letting-be that finds particular 
expression in, and is manifest in its unity with, the beings that it 
lets-be. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are reinterpreted in the language 
of existential-ontological theism as primordial, expressive and unitive 
being. 
On Macquarrie's analysis the 'persons' of the Trinity are symbols 
standing for the different 'modes' or 'movements' of Holy Being. 
Attention now turns to how he understands the three persons of the 
Trinity. 
(b) Being and the Father 
The trinitarian symbol "Father" is given the ontological desig-
nation of "primordial" Be ing. 
This expression is meant to point to the ultimate act 
or energy of letting-be, the condition that there should 
be anything whatsoever, the source not only of whatever 
is but of all possibilities of being. (125) 
Now this sheer act of letting-be is unknowable in and of itself, but 
is present and manifest through that which is 'let-be'. Primordial 
Being - the 'Father' symbol - thus designates "the depth of the mystery 
of God". 126 
125. Macquarrie, Principles, pp.198f. 
126. op. cit., p.l99. 
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Primordial Being also signifies the unity of God,127 Macquarrie 
remarks: 
if the three persons are of one substance, and this 
"substance" is Being, we are again directed to the under-
standing of God as Being, rather than ~ being, and likewise 
directed to understanding Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in 
terms of Being rather than as three beings. 128 
It would seem that primordial Being is Holy Being in that it is that 
Being to which the other 'modes' of Being, viz, expressive and unitive, 
relate. That is to say, without the primordia1ity there is nothing 
to express and nothing which unites . Primordiality is logically prior 
to expressiveness and unity. Yet at the same time Macquarrie clearly 
sees his interpretation of the Trinitarian motifs as remaining faithful 
t h . . d t . d' . 129 . o t e classlcal maXlm opera a ex ra ~n ~v~sa sunt. The varlOUS 
appropriations, he declares, 
are not mere conventions, for they may point to the 
special role of one or other of the persons, but they 
should not mislead us into wrongly separating the 
persons. (130) 
In existential-ontological terms the inseparableness of the three 
trinitarian persons is supposedly guaranteed by the fact of primordial 
Being. Trinity is not triplicity: it is tri-unity. Primordia1ity is 
127. op. cit. , p . 192, 199 . 
128. op. cit . , p.192. 
129. op. cit. , p.194 . 
130 . ibid. 
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not simply a category of Being alongside the categories of "expressive" 
and "tmitive". Primordial Being is the ontological fundament, the 
conceptual 'ground'. It is the 'fount' out of which arises expressive 
and unitive Being as modes of the ontological fundament. 
However, is not Macquarrie really stretching his ontological 
analysis a bit too far when he so neatly equates it with the trinit-
arian formula? Primordial Being would suggest the ontological reality 
of which expressive Being and unitive Being are manifestations 
derivative from this reality . In like fashion God the Father is so 
easily interpreted as the 'real ' God leaving open the question of 
the divine "reality" of Son and Spirit. Yet Macquarrie asserts that 
P · d' , . b . d' , l' . 131 rImor Ia1 BeIng IS not to e conceIve In ISO atIon, as It were. 
Primordial Being is "a source of outpouring which is inseparable 
from the whole structure of Being and which is something like a 
"movement" within it .132 
Macquarrie's understanding of the Trinity in existential-
ontological theism is clearly predetermined by the traditional pattern. 
It does not present an obvious challenge or potential corrective to 
the manifold confusions and ambiguities of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
(c) Being and the Son 
Macquarrie gives to the second symbol of the Trinity, the Son, 
the term "expressive" Being. The dynamic relation between Father and 
Son is depicted thus: 
131. cf . Princi}21es, p.199 . 
132 . ibid. 
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The energy of primordial Being is poured out through 
expressive Being and gives rise to the world of 
particular beings. (133) 
He notes that within orthodox Christian theology the Son is also "Word" 
or "Logos" - "the agent of the Father in the creation of the world as 
11 .. . ,,134 we as 1n 1tS recreat10n . For Macquarrie there is a neat parallel 
between what the relationship of the Father to the Son has stood for 
in trinitarian symbolism, and what he is wishing to conceive in terms 
of the structure of Being. 
Macquarrie states: "Man needs some concrete manifestation of 
God's activity, some manifestation that can seize him and bring him 
to the attitude of faith". 135 In biblical religion, the context of 
such manifestation has been history. 
In the Old Testament, God's reconciling and saving work 
is seen in his historical providential dealings with 
Israel, and especially in the succession of covenants 
which he makes with them, from the covenant with Abraham 
onward. The people may break a covenant and slip back 
into idolatry, but God is represented as continually 
and 
seeking to restore / renew the relationship with himself; 
and this is at the same time a restoration and renewal of 
the people in their very being. (136) 
133. ibid. 
134. ibid. 
135. Principles, p.270. 
136. ibid. 
'-
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The whole basis of God's saving work is the establishment and a re-
establishment of relationships, The "need" which Macquarrie claims 
humanity has for that which will evoke an attitude of faith, is the 
need for the beings to have awareness of Being as 'Holy' - that is, 
to perceive the relational "Fullness" of Being, This awareness is 
needed in order that beings may engage authentically in relationship 
with Being , Within the Christian tradition this means that the 
advent of Jesus Christ 
is the classic, or primordial, revelation on which 
the community of faith is founded and which determines 
its way of understanding Being (God) and of comporting 
itself toward Being. (137) 
As the "decisive or paradigmatic revelation of God", Christ is, 
for Macquarrie, a "symbol" of Being , 138 He notes that there are 
instances in which Jesus is reported to have claimed a unique relation-
ship to the Father such as to denote a relationship of identity , But 
words like "I am in the Father and the Father in me,,139 are "words 
which point to a relationship a good deal more complex than simple 
'd t't" 140 1 en 1 y , As a symbol of Holy Being one may say Christ is God, 
but one cannot reverse the proposition to assert 'God is Christ', 
for the ' is' does not denote material identity, 
As expressive Being, Christ 'expresses' - or reveals - the 
137. ibid. 
138. Principles, p.271. 
139 . John 14:1-9. 
140. Macquarrie, Thinking, p.l04. 
.. 
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essential relatedness of Holy Being: he is the supreme point of the 
coming together of 'Being' and 'being' in true interrelatedness. 
In terms of the incarnation, the sense of initiative and involvement 
that centres on the person of Jesus, as the authentic revelation of 
God, is itself the revelation of the God whose very being is in such 
relating to his people and his creation. As a human being, Jesus 
of Nazareth was an historical person. So also Christ, as a symbol 
of Being, is an historical symbol. Now Macquarrie argues that 
historical symbols have a unique appropriateness which "consists in 
their combination of the existential and ontological dimensions of 
1 . ,,141 H reve at10n . estates: 
The historical symbol is a personal symbol, and, in the 
particular case with which we are concerned, Christ is 
seen as the fulfilment of se1fhood, of that potentiality 
for a truly personal being which is the potentiality 
given with existence . .. persona1 being is the most 
appropriate symbol for Being itself. (142) 
To affirm that Christ is God is to affirm the ontological 
significance of the incarnation. And with this incarnationa1 symbol 
Macquarrie notes three of "the deepest truths of Christian faith" . 143 
Significantly, each of these are truths of relationship. The first 
has to do with initiative: "in Jesus Christ, or, more generally in 
the relations between God and man, the initiative lies with God".144 
141. Principles, p.272. 
142. ibid . 
143 . J. Macquarrie, The Humility of God, London: SCM 1978, p.26. 
144. ibid. 
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This is not to be taken as a reference to what might be called the 
primordial relation of Being, as 'letting-be', to a being, as 'let-be'. 
Rather it signifies, on the one hand, that there are more and diverse 
relations between Being and beings, and on the other, that Holy Being, 
or God, is such as to initiate, to intend, to establish relationship. 
The second truth is that of "God's deep involvement in and with 
h ' '" 145 IS creatIon . In other words, the symbol of Christ, or more 
particularly, incarnation, points to the fundamental relationality 
of Being as that in which beings stand. The third truth is that "this 
initiative and this involvement have their center in Jesus Christ".146 
As symbol, Jesus Christ is not just a sign-that-points-towards, but 
that which most appropriately and authentically manifests and presents 
that-for-\vhich he stands as symbol. The relational Being which is 
Holy Being finds its expression and presence most appropriately in 
the being of Jesus Christ: "Jesus Christ is the focus where the mystery 
of Being is disclosed". 147 
The 'Son' is expressive Being in relation to the primordial Being 
148 he expresses. 
, 1 d 149 Interre ate . 
The 'person' and 'work' of Christ are intimately 
The being of Christ is also denoted by Macquarrie 
145. Humility, p.27. 
146. ibid. 
147. Principles, p.271. 
148. J. Macquarrie, "The Pre-Existence of Jesus Christ", Exp.T. 77, 
April 1966:199-202. 
149. cf. J. Macquarrie, "A Dilemma in Christo1ogy", Exp.T. 76, April 
1965:207-210. 
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by term "Christhood", which is a "way of being".lSO Christhood is 
a way of engaging in relationships consonant with the relationality 
of Holy Being. It is not confined to the historical figure of Christ 
as such. For, in the post-resurrection sense 'Christ' is an ongoing 
symbol of Being, rooted in the specific historical person, yet trans-
cending particular historical data. Resurrection precipitates the 
on-goingness of Christ as a continuously relevant symbol of Holy 
Being. This is demonstrated by Macquarrie by way of the titles 
"Lord" and "Word". By Lord and Word Christ is "existentially the 
one who commands absolute allegiance and ontologically the one who 
renders present-and-manifest holy Being".15l 'Lord' and 'Word' are 
not simply the means by which Macquarrie might adumbrate an existential-
ontological Christology. Rather these titles are the bearers of the 
Christ symbol. Apprehended as Lord and Word Christ symbolises the 
relational matrix of the manifestation and response of Being to the 
beings. 
In discussing the two-natures of the Chalcedonian definition 
Macquarrie suggests that the "person" or "subsistence" in which the 
two natures come together is the particular being, Jesus Christ, 
d d 1 b · 152 un erstoo as persona elng. The value of this interpretation 
is in the understanding that personal being is the most authentic 
locus of Being. If Christ, as the symbol of Holy Being, incorporates 
truly the divine and the human, it is because he is the human being 
150. cf. Principles, p.283. 
151. op. cit., p.294. 
152. op. cit., p.299. 
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that authentically expresses Holy Being. This potency of Christ as 
the symbol of Being is also expressed by the designation of Christ 
as both "True God and True Man". He is the "focus of Being",153 a 
focus to be comprehended in terms of its essential relationality. 
For, as Macquarrie states, 
When we speak of Jesus Christ ... we cannot mean simply 
the individual, Jesus of Nazareth, in isolation, for 
no individual exists apart from social relations. Each 
. . 1 d h' . 1 tt· 154 must be seen In a sOCIa an Istorlca se Ing. 
Christ is the being that authentically presents and manifests Holy 
Being: he is the human being who engages to the full in the relation-
ality of this Being. 
As a human being, Jesus of Nazareth was the point in history of 
a unique and particularly authentic expression of Holy Being in and 
through the beings which it lets-be. Indeed, Macquarrie remarks of 
the incarnation that the "corning together of God and man must be 
understood as the corning together of Being with a being".155 Christ 
is the symbol of Being; he is "God incarnate", the "Word become 
flesh". But he is not the only point at which this is so. For every 
being, as such, is let-be and thus manifests the Being by which it is 
let-be. Also, Jesus Christ is not just a single historical figure: 
he is "event", to be understood in terms of the ongoing community 
which responds to him in worship and witness. 
153. op. cit., p.300f. 
154. op. cit., p.304. 
155. Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.227. 
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The symbol is 'ongoing'. Christhood is a way of being : a way 
of relational engagement. Expressive Being is Being in its very 
interrelatedness, for 
The Christ-event which is said to be the focus of Being 
certainly has its center and origin in this particular 
person, Jesus Christ, but he is unintelligible apart 
from the whole complex of relationships which bind him 
to Israel, to the Church, to the entire human race ... (156) 
Macquarrie comments that "Being is present-and-manifest in any 
being that symbolizes it, that is to say, there is a real inward 
relation between the two".157 Whilst, ontologically, the symbol 
stands in an intimate relation to that which it symbolizes, the 
symbol is nonetheless not materially identical with the symbolizandum. 
The relation is one of authentic manifestation and expression with 
respect to that which is being expressed. Thus Christ is the part-
icular and authentic revelation of God: He is the unique manifestation 
of Holy Being in and through a being. 
The truth of Jesus Christ is "the truth of a person".158 In 
asserting that Christ is the "human face of God" (Robinson) we assert 
that "we meet God communicating himself to us in the medium of our 
156. Principles, p.308. 
157. op. ci t ., p. 271. 
158. Macquarrie, Humility, p.29. 
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h ° " 159 uman eXlstence . Holy Being is not something remote from human 
being. In the particular being that is Christ we may see an authentic 
representation of the reality of Holy Being, and thus we are given 
the means to detect the presence and interrelatedness of Holy Being 
in and with our own being. 
Cd) Being and the Spirit 
The third symbol of the Trinity Macquarrie designates as "unitive" 
Being. Basically this is derived from an analysis of the function of 
the Spirit within trinitarian thought, namely, "to maintain, strengthen 
d h d b h ° f BelOng wIOth the beIOngs".160 an , were nee e, restore t e unIty 0 
The Spirit refers to the building up and unifying of the community of 
faith as the people of God: the Spirit symbolises the essential 
relatedness between God and humanity. 
In his Paths in Spirituality Macquarrie states that, fundamentally, 
"spirituality has to do with becoming ~ person in the fullest sense".16l 
Spiri tua1i ty implies a prior understanding of "Spirit", and 'Spirit' 
is a word evocative of dynamic imagery. Thus if spirituality is 
pre-eminently to do with personhood, the 'Spirit' may be perceived 
in terms of the relational being of personhood. Indeed, this governs 
Macquarrie's notion of Spirit as "Unitive Being". For Macquarrie, 
the Spirit is God present and active in the midst of 
the creation. This is a dynamic presence of God, who 
159. op. cit., p.63. 
160. Principles, p.20l. 
161. Macquarrie, Paths, p.40. 
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has corne forth into creation and is at work in it ... 
The Spirit is God corning forth into the creation to 
indwell it and to build it up. (162) 
It is this activity of "indwelling" and "building" which causes 
Macquarrie to determine the meaning of Spirit as "Unitive Being".163 
It is an activity of 'holding together', at an ontological level as 
well as at an ontic level, the beings that Being has let-be. 
Further, the work of the Spirit is the work of "maintaining" 
and "renewing" the unity - the authentic interrelatedness - of Being 
and th b · 164 e e1ngs . Thus it is, in such a capacity, "another aspect 
of the reconciling work of God, and so another aspect of the work of 
Christ" . 165 With each of the trinitarian symbols of Holy Being, the 
"work" or "activity" that they denote is , each in its own way, the 
"work of reconciliation". 
That Macquarrie ' s understanding of Spirit may be appropriately 
in t erpreted in relational terms can be seen by his statement that: 
From the beginning, the Spirit of God has been 
understood as God in the midst of men , God present 
and active in the world, God in his closeness to us 
as a dynamic reality shaping the lives and histories 
162. Principles, p.328. 
163. 0p. cit . , p . 329 . 
164 . op. cit. , pp.332f. 
165. op . cit. , p . 332 . 
109 
of men. The Spirit, in this sense, is not something 
other than God, but God in that manner of the divine 
Being in which he comes closest, dwells with us, acts 
upon us. (166) 
And, further, he states: 
Spirit is present in and constitutive of man, as well 
as God . The word points to the mysterious affinity 
that binds man to God, an affinity that has to be 
affirmed just as strongly as the otherness which 
differentiates God from man. (167) 
Now the question that immediately springs to mind is: What is 
this 'Spirit'? Or, to put it in ontological terminology, What 
constitutes this "unitive Being" that is common to both the beings 
and Holy Being? The answer must be that Spirit denotes the essential 
relationality of Being which is manifest in the beings. It is that 
by which Being may be comprehended as actively engaged with beings, 
and vice versa. In other words, "Spirit" denotes the common feature 
of essential relatedness of both mankind and God, of human being and 
Holy Being. For Macquarrie also writes: 
If we remember that the Spirit is God, in one of the 
modes or movements of holy Being, and not some mysterious 
entity other than God, then we also understand that he 
is God at his closest to us. He is Being as immanent in 
our creaturely being . (168) 
166. Paths, p . 42. 
167. ibid . 
168. Principles, p.333. 
110 
Spirit is also the "dimension" of being which constitutes the 
d ' ff b d h' 169 1 erence etween a person an a t 1ng. It is a dynamic form 
or mode of be ;ng.170 It' 'th " "b t " th ~ 1S not a 1ng or a su s ance ,ra er 
it "may be described as a capacity for going out of oneself and 
beyond oneself; or again, as the capacity for transcending oneself".l71 
Macquarrie agrees with Cyril Richardson that "the Spirit is not 
a 'thing' over against God, but a way of expressing God in his relation 
to ,,172 us . He states elsewhere: 
Spirit is in man as his deepest and truest self; but 
spirit is also around man as a divine influence that 
touches his life. Man is spirit, but God too is spirit, 
and spirit is thus the mysterious bond that links man 
and God. (173) 
In other words, Spirit is true personal being, It is therefore true 
relational being. It not only is the authentic being of the human, 
but refers also to the wider being, the relational matrix, in which 
the human being exists. Human spirit is relational just as the 
"Spirit" of God is relational. The "mysterious bond" is the very 
relationality of Holy Being. Macquarrie also calls Spirit "the form 
of the persona1,,174 and comments that the Spirit denotes "a hidden 
activity in the world, an activity that lies deeper than the unceasing 
175 physical processes of nature". In this latter connection he notes 
169. Paths, p.43. 
170. op. cit., p.44. 
171. ibid. 
172. Macquarrie, Scope, p.50. 
173. Humility, p.80. 
174. Paths, p.46. 
175. Macquarrie, Thinking, p.]23. 
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Ian Ramsay's comment that "discourse about the Spirit is a way of 
being articulate about God's initiating activity and our responsive 
activity". 176 
The theme that "Spirit" stands for God's activity within the 
world is a recurrent one. It denotes the fundamental relationality 
of Holy Being that permeates, infuses and underlies the actual exist-
ence of the world. But this relationality is not simply a one-way 
activity. It involves a responding activity. It denotes the 
interrelatedness of Being and the beings whereby initiative and 
response are to be seen as the two necessary components of the one 
relational activity. Relationship is a two-way process . 
For Macquarrie, the Holy Spirit "is God's coming to man .. . it is 
the awakening in man of the realization of his kinship with Being, 
an awakening brought about by Being itself that is already immanent 
in man" . l77 This discussion of Macquarrie ' s understanding of Spirit 
has awoken us to the view, implicit in Macquarrie ' s work, that as 
symbolic of Being the third person of the Trinity pre-eminently 
denotes the relationality of Holy Being. 
IV . DISCUSSION 
Macquarrie ' s existential-ontological theism designates God as 
"Holy Being", which is amenable to a relational interpretation . 
Indeed, Macquarrie conceives of God in distinctly relational terms. 
176 . I . Ramsay, Models of Divine Activity, p.13, cited in J. 
Macquarrie, Thinking, p.123. 
177 . Principles, p.333. 
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In Chapter Three I shall explore further this relational motif . 
The immediate task is to draw the present exposition and discussion 
of Macquarrie's thinking on God to a close. 
Existential-ontological theism may be briefly described as a 
theism arising from the dual analyses of human existence and the 
meaning of Being. The doctrine of God is "central and pervasive,,178 
and is therefore the fulcrum for Macquarrie ' s theology as a whole. 
However, the starting point for his theological investigation is the 
phenomenological analysis of human existence. The existential 
analytic leads to the question of "wider Being" in which human 
existence is set. Human being is shown to be relational being. 
The existentialist approach, which looks "to the whole man in his 
active concerns with the world179 portrays the human self as inter-
active agent. The thrust of Macquarrie's view, I suggest, is that 
the human self finds its identity within the matrix of relationships 
in which it exists. This relationality is incorporated into ontolog-
ical identity. The self is not conceived by Macquarrie as an inert 
substance or an enduring solidity, but rather as a relational 
dynamic entity. The analysis of the negative existentialia also 
demonstrate this relational structure of human existence. 
Although Macquarrie begins with the existential perspective he 
moves beyond a doctrinaire existential theology per se. The 
178. G.S. Hendry, "Untimely Systems", Prine. S.B. LXII, Summer 1969: 
15. 
179. Macquarrie, Studies, p.63. 
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existentialist perspective "provides the necessary foundation"l80 
for his theological structure. The term "existential-ontological" 
means that "what is most profoundly true about human nature ... is not 
merely a subjective feeling from which religious reflection may begin, 
but is also a true awareness of something other than ourselves".18l 
Thus Macquarrie's existential-ontological analysis is the 
necessary precursor to the development of his existential-ontological 
theism. However, there is a note of equivocation in his thinking on 
Being. On the one hand revelation is analysed in terms of existential 
relational event: on the other hand it is also a disclosure of some-
thing. "Revelation" embraces both form and content. The problem 
is that Macquarrie wishes to speak of 'being' as the content of 
revelation, yet "being" is not some thing: it is not itself an entity 
that may be revealed. Does this mean that what is revealed is not 
itself something other-than the relational structure of the revelatory 
event? If this were the case then Macquarrie would be advocating a 
wholly immanentist ontological answer. All that would be revealed 
would be the relationality of the existence of the recipient of the 
"revelation". But Macquarrie does not intend this. He wishes to 
say that there is something, other than the being of the recipient, 
that is revealed in the revelatory encounter, viz, a "wholly other" 
mysterium tremendum fascinans which is yet intimately related to 
the recipient. 182 Thus, despite his disclaimer that "being" is not 
180. S. Ogden, Review of Principles, Union S.Q.R. 22, March 1967:263; 
cf. Macquarrie, Studies, pp.lOff. 
181. Editorial review of Principles, Exp.T. 78, June 1967. 
182. cf. Principles, pp.87ff. 
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a "thing", not an "entity", nonetheless his existential analysis of 
revelation indicates that something is revealed; some entity is 
encountered; some relator initiates a relationship. 
The point I would make at this juncture is that it is not the 
relational form of revelation that is also the content, but rather 
the relational form indicates the relationality of the content. Thus 
by attending to the ontological dimension of the existential analysis 
of revelation we may gain a perspective on the ontology of the content . 
Macquarrie's analysis of revelation yields insight into both the 
essential relational structure of human being and also the ontological 
relatedness of the "other" which is encountered within the revelation. 
Macquarrie's use of the term 'Being' in distinction from ~ being -
as itself the key to his own hermeneutic - is both confusing and yet 
pregnant with interpretative possibility. Of the convergence of 
existential and ontological languages in theology Macquarrie writes: 
In the existential language, God is talked of in 
terms of the goals and ideals of existence, as 
summum bonum, ultimate concern, absolute love or 
whatever the expression may be. In ontological 
language he is talked of as Being. (183) 
Now Macquarrie's use of the language of Being is not without 
its critics. James Richmond, for example, attacks Macquarrie's use 
183. Studies, p.95. 
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of 'Being' as theologically inapposite.1 84 But he overlooks the 
existential grounding of Macquarrie's use and development of his 
ontological language: Macquarrie is certainly not engaged in armchair 
metaphysical speculation. He is seeking to ground the concept of 
God in existentially relevant language. Noting himself the standard 
criticism of the existential approach as "subjective" and no more 
than descriptive of emotional states, Macquarrie points out that the 
starting point of his approach is "never a bare subject but a self 
that is already involved with a world", and he notes that "an existent 
self is inconceivable except as it is in interaction with a real world 
and with other real se1ves".185 Thus the re1ationa1ity of the onto-
logical analytic is present even in the existential starting point. 
Schubert Ogden is another who appears to miss the point when he 
criticises Macquarrie's existential starting point. He asks: "Surely 
the only starting point for an existential-ontological theology is 
existence and being in their original and indissoluble correlation".186 
Quite so. But then it is by starting with the existential analysis, 
as Macquarrie does, that this "indissoluble correlation" is indeed 
demonstrated. Furthermore, as my own analysis of Macquarrie's work 
has tried to show, the findings of the existential-ontological analytic 
are demonstrative of the relational motif. This motif - or hermeneutic -
best illuminates the meaning of Macquarrie's existential-ontological 
theism. This becomes particularly apposite at the point where 
184. J. Richmond, Review of Princip1es,J:Th.St. 19, April 1968: 
391-395. 
185. Studies, p.79. 
186. Ogden, Review, p.264. 
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Macquarrie wishes to speak of God as Holy Being. For 'Holy' and 
'Being ' are implicitly relational: the more so when these words are 
conjoined to form the existential-ontological term for God. "Holy 
Being" denotes the relationality of Being that impinges, judges, and 
so on, - that is, that relates to beings. 
I would have a criticism of Macquarrie in that he engages in 
what amounts to terminological re-interpretation or translation 
rather than a radical re-casting of the doctrine of God, which, in 
some ways, he suggests is what he seeks to do. Macquarrie's exist-
ential-ontological theism in the end simply replaces 'God' with 
'Holy Being' as the terminological locus for 'divine' ascriptions 
and attributes. Yet, following Heidegger, he claims to seek to over-
corne any sense in which God or Being may be conceived as ~ being, 
that is, as an entity. He finds in Heidegger a paradigm for theol-
ogical discourse and thinking,187 but his focus on the later 
Heidegger with regard to the language of Being is to the detriment 
of the use that could be made of the relational hermeneutic derived 
from the early Heidegger of Being and Time. He is aware, though, 
that Heidegger's language "advances from being a language about man's 
being to becoming a language about that wider Being in which man lives 
and moves and has his being".188 Thus ontological relationality is 
indirectly acknowledged, but not directly taken up and made use of 
by Macquarrie. 
187. cf. e.g. Studies, p.93. cf. also A.D. Galloway, Review of 
God-Talk, by J. Macquarrie, Exp.T. 78, August 1967:332. 
188. Studies, p.94. 
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Although 'Being' is not identified with God, yet 'Being' may be 
189 
spoken of as incomparable, mys~ery, wonder etc. Kelly notes that, 
for Macquarrie, language of being acts as a bridge between finite 
reality and God. Heidegger's distinction between Being and ~ being 
"allows the Christian to identify Being with God".190 Macquarrie's 
appeal to Heidegger is asserted, rather than argued. Ogden also notes 
there is difficulty with this distinction, particularly in the theol-
ogical context. Indeed he feels that Macquarrie has been misled by 
his "almost complete dependence" on Heidegger. 19l Of course, Being 
is qualified in its 'identification' with God. The problem, which 
exacerbates the criticism that Macquarrie has translated rather than 
re-thought the notion of God, is that the 'qualifier' brings with it 
all the variety of divine ascriptions. 
On the one hand Macquarrie is trying to avoid the criticism that 
'God" . 1 for B' 192 On th th h d h' 1 t t 1S S1mp Y a name e1ng. e 0 er an e 1S re uc an 
to speak of the being of God as such for he does not wish to use onto-
logical language in that way. Ogletree notes that the difficulty in 
using ontological language in theology on the grounds of possible 
"'11 't' h .. of the verb 'to be,,,.193 1 egl lmate ypostatlzatlon He comments: 
"At times it seems that the category of being must be apprehended in 
some sort of immediate mystical vision, or not understood at a1l".194 
189. op. cit., p.88f. 
190. D.H. Kelsey, Review of God-Talk by J. Macquarrie, Th. Today 25, 
October 1968:397. 
191. Ogden, Review, p.264. 
192. cf. J.H. Gill, Review of God-Talk by J. Macquarrie, Interp, 
April 1968:240-242. 
193. Ogletree, p.342. 
194. ibid. 
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In terms of his ontological analysis "Being" means that dynamic 
activity of "letting-be" which is present, and manifestly discernible, 
in existent being. The meaning of Being is relational in that it is 
inclusive of becoming; it denotes that relationality whereby ontic 
reality exists; it is, in other words, the ontological relatedness 
of existent being. Yet a note of equivocation is again struck. For 
in its meaning Being certainly is not understood as an entity by 
Macquarrie. But in terms of what it is,as implied in the manner 
whereby Macquarrie speaks of Being, it is the "incomparable", the 
"that which" engages in the ontological activity of letting-be. 
In reference to the language of the later Heidegger, Macquarrie 
says "Being stands to the entities as the wholly other, the 
t d "195 pansoen ens •.• On the one hand by "Being" is meant empowering 
"letting-be"; on the other hand Being is "the incomparable (that) 
which" does the letting-be. The implication is that there is a sense 
in which "Being" is yet other than the descriptive relational meaning 
Macquarrie gives it. Certainly he does not equate the content of 
Being with "substance", for "substance denotes something static: it 
has 'thinghood' as its model".196 But it is equally certain that 
despite his disclaimer to the contrary, it would seem that "Being" 
is conceived by Macquarrie, at times at least, as some "entity", 
some "thing", albeit an incomparable, transcendent "entity" or 
"thing". 
195. Studies, p.ll. 
196. Principles, p.109. 
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It seems to me that Macquarrie's analytic results in an onto-
logical conundrum. Identified as the mystePium tremendum fascinans~ 
Being is clearly an 'entity', or at least may only be spoken of in 
entity-type language: it is an "other", the "that which ... " It is 
an incomparable something, though nonetheless a relating one. There 
is an apparent disjunction between the relationality of the meaning, 
and the identity of the content, of Being. Macquarrie himself 
endeavours to resolve this disjunction by appealing to the linguistic 
context. Long expresses Macquarrie's position thus: 
assertions about Being cannot refer to or picture 
Being in the same way that assertions may be said 
to refer to or picture empirical facts or beings . 
Being is in some sense transcendent to beings. On 
the other hand, assertions about Being cannot be 
properly understood in such a way as to be completely 
other than assertions about beings. (197) 
The problem of expressing the reality of Being is a problem of 
linguistic limitation, together with the problem of confusing 
ontological and ontic discourse. To speak of that which is revealed 
is to engage in ontic discourse - i.e . language about 'things', 
existent entities and so on . Phrases such as "the incomparable" or 
"that which" used in reference to "being" introduce a notion of ontic 
identity which cannot be satisfactorily ameliorated by reference to 
197 . E.T. Long, "John Macquarrie on Language, Being, and God", R.Met. 
XXX, December 1976:263. 
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symbolism and symbolic language. So despite his disclaimer to the 
contrary, "Being" is still some "thing" to be encountered, understood 
or explained, as some thing. Although, like Heidegger, Macquarrie 
understands Being as that which discloses beings as beings, and that 
also Being manifests itself in relation to beings, he has not broken 
free of an essentially referential approach to the use of Being-
language. 
Macquarrie would agree that "Being" does not refer to some 'thing ' 
as in an incomparable something that "lets-be". However, I am suggest-
ing that "Being" may be fruitfully understood relationaly. Thus 
whatever it is that is the"incomparable" that lets-be may itself be 
ontologically understood in relational terms. 
Understanding Macquarrie's approach to his theological task as 
symbolic re-interpretation rather than radical re-thinking, gives a 
perspective on his endeavour to explicate an essentially orthodox 
trinitarianism in terms of his existential-ontological theism. Again, 
however, there is an apparent duality, or ambiguity, in his thinking. 
For the Trinity is said to be, on the one hand, an (existential) 
symbol, yet, on the other, it is an ontological statement about God 
in himse1f. 198 Macquarrie has not reconciled the economic and the 
immanent Trinity in any clear fashion. 
In traditional understanding, "the three persons of the triunity 
are inseparable, and no one of them exists or acts in isolation".199 
198. See above, p.93f. 
199. Macquarrie, Thinking, p.125. 
{ 
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Such a statement implies that trinitarian language is not just 
symbolic but is also ontological: to speak of God as three persons 
in a unity is to speak of the being of God. The ontological implicat-
ion appears to be that God is a substance - i.e. ~ being - who is 
known in three different modes, or experienced in three different 
ways or types of relationship. However, Macquarrie draws attention 
to the Thomistic understanding that, with respect to God, substance, 
or essence, is identical with Being - not ~ being. Thus he argues 
that 
if the three persons are of one substance, and this 
'substance' is Being, we are again directed to the 
understanding of God as Being, rather than ~ being, 
and likewise directed to understanding Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit in terms of Being rather than as three 
beings. (200) 
Now, although Macquarrie dismisses the 'social analogy' as 
unsatisfactory,201 he does concede its worth "in reminding us that 
because of the inescapable social dimension in man, any analogy 
b .' . ." 202 etween God and man must have In VIew man-In-communIty . In other 
words, analogous to the essential re1ationa1ity of human being of 
which he is the creative source, God is likewise to be understood 
in relational terms. This does not mean that the trinitarian symbols 
are themselves discrete 'relators' and that 'God' is constituted by 
a community of these three as a kind of divine triumvirate. Rather 
200. Principles , p.192. 
201. op. cit., p.194. 
202. ibid. 
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the relatedness that comprises the being of God is manifest ln 
relationship with the world, mankind, and so on. 
Clearly the trinitarian symbols do not refer to individual 
persons in any modern sense of the word 'person' for that would amount 
to tri-theism. However, they may yet be conceived as expressive of 
the essential relationality of the God whom Macquarrie wants to call 
"holy Being". In this regard the three persons symbolise the related-
ness of Holy Being: they are ciphers for the ways in which this 
relatedness is made manifest. The symbolism of the Trinity denotes 
the dynamic reality of God: it thus denotes essential relationality. 
The 'persons' of the Trinity are not so much descriptive of some inner 
life of the Godhead or an essential internal relatedness appropriate 
to God. Rather they are symbolic of the relations that necessarily 
hold between God and the World and between God and humankind. 
Thus, ontologically, the Trinity on Macquarrie's terms would 
appear to express the ad extra relationality of Holy Being. But 
again there appears to be some confusion as to whether Macquarrie 
is addressing the economic Trinity or the Immanent Trinity, or 
whether, in fact, he implicitly reconciles the two. On the one hand 
his language of "Primordial", "Expressive" and "Unitive" Being suggests 
he is addressing the Immanent Trinity, that he is, indeed, describing 
the 'being' of God. On the other hand, he wishes to say that this 
ontological designation reveals the movement of the relatedness of 
Holy Being towards beings. Thus the "Primordial" Father, the 
"Expressive" Son and the "Unitive" Spirit are modes of Holy Being's 
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economic relatedness. But then, the 'Father', as Primordial Being, 
"is unknowable in and of itself": it cannot be one of Holy Being's 
ad extra relational modes which is ipso faato knowable in its relat-
edness. Does this not suggest that Macquarrie means by "Primordial 
Being" the ontological fundament of Holy Being - a kind of 'Being' 
behind the manifested Holy Being? Or does this symbol simply denote 
an aspect of 'wholly otherness' which is part and parcel of any 
relating entity? 
Then again, what is the implication for the 'Father' when the 
Son - expressive Being - is understood as agent of and for Primordial 
Being? Does this imply that the reality of God is in fact denoted 
by the 'Father' symbol? Does this mean that the reality of Holy Being 
resides in Primordial Being such that Expressive Being is merely 
derivative and thus ontologically subordinate? 
Similarly, , Spirit' - unitive Being - implies that which relates 
directly to the beings is other than Primordial Being. Does this mean 
it is not the Father who is relationally engaged, but the Spirit? Or 
is it that 'Spirit' symbolizes the relationality of Holy Being which, 
in its relating, is co-equally Father, Son and Spirit? Kelly notes 
Macquarrie's "lack of precision" in this regard. 203 The question is 
whether the 'persons' of the Trinity are modes of the relationality 
of Holy Being as such, or indicative of different relational encounters 
between the beings and Holy Being such that Holy Being is manifest as 
three different relating entities? On the latter view, there would 
203. A.J. Kelly, "Trinity and Process", Th.St. 31, September 1970:400 
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need to be specific relationships that hold between beings and each 
of Primordial, Expressive, and Unitive Being. On the former view, 
an individual particular being would relate to Holy Being in its 
entirety: the relatedness of immanence expressed in terms of unitive 
Being; the otherness of transcendence expressed in primordial Being; 
and the unity of the two conjoined in expressive Being. On the whole 
it would appear that this is the view Macquarrie favours. Indeed this 
view is in accordance with the maxim operaa ad extraa indivisa sunt. 
As expressive Being, Jesus Christ is understood by Macquarrie 
to be paradigmatic of personal Being: he is the focus of the re1ation-
ality of Holy Being. Thus "expressive" Being, in itself, is a 
thoroughly relational concept. As unitive Being the Spirit denotes 
the relational diversity and i nteractive presence of Holy Being. 
It signifies the activity of Holy Being which is, fundamentally, the 
diverse activity of relationship. "Holy Spirit" stands for the 
essential and intimate relatedness of God to his creation: it signifies, 
ontologically, the relationality of Being with the beings that are 
let-be. 
Existential-ontological theism hinges on the attempt to re-think 
the doctrine of God in terminology derived from Heidegger. The major 
flaw in this attempt is that it becomes more of an effort in symbolic 
re-interpretation: it misses out on offering a radically new ontological 
understanding of God. To that extent Macquarrie clothes traditional 
theism in an esoteric ontological language. As a result he is 
criticised for being too existential and lacking in empiricism204 on 
204. W.J. Samarin, Review of God-Talk by J. Macquarrie, in Chr.T. 12, 
October 1967:34-36. 
125 
the one hand, and propounding "a theological-philosophical ontology, 
but not a theology of Christian revelation,,205 on the other. 
O'Connor finds that Macquarrie ' s "proposed marriage of Heideggerianism 
and Christianity cannot work in any radical sense".206 
As a name for something, "God" cannot be equated with "Being", 
however existentially qualified, where "Being" is a non-entitative 
term. However, the relationality inherent in Being and the relation-
ality implicit in Macquarrie 's theism, provide the impetus for 
exploring the possibility of an ontological-relational concept of 
God derivable, at least in part, from existential-ontological theism. 
205. K. Runia, Review of Principles in Ref.Th.R. 26, September -
December 1967:112-114. 
206. D. O'Connor, "Some Remarks on Professor Macquarrie's Philosophy 
of Death", Exp.T. 88, July 1977:311. Although O'Connor has 
arrived at his conclusion on the basis of an existential dis-
cussion on one aspect of Macquarrie's theism, the same could be 
said, I contend, on the basis of the examination of existentia1-
ontological theism as such. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HOLY BEING : THE RELATIONAL GOD OF 
EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL THEISM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The exposition of existential-ontological theism now turns to 
take account of specific motifs of divinity with a view to further 
exploring the relational interpretation of Macquarrie 's doctrine of 
God. Accordingly, I will examine, in Section II below, how Macquarrie 
understands divine attribute per se ~ together with the relations 
that are traditionally accepted as holding between God and Creation. 
In the third section I shall examine Macquarrie's discussion of the 
Imago Dei, which may be understood in terms of implicit reflected 
relationality. The relational interpretation of existential-
ontological theism finds focus in this concept. 
Attention will then turn to a discussion of how Macquarrie 
understands the 'otherness , and 'presence' of God, and this will be 
followed by an examination of his treatment of the 'activity' and 
'responsiveness' of God. These four motifs directly support the 
thesis that God may be ontologically conceived in relational terms 
because they are the marks, sine qua non~ of a relating 'entity' 
or "relator". 
In order that one entity relates to or with another entity each 
must be distinct from the other. There needs to be, indeed, another 
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to relate to. Yet at the same time each entity must be present to 
the other in order that a relationship may be effected. Furthermore, 
an entity which meets these two criteria must, if it is to actually 
engage in relationships, be seen to be an "active" entity and that 
such activity is "relational" - that is, activity effected in and 
through actual relationships. Any entity that is "other" yet "present", 
and that engages in relational activity must, if it is to be apprehended 
as capable of authentic two-way relationship, also be seen to be a 
"responsive" entity. An authentically relating entity is an entity 
which responds to other entities: responsiveness is as much a mark 
of the ability to relate as is the facility to be "active" and the 
requirement to be "other" yet "present". 
Thus in moving toward a concept of God in relational terms, or 
understanding God as, ontologically, He-who-is-in-relation, the four 
marks of a relator indicated above will be seen to hold true neces-
sarily. Indeed, these marks will furnish insight into the nature of 
the relationality by which God is to be ontologically conceptualized. 
II. ATTRIBUTE AND RELATION 
Any discussion of the doctrine of God cannot help but take 
cognizance of what is meant by "divine attribute". This is certainly 
no less the case in the examination of Macquarrie's doctrine of God. 
Attributes are held to speak of God as he is in himself. Yet, they 
can only be spoken by analogy with respect to the putative relationship 
between world and God. Therefore it is appropriate to discuss the 
notion of "divine attribute", as such, in conjunction with an analysis 
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of the general and formal relationship between God and the World. 
Thus, I shall not embark upon a comprehensive and detailed discussion 
of the variou~ particular attributes of deity.l The concern here is 
to determine how "attribute", as a category of theological discourse, 
is understood and used by Macquarrie. 
With respect to "divine attribute", Malcolm Diamond has commented 
that Macquarrie speaks in terms that are a "splice of Whiteheadian 
2 
metaphysics and existentialist anthropology". Noting Macquarrie's 
rejection of static views of God based on the idea of "substance", 
Diamond points out that, for Macquarrie, this particular existential 
interpretation of attributes makes more coherent "the traditional 
Christian emphasis on the love of God". In other words, Diamond 
suggests Macquarrie's aim is to so interpret particular divine 
attributes that the reality of the loving relatedness of God is made 
manifest. Thus any given attribute is a cipher for the relatedness 
of God. 
However, in 'God 'and 'Secularity, Macquarrie notes that the term 
3 
"attribute" conjures up, at least initially, the notion of 'property'. 
An attribute such as omniscience may be understood as a property of 
God. It is a quality predicated of the being of God just as a property, 
such as rationality, is predicated of human being. Thus to discover 
1. A discussion of some particular attributes is incorporated in 
Sections IV and V below. 
2. M.L. Diamond, Review of God-Talk by J. Macquarrie, Rel.St. S, 
October 1969:117-119. 
3. Macquarrie, Secularity, p.116. 
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what any particular attribute means one would need to analyze the 
property it signifies as it is predicated of God. However, 
Macquarrie notes that 
to do this would be to go on the assumption that God 
is an entity or a thing or a substance of some kind to 
which properties can be ascribed, and . . . contemporary 
theism cannot think of him in this way. (4) 
Therefore, for Macquarrie, God, understood as Holy Being, is not to 
be thought of as a being to which any properties may be predicated 
in the first place. Hence he states "one must resist the tendency 
to suppose that one could analyze and exhibit the properties of God 
as one might do in the case of the properties of any being within the 
world".5 So, then, if divine attributes are not to be understood 
as properties descriptive of God as such, how are they to be understood? 
Macquarrie suggests that attributes are to be taken as "symbols 
that point obliquely to some aspect or other of the mystery of God".6 
Now this could be taken to indicate that, in broad terms, attributes 
symbolise the relatedness of God. That is to say, for Macquarrie, 
specific attributes denote not so much a feature of God as he is in 
the himself: indeed, by implication from/above, God is not such of which 
it could be said he is 'in . himself' . Rather attributes symbolize the 
relatedness which allows us to speak of relations holding between God 
and the world in the first place. "Attributes" describe the 
4. ibid. 
S. ibid. 
6. Secularity, p.117. 
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relationality of Holy Being. The particular relations that hold 
between God and the World are "strands" in the relational matrix 
which is constitutive of Holy Being. Holy Being is thus conceived 
both in terms of 'letting-be' and in terms of the essential related-
ness that holds between Being and the beings. 
By way of demonstration I shall consider what Macquarrie has to 
say concerning his reference to "divine attributes in relation to the 
mystery of God".7 The mystery of Being resides, he claims, in its 
"incomparability". The mystery of God is also denoted by reference 
to him as the "incomparable". Incomparability is an attribute 
descriptive of the "being" of God as beyond categories of comparison. 
But for Macquarrie an attribute is not a property predicated of God. 
Thus 'properties' such as incomparability cannot be attributively 
ascribed to God. Nonetheless he concludes that such 'attributes' are 
indicative of the fact that God is both hidden and manifest: "Our 
highest attributes fall short, yet in so far as they make God unhidden 
8 they are true". 
So such an attribute does not describe directly some facet of 
the being of God in a substantive sense. Rather, because an attribute 
essentially denotes relationality, then an attribute indicative of 
the mystery of God thereby directs attention to the fundamental 
relatedness of Holy Being. Therefore the 'incomparability' of God 
denotes the essential relationality of God which equates with the 
7. Macquarrie, Principles, p.203. 
8. op. cit., p.204. 
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ontological relationality of Holy Being. Macquarrie is interpreted 
as saying, in effect, that the authenticity of an attribute is 
determined by the degree to which it authentically presents God-in-
relation. We may conclude, then, that divine attributes are to be 
formally understood as denoting the relations which are constitutive 
and expressive of the ontological relationality of Holy Being. 
If the term "divine attribute" may be so conceived as indicative 
of a relational concept of God, what then may be derived from the 
discussion Macquarrie has concerning the relation between God and 
Creation? What does his view on the putative relationship between 
God and the world tell us about his understanding of God? 
To expound a Christian understanding of God necessarily requires 
recourse to the relation of God and world. Macquarrie writes: 
The God of Christian faith is not a God who is 
undifferentiated self-enclosed Being - indeed, it is 
doubtful if such Being could be called 'God', and 
certainly we could never know anything about it. The 
God of the Christian faith is a dynamic God who goes 
out into a world of beings. (9) 
This dynamism has been expressed by the notion of "letting-be". It 
is not a 'deistic' notion: letting-be is not a singular act in time 
but the formal designation of the primordial relation between Being 
and beings. In its particular manifestation in actual relationships, 
9. op. cit., p.211. 
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relational Being - as Holy Being, or God - necessarily involves 
relationship with the world of created (let-be) beings. For such 
relationship is constitutive of the Being that lets-be. Therefore 
we may reasonably expect to gain an increased awareness and under-
standing of the relationality of Being if we consider the relationship 
of beings to Holy Being. In theological language, we may gain an 
understanding of God in relation to creation if, from the vantage 
point of standing within creation, we examine something of creation's 
relation to God. 
Macquarrie writes that "Being is inseparable from beings" yet 
he recognizes "a priority of Being over beings".lO Thus, 
Being is the transcendens~ it is already thought with 
every being, it is the condition that there may be any 
beings whatsoever. A being is a being in virtue of the 
fact that it is, but Being is not something that is but 
rather the letting-be that is prior to any is-ness. So 
while Being may be inseparable from beings, it is never-
theless the fons et origo of all beings. The beings are 
subordinate to and dependent on Being, which lets them 
be. This letting-be is the creativity of Being, and the 
dependence of the beings is their creatureliness. (11) 
The question of the relationship between beings and Being - or 
between creation and God - is not a question of originating source. 
10. ibid. 
11. ibid. 
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It is not a case of "the production of beings that belong in the world 
by a being who is outside the world".12 Rather it is a question of 
the relational status of beings: the question of "What does it mean 
to be a creature?,,13 Macquarrie concludes that "the basic meaning 
14 
of creatureliness is dependence". This is a way of denoting the 
ontological relationality of the creature. So the first conclusion 
to be made about the God-World relation is that God is related to 
the world ~ Holy Being on which beings depend as the continuous source 
and ground of their let-be-ness. 
15 . In one particular discussion of God and the World Macquarrle 
addresses a variety of models "on which the complex God-World relation 
can be understood".16 The "monarchical model" has stressed the trans-
cendence of God and his priority over the world. It is an "assymetrical 
relation" and finds expression in statements such as 
The world needs God, but God has no need of the world; 
God affects the world, but the world does not affect 
God; the world owes everything to God but God is not 
increased by the world. (17) 
An alternative to this long-standing model is the "organic model" which 
in many respects suggests a more symmetrical relationship between God 
and the world. 
12. Principles, p.2l2. 
13. ibid (Italics mine) 
14. Principles, p.2l3. 
15. Macquarrie, Thinking, pp.llOff. 
16. Thinking, p.lll; cf. Principles, pp.2l7ff. cf. J. Macquarrie, 
"Creation and Environment", Exp.T. 78, October 1971:4-9. 
17. Thinking, p.lll. See also pp.146ff. 
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The organic model does not abolish the ideas of 
transcendence and priority of God, yet it qualifies 
them, and it tends to see God and the world as 
distinguishable but not separable within an organic 
whole that embraces them. So on this view it might 
be held, for instance, that a God who is outgoing love 
cannot be conceived without a creation; or again, that 
a God of love must in some sense be vulnerable, so that 
he is affected by his creation as well as affecting it. (18) 
The organic model acknowledges and takes account of the reciprocity 
of relationship. The relationality of Holy Being comprises a complex 
of initiation and response. Macquarrie concludes his discussion on 
God and the world by stating: 
We may say that God and the world are not identical, but 
they are much more intimately related to each other than 
much traditional theology has allowed. If we know God 
at all, it is in and through worldly realities - where 
else?" (19) 
We know God in and through the interrelatedness of the world to 
God and God to world. It is in both the "worldly realities" - the 
beings - that manifest Being, and our awareness of the Being that is 
so present and manifest in these realities, that we may apprehend 
Being as Holy. How Macquarrie understands the relationship of God 
18. Thinking, p.lll; cf. Principles, pp.120f. 
19. Thinking, p.120. 
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to world is thus indicative of the inherent relationality in his 
understanding of God. 
In his small book of meditations entitled The Humility of God 
the focus of Macquarrie's thinking is on God's "involvement" in the 
20 life of his creatures. Now such involvement speaks of intimate 
relatedness marked by the qualities of care, concern, and love. 
Macquarrie notes that the word 'created', as indicative of the relation 
of God to the world, signifies the relation of ongoing and sustaining 
. 1 21 Invo vement. He states "God was never an absentee God, dwelling 
apart from his creation. From the beginning, he has been deeply 
involved with his creation".22 Thus the God of which Macquarrie 
speaks is a God whose being is to-be-in-relation: a God who, as Holy 
Being, is relational Being. "Involvement" is itself a term expressive 
of the essential relatedness of God. 
Holy Being is manifest in the particular relations in which 
creation stands to God. "Man and the world belong alike to God".23 
The being of the human and the being of the world are alike in that 
they are structurally relational. Humankind and the world as such 
each manifest the relationality of Being, and each relates to that 
Being in the mode of dependency and belonging. That this is so is 
expressed by J.Z. Young who comments that: 
All of us, animals, plants and bacteria, form one closely 
interlocked network of ecological relationships. It is 
20. Macquarrie, The Humility of God. 
21. op. cit., p.3f. 
22. op. cit., p.19. 
23. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.84. 
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easy to elevate these facts into a pretentious scheme 
of the whole living world as one 'organism '. Yet there 
is a sense in which this is true. It is difficult to 
exaggerate our interdependence. (24) 
This interdependence of ecological relationships is a function of the 
relationality of Being. It manifests the reality of ontological 
relatedness. 
The relation of God to the world is also expressed by the concept 
of 'Providence'. In Macquarrie's understanding "the assertion of 
God's providence is just another way of asserting his constant creating 
25 
and sustaining energy". This is but one way of asserting that the 
beings are continuously dependent on the Being that lets them be. 
Yet this is not a passive dependency. The Being on which beings are 
dependent is actively engaged in the relatedness that constitutes 
this dependency. Macquarrie remarks that: 
Belief in providence ... is founded existentially. It is 
through happenings that increase and strengthen our 
being ... that we come to believe in providence; and we 
do so because in these happenings we have become aware 
of the presence of Being, acting on us and in us, and 
giving itself to us. (26) 
24. An Introduction to the Study of Man, London: Oxford University 
Press 1971, p.640, cited in Macquarrie, Thinking About God, 
p.139. 
25. Principles, p.239. 
26. op. cit., p.241. 
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The "happenings" are, of course, instances within existence 
and history. The strengthening of our being that results from these 
happenings is none other than the strengthening of the authentic 
relatedness of beings with Being. But it is a strengthening that 
takes place because of the active agency - i.e. the intentional 
relating - of Holy Being. The concept of providence denotes the 
awarness of the particular and intentional relationality of Holy 
Being towards the beings, as distinct from the general condition of 
Being as present and manifest in and through all beings. In other 
words, God "is present and active in the whole world process".27 
III. I~GO DEI: REFLECTED RELATIONALITY 
It could be said that Christian life, belief, and practice, has 
as its aim the fullness of personal being - "life abundant". In this 
regard Macquarrie comments that 
God is not glorified through the denigration of man or 
by having man abased before him. On the contrary, he 
is glorified as man attains a being more nearly conformed 
to the image of God. (28) 
The notion of abundant life as promised by Christ29 and understood 
in terms of the fullness of personal being, is intimately inter-
related with the notion of God's glorification through humankind. 
27. op. cit., p.247. 
28. Macquarrie, Paths, p.7. 
29. e.g. John 10:10. 
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The "glory" of God denotes "the very depth of his being".30 
God's glorification is thus the manifestation of this ontological 
depth. That which glorifies God is therefore that which authentically 
manifests and presents, in and through its own being, the reality 
and depth of God's Being. Now humankind may so glorify God, 
Macquarrie is saying, to the extent it 'conforms to', or authenti-
cally represents, the "image" of God. 
The doctrine of the Imago Dei is usually associated with the 
doctrine of Man 31 rather than with a discussion of the doctrine of 
God. However, if it is such that that which is authentically imaged 
in man is the depth of the being of God, then clearly a discussion 
of what it is that is so "imaged" is of direct relevance to a dis-
cussion of God. Thus the issue of the Imago Dei involves the twofold 
question of the meaning and the content of that which is so imaged. 
The particular concern with respect to the present work is to ask 
what Macquarrie means by the Imago Dei, and does this have any bear-
ing upon the attempt to formulate a concept of God in relational terms. 
The attainment of fuller being for the human being amounts to 
the process of conforming to the "image of God". That is to say, 
God is reflected in the fullness of the being that is appropriate to 
human being. Now, on the basis of the relational interpretation of 
Macquarrie thus far, this "fullness" is none other than the fullness 
30. H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans 1979, 
p.301. 
31. cf. A. Richardson (ed), Dictionary of Christian Theology, London: 
SCM 1969, p.202. 
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of relational being. That "being" which is more nearly conformed to 
the image of God is, indeed, personal being, or human being understood 
in its relational plenitude. The fulfilment of human being as personal 
being is the fulfilment of authentic interrelated existence. 
Macquarrie remarks that "If man is, as Christianity asserts, a 
creature of God and dependent on him, then this should show itself in 
32 
a study of man". This implies that if human being does indeed image 
Holy Being then it would surely follow that to conclude that the being 
of the human is relational being gives grounds for the understanding 
f G d · hI' 1 33 o 0 1n t ose same re at10na terms. The Imago Dei is not just 
saying something about human being but also something of the God whose 
image is present and manifest in the being of the human. 
In Macquarrie's language human being is one of the beings that 
are let-be by Being. But human being is also the particular locus of 
Holy Being. In other words, in distinction from the rest of creation 
only humankind is made in the image of God. Now this is a recognition 
that the personal being that most properly denotes human being is itself 
and as such the essential mark of affinity between human being and Holy 
Being; between, that is, humankind and God. 34 The relationality of 
personal being is the relationality not just of the human being as 
such but also of the Being in whose "image" human being is let-be: 
"man is disclosed in his creaturely relation to God, the ground of 
his being".35 
32. Macquarrie, Studies, p.5. 
33. cf. Studies, p.9: The understanding of humanity involves implicitly 
the understanding of God. 
34. cf. Existentialist Theology, p.17. 
35. op. cit., p.140. 
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Macquarrie notes that the doctrine of human being made in the 
image of God is the theological expression of the biblical claim for 
humanity of a "distinctive place in the creation".36 He also notes, 
significantly, that the philosophical expression of this distinctive-
ness is connoted by the term "existence". He writes: 
The full meaning of the claim that man is made in the 
image of God can be better conveyed in the contemporary 
language of "existence". What distinguishes man from 
other creatures is that he 'exists', and to exist is to 
have an openness, which is perhaps the best clue to the 
mysterious affinity of God and man. Just as God opens 
himself into the creation and pours out being, and 
therefore has 'letting-be' as his essence, so man is 
most truly himself and realizes his essence in the open-
ness of an existence in which he too can let be, in 
responsibility, in creativity, and in love. (37) 
In other words the very relationality of human being encountered earlier 
is to be seen in the context of understanding man as imago Dei . . Relation-
ality does not just determine humankind's authentic representation or 
"imaging" of God, but is descriptive of the Holy Being that is God. 
Thus can Macquarrie argue that "we must think of the Imago Dei more 
in terms of a potentiality for being that is given to man with his very 
being, than in terms of a fixed 'endowment' or 'nature,,,.38 
36. Principles, p.229. 
37. ibid. 
38. Principles, p.231. 
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There is more than an implicit ontological relationality in 
Macquarrie's exposition of the Imago Dei . However, his view contrasts 
with, for example, that of Nels Ferre who, whilst commenting that the 
Imago Dei embraces the "whole spirit-mind-body relation,,39 nonetheless 
speaks of this image as an endowment giving shape and form to human 
40 
nature. For Ferre the Imago Dei constitutes the restless root of 
41 human nature and is thereby preparatory for "the fuller work of the 
Holy Spirit".42 Against such a pseudo-substantialist view Macquarrie 
understands the image of God as the presence and manifestation of 
Holy Being in human being qua personal being. To understand the 
content of Imago Dei Macquarrie refers to his understanding of the 
'being' of human being. Thus he notes that "a person in the fullest 
sense can only come into being in interaction with other persons", 
yet there is always a sense of "separateness" which attaches to the 
notion of person. 43 
Now this amounts to understanding personhood - the essence of 
human being - as relational in ontological structure. The .'inter-
action' is the relational activity which comprises the 'being' of 
human being. This also involves a requisite 'separateness' for each 
person as a relating entity must be a self in distinction from other 
selves in order to then relate with these others. 'Separateness' and 
'interaction' are the hallmarks of relational being. The 'being' for 
which the human being has the potential of fullness is, therefore, 
39. N.F.S. Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God, London: SCM 1952, 
p.39. 
40. op. cit. , pp.44f. 
41. op. cit. , p.llS. 
42. op. cit. , p.170. 
43. PrinciEles, p.l93. 
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the personal - i.e. relational - being that authentically presents 
and manifests Holy Being in its relationality. This is not a function 
of the isolated human existent but embraces the necessary interrelated-
ness of being-in-the-world and being-with-others. 
Macquarrie comments that: 
Man is understood not just as individual but in the 
inescapable social dimensions of his being. This is 
very clear in both of the biblical creation stories. 
In the first, both man and woman are needed in their 
community to reflect the image of God; and in the 
second, Adam is incomplete until Eve is created as his 
companion. (44) 
Now these comments are highly significant for they illustrate that 
the origins of the understanding of human being as Imago Dei lie in 
the implicit recognition of the essential interrelatedness of human 
being. And this relatedness is essential because it is, in fact, 
the image, the presenting and manifesting, of the relatedness of 
Holy Being. 
This relational interpretation of Macquarrie 's existential-
ontological viewpoint compares with Barth's early view that the 
Imago Dei amounted to "the appointment to reflect God's glory" that 
had been lost in the Fall and could be restored only in and through 
Christ. 45 John Baillie criticised this earlier view of Barth's as 
44. op. cit., p.232. 
45. H. Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth, London: Duckworth 1964, 
p.130. 
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k ' th r: D" ff " 1 hI' 1 f t " 46 rna 1ng e ~mago e~, 1n e ect, a pure y arc aeo og1ca ac . 
As with Brunner, Baillie prefers to determine the content and meaning 
of Imago Dei by taking cognizance of "human nature" as it presents 
, If 47 h 1tse. Now although this appears an approach compatible to t at 
of Macquarrie's there are some fundamental differences. Whereas 
Macquarrie begins with human existence, Baillie, in speaking of "human 
nature" concludes that the Imago Dei signifies "a good th~'!fJ spoiled".48 
Brunner argues the content of Imago Dei is lost, although the form, 
as "addressability" and "receptivity" to the Word of God, remains. 49 
Baillie and Brunner belie crypto-substantive views of the Imago Dei. 
The image of God is some 'thing' which mayor may not be there. To 
the extent that it is there, it is infused in all human nature, "to 
be fOlDld dimly and brokenly reflected,,50 therein. 
However, it is Karl Barth who has nonetheless most clearly 
apprehended the relational import of the Imago Dei in that it consists 
of the anaZogia reZationis, the analogy of similarity in spite of all 
d ' "1 ' 51 1SS1m1 ar1ty. Hartwell comments that "Barth's notion of humanity 
as co-humanity is closely related to his concept of the image of God 
in man as developed in his later theology".52 The Barthian under-
standing of the content of Imago Dei embraces the mutual relationship 
between mankind and God, as well as the motif of co-humanity conceived 
as relationally analogous to the inner-trinitarian relations. Thus, 
46. J. Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, London: OUP 1949, p.22. 
47. ibid. 
48. Knowledge, p.23. (Italics mine). 
49. op. cit., p.29. 
SO. op. cit., p.102. 
51. cf. Hartwell, Barth, p.130. 
52. ibid. 
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according to Hartwell, the Imago Dei for Barth 
takes place ... in the I-Thou relationship as the form of 
life common both to God as the Triune God and ... to man 
as a being in relationship, related to God and created 
male and female. (53) 
The Imago Dei, on the one hand,is preparatory for the taking up of the 
Covenant relationship, and, on the other, is reflective of inner-
t ' 't ' 'h' 54 rInl arlan relatIons IpS. 
Thus the Barthian analysis of the relationality of the Imago Dei 
is complementary to that of Macquarrie. Each reflects the existential 
dimension. However, the ontological dimension is made more explicit 
by Macquarrie . Human being, made in the image of Holy Being, engages 
in relational activity that is both of the same order as the relational 
activity of Holy Being, and is also the actual effecting of Holy Being's 
relational activity . Holy Being, as it were, acts through the beings . 
Macquarrie expresses it thus: "Man not only is, he has the power to 
let be . That is to say, he has a share in the creativity of God".55 
And this sharing in 'letting-be' is a component of the being of the 
human. It is thus 
the highest activity open to man, the most 'godlike', 
we may say; and perhaps its highest is in letting the 
neighbour be, that is to say, in helping the other to 
53. ibid. 
54, Barth, p . 131. 
55. Macquarrie, God-Talk, p . 226 . 
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the fulfilment of his being. This is in fact nothing 
but a description in ontological terms of disinterested 
love or agape. (56) 
Such activity is 'godlike' because it 'reflects' - it is like or'images' 
the being of God. The doctrine of Imago Dei is about the being of the 
human as imaging the being of God. 
The existential import of the doctrine of the Imago Dei is also 
indicated by, for example, Calvin, when he claimed that the image of 
God in man consists "in the right relationship with God".57 Further-
more, Calvin signified the unique applicability of the Imago Dei to 
human being when he argued that it "extends to everything in which 
the nature of man surpasses that of all other species of animals".58 
To use Macquarrie's terminology, the Imago Dei doctrine has unique 
applicability to human being as that being which authentically 
represents Holy Being. Or, as Berkhof puts it, "one who can like 
God speak , the only creature that can perceive and respond to the 
creative word".59 
The incarnation, as the unique focus of the interrelatedness of 
Holy Being and human being, may also be seen as a particular expression 
of Imago Dei . As the "human face of GOd",60 Jesus Christ was the 
human being in whom the relationality of God was fully and authentically 
expressed. Jesus Christ was not some kind of 'vessel' into which was 
56. ibid. 
57. Cited in Berkhof, Christian Faith, p.179. 
58. Institutes I, xv, 3. Cited in Baillie, Knowledge, p.27. 
59. Berkhof, Christian Faith, p.l82. 
60. J.A.T. Robinson, The Human Face of God, London: SCM 1972. 
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'poured' the being of God: this is to misunderstand the term 'being' 
in a quasi-substantial-cum-spiritual manner . Rather, Jesus Christ 
was the manifestation of the essential relatedness of God. He was 
the portrayal of the humanity of God, the expression of Holy Being's 
necessary need of beings in and through which to be itself. Thus 
Macquarrie writes that "in creating man in his own image and in 
sharing with man something of his own creative and personal being, 
God was already committing himself to the incarnation, to standing 
alongside man ... ,,61 God is committed to humanity in the mode of Holy 
Being in its necessary interrelationship with beings. 
The Imago Dei is, in effect, the theological justification both 
of Macquarrie's existential-ontological method and of the relational 
interpretation made of it. The appropriateness of the relational 
interpretation is signalled by Berkhof who comments that: "God 
created man after his image and therefore he deals with him in personal-
social categories".62 The Imago Dei implies that the human being is 
free to love, to exercise power, to respond, to initiate - in other 
words, to engage in the fullness of relational being - in analogous 
fashion to God. 63 
The doctrine of the image of God in man is both ontological and 
existential in its import and reference. It is not a doctrine of 
imitative behaviour, neither does it signify a non-participative image. 64 
61. Macquarrie, Humility, p.66. 
62. Berkhof, Christian Faith, p.69. 
63. op. cit., p.135. 
64. cf. Baillie, Knowledge, p.230. 
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It addresses the ontological reality of both human being and the 
being of God: the relationality that comprises the being of God is 
reflected in the relationality of human being. 
IV. GOD TRANSCENDENT AND IMMANENT 
In the previous section it was noted that 'separateness' together 
with 'interaction' were hallmarks of a relational entity.65 In the 
Introduction to this chapter I denoted four motifs or "marks" of a 
Relator. I shall here examine the first two of these. "Otherness" 
denotes the necessary separateness of identity such that relational 
entities may be distinguished one from the other. The motif of 
'presence' indicates that 'at-handness' or 'readiness' for engagement 
in relationship without which the entity could not be spoken of as a 
'relating' entity. The issue here is, of course, to examine how 
Macquarrie treats of these two motifs in conjunction with his notion 
of God as Holy Being. 
(a) The Otherness of Holy Being 
The extent to which Holy Being is genuinely an "other" in 
Macquarrie's existential-ontological theism is the question to be 
addressed. Macquarrie states that: 
Being is not only not ~ being, but is not the sum of 
beings or the totality of beings or an all-inclusive 
being. Being 'is' the tPansaenden8~ and this term 
indicates not only God's distinction from the world 
but his 'wholly other' character as over against 
65. See above, 141. 
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whatever is within the world. Yet at the same time, the 
acknowledgement that there 'i s ' no being apart from 
beings, and that being 'is' present-and-manifest in every 
being, guards against an exaggerated transcendence of God ... 
and seeks to do justice to his immanence. (66) 
He also remarks that 
In calling God 'transcendent' we mean that he is other 
than the world, indeed that there belongs to him a 
different order of being: and further that God's being 
is prior to the being of the world . (67) 
This 'otherness-from' and 'priority-to' denotes the transcendence of 
God. Indeed, for Macquarrie, they are particularly relevant to the 
conception of God as Holy Being, for 
Being is of a different order from the beings, and the 
dynamic letting-be of being is prior to the derivative 
existence of the beings, whether person or things. (68) 
So the first conclusion concerning Macquarrie's understanding of 
the otherness of God is that, for him, it is a real apprehension, 
marked particularly by the notion of the prior condition of'letting-be' 
to the beings that are let be. Yet this is not a passive state of 
affairs. This 'condition ' denotes in essence the primordial relation-
ality whereby Being relates to beings. Thus transcendence not only 
denotes the otherness of identity necessary to talk of entity as such, 
66. Macquarrie, Principles, p.120. 
67. ibid. 
68. ibid. 
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it also implies the essential relatedness implicit in that very 
otherness. The "other" is not isolated in otherness, but as "other" 
it is in a position to authentically engage in relationships per se. 
Understanding 'otherness' in existential-ontological theism may 
also be determined by observing how an "attribute" such as omnipotence 
is conceived. For Macquarrie omnipotence is not to be taken "as an 
absolute power to do anything". 69 He concurs with the classic cri ti-
cism McTaggart made of omnipotence that no real sense is to be made 
of "a thorough-going omnipotence of God" 70 Macquarrie himself 
concludes that omnipotence can "hardly mean sheer unlimited capricious 
th t . h b k . d . ." 71 power a mIg t rea out In any Irectlon . Rather he finds that 
God's power, though indeed mysterious, must be thought 
of as ordered or structured power, and as soon as we 
begin to think of it in this way, then we see that its 
very order or structure rules out any manifestations 
of it that would disrupt that structure. (72) 
In other words, God's omnipotence amounts to his exercise of 
power - of 'letting-be' - in and through the ordered structures of 
relationships. Such structures determine appropriateness of power -
the extent, focus and limit necessary to effect the purpose or aim 
for which the power is being exercised. Furthermore. given the 
69. Macquarrie. Secularity. p.118. 
70. ibid. 
71. Secularity. p.119. 
72. ibid. 
I. 
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findings on Macquarrie ' s view of "attribute" per> Be,73 'omnipotence' 
is to be understood in terms of the relationality of that which is 
called omnipotent . Thus the word 'omnipotence' is for Macquarrie 
"an evocative image or symbol rather than a philosophical concept 
that can be precisely analyzed" . 74 Macquarrie also locates omnipotence 
as one of a group of attributes that center on the notion of God ' s 
"overwhelmingness75 which preserves the existential dimension of his 
interpretation, for omnipotence describes "God as he relates to man"; 
and God relates as "the tr>emendwn".76 
So "omnipotence" is descriptive of the relationship in which God 
stands toward that which he has created. It thus expresses something 
of the essential relatedness of God, or Holy Being. In particular 
it denotes f or Macquarrie "the contrast between the very limited 
possibilities open to any man in a particular situation and what must 
be the possibilities for Being as such" . 77 The "possibilities" that 
are appropriate to Being are the possibilities of "letting-be"; the 
possibilities of making itself present in and through the beings; the 
possibilities of manifold relationships concomitant with the essential 
relationality that is constitutive of Being. Macquarrie writes that 
God's omnipotence means that he himself ... is the source 
and also the horizon of all possibilities, and only 
those are excluded that are inconsistent with the structure 
and dynamics of God himself. (78) 
73. See above, pp.127-137. 
74. Secularity, p .119. 
75. PrinciEles, p.204. 
76 . ibid. 
77. PrinciEles, p.206 . 
78. ibid. 
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'Omnipotence' denotes the contrast, the sense in which there is 
an 'other', that Holy Being is other-than the beings which it lets-be. 
God is other-than that which he creates. Yet 'Being', precisely 
because of its inherent relationality is not 'cut off from ' the beings: 
there is a necessary interrelatedness of Being and beings. Omnipotence, 
understood as that possibility which is concomitant with the very 
relational structure of Go~ is the possibility of real relationship. 
God's power - his omnipotence - is the potency or potential for 
. h· l· h· 79 engagement 1n aut ent1c re at10ns 1p . 
Further understanding of "otherness" in Macquarrie's thinking 
may be gained from the notion of "infinity". 
As applied to God, the word 'infinite' is contrasted 
with the felt finitude of a human existence, and the 
basic sense of the word in a theological or religious 
context is to be sought in developing the contrast 
between the existentially grasped sense of finitude 
on the one hand and the overwhelmingness of God on 
the other. (80) 
As one of the terms of the via negativa theology, ' infinite ' purports 
to say something of God by denying, or negating, the corresponding 
element within human existence when applied to God. In particular 
it implies that the limitations concomitant with human existence are 
not to be found in the concept of God. Put otherwise, "Being" is not 
79. cf. Macquarrie, Secularity, pp.l22ff. 
80. op. cit., p.l2l. 
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bound by the specific limitations of the beings. Thus, from an 
ontological perspective, Macquarrie remarks that the word 'infinite' 
"when spoken of God, points to the contrast between our particular 
beings as 'beings-there' (Dasein) and Being itself as that which 
makes being-there possible".81 
So the attribute 'infinite' , as an ascription of God, does not 
actually say that God himself is totally without any sort of limitation 
or constraint. Rather, in contrast to the limitations experienced 
within human existence, these do not apply as such to God. But such 
'limitations' are the limitations of the beings in their capacity to 
make present and to manifest relational Being authentically. There-
fore, to negate this of God is to implicitly affirm that God - i.e. 
Holy Being which is relational Being - is not subject to such limits. 
God is non-limited with respect to the capacity to relate authentically. 
The otherness of God in existential-ontological theism is marked 
by the notions of transcendence, omnipotence and infinity . But these 
are ascriptions denoting an "Other" to be apprehended as a relational 
entity. 'Transcendence' denotes the prior condition, or primordial 
relation, of Being with respect to beings; 'omnipotence' connotes 
the sense of power or ability of the "Other" to engage authentically 
in relational activity concomitant with its relational structure; 
'infinite' denotes the unlimited capacity for such engagement in 
relationships. Thus these motifs of the otherness of God are also 
indicators, or reflector~ of the relationality of God: i.e. of an 
understanding of God as a "that which" (or "He Who") relates. 
81. Principles, p.20S. 
t 
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Otherness is one of the four necessary marks of a relational 
entity. Macquarrie affirms the otherness of God . The ways in which 
this otherness is understood indicates an appropriateness of speaking 
of God as a relational entity. The re1ationa1ity inherent in 'other-
ness' derives in part from the fact that the entity which is 'other' 
is not an other in the sense of 'removed-from', but an other that 
is 'present -to '. The God who is transcendent is also the God who is 
immanent. Immanence denotes that 'presence' of God which is the 
necessary corollary and corrective to the 'otherness ' of transcendence. 
(b) The Presence of Holy Being 
God 'transcendent' and 'immanent' is a paradox widely affirmed. 
"Otherness" (in the sense of "over-against" or "distinct-from" rather 
than simply "different-than") and "Presence" are necessarily correlat-
ive motifs in our understanding of the divine. For Macquarrie these 
motifs have a great significance and are of equal value in his determin-
ing God as Holy Being. He comments that "it is in terms of 
equiprimordial transcendence and immanence that we have presented the 
idea of holy Being (GOd)".82 And he further makes the summary 
statement: 
Our teaching has been that Being combines its 
transcendence as the mysterious act of letting-be 
with its immanence as present-and-manifest in all 
particular beings. (83) 
Now the starting point of Macquarrie's understanding of the 
82. op. cit., p.152. 
83. o~. cit., p.2l9. 
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presence of God is his affirmation that "God does not dwell apart, 
but takes the risk of meeting men in the midst of the world".84 The 
God who is other-than is also the God who meets humankind in the 
midst of existence. Holy Being is present in and through the exist-
ence of the beings and 'meets' the beings in their awareness of the 
relationality of Being . 
This 'meeting' comes to particular focus in the understanding of 
Christ in terms of the incarnation: for Macquarrie understands 
incarnation as "the advent and epiphany (presence and manifestation) 
of Being in Jesus Christ".85 So God's immanence is illustrated by 
the sense in which he dwells in and with the world, meeting the world, 
as it were, on its own terms. Being is not that which, as other, is 
apart-from. The immanence of Being is its necessary relatedness to 
the beings. 
Macquarrie comments that: 
On the one hand, Being is immanent in man, so that he 
lives in the light of Being, and his very thought and 
action can be the occurrence of Being in him ... On the 
other hand, Being has entrusted itself to man and made 
him its guardian. (86) 
The 'meeting' that immanence involves is not that of casual encounter 
but reflects the genuine reciprocal interrelatedness that holds 
84. Secularity, p.87. 
85. Principles, p.283. 
86. op. cit., p . 335. 
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between Holy Being and the beings. Holy Being relates primordially 
as letting-be; it relates as caring presence; it relates also in its 
dependability and 'trustworthiness'. The human being, in particular, 
is a being which may interact with this Holy Being and thus has the 
potential to allow to Holy Being authentic fulfilment in terms of its 
immanence in the beings. On the other hand human being has the power 
also to deny this, or at least thwart it, by virtue of its own 
inauthentic relating. 
The interrelatedness of Being with the beings denotes God as 
immanent in his creation. 
If we understand God as being, then his immanence in 
the world is just as fully recognized as his transcendence; 
the relation is that of being to the beings rather than 
that of one being to another, and we have seen that being 
is present and manifest in the beings. (87) 
This presence of God denoted by immanence is the presence of that which 
is itself present-and-manifest. For Macquarrie, 'presence' and 
'manifestation' characterise the letting-be of Being. He writes: 
Bein&we have seen, is nothing apart from its appearance 
in and through and with particular beings ... Being, which 
is transcendent of every particular being and is thus 
'wholly other' and the furthest from us, is also the 
closest because it is present in every being, including 
our own being. (88) 
87. op. cit., p.121. 
88. op. cit., p.114. 
156 
So along with 'presence' as a character or mark of the letting-be 
which is the sine qua non of Being, there is also 'manifestation ' 
which refers to Being "opening itself in the beings".89 Manifest-
ation denotes the presence of Being "in every particular being". 
As ' letting-be', Being is both causative and sustaining . It "brings 
into being" in the first instance, but is also and always "present 
and manifest" in and through that which has come into being. For 
coming into being, in the sense of commencing to exist, by no means 
is the end of the matter , least of all for human being . There is 
an 'on-goingness' of the beings, and of the Being present and manifest 
through them, that requires a more satisfactory explanation than 
simply the concept of 'letting-be ' , however dynamically understood. 
There is a continuing relationship of ontological significance that 
must needs be taken into account. 
That we may speak of God at all is in part a function of the 
'presencing' of Being through the beings: the "faith that a holy 
presence makes itself known in our ambiguous world" . 90 Faith in a 
divine presence or, put otherwise, the faith-interpretation of the 
perceived presence of Holy Being, relates to what was discussed above 
in connection with the symbol f S . . 91 o pl.rl.t. For 'Spirit' denotes 
"God at his closest to us. He is Being as immanent in our creaturely 
being . .. ,,92 Spirit is the symbol for "God in his nearness to us".93 
89. ibid. 
90 . PrinciEles, p.154. 
91. See above, pp .107 -111. 
92. PrinciEles, p.333. 
93. Macquarrie, Humilitl> p.61. 
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In exploring the understanding of God as necessarily present and 
manifest Macquarrie comments on five Christian doctrines each of which 
fl f h ' d 'f ,94 re ects some aspect 0 t IS presence an manl estatlon. (i) The 
doctrine of Creation reflects the presencing of Being in the beings 
and the concomitant interrelationship that issues in the sense of 
accountability and stewardship. (ii) The doctrine of the incarnation, 
as central to Christian faith, "focuses in a single point what God 
95 has, in a sense, been doing always and everywhere". Christ is the 
particular and authentically transparent point of the presence and 
manifestation of Holy Being. "The incarnation declares that God has 
become present and manifest in the flesh".96 (iii) The Church 
continues the presence and manifestation of God that came to expression 
in the incarnation. Macquarrie comments that 
no human person is an island, for what is involved in 
being human implies, among other things, a being-with, 
a community with other existents; thus Christ cannot 
be separated from the social reality of which he was 
the center. This social reality we call his body. 
In the first instance it is the church, but ideally it 
is all humanity ... We must affirm, then, that God is 
present and manifest in the human social reality of 
the church. (97) 
(iv) Macquarrie cites as his fourth doctrine that of sacramental 
98 presence. This, he acknowledges, is but one of the many ways in 
94. Secularity, p.124f. 
95. op. cit., p.133. 
96 . op . cit., p .134 . 
97. ibid. 
98. Secularity, p.136; See also Paths, pp.82ff. 
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which God is "present". But it is of particular relevance as it 
"expresses in a more vivid and meaningful way the closeness of God 
to his created world".99 The sacramental presence in some ways 
unites the incarnational presence with that of the church: it is a 
specific and particular act in which God is present and manifest in 
the life of the Church. (v) Finally, the doctrine of eschatology 
Macquarrie takes as "the belief that there is a directedness in the 
world process and that it moves on into fuller being".lOO This 
'fuller being' is a fullness of relational Being: thus the "direct-
edness" toward fuller being would denote, on the relational 
interpretation of Being, movement toward more authentic interrelated-
ness with Holy Being. 
These five doctrines bear witness to the presence and manifestat-
ion of God, each in its own way. The God who is immanent is so by 
virtue of his manifold presence: Holy Being is characterized by 
presence. 
Now the presence of God is denoted not only by immanence and the 
manifold ways in which God is perceived as present and manifest, but 
also in the more dynamic sense in which God is understood to partici-
pate in and with the world. Being is "wholly other" than the beings 
it lets-be, yet it is also 'the closest' because of its presence in 
and through the beings. The notion of 'participation' is ontologically 
suggestive for Macquarrie and therefore hermeneutically helpful. He 
99. Secularity, p.136. 
100. op. cit., p.137. 
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b " " " "b"" 101 states : "nothing can e unless It partlclpates ln elng " However, 
I would venture to suggest that the sense of 'presence ' that attaches 
to Holy Being does so not so much because of the participation of the 
beings in Being, but rather on account of the correlative converse: 
that Holy Being 'participates ' in the beings. This would seem a 
more apposite implication of the notion of 'letting-be '. Holy Being 
participates in that which it lets be by virtue of its letting-be of 
the beings. Thus is "Being" present in the beings. 
The structure and form of Holy Being is the relatedness of active 
participation which is also indicative of "the presence and hence the 
openness and accessibility of being in the beings, as over against 
its distance and transcendence as the mysterious act or energy of 
letting-be". 102 Participation is a two-way affair. The symbol of 
'Spirit' denotes the active participation of God in the midst of the 
" f h b" 103 eXlstence 0 t e elngs. God is bound to humankind and humankind 
to God in the essential i nterrelatedness denoted by the participation 
of beings in Being, and of Being in the beings. Yet, whilst all 
things participate in God or Being,104 Macquarrie also points out 
that the human being is destined to participate in Being in a part-
icular way, that is, "to become a co-worker with God in creation, a 
d" f" h h b d h " b " 105 guar lan 0 Belng to w om as een entruste t e capaclty to let- e . 
Human being per Be is the unique sphere of the presence and manifest-
ation of Holy Being. 
101. Principles, p.1l4. 
102. ibid. 
103. cf. Paths, p.42 
104. PrinciE1es, p.232. 
105. op. cit., p.233. 
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I noted above that for Holy Being to be conceived as "relational 
entity" it must be able to bear the marks of 'otherness' and 'presence'. 
This is indeed the case for Macquarrie's existential-ontological 
theism. "Otherness" is denoted by transcendence, omnipotence and 
the infinite. "Presence" is denoted by immanence." the sense of 
present-and-manifest, and participation. 
indicative of the relationality of God. 
All these categories are 
I shall now turn to the other 
two marks of relational entity - activity and responsiveness. 
V. GOD IN ACTION AND INTERACTION 
Any genuine relational entity as well as being both an 'other' 
and yet at the same time 'present', must also be such as to be 
actually engaged in activity of a relational nature. It must actively 
realize its relationality through participation in actual relation-
Ships. Further, it must also be such as to be capable of responsiveness. 
The ability to sensitively respond to others - to truly interact - is 
a mark of capability for two-way relationship. 
(a) The Activity of Holy Being 
I shall examine, first of all, the mark of activity: God-in-action. 
In this connection I shall discuss how Macquarrie understands the 
activity of Holy Being from three perspectives: that of Being's self-
disclosure and creative activity; that of the work of Christ; and 
that of the work of the Spirit. 
God in action is, firstly, God taking the initiative. It is Holy 
Being initiating the letting be whereby there are beings at all. I 
have already noted the relational import of the transposition of the 
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"I am what I am" to "I let be what I let be" in Macquarrie ' s exist-
ential-ontological theism. l06 Holy Being, in terms of the symbol of 
God the Father, is the Creator who 'lets-be' creation. In this 
connection I have also noted the understanding of Holy Being as the 
"dynamic God who goes out into a world of beings".107 The very 
creativity of Being is its letting-be. 
The connection between the notion of the 'Father' as Creator 
and this creativity of Being is very close: "Since Father is primordial 
Being, the ultimate letting-be, it is natural that we should especially 
, h' 'h '" 108 assoc1ate 1m W1t creat1on, Creative activity is the necessary 
outcome of God being God. It expresses God as relational - Holy -
Being. l09 But the activity of creation, the initial act of letting-be, 
does not exhaust the sense of 'creative activity' that is associated 
with God. Macquarrie notes that the biblical writers "clearly believed 
that God acts in the world. Indeed, the bible has been called the 
recital of the acts of God, and a God who did not act would be a some-
what redundant de l' ty" .110 'A t' . t ' . 1 t' h C 1V1 Y 1S a necessary e emen 1n t e 
understanding of who God is. 
The question then arises: "How does God act in the world?"l1l 
In responding to this question Macquarrie concludes that God acts 
"specifically" wi thin history and wi thin "the life-stories of 
. d' 'd ,112 1n ]. v]. uals '. 
106. op. cit. , 
107. op. cit. , 
108. op. cit. , 
In keeping with the analysis of personal being 
p.197. 
p.211. 
p.2l9. 
109. Macquarrie, Thinkin~, p.lSl. 
110. Humility, p.37. 
111. op. cit. , p.39. 
112. op. cit. , p.40. 
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b 113 f' d M . . h h . h' h G d a ave, we 1n acquarr1e stat1ng t at t e way 1n w 1C a acts 
is itself personal. God acts "by appeal, by attraction, by drawing 
people out of themselves and towards himself".114 The activity of 
God is that of creative letting-be and the presencing self-disclosure 
of Being in that which is let-be. Furthermore, the faith that affirms 
this God is 
founded on the unity of God's action - an action on 
the whole personal being of man within the community 
of faith. God's action and God's claim are upon the 
whole, and the only worthy response is one that is 
made by the whole man. (115) 
The activity of God is also comprehended as relational in terms 
of the existential-ontological understanding of the work of Christ. 
Christ is denoted by the term "expressive Being" and this is conceived 
to be "the agent through which creation comes into being ... expressive 
Being is God in one of his ways of being". 116 The creative activity 
of God is represented in terms of the work of Christ. The understanding 
of the work of Christ begins with the recognition that it centers on 
the relationa1ity of creative activity. The work of Christ is the 
work of God: the activity of Christ's work is that of God-in-action. 
In his discussion on the work of Christ l17 Macquarrie notes two 
motifs - obedience and self-giving. Both these motifs imply a 
113. See above, pp.7l-7S. 
114. Humility, p.40. 
115. Paths, p.lO. 
116. Principles, p.220. 
117. op. cit., pp.3l1ff. 
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relational context in which an understanding of Christ's work is 
set. Obedience is'obedience-to'. It is the outcome of a specific 
relationship. Self-giving is also a 'self-giving-to': it is intent-
ional movement or development in a particular relationship. Thus the 
work of Christ - as itself God's activity - displays the essential 
relationality of Holy Being. This is further demonstrated by examining 
Macquarrie's view on salvation. The point is that 'salvation' is not 
just something that Christ does, as it were, in isolation. Such 'work' 
involves engagement in relationship. It involves the relating of 
Christ to that which is to be saved as well as a reciprocal responsive 
relationship of "the saved" to Christ. Macquarrie notes that "man 
is saved only in so far as he responds to and appropriates into his 
existence the saving activity that is directed toward him".118 
Salvation, as the work of Christ, is an activity of relationship: it 
involves a reciprocity of initiation and response. Macquarrie's 
understanding of the work of Christ is itself both a part of, and 
also symbolic of, the relational activity of God. 
The third motif is that denoted by the work of the Spirit. Indeed 
"Spirit", as a symbol of Holy Being,directs attention toward the 
"active" element in the comprehension of Holy Being in a singular 
manner. The Spirit is, above all else, God in action. 119 Macquarrie 
argues that on the "human level" the meaning of spirit is ad extra 
. . l20H 1· h b 1 act1V1ty. e c a1ms t at y ana ogy we may say that 'Spirit', as 
118. op. cit., p.116. 
119. op. cit., p.328. 
120. Humility, p.8l. 
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a term for God, means that "God is the One who goes out from himse1f".121 
Now the point is that such language of ad extra activity - of 'going 
out', or 'out -pouring ' - is language of relationship. There can be 
no sense to the ' going out' unless it is a 'going-out-towards' 
an-other. Going-outness, as descriptive of the activity of God, is 
indicative of an inherent ad extra relationa1ity to the being of God. 
Such work is not random movement or purposeless action . The activity 
of God is the activity of engagement in relationship: and the quality 
and nature of such activity is indicated by the purposiveness or 
intentionality implicit in the 'going-out-towards'. 
Inasmuch as Spirit "refers to a mysterious dimension of existence,,122 
it refers, on my interpretation of Macquarrie, to the fact that exist-
ence is grounded in the essential re1ationa1ity of Being. Relational 
activity is the activity appropriate to the Being which is present and 
manifest only in and through the existence of the beings. Spirit 
denotes the "with-ness" of God. God is 'with' his creation in the 
sense of the essential relatedness by which Holy Being is with the 
beings. 
The Spirit is pervasive in the creation, not in the 
sense of a merely passive indwelling, but in the 
active sense that he is everywhere at work. (123) 
The relational interpretation of the work of the Spirit was 
121. op. cit., p. 82 . 
122. Thinking, p.124. 
123. op. cit., p.127. 
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further indicated by the discussion of Spirit as "unitive Being".124 
Here the work of the Spirit is portrayed in distinctly relational 
terms, as "bringing the beings into a reconciling unity with Being". 125 
Th k f h S . . . "h k f . . . . t ,,126 h e wor 0 t e p1r1t 1S t e wor 0 ma1nta1n1ng un1 y, t e 
work of relational Being. The Spirit denotes, for Macquarrie, 
God ' s way of acting in the world and in the affairs 
of men . .. it is a fundamental point to see the Spirit 
as God ' s activity in the world. Spirit . .. is active 
and dynamic . Spirit is activity . (127) 
The activity of Holy Being is the activity of creation and self-
disclosure, an activity that has to do with relationship. The activity 
of Holy Being is also an activity denoted by the work of Christ and 
the work of the Spirit . I have endeavoured to show that these are 
works of relational activity : God in action is God within the activity 
of relationship. 
(b) The Responsiveness of Holy Being 
The final mark of authentic relational entity to be examined is 
that of ' responsiveness '. Is the God of existential-ontological 
theism a responsive entity - one who 'responds-to', or ' interacts-
with' that which is other than himself? The three particular elements 
which wil l determine the extent of the responsiveness of Holy Being 
124. See above , pp . 107 -111. 
125. Principles, p.22l. 
126 . op . cit. , p.332. 
127. op . cit . , p . 123 . 
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are personal being; the dynamics of love and reconciliation; and the 
ascription of immutability that is made of God. 
The relational significance of personal being was discussed at 
an earlier stage of the examination of Macquarrie ' s existentia1-
1 . 1 h' 128 onto oglca t elsm. Central to the notion of personal being is 
the recognition that "a person in the fullest sense can only come into 
129 being in interaction with other persons". Personal being is not 
i solated being: i t is the being of individua1-in-community . Personal 
being is relational, and the relationa1ity of personal being is 
founded on interaction: the individual exists with, and in response 
to,others . Indeed, it is because Being appears and is present (as 
personal being) in beings that allows Macquarrie to speak of God in 
130 personal language. Personal being , in manifesting its responsive-
ness to other beings/ thereby expresses the responsiveness inherent 
in the re1ationa1ity of Being as such . In so far that God may be 
spoken of in terms of personal being, then he is spoken in terms of 
responsiveness . 
The responsiveness of Holy Being may also be discerned by consid-
ering the ontological structure of love and reconciliation . For 
Macquarrie the love of God "has a supreme place, for self-giving love 
is what comes nearest to expressing the mystery of the divine letting-be ll : 31 
Now self-giving is a giving that is to-something and for-something: 
128. See above, pp . 7l-75. 
129. PrinciE1es, p.193. 
130. op . cit. , p.204 . 
131. op . cit . , p.209. 
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self-giving occurs only in the context of relationship of the self 
that gives of itself with an other to whom the gift is offered. 
'Love' is not some quasi-metaphysical quality or character that may 
be possessed, not even by God. Rather the ascription of 'love' 
denotes 'loving-ness' - that is, loving relationship as such, or at 
least the potential therefor. And loving relations are responsive: 
'loving' is pre-eminently the relationship involving giving and 
responding. 
Within Christian theology love is to be talked of only in super-
lative terms, and rightly so. For love epitomises the essential 
relatedness of Holy Being. Thus Macquarrie speaks of love as 
the culminating quality of human existence, for we 
have seen in our consideration of the person of 
Jesus Christ that it was his manifestation of absolute 
love that constitutes his God-manhood. (132) 
Love is the supreme designation of essential relatedness. This can 
be seen further by considering how Macquarrie speaks of the ontology 
of love in terms of letting be: 
Love is letting-be, not ... in the sense of standing off 
from someone or something, but in the positive and 
active sense of enabling-to-be. When we talk of 'letting-
be, we are to understand both parts of this hyphenated 
expression in a strong sense - 'letting ' as 'empowering', 
132. op. cit., p.348. 
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and 'be' as enjoying the maximal range of being that 
is open to the particular being concerned. (133) 
Love denotes 'engagement-with' and 'responsiveness- to'. Love is the 
or 
expression of the essential interre1atedness,/responsive relatedness, 
of Holy Being. And in so far as the individual being affirms and 
engages in relational Being - that is, in so far as an individual 
"manifests the letting-be of love" - then that individual is brought 
thereby into a more authentic relationship with the Being that lets 
it be: the individual is "brought into a closer relation to God".134 
This 'love' by which we may speak of the responsiveness of God, 
is expressed in and through the activity of reconciliation. For, 
as an activity, reconciliation demonstrates God's responsive inter-
action in and with creation. It matters to God that creation be 
reconciled to himself: it matters to Holy Being that the beings which 
it lets-be and which are the vehicles for its own self-disclosure, 
do, in fact, stand in authentic relationship with itself. Thus 
reconciliation is not something God just 'does' in and of himself: 
it involves his own response-to his creation. Divine love finds 
its expression in the responsiveness of reconciliatory activity. 
And this is an ongoing activity: God is "continually seeking to 
restore and renew" the relationship between himself and His peop1e. 135 
133. ibid. 
134. Principles, p.349. 
135. op. cit., p.270. 
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The final element of Macquarrie's view of the responsiveness 
of Holy Being in his existential-ontological theism is that of the 
so-called "immutability" of God. At first glance this would appear 
to be the worst possible place to look for the sense of responsiveness. 
How can the Immutable, that which 'changes not', be said to be 
responsive? Surely responsiveness is a mark of change and mutability? 
The task is to see if Macquarrie's understanding of immutability will 
indeed provide a mortal blow to the responsiveness of God, and 
perhaps thereby to the possibility of a relational conception of God, 
or whether immutability may 'embrace' responsiveness. 
Macquarrie clearly holds that immutability cannot mean "that God 
'. . d'." 136 remaIns In a statIC con Itlon . He notes that this 
ascription of immutability arises out of the paradox 
or dialectic of dynamism and stability, and even asserts 
a priority for stability". This can be vindicated, for 
becoming is included in being, not the other way round ... 
if all were dynamism and change, this would be chaos. 
The immutability of God points to his consistency .. . It 
stands for God's unchangingness through change. (137) 
Actual relationships are fluid and changing: particularly so at the 
inter-personal level. "Immutability" implies that to speak of God 
as relational, or to talk of God in terms of the essential related-
ness of Holy Being, is not to say that the being of God resides in 
the relationships of fact such that God is ontologically and materially 
136. op. cit., p.207. 
137. ibid. 
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identified with these relationships. For this would amount to a 
reductionist approach to the understanding of God in relational 
terms. Rather 'immutability' denotes the unchangabi1ity of the 
essential relatedness of God which itself is that stability under-
girding and making possible actual, changing, relationships. In 
this sense 'immutability' denotes the 'faithfulness' of God to his 
being as relational. 
The concept of immutability was originally born of an understanding 
of God "conceived of on the model of thinglike substance". 138 Given 
that Macquarrie's doctrine of God is based on "more dynamic ways of 
thinking of God" then the understanding of immutability shifts from 
meaning "a complete absence of change" to being conceived "as a symbol 
pointing to the matchless stability and faithfulness of God" 139 
Immutability signifies that God may be relied on to manifest his 
re1ationality. God may be trusted to respond authentically and 
appropriately. Thus does Macquarrie cite Daniel Day Williams' remark 
concerning the existence of God and World "in a community of mutual 
action and passion ... We no longer try to think of God as unaffected 
140 by what happens among creatures". 
'Immutability' refers to the surety that God does, in fact, 
respond to creation: Being is necessarily responsive to the beings 
it lets-be. Responsiveness is a facet of the essential relatedness 
138. Secularity, p.117. 
139. ibid. 
140. Secularity, p.9S. 
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of Holy Being. Interaction is a mark of the being of God. For 
Macquarrie, '!!God' is the religious word for Being, understood as 
gracious" 141 That is to say, whilst 'Being' and 'God' are not 
synonymous terms, nonetheless "'Being' can be equated with 'God' 
only if Being has the character of grace and is responsive to man's 
. . 1 d· " 142 eXlstentla pre lcarnent . But only a "relating entity" could be 
spoken of as gracious and responsive. Given that fundamental to 
Macquarrie's doctrine of God as Holy Being is the apprehension of the 
responsiveness of Being to the beings, or of God to his creation, then 
such responsiveness is a key element in conceiving the being of God 
in terms of ad extpa relationality. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Having adumbrated Macquarrie's doctrine of God as Holy Being in 
Chapter Two above, the purpose of this chapter has been to explore 
further the relational interpretation I made of that. Various aspects 
of the doctrine of God have been addressed. I sought to describe 
Macquarrie's formal understanding of attribute as such, together with 
an analysis of how he understands the acknowledged relationship between 
God and the World. Macquarrie understands an attribute as a symbol 
of (relational) Being. 
The fundamental relation which attributes symbolize is, of course, 
the relation between God and the World, or between Creator and creation. 
This is understood by Macquarrie in terms of the inseparableness of 
Being from the beings. The point is, therefore, that the relation of 
141. Studies, p.ll. 
142. ibid. 
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God and World is neither accidental (in the Aristotalian sense) nor 
is it gratuitous. God and World stand together in the complex and 
necessary interrelatedness of Being and beings. 
On the one hand, then, my exposition of divine attribute and 
relation in existential-ontological theism reinforces the general 
relational perspective of Macquarrie's work. Attribute signifies 
relatedness: attributes as such denote the ontological relationality 
of God. The fundamental relation of God and World is a relation of 
mutual interdependence. Thus the world is dependent on God in the 
sense that being is dependent upon Holy Being for its ontological 
sustenance, and God depends on the world in the sense that Holy Being 
requires beings by which to express its 'Being-ness'. For Macquarrie 
all this is summarized in his notion of organic interrelatedness of 
God and World. 
On the other hand Macquarrie states that God is not an entity to 
which properties or attributes may be ascribed, yet he clearly views 
'God' or 'Holy Being' as denoting "something which engages in" relat-
ional activity. The question that is still to be resolved is whether 
the relationality of Holy Being is no more than 'ontological-relatedness , 
as such, or whether it does in fact denote the conception of the being 
of God as the relatedness of God. 
This confusion in Macquarrie is sharpened by the discussion of 
the Imago Dei . To the extent that the human being 'images' - i.e. 
authentically reflects - God, then there is, by implication, a "that 
which" may be so reflected. The Imago Dei was seen, in Macquarrie's 
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thinking, to imply the ontological relationality of God. The 
relatedness of human being reflects the relationality of the divine. 
The general examination and interpretation of Macquarrie's doctrine 
of God lead finally to a discussion of those marks that are usually 
involved in any understanding of God. When taken together they may 
be seen as the 'marks' of a genuinely relational entity. To be 'other' 
and 'present', 'active' and 'responsive', reveal that, in Macquarrie's 
thinking, God is such that to the extent these 'marks' are true of him 
then the being of God may be interpreted as relational Being. 
This conclusion may be further demonstrated by examining 
Macquarrie's discussion of religion and Being. He defines religion as 
"a commerce between man and transhuman reality of God or Being". 143 
The centre of the meaning of religion constitutes a relational activity, 
something that both takes place between two agents, yet which is also 
bound up in the very ontological meaning of those agents. From the 
human perspective the 'other' in the religious relation is an active 
agent whose activity is directed to and for mankind. Thus Macquarrie 
writes: 
Most basic of all the characteristics of religion is 
the impinging of God as holy Being upon man's existence. 
The initiative is from the side of God ... (144) 
But the religious relation is not one way. Humanity is not merely 
the recipient of the activity of the 'other': "Religion includes not 
143. Principles, p.149. 
144. ibid. 
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145 only the impinging of holy Being upon man, but man's response". 
This response is understood as the commitment and acceptance of f aith. 
For Macquarrie the heart of religion is two-way activi ty - the 
reality of interrelationship. Furthermore, he is quite insistent that 
"faith belongs in a community" not simply as an accident of the 
definition of religion but because there is "a communal dimension 
th t b 1 h . ., t .. ,,146 a e ongs to uman eXlstence In 1 s very constltutlon . 
Religion takes its place within, and as part of, the relational 
matrix of existence. 
Macquarrie's understanding of Being, and in particular the l i nk 
he makes between this and religious discourse, is neatly summarized 
in the following statement: 
Being has been called an incomparable and a transcendens, 
and there could be no beings without the Being that lets 
them be; but Being is present and manifest in the beings, 
and apart from the beings, Being would become indistinguish-
able from nothing. Hence Being and the beings, though 
neither can be assimilated to the other, cannot be separated 
from each other either. This ontological doctrine cor-
responds to the religious experience of the holy as at 
once tremendum and fascinosum, as characterized by other-
ness and closeness. (147) 
145. Principles, p.150. 
146. op. cit., p.15l. 
147. op. cit., p.138 . 
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Without the existence of beings, there would be no Being: Being is 
not unless it is in and through the beings. Conversely, individual 
beings cannot themselves be unless they stand, as it were, in the 
Being that lets them be. Being is not materially identical with the 
beings, whether individual or in sum. Yet Being cannot be conceived 
or discussed apart from the beings it lets-be. Now it is this sense 
of the otherness and yet nearness, of both transcendence and immanence, 
that attaches to talk of Being which provides for Macquarrie the 
bridge to his idea of Holy Being. This leads to his identification 
of Holy Being with God, although this amounts to little more than a 
process of symbolic interpretation. 
The reason that personal being is the most appropriate symbol of 
Being is not so much because personal being is the highest in a 
"hierarchy of beings,,148 as Macquarrie would have it. Rather it is 
because personal being is pre-eminently relational being. To be a 
person is to be-in-relation, to be, in fact, by being-in a multitude 
of relationships. Thus Being, which is expressly symbolized by 
personal being~ is the essential relatedness of existence, the relational 
matrix in which beings stand - that begins with the relation of 
'letting-be'. Similarly Christ, as a historical symbol, is also 
.personal symbol. He is therefore a particular symbol of relational 
Being: the manifestation par exoeZZence of the relational God. 
Although, as symbol, Christ is unique and particular, this is not the 
only potentially superior symbol of Holy Being. Macquarrie states: 
148. op. cit., p.272. 
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In any actual theology, the bare language of existence 
and Being becomes clothed, so to speak, in the concrete 
symbolism of a particular religious faith. This is 
possible because every entity, as something that is, is 
a bearer of or a participant in Being. (149) 
Or as Diamond expresses it: "All words which have ontological value, 
in the sense of referring to things that exist, also have existential 
association".150 The existential association gives the form and 
content to the symbolism: entitative reference is supplied by the 
fact that symbols are grounded in existent reality. But Diamond notes 
that Macquarrie endeavours to reverse this when it comes to God. 'God' 
is "a word that is so heavily freighted with existential significance 
(that it) must have ontological purchase as well".151 And so we are 
returned to the problem of reference. Does Holy Being refer to an 
entity, albeit a 'relational' entity, or not? And if not, to what 
does it really refer? For it would seem that Macquarrie does indeed 
think of Holy Being as 'God', and God as that-which (or He-Who) engages 
in relationship. The conclusion of the discussion on attribute and 
relation, on Imago Dei, and on the four marks of relational entity, 
suggests that Macquarrie's doctrine of God in his existential-
ontological theism is, indeed, a doctrine of a "relational entity". 
Yet there is no entity which may be called "Being", for Being is not 
a being. So the term 'Being' refers to the ontological relatedness 
of existing reality. For Macquarrie, then, God is not identified 
149. Studies, p.95. 
150. M. Diamond, Rel.St.5, October 1969:118. 
151. op. cit., p.119. 
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with Being, but he is synonymous with "Holy Being". Now I would 
contend that "Holy Being", unlike 'Being' simpZicitel', does denote 
an entity, viz, God. The synonymous identification that Macquarrie 
makes means that 'God' is to be entitatively conceived in the mode 
of 'Holy Being'. Furthermore, I have shown that Holy Being denotes 
relational entity: it is the existential-ontological term for that 
'entity' which has ontological relatedness as its sine qua non . 
I shall return to the theme of God and Being in Chapter Six 
where a summary and further critical discussion of Macquarrie ' s 
existential-ontological theism will be placed alongside that of 
Hartshorne's neoclassical theism. It is to an exposition and 
discussion of the latter that attention now turns. 
PART TWO 
GOD AND BECOMING 
THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN THE THOUGHT OF CHARLES HARTSHORNE 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NEOCLASSICAL THEISM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The understanding of God in terms of Being is complemented by 
the understanding of God in terms of Becoming. Just how the exist-
ential-ontological and the neoclassical concepts of God stand one to 
the other will be explored in Chapter Six below. The task of the next 
two chapters is to expound Charles Hartshorne's doctrine of God and, 
in so doing, to explore the relational dimensions and implications 
of his neoclassical theism. 
Charles Hartshorne is a professional philosopher l who has spent 
his life working primarily in the area of metaphysics. 2 However, in 
so far as, according to Hartshorne, a right metaphysic is ipso f acto 
natural theology, then he may justifiably be called a theologian. 3 
As philosopher and as theologian it has been within the stream of 
1. For good biographical resume see, e.g. A. Gragg; 'Charles 'Hattshotne, 
Texas: Word Books 1973, and E.H. Peters; 'Hattshorne 'and 'Neoc1assical 
Metaphysics, University Nebraska 1970. 
2. For Hartshorne, metaphysics "seeks ... the essential nature of becoming 
which does not itself become and cannot pass away; or, it seeks the 
universal principle of relativity whose validity is absolute. 
'Nothing is absolute but relativity' ... (is thus) .•. the secret of 
secrets". Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, London: SCM 
1970, p.26. 
3. cf. W.L. Sessions, "Hartshorne's Early Philosophy" in L.S. Ford (ed), 
Two Ptocess 'Philosophers, Florida: AAR 1973, p.29; Cragg notes . 
"Hartshorne has demonstrated that the deepest levels of metaphys1cs 
inevitably involve the question of God", Hattshorne, p.1S. 
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Process Thought that Hartshorne has clearly swum. As a leading 
expositor and interpreter of the thought of A.N. Whitehead Hartshorne 
"has given a lifetime of attention to the metaphysical conception of 
God implied in process thought".4 
In his own work in process theology the particular approach 
Hartshorne has espoused and developed he terms "neoc1assica1".s He 
is a philosophical and theological reformer, yet he remains firmly 
within the orbit of that which he endeavours to reform. 6 Although 
he has drawn substantially on the thought of Whitehead7 Hartshorne's 
own metaphysical and theological perspective stands on its own merits. 
He is much too creative, and acknowledges a much too broad a range 
of intellectual influences, to be labelled a disciple of Whitehead 
in any narrow sense. Whitehead's inf1uece on Hartshorne is undoubtedly 
singular and seminal; it is by no means final and delimiting. 
Hartshorne notes as his intellectual mentors, apart from Whitehead, 
C.S. Peirce and Henri Bergson. 8 He has also been influenced by Hocking,9 
4. D.D. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, New York: Harper 
and Row 1968, p.10s. 
5. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, p.xvi. 
6. e.g. Gragg claims that Hartshorne stands "in the same tradition 
with Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel and Whitehead"~ 'Hartshorne, 
p.ls; and Colin Gunton remarks that Hartshorne "accepts wholeheartedly 
the quest of the classical theists", Becomirtg 'artdBeing, London: OUP 
1978, p.ll. 
7. Gragg notes that "In broad outline, hartshorne's dependence on 
Whitehead finds clearest expression in his enthusiastic adoption of 
Whitehead's view of the universe as essentially one of perpetual 
change and becoming. This view, which Hartshorne affirms without 
reservation, holds that everything, including God, is ceaselessly 
changing in a dynamic process of creative advance that will never 
end". Hartshorne, p .16. 
8. C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, Illinois: Open Court 1973, 
pp. viii-ix. 
9. C. Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, New York: Harper and Row 1941, 
p.xviii. 
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10 as well as Royce, James, Perry and Berdyaev, not to mention Husserl 
d H . d 11 W·· an e1 egger. D.O. llllams notes a close affinity between prag-
matism and process thought: 12 Dewey is to be added to the list of 
influences upon, or resources for, the creative thought of Charles 
Hartshorne. Of Hartshorne's own distinctive style of thinking, Gragg 
has commented that "Hartshorne may properly be called an untamed 
. 1. ,,13 rat10na 1st . 
Now the process school of thought has been fighting a rearguard 
action in both philosophical and theological circles since it's ~ 
beginnings earlier this century. However, it could be said that in 
the past decade - the 1970's - process theology has come of age. 
This is due in so small measure to the efforts of Charles Hartshorne. 
He may be something of a 'prophet crying in the wilderness' as far 
as the world of professional philosophy is concerned, but in the 
theological realm there is a growing body of theologians, particularly 
in the U.S.A., who have taken up the challenge and insights of process 
thought as a direct consequence of Hartshorne's inf1uence. 14 
10. C. Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, New York: Hafner 1971, 
pp .19-23. 
11. See R.E. James, TheCortctete 'God, New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1967, 
for a discussion of the influence of Husserl and Heidegger along 
with Pierce and Whitehead on Hartshorne's own thinking. 
12. Williams, Spirit, p.lOS. 
13. Gragg, Hartshorne, p.12. 
14. Chief among these would be Schubert Ogden, John B. Cobb, Lewis 
Ford, David Griffin and the late D.O. Williams. Other notable 
process theologians, such as Norman Pittenger, have developed 
their thought more directly from A.N. Whitehead himself. (cf. 
e.g. Pittenger, Process 'Thought and Christian Faith, Herts: 
Nisbet 1968, pp.viiff. However, all process theologians, to a 
greater or lesser degree, are working out the seminal thought 
of Whitehead: to that extent Hartshorne may be designated chief 
guide and pathfinder. 
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With respect to the purpose and aims of this thesis I do not 
intend to delve in detail into the antecedent influences on Hartshorne. 
Having noted the tradition out of which his thought emerges, my 
interest lies more with where it may be leading than analysing from 
whence it has come. Nonetheless, it will be appropriate at certain 
points to note salient features and aspects of Whitehead's thought in 
illuminating that of Hartshorne. 
Hartshorne's reforming task could be characterized as that of 
effecting conceptual change by the principle of addition. Where 
classical theism affirms that God is Absolute - and thereby explicitly 
denies any relativity to God - Hartshorne argues that God is both 
Absolute and Relative. The problem then remains to explicate and 
comprehend this seemingly paradoxical conjunction. 
Hartshorne combines metaphysical insight and vision with logical 
rigour and exactitude in his quest to unearth the "philosophical power 
inherent in the truly religious conception".15 In much of his writings 
. G d h b k l' 1 l' d 1 . f' . 16 concernlng 0 e em ar s upon oglca ana YS1S an c aSSl lcatl0n, 
yet never dispassionately so. For the aim is to demonstrate that the 
particular concept of God with which he works, and for which he wants 
to argue, is, indeed, demonstrably reasonable, logically coherent, and 
religiously satisfying in a way in which alternative and classical 
conceptions are not. He states of his view of God that "it must be 
15. Hartshorne, Man's Vision, p.viii. 
16. cf. Man's Vision, p.x; cf. his Divine Relativity, New Haven: Yale 
1948, pp.ix, xvi. 
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an expression of one of the three and only three formally possible 
views ... regarding the supreme being".17 It is important to note that 
it is a view of the supreme being to which Hartshorne addresses him-
self. As mentioned above, he is engaged in reforming what is still, 
at heart, the classical concept of God. His quarrel is not with the 
notion of 'supreme being' as such, but rather with how the 'supremacy' 
of such a being is to be properly understood. 
Hartshorne appears almost Hegelian in his desire for a 'higher 
synthesis' by which his concept of God embraces both the thesis of 
classical theism and many of those views and positions which are 
normally taken to be antithetical to it. The classical theism of 
the via negativa Hartshorne calls 'first-type theism' of which he 
writes: 
Is it not precisely first-type theism, traditional 
theology, which is one-sided, meagre, incomplete in 
its use of experience to arrive at the nature of God? 
It simply denies certain all-pervasive, infinitely 
fundamental aspects of life - change, memory, antici-
pation - as relevant to the idea of God. (IS) 
Here we are taken to the heart of both Hartshorne's objection to 
classical theism and, rhetorically, to the nub of his own ~lternative 
view. He would argue that, if not totally correct, it is at least 
much nearer the truth than the classical views. It is Hartshorne's 
17. Man's Vision, p.3. 
IS. op. cit., p.125. 
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earnest quest to weave together the "two strands in theology", viz: 
"the popular or operative religious idea of the God of love, perfect 
in lovingness, and hence all-understanding and everlasting" on the 
one hand, with, on the other, the "set of secular concepts by which 
this religious idea has usually been interpreted: pure actuality, 
immutability, impassivity, uncaused causality".19 
I have noted that Hartshorne is very much his own man. He acknow-
ledges a degree of indebtedness to Whitehead, but he makes it clear 
that he questions some of Whitehead's key ideas concerning God. 20 
Nonetheless, those elements of Whitehead's thinking which Hartshorne 
finds particularly felicitous are "summed up in the doctrine of 
'creative synthesis' or 'creativity' as the 'ultimate ' abstract 
principle of existence".2l For Hartshorne, the concept of God must 
take full cognizance of this principle. Any understanding of God must 
therefore take into account the experience of creativity - of becoming -
that is manifest in the existence of the world such that God, as 
Creator, is understood in a parallel dynamic fashion . Thus it is 
that Hartshorne identifies the two key questions of the theistic 
debate, viz: 
"(1) Is God independent of the universe of entities 
other than himself, capable of existing without 
them, or is he not thus capable? 
(2) Is God a perfect being, and in what sense?" (22) 
19. op. cit., p.128. 
20. Creative Synthesis, p.xv. 
21. ibid. 
22. C. Hartshorne and W. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, Chicago: 
University of Chicago 1963, pp.499f. 
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In identifying these two key issues Hartshorne takes us to the 
heart of the question as to whether, and to what extent, God may be 
conceived as a "relational entity". For if the short answer to the 
first question is negative, then the answer to the second question 
can only be in terms of an understanding of God such that God's 
"perfection" is defined in terms of ' re1ationality ' . That is, 
perfection is to be understood in terms of relational interdependence 
rather than sheer dependence or independence. The exploration of 
Hartshorne's own answer - his thesis of 'Surre1ativ. ism' - should there-
fore highlight the relationality of his concept of God. Indeed, the 
entire analysis and discussion of Hartshorne's neoclassical theism 
will show the extent to which the reality of God consists of his 
being relational . 
The over-arching issue to which Hartshorne addresses himself is 
the question of the meaning of 'God,.23 He believes that religion, 
"as a live option", is not bound into a "standard metaphysical position 
of the past" such that to debunk the latter is to discredit the former. 24 
He believes firmly in the God of religion; the God of faith, who is f 
a personal God. Thus he makes bold the claim that 
23 . cf. 
24. op . 
25. op. 
A personal God is one who has social relations, really 
has them, and is thus constituted by relationships and 
hence is relative - in a sense not provided for by the 
traditional doctrine of divine Substance wholly non-
relative toward the world ... " (25) 
Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p.v. 
cit . , p.vi. 
cit . , p.x. (Italics mine) 
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This claim is Hartshorne's premise, yet it also, in a sense, 
contains the conclusion to which he proceeds: that Deity is primarily 
Relative. Thus he refers to God as the 'Divine Relativity' and he 
does so on the basis that the Divine Relativity includes the absolute. 26 
Whatever God is conceived of in 'absolute' terms, such conception is 
embraced by the more penetrating and inclusive understanding of God 
as essentially relational - as "const ituted by relationships". As 
Colin Gunton rightly points out, 
Hartshorne's first attack on classical theism concerns 
the way in which it conceives the relation of God to 
the world. He argues that it is absurd to hold that 
God is totally unaffected by the events that take place 
in the universe. (27) 
Hartshorne seeks to hold together conceptually the experience of God 
as relative with respect to humankind and creation, and the under-
standing of God as wholly other than and superior to humankind and 
creation. 
Hartshorne has embarked upon a new approach to the understanding 
of God. He not only challenges the long-cherished views of classical 
theism, but also his own conceptual development poses an alternative 
to both atheism and pantheism. He challenges both the 'thesis' of 
the absolute, infinite deity of classical theism, and the ' antithesis ' 
of a finite God. 28 He places his hope for the concept of God in the 
26. op. cit., p.ix. 
27. Gunton, Becoming, p.llf. 
28. Man's Vision, p.4f. 
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"re-examination of the idea of infinity or perfection". 29 If the 
notion of perfection as applied to God can be seen to embrace both 
absolute and relative aspects in the understanding and experience 
of deity, then perhaps Hartshorne's doctrine will indeed have 
signalled a theological breakthrough. 
What, then, is Hartshorne's doctrine of God? It will be the 
task of this chapter to respond to that question. Together with the 
subsequent chapter it will also bring to bear the overriding question 
of this thesis: In what way, and to what extent, may God be conceived 
as essentially relational? To the extent that Hartshorne's doctrine 
is in fact explicitly relational, the question focuses on how this 
relationality is understood, and what ontological implications it 
may raise for the doctrine of God. 
II. THE DIPOLAR CONCEPT OF GOD 
(a) Dipolarity and God 
I have said that Hartshorne's neoclassical theism may be charac-
terized as an attempt at change by addition . This is particularly 
noticeable with respect to the Law of Polarity as applied to the 
doctrine of God. 30 Hartshorne proposes that the "standard terms of 
religious philosophising", whilst they are applicable to the "God 
of religion", they are not exclusively applicable and therefore 
God is somehow absolute, infinite, immutable, and supreme 
cause; but in such a fashion that he can also be relative, 
29. op. cit., p.6. 
30. cf. E.H. Peters, Hartshorne, p.79. 
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finite, mutable, and supreme effect. God comes under 
both sides of the basic contraries. (31) 
Cohen's 'axiom of polarity', viz: "that categories run in 
contraries so related that neither of the contrary poles has meaning 
or application by itself", is highly important to Hartshorne's 
h · k' 32 t In lng. According to Gunton, the "dipolar conception of God" 
means for Hartshorne that: 
God is conceived to be such that in part of his being 
he is affected by the doings of other entities, and in 
particular that he is able to suffer with them, while 
in the other part he is such that his very existence 
cannot be threatened by what he suffers. (33) 
Thus the dipolarity of God means that apparent contraries both apply 
to God, for each term applies appropriately to one or other of the 
two 'poles' or aspects which mark the being of God. 34 Thus such 
contraries become, according to the dipolar theory, 'correlatives', 
co-equally constitutive of the being of God. 
31. C. Hartshorne, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy" in 
G. Vesey (ed), Talk of God, London: Macmillan 1970, p.162. 
32. Hartshorne, Reality, p.86; cf. Peters, Hartshorne, pp.124f.; 
Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p.xf.; cf. Cragg, Hartshorne, p.84. 
But note that Cohen speaks of "the necessary co-presence and mutual 
dependence of opposite determinations" such that these correlatives, 
by implication, have co-equal status. But Hartshorne goes beyond 
this: in the end one 'pole' has priority over the other, viz., the 
pole he introduces which is the pole rejected by classical theism. 
The reason for this assyrnetry of polar status has to do with the 
relation of inclusion which shall be discussed below. 
33. Gunton, Becoming, p.2l. 
34. cf. Ford (ed), Two Process Philosophers, pp.3Sf. 
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Now Hartshornets point is that his dipolar view of God overcomes 
the artificial disjunction of qualities brought about by the monopolar 
bias of the classical view. 35 Thus, with respect to God - and, indeed, 
with respect to metaphysics as such - Hartshornets basic doctrine is 
that tithe two poles of each contrast stand or fall together; neither 
is simply to be denied or explained away, or called tunrealttt.36 
Against the classical tradition by which is ascribed to God a set of 
attributes or qualities such that their logical antonyms are explicitly 
denied, dipolar theism, notes H.P. Owen, maintains that God ttmust 
include opposites: he must be both temporal and eternal, both changing 
and changeless, both creator of the world and dependent on ittt.37 
Hartshorne argues that the classical Western tradition has over-
simplified - and hence distorted - the concept of God by an arbitrary 
favouring of one polarity over the other; by affirming one term of a Y 
pair of contrasts as applicable to deity, and the other as not. The 
method of the classical tradition Hartshorne describes as 
taking each pair of ultimate contraries, such as one 
and many, permanence and change, being and becoming, 
necessity and contingency, the self-sufficient or non-
relative versus the dependent or relative, the actual 
versus the potential, one decides in each case which 
35. cf. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, p.44. 
36. op. cit., p.99. 
37. H.P. Owen, The Christian Knowledge of God, London: Ath10ne 1969, 
p.lOS; cf. S. Ogden,TheReality 'of 'God, London: SCM 1967, p.62. 
Owen himself is critical of dipolar theism, arguing that it is 
a self-contradiction. I will address such criticisms in Chapter 
Six below. 
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member of the pair is good or admirable and then 
attributes it (in some supremely excellent or trans-
cendent form) to deity, while wholly denying the 
contrasting term. (38) 
Thus it is that 
One pole of each contrary is regarded as more excellent 
than the other, so that the supremely excellent being 
cannot be described by the other and inferior pole. (39) 
Now Hartshorne questions the validity of affirming meaning to a 
supposedly 'superior' pole by the process of denial of its contrast. 
Following Cohen he raises the question as to whether, in fact, 
contraries are not "essentially correlative". He holds that: 
ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually inter-
dependent, so that nothing real can be described by 
the wholly onesided assertion of simplicity, being 
actuality, and the like ... (40) 
At the heart of Hartshorne's dipolar approach to God is the equal 
valuation of both poles of each pair of ultimate contraries, with the 
condition that 
to avoid contradiction we must posit two main aspects 
in the essence of supreme being, to one of which the 
38. Hartshorne, Philosophers Speak, p.l. 
39. op. cit., p.2. 
40. ibid. 
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one pole supremely applies ... to the other aspect, the 
other pole applies. (41) 
Thus Hartstone rejects both the calssical doctrine of God as well as 
the alternative monopolar view which simply reverses the classical 
42 procedure. Instead, God is 
the union of supreme actuality and supreme potentiality, 
supreme activity and supreme passivity, supreme being 
and supreme becoming, the most strictly absolute and 
the most universally relative of all entities, actual 
or possible. (43) 
The theory of dipolarity is thus at the centre of Hartshorne's neo-
classical theism. The basic polarities which Hartshorne resolves in 
order to obtain his fundamental dipolar concept of God are the 
contraries Absolute/Relative and Abstract/Concrete, along with a 
resolution of the 'polarity' of Internal and External relations as 
applied to God. 
To discuss specific polarities in isolation, as it were, is 
virtually impossible. If the approach that Hartshorne takes to 
establish his doctrine of God is by way of an investigation and 
application of the theory of dipolarity, then the resolution of 
this approach is to be found in his doctrine of Surrelativism. Thus, 
whilst I begin with a consideration of the polar concepts 'absolute' 
'- l 
41. Philosophers Speak, p.4. 
42. op. cit., p.5. 
43. op. cit., p.14. 
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and 'relative' - because they are a starting point for a detailed 
examination of Hartshorne's doctrine of God - there is nonetheless 
a sense in which the basic polarities, and their resolution, are so 
intertwined that it becomes almost artificial to isolate any element 
for discussion. However, notwithstanding this oaveat, I shall proceed 
with an examination of the major factors of neoclassical theism as I 
have identified them in anticipation that in due course the isolated 
threads will be seen in the full context of the tapestry into which 
they are woven. 
(b) Absolute and Relative 
According to Hartshorne the polar concepts Absolute and Relative 
"require each other",44 and are to be interpreted in terms of each 
other. 
Noting that the history of metaphysics yields a diversity of 
species "conforming to the generic concept, absoluteness" Hartshorne 
states the need of, and himself attempts, "a systematic analysis of 
the rationally possible variations or analogous forms implied by the 
meanings .. . of terms like 'absolute', 'relative', 'perfect', and 
their contradictories".45 The term 'an absolute', Hartshorne states, 
usually means 
(1) A being wholly incapable of change, and thus 
"independent" of or "impassive to the action of other 
beings; or (2) a being whose value or reality is an 
unsurpassab1e limit, a sheer maximum. (46) 
44. Man's Vision, p . IS 
45. Reality, p.lli. 
46 . op. cit., p . 112 
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Now the mistake of conceiving God as absolute per se he claims, 
resides in the assumption that "God is conceptually unique because 
h 1 d . II 47 e a one oes not react or 1nterreact . But God is conceived by 
Hartshorne as related to the world, and this means he has a relative 
pole as constitutive of his being - along with an absolute pole. 
For otherwise, if "God is wholly absolute, a term but never a subject 
of relations, it follows that God does not know or love or will us, 
his creatures".48 So Hartshorne would see the ascription to divinity 
of 'absolute' as the motif whereby relativity is explained, rather 
than opposed. 49 
With respect to divine absoluteness, he comments that it 
is a relative absoluteness, it is universality, on 
the one hand specified a priori and obtaining by 
necessity, but on the other hand always existing 
concretely with respect to some contingent world. (SO) 
This means that on the one hand God is conceived as perfect in both 
an absolute and relative senseSl and also that, on the other hand, 
there is a transcendent mutual interpretation: the absoluteness of 
God is his supreme relativity. The supremely relative - the 
"surrelative" - is thus absolute. Indeed Hartshorne asserts that 
47. C. Hartshorne, A Natural Theology For Our Time, Illinois: Open 
Court 1967, p.69. 
48. Divine Reality, p.16. 
49. cf. Natural Theology, pp.70ff. 
50. op. cit., p.70. 
51. cf. Discussion in Gunton, Becoming, p.27. 
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"Relativity is the absolute principle" and claims that "if there 
is such a thing as 'the absolute', it is some ultimate or supreme 
k ' d f 1 ' , ,,52 1n 0 re at1v1ty , 
In his Divine Relativity Hartshorne states his aim to determine 
the conceptual content of both 'absolute' and 'relative' and thereby 
53 
"to know the relations of these conceptual meanings to each other". 
Drawing attention to the way in which the absolute-relative question 
has been considered theologically in the past, Hartshorne raises the 
question: "How can we know God as causally related to the world, if 
he is not related at all, if he has no relative being?,,54 Behind 
this question lies the argument that by idol ising the absolute pole 
classical theology has effectively removed the concept of God from 
discussion and cognizance . Indeed for Hartshorne the espousal of 
the necessary correlation of relative and absolute and, with respect 
to the doctrine of God, the emergence of the doctrine of surrelativ-
ism, is in part motivated by his negative reaction to the "idolatry 
of absoluteness".55 One could argue that it is on account of this 
idolatry that the relational elements in the biblical witness to 
the reality of God have been largely lost to the dogmatic doctrine 
of God. 
Now Hartshorne makes a useful distinction between using the 
term ' absolute' to denote excellence and using it to denote aseity .56 
52. Creative Synthesis, p.47. 
53. Divine Relativity, p . 5 . 
54. op . cit., p.15 . 
55. Creative Synthesis, p.104; cf. Natural Theology, pp.127f. 
56. Divine Relativity, p . 18. 
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The marks of aseity - independence, immutability, and so on - are 
not to be taken as ipso facto excellent in and of themselves. 
Therefore by separating 'excellence' from 'absolute' Hartshorne is 
able to propound a view of God as the supreme or 'excellent' being, 
whilst arguing that to resolve the absolute-relative polarity will 
require the recognition that 
'the absolute' is not identical with supreme being 
of God, but in a strict sense is infinitely less than 
' the supreme, and in fact is a certain kind of 
constituent within it. (57) 
Not only is the absolute not to be identified with the supreme, but 
also it is not to be identified with the "inclusive".58 The "all-
inclusive" embraces the absolute: which means that the Divine Relat-
ivity, as the all-inclusive deity, includes the Absolute within 
't If "1 t 59 1 se as a const1tut1ve e emen . So the neoclassical concept of 
God - the supreme being - embraces the absolute/relative correlate 
such that both poles are conceived as constituents of the reality 
of God. 60 
In his ingenious analysis of grades of being6l and metaphysical 
contraries62 Hartshorne develops further his understanding of the 
57. ibid. This viewpoint is not unlike that of Barth, although any 
similarity would effectively end there. 
58, Divine Relativity, p.62 
59. op. cit., pp.86ff. 
60. Reality, p.113. 
61. op. cit., p.118. 
62. Creative Synthesis, pp.99ff. 
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absolute-relative polarity. Each of the three grades of being has 
two forms, corresponding to the polar correlates. On the one hand, 
"the absolute form is the element of mere being"; on the other "the 
relative form includes, besides mere abstract being, the concrete 
being-of-becoming".63 Relative being embraces both process and the 
mere being of 'absolute'. Thus Hartshorne concludes that making 
"the absolute as such the most real or inclusive entity" was a meta-
physical failure that "contaminated" the arguments of theism . 64 
In the Preface to A Natural Theology For Our Time , Hartshorne 
suggests that "the God of Religion is i n a sense more absolute than 
most philosophers have been prepared to admit , or most theologians 
claim". 65 Although the traditional Greek-derived Western interpret-
. f d b h b . k 66 h h atlon 0 Go as a solute as een a mlsta e t ere are nonet eless 
absolutes which are 'in ' God. Such abs olutes take the form of 
"d' . . 67 IVIne prerogatIves". Of Hartshorne ' s dipolar theism we could 
say that God is not describable in terms of absolutes alone, but 
"absolutely" in terms of the relativity that contains the absolute 
as a factor within itself; or as t hat inclusiveness of the meta-
68 physical contraries taken all together. Thus is God "more 
absolute" by yet not being identified with the merely absolute . 
63 . Reality, p . l24 . 
64 . ibid. 
65 . Natural Theology, p . x . 
66 . op . cit . , p.24. 
67. op. cit . , p . 54. 
68. cf . Reality, p . 115 ; Creative Synthesis, p . l20. 
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Relativity does not apply to God in exactly the same way as it 
does to elements within creation, viz, as denoting a fundamental 
changeability according to changes in external factors that bear 
some influence, whether direct or indirect. Thus: "God is relative, 
but what we may call the extent of his relativity is wholly independ-
ent of circumstances, wholly nonrelative".69 The essence of the 
interpretation of the Divine as Relative is that God, in embracing 
both absolute and relative poles, must thereby manifest relativity 
in respect of the relations in which he is engaged. This is in 
contradiction to the classical interpretation of God in terms of 
an essential self-identity which remains aloof from influence. 
The notions of 'absolute' and 'relative' are necessary polar 
correlates in Hartshorne's neoclassical theism. They each denote 
distinctive aspects of the reality of God: their correlative con-
junction forms a constitutive element in the being of God. That 
the relative pole is accorded conceptual priority is indicative of 
the explicit relationality of God inherent in Hartshorne's viewpoint. 
(c) Abstract and Concrete 
The second correlative contrast central to Hartshorne's dipolar 
theism is that of the Abstract-Concrete polarity. In many respects 
this second polar contrast interprets, and develops upon, the first. 
The 'absolute' aspect or pole in the being of God is also the 
'abstract ': and the 'relative' pole is the 'concrete' element of 
the Divine Reality. Just as the resolution of the absolute-relative 
69 . Divine Relativity, p. 82 . 
.-
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polarity is brought about by the inclusion of the absolute within 
the relative, so we find that the abstract is a category which , 
though conceptually distinct, is nonetheless included within the 
concrete. This principle that "the concrete is greater than and 
includes all abstractions" is a methodological key to Hartshorne's 
work, the comprehension of which, as James notes, "is required if 
his treatment of theological topics is to be understood". 70 
Hartshorne's reasoning runs as follows: "abstract entities are 
not real simply in themselves, apart from all concrete embodiment ... 
the basic form of reality is concrete reality ... the most fundamental 
71 
abstraction is concreteness as such". The category of the concrete -
or "concreteness" - is viewed by Hartshorne as the key metaphysical 
" 72 h pr1nc1ple. Peters states that for Harts orne 
Metaphysics ... is primarily the theory of concreteness, 
the concrete being reality in its fullness or inclusive-
ness ... The complete generality of metaphysics does not 
imply indifference to the distinction between the concrete 
and the abstract, that is, between the concrete and its 
aspects or constituents; indeed a theory of concreteness 
must include a theory of abstractness . (73) 
Now James' study focusses on "the particular problem of the 
70. James, The Concrete God, p.57. 
71. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, p.22. 
72 . Creative Synthesis, p.32: "It is arguable that strictly speaking 
there is but one metaphysical, innate or strictly universal and 
necessary idea-Qr principle, concreteness (containing internally 
its own contrast to abstractness) .... " 
73. Peters, Hartshorne, p.26 . 
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abstract God and Hartshorne's concrete solution".74 He addresses 
himse l f to the way Hartshorne meets the ongoing problem of relating 
the "abstraction of an unchanging God to the concreteness of a 
changing world".75 The meaning , and hence the contrast, of ' abstract ' 
and 'concrete' is expressed by James thus: 
To be abstract is to be empty, withdrawn from everyday 
life, indeterminate, but above all to be changeless . 
The polar opposite of abstract is therefore full immersion 
in everyday life, namely, the concrete. Unlike the 
abstract, the concrete abides with rich diversity, real 
particularity, above all, the concrete is changing . (76) 
In his discussion of Hartshorne's notion of the concrete James 
examines the influences of Husserl, Heidegger, Peirce and Whitehead . 
With respect to Husserl, Hartshorne derives three characteristics 
of the category of the concrete: time (or temporality), intuition, 
d '1' 77 an SOCIa Ity. The temporal element of concreteness is the fact 
of event: time itself is a 'happening'. Intuition, or intuitive 
feeling, denotes the aspect of real particip~tion that is part and 
parcel of the meaning of the concrete. Sociality denotes the aspect 
of real interrelatedness. The net result of the consideration of 
these characteristics, James observes" is that for Hartshorne "abstract 
78 thought is ontologically secondary to the concrete" and further 
74. James, Concrete, p . xvi. 
75. op. cit. , p.xxi. 
76. op. cit. , p.xiv. 
77. op. cit. , p.3ff. 
78. op. cit. , p.ll. 
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that "to abstract is to neglect the whole realm of social inter-
dependence". 79 
Hartshorne defines "concrete" in terms of definiteness and 
d . 80 eterm1.nateness. Phenomenologically, the concrete is constituted 
as the felt participatory interrelated (i.e. non-isolated) real event. 
It is the "intuited social whole", the "implied ground from which 
abstraction is abstracted".81 James notes that Heidegger's exist-
entialism is perceived by Hartshorne as "more concrete than Husserl's 
phenomenology". 82 And this tendency toward the concrete is found 
also in Peirce as meaning "the actuality of the empirical world is 
rea1".83 Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne's understanding of 
the concrete is in terms of the notion of actual entities - or 
occasions - which are for Whitehead "the final real things of which 
the world is made up".84 
So the concrete is thus seen to be the realm of real - i.e. 
~ 
definite or determinate - events or occurrence spf activity that take 
place within, and indeed constitute, the process of actualising 
'b'l' 85 pOSS1. 1. 1.ty. But such events are not discrete and isolated, for 
they occur within the matrix of social interrelatedness. They occur 
The 'concrete', 
79. op. cit. , p.ls. 
80. Creative Synthesis, pp.22f. 
81. James, Concrete, p.ls. 
82. op. cit. , p.17. 
83. op. cit. , p.31. 
84. See Concrete, p.44. 
85. cf. Concrete, p.4s. 
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as the category denoting the world of change, of intentional choice, 
of event, of fluid relationships, is pre-eminently a relational 
category. The category of the ' abstract ' is but the end product 
of the process of ' abstracting from ' this concrete-relational -
reality . However, as Gunton notes, "priority is on the side of the 
concrete pole" which means that "it is from what is believed to be 
the case concretely (e . g. that God is now related to all reality) 
that the dipolar description of him is abstracted".86 
With regard to the polar inclusiveness of deity Hartshorne's 
point is that an abstraction "is fixed regardless of what happens": 
by contrast, "the concrete can be more or less, while still being 
itself" . 87 Hartshorne argues that "God is both universal and 
concrete; but the concreteness transcends the universality and is 
incomparably more than God merely as existing or individual".88 
There is a "real distinction" between God's "abstract individuality 
or existence" and his "full concrete actuality". The one equates 
with necessity in God; the other with contingency: but the uniqueness 
of Hartshorne ' s approach is to see the reality of God as inclusive 
of both the necessary abstract and the contingent concrete. Thus 
86. Gunton, Becoming, p . 36. 
87. Hartshorne, Reality, p.114 . 
88 . Hartshorne, Natural Theology, p.37:"Analysis shows that there is 
one idea in which the extremes of greatest generality or abstract-
ness, also greatest particularity or concreteness and unsurpas-
sable value are all found together, namely in the idea of God as 
eminent individual who, though individual, is also somehow 
completely universal ... and concretized in states whose range of 
possibilities is in some strict sense as wide as the possibilities 
for contrasting states of things in general" . Creative Synthesis, 
p.74 . 
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as "universal", 'Ueity is abstract, a mere outline of reality"; as 
"concrete"deity "is always more than any universal" for the concrete 
. t' . 89 1ns ant1ates un1versa1s. Thus the emergence of 'concrete' as the 
prior and inclusive category means, as James states, 
that the inclusive concrete contains the abstract; is 
ontologically prior to the abstract; precedes the 
abstract temporally; and that the changing concrete 
is superior to abstractions which do not change. (90) 
Hartshorne argues that "the non-reflexive or non-relative is the 
necessary element of abstract identity required by the concrete, 
relative or changing" and concludes that the abstract is a factor 
contained within the relative or concrete. 91 Hartshorne's view of 
concrete individuals is important for his understanding of God. For 
such individuals "must in some degree be self-managed, agents acting 
to some extent on their own, or they are not individuals, concrete 
units of reality. This is inherent in the concept of concreteness".92 
Thus "a definition of deity which violates this concept is illicit ... 93 
On this basis immutability is an "abstraction from process" and is to 
b 'd d 94 e aVOl e . Immutability that grants relational immunity is a 
89. Natural Theology, p.61. 
90. James, Concrete, p.S8; cf. Creative Synthesis, pp.46f. and l19f. 
for discussion of the abstract depending on the concrete. 
91. Reality, p.IIS. 
92. Creative Synthesis, p.30. 
93. ibid. 
94. Creative Synthesis, p.17. 
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95 travesty according to the neoclassical concept of God. 
James notes that 
Hartshorne ' s driving concern is to show the failure of the 
God of classicism ... The abstract God cannot 'get involved' -
He is dominated by classical abstractions which make 
historical involvement impossible. (96) 
Thus on the one hand the abstract pole within God denotes unchanging 
character, on the other hand the concrete pole "designates His 
97 
relative, changing, inclusive aspect". The abstract pole "is the 
logical necessity that some events be actualised", the concrete pole 
denotes full contingency "upon what happens in the universe". 98 The 
' concrete ' pole of the being of God constitutes the resolution of 
Hartshorne's claim that for God to be God requires that he be 
relative to - i.e. in appropriate relationship with - the universe. 
For Hartshorne, "God and the universe are interdependent and involved 
. . , f' , '" 99 1n S1gn1 1cant 1nteract1on . 
Inasmuch as the concrete is pre-eminently a relational category 
then God, as the supremely concrete, is thereby the supremely 
95 . "To attribute to God immunity in every sense to misfortune is 
merely to degrade God to the status of an abstraction from the 
total actuality. It also serves, most evilly, to reinforce our 
own tendency to deny our SOlidarity with the weal and woe of 
others, by making deity the model of such aloofness. Intrinsic 
togetherness with things both good and evil is not a defect, 
but is the perfection of concreteness". CreatiVe 'SyntheSis, pp.17f. 
96 . James, Concrete, p.106. 
97 . op. cit. , p.120. 
98. op. cit . , p.125 . 
99. op. cit , , p.126. 
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relational entity. The ' abstract' aspects of God have credibility 
only in so far as they are extrapolated from the awareness of the 
essential relatedness of God. This is indicated by Gunton when he 
notes that there are 
three things to say about Qod and the way he is described 
in neoclassical terminology: 
(i) that he is in fact related to everything that is 
actual at any given time; 
(ii) that to say (i) is to give an abstract description 
of his concrete reality; and 
(iii) that there is a further element, God's abstract 
pole, to be described, and the resulting descriptive 
language is an abstract description of God's abstract 
reali ty. (100) 
The dipolarity of abstract and concrete is highly significant 
for neoclassical theism. The significance lies in comprehending 
adequately the dipolar God who is primarily concrete, i.e. who is 
inclusive of all reality. 'Reality' is understood as process or 
'becoming': the serial ordering of prehending entities for whom the 
concreteness of their reality is the social interrelatedness of their 
event-nature. This concreteness is incorporated into the reality of 
God as the polar correlate of the abstract aspect of the reality of 
God. The absolute aspect of God is embraced by the relative: the 
abstract is included within the concrete. The conceptual distinct-
ions still stand, but in terms of the reality of who God is - i.e. 
100. Gunton, Becoming, p.36. 
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in terms of the very being of God - the theory of dipolarity resolves 
these contrasts by the relation of inclusion . This would indicate 
that God, qua concrete and relative reality, is to be comprehended 
as relational entity.lOl 
Cd) External and Internal Relations 
Neoclassical dipolarity, and its relational implications, may be 
explored further by considering Hartshorne's understanding of external 
and internal relations. Although these terms form a pair of contrasts, 
they do not fall into that cluster of terms which generally denote the 
dipolar view of God. Yet the resolution of the apparent tension 
between external and internal relatedness of God takes us to the heart 
of neoclassical theism and the relational interpretation of the con-
cept of God that is the focal concern of this thesis. 
As with other dipolarities, Hartshorne holds that both external 
102 
and internal relations are necessary. Hartshorne explains his 
position thus: 
Of internal relations, for a whole logically requires 
its constituents and God in his concrete actuality 
being the inclusive whole requires all thi~gs; ... Of 
external relations, for though God in his particular 
or contingent actuality includes all actuality, yet 
101. For a fuller discussion of the entitative status of God see 
Chapter Six below. 
102. Hartshorne aims "to show that a world of purely externally 
related entities is an absurdity and that any conceivable 
world requires both internal and external relations". Sessions, 
"Hartshorne's Early Philosophy", p.28. 
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in his bare individual existence as the divine being 
and no other he - and he alone - is necessary, and what 
is necessary cannot include, or be constituted by, 
relation to anything contingent. Only the contingent 
can be relative. Hence the abstract necessary aspect of 
God does not include the actual world, and is not 
relati ve to it. (103) 
'External relations' are relations such that one, or both terms are 
unaffected by, or ontologically neutral with respect to, the relation 
as such. Hartshorne expresses it thus: 
By a relation to Y being external to the term X (means) 
that X could have been exactly the same in nature had 
there been no such relation to Y. (104) 
By contrast, an internal relation is one which materially affects 
or involves, or is an ontological constituent of, one or both terms. 
Gunton summarises Hartshorne's understanding of relations as: 
(i) Relations between entities are either external 
or internal. 
(ii) If an entity A is externally related to entity B, 
A is not in any way affected by that relation .... 
(iii) Internal relations are possible only for knowing 
entities, that is, for those who are affected or altered 
by the act of cognition. (105) 
103. Natural Theology, p.26. 
104. Divine Relativity, p.62. 
105. Gunton, Becoming, p.12f. 
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106 In an analysis of Hartshorne's work Sessions comments that 
The only conceivable way of accounting for both internal 
and external relations, Hartshorne believes, is to con-
ceive of all relations of a thing as 'contained' in a 
'mediating Reality'; all properties he suggests, are 
relational, at least in the sense of being modes of 
relatedness or worth to the One. (107) 
This 'One' - the mediating monistic Reality - emerges eventually in 
Hartshorne's thinking as the dipolar God: the Divine Relativity -
the Unity containing all Plurality, all Relationality. Hartshorne 
states: 
A theistic philosophy cannot do either of the following ': 
(1) It cannot explain relations away ... For the creatures 
must really depend on God for their existence. (2) It 
cannot admit symmetry in this relation of existential 
dependence since God is not thought to depend upon any 
particular creatures for his existence. Relations to 
God are intrinsic to a creature, constitutive of its very 
existence; but relations to the creatures are extrinsic 
to the mere existence of God (though not to his total 
actuality, including his contingent qualities). (108) 
It is important to note that it is only the abstract aspect of 
God that is non-relative; only the absoluteness of his existence as 
such that stands aloof from relations. In his entirety - that is, 
106. Hartshorne's own doctroal dissertation, "The Unity of Being". 
107. Sessions, p.28. 
108. Creative Synthesis, p.226. 
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in his full. concrete and abstract, relative and absolute, being -
God, as such, does relate to all else, if only by the relation of 
inclusion. This comprehensive relationality - or 'super-relativity' -
I shall explore below. The point here is that for the neoclassical 
view the being of God is to be understood with respect to both 
external and internal relations. Thus, for example, with respect to 
the relationship between God and humankind, rather than having to 
decide between understanding this relation as either symmetrically 
external (whereby the relation is indifferent with respect to the 
terms), or symmetrically internal (whereby both God and humanity 
mutually constitute each other, thus diminishing the sense of real 
difference between them), we may perceive the reality of the relation-
ship as embracing parallel and complementary asymmetrical relations. 
Therefore, i n Hartshorne 'sview, there is a relation whereby 
humanity is internally related to God which carries with it the con-
verse of an external relation of God to humankind. Then there is a 
relation of God to humanity that is internal for God and external for 
human being. The combination of both relations yields the complete 
relational situation in which both terms, God and Humanity, are, in 
different aspects, internally and externally related to each other. 
This relational dynamic also holds for Hartshorne's wider view of the 
relationship between God and the cosmos per se. 
Before proceeding to the doctrine of surrelativism as such some 
other dipolarities need to be noted. The polarity of dependence and 
independence will be discussed in the next section. Finitude and 
infinity form a pair of contrasting terms, and Hartshorne's view is 
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that "it is not difficult to show that finitude and infinity involve 
the same double duality as dependence and independence".l09 That is, 
one term is included in the other, and both are included in the 
reality which the inclusive term denotes. This is similarly the case 
for the polarity of actuality and potentiality. 110 A further polarity 
is that of necessity and contingency. Gunton remarks that for 
Hartshorne, "if God is to be God, his existence must be necessary, 
III but this is not to say that he is so in every respect". Finally 
we may note the eternal-temporal polarity. As Gunton comments, for 
neoclassical theism, 
God is eternal not by virtue of being the creator of 
time, or by being in some way outside time or timeless; 
he is eternal only in abstraction from his involvement 
in time. He is eternal because he is necessarily 
temporal ... His eternity consists in his supreme 
temporality. (112) 
At the heart of the dipolar concept of God there is an essential 
relatedness. An examination of this relatedness - or supreme 
relativity - will occupy the next section of this chapter. 
III. SURRELATIVISM THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE RELATIVITY 
(a) Perfection and Surpassability 
Accord1ng to Hartshorne, surrelativism means 
109. Creative Synthesis, p.234. See Chapter Six below for discussion 
of critical responses to this and other aspects of Hartshorne's 
work. 
110. Creative Synthesis, p.235. 
111. cf. Gunton, Becoming, p.17. 
112. op. cit., p.33. 
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that the 'relative' or changeable, that which depends 
upon and varies with varying relationships, includes 
within itself and in value exceeds the nonrelative, 
immutable, independent, or 'absolute', as the concrete 
includes and exceeds the abstract. (113) 
Thus the 'social conception' means that God "is supremely relative to 
. . . 1 b ." 114 creatlon, lnteracts with all reallty and exceeds al a stractlons . 
Surrelativism is the result of the synthesis of absolutism and relat-
ivism in accordance with the dipolar theory. It is 
the theory that deity, or the categorically supreme 
individual, is neither absolute nor relative in the old 
sense, but a synthesis of absolute and relative. Not 
'absolutism', but 'relativism', in a new sense, is the 
last word; precisely because, in this new sense, it can 
include all the absolutism there seems need to admit or 
possibility consistently to conceive. (115) 
Now for Hartshorne, the problem of explicating the concept of 
Divine Relativity hinges on a right understanding of deity as the 
supreme or perfect being. He states the problem thus: 
By God we mean, or for religion we require, not simply 
a supreme or most excellent but a perfect being. And 
how can a perfect being change (as it must if relations 
to the changing world are internal to it) 1" (116) 
113. Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p.ix. 
114. James, Concrete God, p.8s. 
115. Hartshorne, Reality, p.2s. 
116. Divine Relativity, p.19. 
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Hartshorne's point is that either the Perfect Being does, or it does 
not, include the totality of reality. This totality includes within 
itself imperfection, change, relationships and so on. The dilemma, 
now ensues such that if the Perfect Being does so include total 
reality, then presumably it is inferior. This is to say it is less 
than fully perfect - by virtue of the imperfections etc., it thereby 
includes within itself. If it does not include all reality, then 
total reality is greater than the Perfect Being, for total reality 
consists of the Perfect Being plus all that is not included within 
that being. Thus the notion of the Perfect Being as all-inclusive 
is either defective with respect to "perfection" or vacuous with 
respect to the claim to all-inclusiveness. For Hartshorne, the means 
of escape from this dilemma is a radical reinterpretation of the 
"perfect" (superior) Being as including both real perfection and 
imperfection. For "the imperfect-and-the-perfect is something super-
ior to the perfect 'alone'''. 117 In other words, he seizes upon the 
first horn of the dilemma and challenges the very notion of perfection. 
Indeed, for Hartshorne, the way to a "rejuvenation of theology" lies 
. '1 . h . t' f h . d f f . 118 prlmarl y In t e re-examlna Ion 0 tel ea 0 per ectlon. He 
seeks to clarify the choice to be made between the classical and neo-
classical conceptions of divine perfection. 119 
Now the key-term that Hartshorne fastens onto with respect to 
the neoclassical interpretation of perfection is "surpassability". 
He argues 
117. ibid. 
118. Man's Vision, p.6. 
119. Hartshorne, Logic, p.26. 
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Suppose we define the perfect, or supremely excellent 
or good, as that individual being ... than which no other 
individual being could conceivably be greater, but which 
itself, in another 'state', could become greater ... (120) 
From this basis he concludes his definition of "perfect" as the "self-
121 
surpassing surpasser of all". He notes that: 
Perfection taken as an absolute maximum does exclude 
change as well as any possibility of being surpassed by 
another. But the converse deduction, of the absolute 
maximum from unsurpassability by another, succeeds only 
if we assume that what is unsurpassable by another must 
be unsurpassable by self as well, and this assumption is 
not self-evident... (122) 
Whether classically or neoclassica11y defined, the notion of 
d· . f . .// 123 1V1ne per ection "connotes excellence definable a pr'[.,on • With 
respect to the classical side, Hartshorne notes the vagueness and 
ambiguity of the Anselmian definition, viz, God is that "than which 
th ' b' d 124 no 1ng greater can e conce1ve ". He comments: 
It may mean (a) no individual greater than God is con-
ceivable, or (b) not even God Himself in any conceivable 
state could be greater than He actually is. Those who, 
120. Divine Relativity, p.20. 
121. ibid. 
122. Natural Theology, p.19. 
123. Logic, p.34. 
124. Proslogion II, in Hick (ed), Classical and Contemporary Readings 
in the Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 
1970, p.28. 
.... . --.-
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as Anselm himself did, take the meaning as in (b) say 
that the very idea of alternative possible states of an 
individual is inapplicable to deity; but those who take 
the meaning as in (a) accept the distinction between 
divine individual and divine states. (125) 
Hartshorne also notes Plato's definition of deity as the "perfect" 
to mean: 
possessed of value or worth so great that no increase or 
improvement would be conceivable, and no decreas e either, 
since the possibility of such conception would be a 
defect. (126) 
Now the classical religious conception of perfection mirrors the 
Platonic-based Anselmian notion. God, as the Worshipful One, is the 
U h . 127 nc anging, Complete, Absolute Be1ng. As perfect, God is infinitely 
superior to mankind. But the point of the neoclassical interpretation 
of perfection is that this superiority is challenged. 
In purely logical terms there are three possible cases 
of superiority between a thing and other things, or an 
individual and other individuals ... These are: superiority 
to ~ others, to ~ others, and to all others. If by 
'others' is meant, as shall be our usage, indifferently 
125. Logic, p.39. 
126. C. Hartshorne, AquirtastoWhitehead, Milwaukee: Marquette 
University 1976, p.4. 
127. cf. Logic, pp.40f . 
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actualities or possibilities, the 'superior to no 
others' means that an inferior is not even possible, 
and 'superior to all others' means such that a 
superior or even an equal is impossible (inconceivable). 
Thus, these cases define least and greatest being, 
respectively. But ... they do not define 'absolute' being, 
in any usual connotation. (128) 
However, superiority is not only a term of contrast between two 
or more entities, it also has a reflexive dimension. Thus, "a thing 
may vary, not only in its superiority toward others, but in its 
superiority or lack of it toward itselp,.129 But this very reflex-
ivity of superiority indicates that the supreme being, as the self-
surpassing surpasser of all, does not degenerate: change may be 
relationally neutral, but in terms of value it can only be positive 
for the being of the Divine. 
Now this does not mean a reduction to a mere relativism, albeit 
a positively directed one with respect to value. For, 
although the self-surpassing surpasser of all must 
obviously be in some aspect relative, it does not 
follow that it is in ~ aspect absolute. For to be 
capable of self-increase in some respect does not 
imply capacity to increase in every respect ..• To be 
absolutely guaranteed superiority to absolutely every 
128. Reality, pp.lll-ll2. 
129. Opt cit., p.112. 
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other individual that comes to exist is an absolute 
maximum in certainty and universality of superiority. (130) 
Thus there is an absolute aspect of perfection and a relative aspect, 
which Hartshorne denotes as "A - perfection" and "R - perfection" 
respectively. Of R - perfection Hartshorne notes that 
the relativity of the surrelative is also the ref1ex-
ivity of its all-surpassingness. It surpasses itself, 
as well as everything else; with the difference that it 
surpasses others simultaneously, but itself in only a 
subsequent state. (131) 
Absolute perfection therefore amounts to absolute unsurpas-
sabili ty, i. e. "unsurpassable in conception or possibility even by 
itself", and relative perfection denotes "unsurpassable except by 
itse1f".132 In his logical tabulation of the seven possible defini t-
ions of God which range from absolute perfection in all respects, to 
absolute perfection in no respects (which means imperfection in all 
respects), the neoclassical resolution of surre1ativism comes out 
"AR", viz, "absolute perfection in some respects, relative perfection 
. h ,,133 1n ot ers . Thus, as indicative of reflexive superiority, 
"relative" means "super-relative, a 'super-eminent' type of relativity, 
since it invoZves an element of abso1uteness ... ".134 
Minimally defined, "God is an entity somehow superior to other 
130. Divine Reality, p.21. 
131. op. cit., p.22. 
132. Man's Vision, p.7. 
133. op. cit., p.B. 
134. Reality, p.113. (Italics mine). 
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entities. 135 On the neoclassical concept of perfection, the super-
iority of God issues in self-surpassing surpassability. Thus the 
uniqueness of God resides not in a static supremacy but in a dynamic 
"unrivalled excellence". 136 With respect to Anselm's discovery 
Hartshorne concludes: 
God is the not conceivably surpassable being. For if 
God could be surpassed by a greater or better, should 
we not worship the one who would surpass him - even 
were this but a conceivable not an actual being? (137) 
The perfection of God thus involves his non-surpassability by 
another, coupled with the ability to actually surpass himself. 
Further, by self-surpassing - or self- excelling - "the most excellent 
being changes, not into a more excellent being, but into a more 
11 f h b ·" 138 exce ent state 0 t e same e1ng. The doctrine of surre1ativism 
does not undermine the integrity of the self-identity of God. 
The three basic views about God with respect to his perfection 
are that he is perfect in all respects - i.e. he is complete in 
himself, therefore self-sufficient, therefore non-relational; or 
that he is so 'perfect' in some respects only; or that he is in no 
139 
respects perfect. The neoclassical concept of God as surrelative 
affirms the second view. It thus affirms the essential re1atednes~ 
135. Man's Vision, p.6. 
136. op. cit., p.47. 
137. Natural Theology, p.17. (Italics mine). 
138. Philosophers Speak, p.10. 
139. Reality, pp.155ff. 
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of God over against both the concept of God as non-relational, and 
the concept of God in which his own identity is lost within forever 
changing reality. 
(b) Supreme Personality 
It could be said that, for Hartshorne, 'to be' is 'to be in 
relation'. To be a person is to be in relation: this is the essence 
of Hartshorne's understanding of personality. It refers to an onto-
logical rather than a psychological description. Personality - or 
personal being - is, in essence, 'social' being; that interrelatedness 
which is the very basis of existence. According to Hartshorne this 
is demonstrated by the fact that any individual whatsoever (and he 
includes God in this category) cannot be "totally without sensitivity 
or responsiveness to other individuals", neither can it be what it 
° ,,0 h d h ° dO °d 1 " 140 1S W1t out regar to w at 1n 1V1 ua s are. 'Personality' is 
thus not something the individual 'has' as a private possession, it 
is rather a term denoting the relational matrix by which the individual 
exists as a human being. 
The basis for Hartshorne's understanding of personality is found 
in his social theory of existence. Thus: 
A social being receives from others as well as gives 
to them. It takes upon itself their joys and sufferings, 
and in this way it is enriched, though also troubled, by 
their lives. It cannot in every sense and aspect be 
'independent' of them or incapable of receiving from them 
140. op. cit., p.134. 
21 7 
additions to its own being, however 'complete' in 
some aspects is this being. (141) 
Now God, as supreme personality, is such a social being. On the 
dipolar conception, the concreteness of God issues in the awareness 
of his being personal: God concretely cares for his creation; he is 
caught up in necessary relationship to that over which he is Lord. 
Yet he is himself. He maintains the integrity of self-identity 
through changing relationships. Hartshorne comments: "It is the 
human being that more or less exhibits personal continuity and 
integrity, God that literally is always the same personal '1,,,.142 
The relationality inherent in Hartshorne's view is demonstrated 
by the rhetorical questions: 
What is a person if not a being qualified and constituted 
by social relations, relations to other persons? And 
what is God if not the supreme case of personality? (143) 
The conception of God as supreme personality underlies the basic 
understanding of God as ontologically constituted by relationship 
144 
ad ext~a. Relationality and personality go hand-in-glove. On the 
one hand this is because relationships are an essential feature of 
personal being. On the other hand it is because, according to the 
dipolar theory of perfection, the maximization of both relativity 
141. ibid. 
142. Divine Relativity, p.39. 
143. op. cit., p.25. 
144. Divine Relativity, p.x. "A personal God is one who has social 
relations, really has them, and is thus constituted by 
relationships and is hence relative". 
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and absoluteness in God means that God may be conceived as "a supreme 
person". 145 Now, with respect to "relational alternatives", the 
absolute, as such, is strictly neutral: it does not engage in actual 
relationships. But as Hartshorne points out, a person cannot be thus 
neutral. As the "supreme person" God is most assuredly not neutral 
to relational alternatives: indeed, as personal, he must engage in 
relationships. It would only be if God were, as the extreme classical 
case would have it, "in all aspects absolute" could it be said that 
God, as such, was non-related with respect to humankind and the 
universe. But God is "not neutral to relationships except qua 
absolute", and "qua absolute" means "taken merely with respect to 
the generic and universal form of his relationships abstracting from 
h . ·f· . d· ·d 1 ttl 146 t e~r spec~ ~c or ~n ~v~ ua conten . 
Throughout the changingness of particular relationships the 
supreme personality maintains the constancy of its essential and 
irreducible ontological re1ationa1ity. This supreme personality 
that is the mark of the being of God Hartshorne speaks of also as 
"adequate personality". 
The for,m of adequate personality is nonpersonal or 
absolute, even though no other person exemplifies it 
and thus it is personal, i.e. individual to God. It 
is nevertheless nonpersona1 in the sense that it does 
not think or feel or will. The character of a man does 
not think or will, the man thinks or wills. The abstract 
145. Divine Relativity, p.142. 
146. op. cit., p.143. 
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does not act, only the concrete acts or is a person ... 
it is the divine Person that contains the Absolute, and 
not vice versa. (147) 
"Inclusive re1ationa1ity" is the form of the supreme personality. 
Hartshorne argues that persons "contain" the relations they have 
toward other persons or things - i.e. such relations are internal. 
Furthermore, relations 'contain' their terms. Therefore persons 
' contain ' the other persons or things to which they relate. 148 The 
import of this is that the relations persons engage in are not indif-
ferent with respect to the being of the person, irrespective of how 
apparently insignificant particular relations may seem. This is but 
the ontological correlate of the fact that the relations a person has 
actually matter to the person. How much more is this the case with 
respect to the supreme personality: He who is all-inclusive; supremely 
relative - in other words, related to all? 
Hartshorne also makes the point that the uniqueness of God "must 
consist precisely in being both reality as such and an individual 
reality, insofar comparable to other individuals".149 As an"individ-
ual reality" - i. e. as supreme personality - God is pre-eminently 
relational in virtue of being related to all. Thus "God is the 
universal Individual who, through His states , with unique effective-
ness and adequacy, includes all actuality, hence all entities 
147. op. cit., p.142. (Italics mine). 
148. op. cit., p.144. 
149. Natural Theology, p.3S. 
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whatsoever". 150 But this does not diminish the sense of the personal 
in the understanding of God: the relational complex which is constit-
utive of the being of God is not that of the ~ersonal, but of the 
truly personal. For the supremely personal is just that: supremely 
personal. And this means that 
Neoclassical theism can say and mean, 'God is love'. 
The unsurpassable could not be without love - for even 
we ourselves would surpass a loveless being. To love 
is to rejoice with the joys and sorrow with the sorrows 
of others. Thus it is to be influenced by those who are 
loved. (151) 
Thus the inclusiveness of Divine Relativity is the inclusive 
relationality of the Supreme Personality. Classical theism excludes 
the being of God from social relatedness of reality; neoclassical 
theism affirms the being of God as necessarily including this social 
relatedness. 
(c) Social Relatedness 
Peters notes that, along with Bergson and Whitehead, Hartshorne 
152 
"has seen that reality is social, creative process". In his 
discussion of the rational grounds for affirming the sociality of 
the supreme being Hartshorne comments that "human nature is social 
through and through" and as human nature "is the supreme instance of 
150. Logic, p.lO. 
151. Natural Theology, p.75. 
152. Peters, Hartshorne, p.91. 
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nature in general", then the supreme being, as such, must itself be 
1 . 1 153 supreme y SOCIa . For Hartshorne reality is social: it is con-
stituted by relationships and is thus relational in essence. 154 
Hartshorne's understanding of social relatedness embraces the 
relationality that is involved in thought ; i n emotional interaction -
e.g. love and hate; and in the very social structure that is found 
in all of life at the bio-physical level. 155 With respect to a 
discussion of the essential sociality of love, Hartshorne states 
that: "The key to all relationships is social integration". 156 On 
the fundamental reality of the social structure of life and existence 
he remarks: 
That the social structure of life is basic is obvious 
in various ways. Language is nothing if not social. 
Man's intelligence is a social product through and 
through. In all religions love is taken as either the 
highest or nearly the highest value ... Non-social con-
ceptions are products of sophisticated abstraction ... (157) 
Elsewhere Hartshorne speaks of the 'social' as "the appeal of 
life for life, of experience for experience": it is "shared 
experience", viz, 
the echo of one experience in another. Hence nothing 
can be social that is without experience. The minimum 
153. Divine Relativity, p.27. 
154. Hartshorne's understanding of the relatedness of reality echoes 
that of Whitehead. cf. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 
Cambridge: CUP 1929, pp.viii, Ill, 161. For Whitehead, reality 
consists of actual entities, or occasions, which are themselves 
relational in essence. 
155. cf. Divine Relativity, pp.27f. 
156. Man's Vision, p.155. 
157. Creative Synthesis, p.8l. 
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of experience ... is feelin g . Creatures are social if 
they feel, and feel in relation to each others' feelings . 
Can this be true, as the social philosophy holds, of all 
things? (158) 
Can this be true of God? According to the social theory, reality is 
relational. According to neoclassical theism, the being of God i s 
inclusive of reality . God includes the whole of relational reality 
and is thus relative to reality . The social relatedness of the 
world implies a like relatedness in God. So the next step in the 
discussion of socia l relatedness is to explore Hartshorne ' s under-
standing of the relation that holds between God and the World. 
Peters claims that the "supreme illustration" of Hartshorne's 
conceptual understanding of God is to be found in this relation of 
159 God and World, or cosmos. Hartshorne states that: 
The relation of God to the world must necessarily be 
conceived, if at all, by analogy with relations given 
in human experience. To reject such analogies completely 
would be to adopt a wholly 'negative' or empty theology, 
besides contradicting the basic religious doctrine that 
man is the image of God . (160) 
Hartshorne examines a number of possible relations of superior/ 
158. Reality, p.34. 
159. cf . Peters, Hartshorne, p.9l. 
160. Man's Vision, p.174. 
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inferior type in order to determine the appropriate relational analogy 
that may be applied to the understanding of the God-World relation. 
He concludes that there are two such relational analogies , viz, person 
to person, and mind-body. These two, he claims, may be taken together 
to arrive at a more complex and accurate analogy for the relation that 
holds between God and the World . 16l This leads him to argue that, in 
162 
effect, "the world is God's body". The relation of God to the 
world is conceived on the basis of an organic analogy . On the other 
hand there is also the social analogy, the analogy of interpersonal 
1 . 163 re atlons. Hartshorne provisionally concludes that each of the 
analogies 
is strong where the other is weak, and neither ... alone 
can suffice. The organic relation is factually immediate 
but mysterious or unintelligible as it stands ... On the 
other hand, the human social relation, while intelligible, 
and a relation of mind to mind, lacks immediacy. (164) 
His aim is to combine these two analogies by which he eventually argues 
that 
on every ground we may well consider seriously the doctrine 
that the world is God's body, to whose members he has 
immediate social relations, and which are related to each 
other, directly or indirectly, exclusively by social 
relations. (165) 
161. op. cit. , pp .175ff. 
162. op. cit. , p.18S. 
163. op. cit. , p.186. 
164. op. cit. , p.187. 
165. op. cit. , p.192. 
224 
The point of Hartshorne's use of the mind-body analogy in concert 
with the interpersonal analogy in his explication of the relation 
between God and the world is that God is intimately and necessarily 
related to the world. 
In the Divine Relativity, Hartshorne states clearly the limitation 
f h ' d' ,166 o 1S 1SCUSS10n. Despite his caveat it is clear where his think-
ing is going: the supreme being is constituted by social relatedness. 
Indeed, in his conclusion he states that the basis of theological 
thinking and activity should be "the manifest necessity of divine 
social relatedness to the wor1d" . 167 This means that it is the task 
of the theologian to seek "the supreme excellence of deity in the 
universality , unfailingness, or unique adequacy, of the divine social 
relativity . . . ,,168 and thus to find "in this unfailing adequacy, as 
generic quality in and of every concrete act of divine self-relating, 
the only absolute of which there is theoretical or practical, religious 
h ' h' 1 d" 169 or p 1losop 1ca , nee . 
In his focus on social relatedness as indicative of the essential 
characteristic of God.J Hartshorne reverses the question "Can the 
Absolute or Perfect Being be personal or social?" to "In what sense, 
170 if any, can a social being be absolute or perfect?" Thus he 
determines that the central question for theology will be that of 
finding "technically precise terms .. . which express the supremacy of 
166 . Divine Relativity, p.28 . 
167 . Op e cit. , p . 1SS . 
168 . Ope cit . , p . 1S6 . 
169 . ibid . 
170 . Divine Relativity, p.2S. 
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God, among social beings, without contradicting his social 
171 
character". Social relatedness is a primary category in determ-
ining the understanding of God. As such it is clearly demonstrative 
of the essential relationality of God as conceived in neoclassical 
theism. 
(d) Dependence and Independence 
The issue of dependence versus independence in the being of God 
is relevant both to the concept o~ surrelativism and also to the 
discussion of dipolarity. This issue demonstrates the practical 
complementariness of dipolarity and surrelativism. Both are needed 
together for a full understanding of the God of neoclassical theism . 
Ontological and Existential Independence is the key motif in the 
concept of the aseity of God. Dependence, if admissable challenges 
aseity and necessitates conceptual reconstruction. 
Hartshorne acknowledges that the traditional notion of independ-
ence has been central to classical theism . This "one-sided 
dependency ... was held the crowning glory of deity".172 God is the 
absolute and independent, "strictly neutral with respect to all 
other terms" .173 Or, put otherwise, 
Sheer independence in every respect whatsoever, wpile 
all else in every respect depended upon him, was 
regarded as essential to God ' s perfection. (174) 
171. op . cit., p . 26 . 
172 . op. cit . , p . 42. 
173 . op. cit . , p . 43. 
174 . op. cit., p.42. 
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But for Hartshorne, such a God inspires no respect or admiration . The 
worship of such a remote and non-related deity would at best be 
irrelevant, at worst a betrayal of the very reality of God. The 
denial of any sort of dependence in God leads to "an idealization of 
h t t b · t 1 . h'" 175 t e yran -su Jec re at10ns 1p . Such a conception means viewing 
God as independent of any relationship with or to humankind and the 
world, and this implies "neutrality or indifference to relational 
1 . " 1 76 a ternat1ves . But the God of faith, the God of religious worship, 
is undeniably held to be a God who is in no wise neutral or indiffer-
ent . There is a real sense in which God is perceived to be dependently 
related to the world. The question is: In what sense? And what does 
this say about the nature or being of God? 
Hartshorne affirms that "there are appropriate forms of dependence"l77 
applicable to deity . His contention is that "the higher the being the 
more dependence of certain kinds will be appropriate for it " , and 
therefore that the "eminent form of sympathetic dependence can only 
apply to deity" . That the ' appropriate' form of dependence is qualified 
by the term ' sympathetic ' indicates the implicit re1ationa1ity of the 
dependency of which Hartshorne speaks. For to be "sympathetically 
dependent" is to be so engaged in mutual interrelation that a change 
in the existential state of one entity within the relationship effects 
a sympathetic change in the other. Thus when human persons joy or 
sorrow, God, who is supreme over humanity, nonetheless sympathetically 
175 . op. cit., p.44. 
176. op. cit . , p.72 . 
177. op . cit . , p . 48. 
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joys and sorrows with human being. So there is a sense in which God 
is legitimately dependent upon humankind. 
However, this dependency is not that of the ultimate dependency 
for existence as such. God's existence does not depend on any prior 
existent. But it does manifest the dependency of ontological related-
ness. That is to say, God does not depend on humankind for the fact 
of his existence as such, but that there is nonetheless a"dependency" 
vis a vis the nature of his existence. In terms of what is is to be 
God it is necessary that he exists in-relation-to something other than 
himself, although albeit included within his all-encompassing Being. 
Thus Hartshorne comments: 
It is one thing to say God could exist without us, or 
without any creature or group of creatures you wish to 
specify; it is logically quite another to say he could 
exist were there no creature at all. For God's necessity 
of existing, while our existing is contingent, may simply 
mean that had we not existed, still ~ creatures or 
other would necessarily have existed, sufficient for God's 
needs ... Thus God may depend, even for his essence, upon 
there being creatures ... (17S) 
So, by virtue of the necessary relation that holds between God 
and the created world, there is an appropriate dependency within God. 
In part this is the complement of the awareness of the dependency of 
the creature upon God. The neoclassical position is that "all being 
l7S. Man's Vision, p.lOS. 
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is in God",179 and that therefore humankind depends for its very 
being upon God - "Without God we should be nothing at all ... ,,180 
However, Hartshorne also asserts that: 
without us God would not be the same as he is. He would 
exist, and existence would be generically what it is 
now, namely, the self-identity of his all-participating 
life. But it is obvious that the details of the partici-
pation would be different if the things to be participated 
in were different, and that thus the divine dependence 
and independence are inseparable aspects of one mutual 
relationship. (181) 
The dependency of God upon humankind and of humankind upon God is the 
dependency of mutual and reciprocal, though not wholly symmetrical, 
ontological participation. This participation is indicative of real 
d . l' 182 a extra relat10na 1ty. 
The resolution of the dependent/independent polarity is effected 
by the recognition that there is both an appropriate dependence and 
an appropriate independence in God, reflected by the balance of 
. .. d 183 appropr1ate act1v1ty an response. Hartshorne affirms that in 
God, "there is an admirable independence, but it is independence in 
basic ethical purpose not in specific concrete experience ... " and 
that " there is also admirable dependence, which is appropriate response 
179 . op. cit . , p . 282. 
180. ibid. cf. pp .106ff. 
181. Man's Vision, p.282. 
182 . op. cit. , pp.283f. 
183 . cf. Divine Relativity, p.44. 
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duly proportionate to the balance of factors in the world known to 
f .. .. d . " 184 us, 0 sympathetIc reJoIcIng an sorrOWIng 
How Hartshorne states that the Independent, as such, is that 
which "can be abstracted, detached in thought and, at least potentially, 
in actuality, from various relationships or contexts, and yet in this 
detachment still be the identical entity".185 The independent element 
in the being of God is that identity which enables him to yet be 
himself through, and in distinction from, all changing actual relation-
ships. That is to say, unless God were in some sense an entity 
independent of other entities , such as world or humankind, then it 
would make no sense to speak of his engagement in relationships. 
Furthermore, Hartshorne comments that "Dependence simply means the 
impossibility of existing without the thing depended upon", and that 
therefore "a thing cannot exist lacking any of its constituents . .. 
hence nothing is quite so dependent or relative as the inclusive or 
1 . ,,186 total rea Ity . 
Neoclassical theism holds that God ' is this "inclusive total 
reality" . Thus in identity and content the being of God is, in 
different aspects, both dependent upon and independent of the created 
world . Independency is 'included' within dependency; both are 
contained within the relational being of God . 
184 . op. cit., p .45. 
185. op. cit., p .68. 
186. Creative Synthesis, p . 103 . 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to elucidate the principal 
features of Hartshorne's Process Theism. God is no static 'absolute' 
entity. Rather God is understood as all-inclusive relativity; as 
all-pervasive social relatedness; as self-surpassing becoming. The 
review of Hartshorne's theory of the dipolar concept of God together 
with his concept of surrelativism, or the doctrine of Divine Relat-
ivity" reveal the extent of his understanding of God as "relational". 
His concept of deity is that of the 'One-in-relation-with-the-many'. 
The nub of this relationality is inclusion: God includes within 
his essential being the polar correlatives. Both poles are real in 
themselves, and are together contained within - and thereby constitute -
the reality of God. The mode of their constitutiveness - and hence 
the mode of that which they constitute - is relational. 
NOW, as defining references, polar correlatives are usually applied 
to God in disjunctive rather than conjunctive fashion. The effect 
of disjunctive application is to define God in static non-relational 
terms. Hartshorne's method, however, stresses the ontological 
relatedness of God, viz, social relatedness or constitutive ad extra 
relationality. God is understood, in the neoclassic perspective, to 
include in his being aspects such as concreteness, relativity, depend-
ence, and internal relatedness. Such motifs denote fundamental 
relationality as intrinsic to any ontological description of God. 
James notes that, for Hartshorne, metaphysics "ought to be the 
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study of relational structures as embodied in reality as such . . . IIl87 
The theory of dipolarity is such a study. All relations, according 
to Hartshorne, are internal to something and possibly external to 
something else as well. Thus he admits the relational modes, or 
patterns, of Internal-Internal; Internal-External; and External-
Internal - but not External-External . 
Traditional theism, whilst not denying relationality to God 
outright, has nonetheless tended to downplay specifically relational 
terminology in descriptions and definitions of God in favour of term-
inology of a ' pure ' non-relational type . On the traditional view God 
"is defined by an essential one-sidedness or monopolarity", such that 
God is 
so far from being the eminently relative One that he is 
denied to be really related to our life at all. He is 
said to be a reality which is in every respect absolute 
and whose only relations to the world are the purely 
nominal or external relations of the world to him. (188) 
By contrast, the neoclassical perspective portrays God as eminently 
related , thus polar correlates are conceived as necessary to the being 
of God both with respect to the distinctive elements within the reality 
of God which they connote, and also in terms of the mutual interpret-
ation which results in the 'surrelative' concept of God . It is, 
however, the ' relative ' pole which takes the conceptual lead . The 
187. James, Concrete, p . 49. 
188 . Ogden, Reality of God, p.48 . 
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'relative' pole points to essential relatedness; the 'absolute' pole 
qualifies the relatedness as re1iab1e,189 for 'reliability' is a 
qualifier of relationship, not a designation of remote, nonrelative 
fixity. Hence 'abs lute reliability' is the reliableness of the 
essential re1ationa1ity of God. 
Hartshorne's use of dipo1arity as the key to the neoclassical 
f G d d·· 1 d" . 190 concept 0 0 purports to overcome many tra 1t1ona 1SJunct1ons. 
The strategy of dipo1arity is to apply these polar categories to the 
concept of God on the basis of 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' .191 
Now the following questions may ~e asked of Hartshorne's approach: 
does dipo1arity create within the being of God a fundamental 
contradiction? How is the apparent ontological dichotomy resolved 
in the concept of God? Dipo1arity is indicative of "two main aspects 
in the essence of supreme being,,192 but do these aspects have the 
status of bi-partite divisions within the being of God? Is God 
onto1ogica11y 'split' as it were? Hartshorne certainly is not intend-
ing bi-theism. Yet if the being of God is understood in dipolar terms, 
then these need to be comprehended within the context of an ontological 
understanding of the unity of God. Such an understanding begins with 
the affirmation that the being of God ·is the conjunction of the polar 
correlates, and is not to be defined in terms of their disjunction. 
Correlative contrasts are expressive of the being of God: they are 
descriptive of aspects of the one God. The core assertion of the 
189. Divine Relativity, pp.22f . 
190. See, e.g. Natural Theology, p . 36 . 
191. cf. Peters, Hartshorne, p . 77 . 
192 . Philosophers Speak, p.4. 
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dipolar view is that contraries are both required for a veridical 
conception of God. As applied to the notion of deity the classical 
contraries are in fact correlatives. Each requires the other. Thus 
the dipo1arity of God may be adequately comprehended without leading 
to a bi-theistic view. 
H.P. Owen notes three grounds for, or benefits to be gained from, 
193 the dipolar concept of God as espoused by Hartshorne. In the first 
instance it is held to solve the problem of the One and the Many, of 
infinite and finite. Secondly, it undergirds the notion of God as 
personal - indeed, "Hartshorne insists that God cannot be personal 
if he is regarded as being incapable of passivity (that is, change in 
response to his environment) and plurality (that is, internal differ-
. . )" 194 entlatlon . Thirdly, it allows for the ascription of love to 
God, which, in Hartshorne's view, in its application to the classical 
concept of God it is an incomprehensible ascription. 
Hartshorne's view is unmistakably clear: "If God is love he must 
be a 'socia1'being".195 The ontological implication is that God is 
relational1y conceived. On the dipolar theory this amounts to an 
ontological relationship of 'double inclusion': God is onto1ogica11y 
constituted by (i.e. "includes) the polar correlatives. As 
193. H.P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, London: Macmillan 1971, pp.8lff. 
194. op. cit., p.82. 
195. ibid. 
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'all-inclusive' ,196 God is in relationship to the whole of reality: 
there is nothing that is beyond the encompassing range of the being 
of God. 197 Put otherwise, as 'Supreme Being' God encompasses the 
totality of reality. This is the essential meaning of 'panentheism'. 
As the 'Perfect Being' God's perfection is inclusive. 19B 
However, the very inclusiveness of God is itself the mark of the 
.. f ... h . f G d 199 R 1 .. . prlorlty 0 relatlvlty ln t e concept10n 0 o. e at1v1ty 1S not 
only a pole within the being of God, it is also a fundamental ontolog-
ical denominator of the being of God. Ontological primacy is given 
to the relative pole: the being of God is that of supreme relativity. 
The relationality of the supremely relative is all-inclusive. Thus: 
196. Gunton notes that "there is both a linguistic and an ontological 
inclusiveness about the concept of God. Ontologically speaking, 
God the absolute-and-relative combine into a concept of God as 
'Creator-and-the-whole-of-what-he-has-created'. If, on the 
other hand, we turn our attention to the language in which God 
is described, we find that Hartshorne's concept represents an 
attempt to make a more comprehensive use of the concepts that 
metaphysicians have developed in speaking about the world and 
God" . Becoming, p. 2 Bf. 
197. Hartshorne comments: "To say that there is something all-inclusive 
is to say there is something that contains and is thus related 
to all other things". Divine Relativity, p.92. However, he 
notes that "from this it cannot be deduced that all other things 
are related either to the inclusive thing or to each other". 
ibid. Peters makes the comment that "inclusiveness is guaranteed 
only if he is capable of incorporating any and every change in 
reality, for failure to accommodate some new fact or other would 
render him surpassable, since a more inclusive being and thus a 
greater being would then be conceivable:. Hartshorne, p.64. 
198. cf. Divine Relativity, p.86. 
199. op. cit., p.145. 
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The supreme being must be all-inclusive, since otherwise 
there would be a total reality superior to the supreme, 
which latter would have the status of a mere constituent 
of this total. On the other hand, if supreme is identical 
with absolute or non-relative, and yet the supreme must 
include all things, hence all relations, the result is a 
contradiction. (200) 
The relationality of the double inclusion is thus the implicit resolut-
ion of the question of the ontological implication of dipolar theism. 
Inclusiveness forms the basis for the doctrinal emphasis of surrelat-
ivism, which is itself a matter of relational inter-dependence. By 
his very nature God exists in unceasing interaction with creation. 
God's surrelativism means that he is "supremely related to all": he 
is the "supreme relativist"; the "supreme concrete reality".20l God 
is supreme in his self-surpassing unsurpassabi1ity. 
The neoclassical idea of self-surpassing perfection results from 
affirming "the legitimacy of divine states".202 As individual, God 
has none greater . But in terms of the divine states - the modes of 
the being of God - the prospect of one state surpassing another is 
an open possibility. More than that, on the neoclassical understanding, 
it is an actuality: God does surpass himself in virtue of his changing 
states which in turn so change because of his relativity, or essential 
relatedness, toward the universe and humankind. 
200. op. cit., p.6l. 
201. Divine Relativity, p.129; Logic, p . 5. 
202. Logic, p.39. 
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Gunton claims that Hartshorne's approach is limited by being a 
"t·tt· t· fd· · f· ,,203 quan 1 a Ive concep 10n 0 1Vlne per ectl0n . He argues that, 
for Hartshorne, 
It is as if the superiority of God can only be understood 
in terms of the superiority of his experience or embrace 
of reality ... God is 'unsurpassable' ... in his experience 
and possession of reality; that is the end of the ways 
of God for neoclassical theology. (204) 
But surely Gunton is here misunderstanding Hartshorne. For while 
Hartshorne uses the language of 'containment' he does not mean it in 
a pseudo-physical spatio-temporal sense: God is not an 'ontic' 
container; he is beyond spatio-temporal measure. Hartshorne's 
language which, prima facie, may suggest a quantitative interpretat-
ion, on closer inspection has qualitative reference. It refers to 
the relational quality of experience and reality. Thus when Hartshorne 
defines the word 'God' as the "label for the One who is worshipful 
because regarded as unsurpassably excellent" he goes on to state that: 
unsurpassable here does not mean 'perfect' in the classical 
sense of actualizing all possible value. This is impossible, 
since there are incompatible values. Nor does unsurpassable 
mean that nothing can be added to the divine reality or 
value; it means that there can be no rival to God, since 
203. Gunton, Becoming, p.24. 
204. op. cit., pp.24f. 
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any value actualized by anyone and not already a divine 
value becomes divine as God's unsurpassable knowledge and 
love embrace it. (205) 
The fact that God embraces both sides of the contrasts within his 
being instead of one side only is the basis for Hartshorne's claim 
that God is unsurpassable by another, yet self-surpassing within his 
own being. 206 Such self-surpassingness is an instance of the relation-
ality of God. It challenges the traditional understanding of the 
'perfection' of God,for the being of God is not something 'static', 
but dynamic. Yet an appropriate sense of absoluteness is maintained 
in that whilst God is "self-surpassing" he is nonetheless "surpasser 
of all". 207 Thus Hartshorne understands 'perfection' and the unsur-
passability of God by any save himself. 208 He regards as catastrophic 
errors "the unqualified denial of divine change (in the form of 
increase of content) and the unqualified denial of relativity or 
209 dependence'.' Hartshorne argues, according to Macquarrie, 
205. C. Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept of Prehension", 
I.P.Q. XIX, September 1979:261-262. Ward notes that Hartshorne 
"argues forcefully that the notion of perfection as the simul-
taneous possession of the fullness of being, which excludes all 
change, should be replaced by the notion of perfection as the 
unsurpassable capacity to move to creative and new expressions 
of its being". K; Ward, The Concept of God, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell 1974, p.155. 
206. cf. Natural Theology, pp.74f. 
207. cf. Hartshorne, Reality, p.113. 
208. cf. Gunton, Becoming, p.16. Gunton suggests that Hartshorne 
understands perfection in terms of quantitative maximization 
of experience of reality. See Chapter Six below for further 
discussion. 
209. C. Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity", R.Met. XXI, 
December 1967:273. 
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that the idea of God who completes himself is more 
consonant with the 'l iving' God of biblical revelation 
than the idea of static perfection; that the notion of 
a God who is in some manner still 'on his way' goes far 
toward easing the problem of evil, so intractable for 
traditional theism; and that such a notion also gives 
fuller meaning to the moral life of men by taking 
seriously their responsibility as 'co-workers' with God.(210) 
The theme of inclusiveness that underlies panentheism means 
that the world is in God, but not strictly coincident 
with Him because He exceeds the world . Because God is 
actually relative to what happens in the world, He 
changes when the world changes. (211) 
For the world to be ' in God', does not mean the context of the existence 
of the mutable world is that of an absolute or unchanging 'ground', 
rather its context is itself that which is a "changing concrete 
h 1 " 212 woe. Inclusiveness and concreteness are marks of relationa1ity; 
" 1 .. . h . 1 . t . ,,213 re atlvlty IS t e Inc uSlve, concre e conceptIon. 
Hartshorne remarks that 
To be relative is to take other things into account, to 
210. J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, London: SCM 
1976, p.277. 
211. James, Concrete, p.86. 
212. ibid. 
213 . Hartshorne, Reality, p.llS. 
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allow them to make a difference to oneself, in some sense 
to care about them. What else, then can the ancient 
saying, deus est caritas, imply if not the supremacy of 
relativity? (214) 
The assertion that 'God is Love' is the fundamental assertion of the 
essential relatedness of God. And Hartshorne comments that: "Not to 
sustain relationships, not to respond sensitively to the existence of 
others is to be wooden, stupid, or an utterly empty abstraction".2l5 
He asserts that "God is conceived socially before he is conceived 
absolutely or as perfect", and also that "Either God really does 
love all beings, that is, is related to them by a sympathetic union 
surpassing any human sympathy, or religion seems a vast fraud". 216 
As lover of all God must needs be conceived as necessarily related 
to all else: indeed such relations are ontologically constitutive for 
him. The identifying defining characteristic2l7 is that ontological-
relationality whereby God, as the "supreme socius" is "held to love 
all, not just a few; always, not just at times; in all their being, 
not with neglect of this or that aspect".2l8 Even if not ontologically 
determined by the other term of a relationship, God must at least be 
aware of all relationships of which he forms a term. Awareness is 
itself a modifier in the sense that, to be aware of something 
constitutes a different state to that of being unaware. Thus even 
214. Creative Synthesis, p.55. 
215. ibid. 
216. Divine Relativity, p.2S. 
217. cf. Peters, Hartshorne, p.9l. 
218. Hartshorne, Reality, p.135. 
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where a relationship is perceived as external to God, the fact of 
omniscience means that the externality of the relationship is 
not necessarily final. Rather it signifies that the relationship 
engages God in only one aspect, viz, that of the absolute/abstract 
pole. But that very engagement is included within the full concrete 
relational reality of God, for God is 'Surrelative'. 
Surrelativism, the doctrine of the concrete, relative God, or 
otherwise the doctrine of divine relativity, means that "God really 
. . h' 11 . . h . ,,219 Interacts WIt , IS rea y contIngent upon, every event In t e unIverse . 
In short, surrelativism is the doctrine of the essentially relational 
deity; the God for whom 'to be' is 'to be-in-relation'. The reality 
of God is constituted by inclusive interrelatedness. 
Finally, the neoclassical understanding of God as personal is an 
understanding of a God who sustains relationships. Personhood is a 
relational construct: the individual personality is constituted by a 
matrix of interconnected relations. God is the supreme instance of 
this: the "chief exemplification" (Whitehead). "Supremacy" here is 
not a value judgement but a term referring to ontological scope. 
The absoluteness of deity is the constancy, throughout changing circum-
stances and relationships, to nonetheless continue relating appropriately. 
It is thus constancy of purpose and faithfulness to be engaged in 
relationships in accordance with relational being pe~ se. 
The relational structure of personality is eminently the case for 
219. James, Concrete, p.85. See also on the subject of surrelativism 
James, p.90; Hartshorne, Philosophers Speak, p.16. 
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the supreme personality. Social relatedness in particular draws 
attention to the relation that holds between God and the World, which 
Hartshorne himself describes on the basis of a combined organic and 
social analogy. The point is, of course, to underscore the necessary 
and intimate relatedness of God and World. 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis and discussion, two features 
emerge which are key elements in the neoclassical concept of God, and 
which are germane to the perception of the essential relationality of 
that concept. The first feature is "inclusiveness", which is a signif-
icant element in Hartshorne's thinking. He discusses inclusiveness 
in terms of a standard antinomy often levelled at the notion of supreme 
reality. This states that, as absolute, the supreme reality "must be 
. 11' 1 . ,,22 0 N h h eIther all-inclusive or not a -Inc uSIve . ow e comments tat, 
on the one hand, 
The supposition of inclusiveness involves a choice 
between the contradiction that constituents which could 
have been otherwise contribute to a totality which could 
not have been otherwise and the contrasting absurdity 
that neither the totality nor the constituents could 
have been otherwise, and thus that everything is absolute -
wherewith both relativity and absoluteness lose all 
distinctive meaning. (221) 
On the other hand, 
220. Creative Synthesis, p.48. 
221. ibid. 
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The supposition that the supreme reality is not all-
inclusive implies that it is but a constituent of the 
totali ty, and so not the supreme reality after all. (222) 
However, in terms of the metaphysics of neoclassical theism Hartshorne 
asserts that 
the supreme reality is held to be supremely relative. 
It therefore can be all-inclusive, not only of all 
relative things, but also of 'the absolute' which is 
indeed but an abstract aspect of relative reality, its 
relativity as such or in principle. (223) 
What God includes is the changing, dynamic, relationality of 
reality: the being of God includes all relations, all relativity. 
Now this is a unique inclusion, for 
to reflect changes in any and all other things can only 
be a feature of something indeed extraordinary and even 
very different in principle from ordinary things and 
surely not by way of inferiorityl ... No being, however, 
unless God, could reflect in fullest measure all changes, 
no matter where. (224) 
The second feature, 'relatedness', is the category that is 
"completely ultimate for thought and life". 225 Indeed, without this 
222. ibid. 
223. ibid. 
224. Philosophers Speak, p.5. 
225. Divine Relativity, p.28. 
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category, even 'absolute' has no real meaning, and deity can be 
conceived only as wholly other and non-social, i . e . remote and 
d f h . 226 remove rom uman experlence. 
The application of relatedness to God is not without problems. 
For example, the relatedness of God to the world means for Hartshorne 
that God is subject to "increase value". Does this mean that God was 
previously lacking in value, implying imperfection? Hartshorne turns 
the question around. Given a meaning of perfection in terms of 
worthiness, respectfulness and so on qua supremacy, he asks "is such 
complete admirableness infringed by the possibility of enrichment i n 
total value?,,227 Hartshorne answers with a firm negative. He 
explains: 
If God rejoices less today than he will tomorrow, but 
ideally appropriately at both times, our reverence for 
him should in no way be affected by the increase in joy. 
Indeed, if he were incapable of responding to a better 
world with greater satisfaction, this would infringe 
upon our respect; for it would imply a lack of proport -
ionality in the divine awareness of things. (228) 
Furthermore, in so far as the relatedness of God toward the world 
issues in a dependency of God upon the world, and specifically upon 
humankind, Hartshorne asserts that this means the individual is of 
226. ibid. 
227. Divine Relativity, p.46. 
228. op. cit., p.47. 
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value to God. For, 
As we are indebted to a few persons for the privilege 
of feeling something of the quality of their experiences, 
so God is indebted to all persons for the much fuller 
enjoyment of the same privilege . (229) 
The terms 'inclusiveness' and ' relatedness ' are conceptually 
intertwined. Separately and together they indicate the relationality 
of the God of neoclassical theism. That God is all-inclusive, and 
that he is relative to reality, does not diminish his worshipfulness 
or supremacy . 230 As Peters comments, such a God "must be infinitely 
flexible and adaptive, including in its actuality all actuality and 
231 in its potentiality whatever may be". It is of the essence of 
God to be relative, that is, to be related to all else as, to be 
thus inclusive of all reality . 
The relational God is not ' relative ' in any fickle sense. 
Rather it means that in his relationships God genuinely interacts, 
both giving and receiving, and therefore continually modifying him-
self in regard to specific relationships . But the intent and purpose 
of such relating remains absolutely reliable and unchanging. God 
contains within his being both a measure of independence and a 
measure of dependence . He is a relating agent in his own right, who 
is engaged in activity and responsiveness with respect to the created 
229. ibid . 
230 . Creative Synthesis, p.225. 
231. Peters, Hartshorne, p.64; cf . also Hartshorne, Reality, p.113. 
245 
order . Thus is God "constituted by relationships"; thus is it that 
"God as personal must have relations and relata, and must actually 
and effectively have these". 232 Neoclassical theism understands 
the reality of God as pre-eminently relational. In the following 
chapter this relationality wi ll be more closely examined. 
232 . Divine Relativity, p.92. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DIVINE BECOMING: THE RELATIONAL GOD OF 
NEOCLASSICAL THEISM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hartshorne believes that traditional theism has been badly 
formulated. He eschews any view of God as a static Being, as complete 
in Himself and apart from the world. If the summary focal term for 
Macquarrie's concept of God is 'Holy Being', then for Hartshorne it 
could be said to be 'Divine Becoming'. The term 'becoming' is 
perhaps the fundamental term of process thought. In the theological 
context it signifies divine relativity and denotes that in the neo-
classical perspective there has been transition 
from a conception of God devoid of relativity and 
becoming to the conception of Him as in his full 
actuality the supreme relativity and becoming, the 
supreme subject of social relationships and 
interactions. (1) 
Thus far the elucidation of the doctrine of God in the thought 
of Charles Hartshorne has focussed on his two key conceptual bases -
dipolarity and surrelativism. The various aspects examined above 
have illuminated the being of God as "relational". This analysis 
1. C. Hartshorne; Reality as Social ·process, p.23. 
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of Hartshorne's thought is now carried further by turning to the 
process notion of 'becoming'. An understanding of God in terms of 
processive 'divine becoming' will further elaborate the neoclassical 
concept of God. 
Process thinking seeks to replace the classical metaphysical 
term ' substance ' with the dynamic 'becoming '. The claim is that: 
physics has shown us the importance of the dynamic 
elements of the universe, its ' becoming '. The 
mistake of classical metaphysicians to favour 'being' 
or substance and to neglect becoming is not now 
excusable. (2) 
The classical f ocus upon 'being' in both metaphysics and theology has 
been at the expense of the understanding of 'becoming '. The world 
has been perceived as the sum of many beings; God the "Supreme Being ' 
or perhaps the 'Being Itself' which is both other than, yet also 
undergirds the substance of, these manifold beings. 3 To a very real 
degree the concept of substance "as a pattern of thinking" has been 
"destructive of the idea of God".4 
The key categories of 'event ' and ' relation ' within process think-
ing are subsumed under the primacy of becoming . Such categories are 
inclusive. S In Hartshorne's thinking, and following Whitehead, 
2. C. Gunton, Becoming and Being, p.l9. 
3. cf. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, p.l6. 
4. op. cit., p.ll9. 
S. C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, p.S3. 
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'being' is defined in terms of 'becoming ,.6 Being is understood in 
terms of action, and existence as "essentially social". 7 'Being ', 
on the neoclassical interpretation, is "the abstract fixed aspect in 
becoming". 8 In the sense of being more inclusive, "The divine 
becoming is more ultimate than the divine being".9 
The process perspective of Hartshorne's neoclassical theism may 
be said to come to f ocus in the notion that God's being is his 
becoming. Hartshorne seeks to infuse the ontological conception of 
God with the dynamism of 'becoming '. It is the term describing the 
overall character of reality. His concern is not simply with its 
primacy, but with its "creative-synthetic nature".lO He sees the 
notion of creative becoming as having religious origin, as "the 
generalization of the divine ' fiat ' back of the world".l1 It is 
d . . f· . 1 fl . b 1 th "locus f 11 . b· 1 . ,,12 pro uctlve, ln lnlte y eXl e, e 0 a POSSl 1 lty . 
It therefore denotes reality itself. It yields "the perfect union 
of the idea of indi viduali ty and uni versali ty" and therefore means 
that "God's reality must be conceived as the eminent form of 
becoming". 13 
The theological use of the category 'becoming ' is not a descent 
into arbitrariness. This category is viewed as "something positive 
6. op. cit., p.26. 
7. cf. Logic, p.202. 
8. op. cit., p.248. 
9. Hartshorne and Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, p.24. 
10. Creative Synthesis, p.15. 
11. Logic, p.122. 
12. C. Hartshorne, "Necessity", R.Met XXI, December 1967:295. 
13. ibid. 
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and ultimate".14 It is the "richer, more concrete conception", the 
"unique relatedness or relativity ... which makes it the inclusive or 
concrete form of reality" . IS Thus for Hartshorne, 
God is a being whose versatility of becoming is unlimited, 
whose potentialities of content embrace all possibilities, 
whose sensitive responsiveness surpasses that of all 
other individuals, actual or possible . (16) 
'Becoming ' has the notions of 'growth' and 'potential' inherent in 
its very meaning. 17 The God of process thought is he who becomes, 
who grows with and by his creative action and interaction, whose 
fullness is his potential, and his potential fullness . 
The becoming God is the God who makes choices, who may change 
because he interacts with and takes account of the reality of the 
created order. 18 Contingency within the reality of God is taken 
seriously by Hartshorne. It is integral to the application of 
'becoming ' to the understanding of God. Applied to both God and 
World, the category 'becoming' embraces all concreteness. 19 It holds 
together in co-extension possibility and actuality and undergirds the 
concept of God's self-surpassingness. 20 
14. Philosophers Speak, p.6. 
15. Creative Synthesis, p.16. 
16. Philosophers Speak, p.6. 
17. cf. Creative Synthesis, p.35. 
18. C. Hartshorne, Asuinas to Whitehead. p.32. "Even God must make 
contingent decis10ns to create a world; he must rule out good 
alternatives. Even he cannot have the values of all possIble 
worlds. all fully actualised . According to Whitehead, this is 
the rationale for becoming, that no actuality can leave nothing 
further to seek" . 
19. Logic, p.9l. 
20. cf. C. Hartshorne, A Natural Theology For Our Time. p.72. 
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A problem arises, however, in that this analysis of becoming 
in respect of the concept of God may be indicative of God as a part 
21 of, and therefore less than, the whole. However, Hartshorne 
argues that: 
The sense in which God is part of each thing is that 
generalized sense better expressed as 'factor of' , 
meaning something in abstraction from which the thing 
would be less than it is ... God is a factor of everything, 
and he is precisely that one factor which alone sums up 
all that each thing is, and infinitely more besides. (22) 
In other words, God is the relational context of all existent reality; 
the locus of possibility, inclusive of all actuality. 
Hartshorne makes the point that "a metaphysics of becoming and 
relativity is the modern philosophical task".23 In his approach to 
theism, Hartshorne is opening up to theology the way to conceive God 
in terms of becoming and relativity. The divine becoming is neither 
an inferior aspect of the divine being, nor, strictly speaking, an 
alternative to it. Rather the term 'divine becoming' illuminates 
'Divine Relativity', the neoclassical interpretive term for the 
divine being. Hartshorne remarks: 
Perhaps, whereas other beings are accidental products 
of becoming, we should think of God as qualifying 
21. cf. C. Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, p.284. 
22. op. cit., p.285. 
23. Creative Synthesis, p.46. 
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becoming essentially, so that he is always certain to 
become, his life being a process inherent in all 
process, in process as such, or within which all process 
must occur, therefore beginningless ... and ... endless. (24) 
In Hartshorne's neoclassical theism, the divine being is the "Becoming 
God". Thus God is not conceived iryterms of static substance, but 
rather dynamic relationality: God is to be thought of most approp-
riately in terms of relationships. Hence the prime motif of God's 
being is essential relatedness. 
The analysis and discussion of God understood as divine becoming 
will focus on two particular relations: Onmiscience, or the "Cognitive 
Relation", and Creativity, or the "Causal Relation". This will be 
followed by two sections in which the relationality of Divine Becoming 
is explored by means of investigating the marks of 'otherness', 
'presence', 'activity', and 'responsiveness'. 
II. OMNISCIENCE: THE COGNITIVE RELATION 
The epistemological theory espoused by Thomism, and against which 
Hartshorne wishes to argue, is that "apart from God it is the knower 
who is related to the known, not the known to the knower".25 
Hartshorne states of the classical theory that the knower enjoys a 
relation to what is known, without that which is known having any 
regard to the fact that it is so known. "The cognitive relation is 
24. Philosophers Speak, p.9. 
25. C. Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p.7. 
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26 
external to the known, internal to the knower". Hartshorne sees 
nothing wrong with this as it stands. However, it is when the 
question of God as knower arises that a great difference emerges 
between the classical view and the neoclassical understanding. The 
classical view holds that internal relatedness to knower, external 
to known, is reversed in the case of divine knowledge. Thus: 
God knows all things, but in such fashion ... that there 
is zero relativity or dependence in God as knower , and 
maximal dependence in creatures as known. Divine thought 
is the sheer opposite of thought in general, in that it 
endows its terms with all their being and nature. The 
divine knowledge creates all things, but itself derives 
nothing from them as created. (27) 
Hartshorne seeks to challenge this "alleged reversal of cognitive 
relativity in God" 28 The thrust of this challenge is found in a 
threefold affirmation. First, Hartshorne affirms that divine know-
ledge is absolute, though not in all respects. Second, he affirms 
that it is a mistake to assume that human knowledge is relative 
simply because it is inferior. Relativity is not a matter of infer-
iority. Third, Hartshorne affirms that 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
ibid. 
it is precisely the ideal case of knowledge, knowledge 
absolute in certainty and complete adequacy to the known, 
that must in some other aspects be literally and 
unrestrictedly relative . (29) 
op. cit. , p.8. 
ibid. 
op. cit. , p.g. 
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The cognitive relation is a prime instance of the application 
of the doctrines of dipolarity and surrelativism. In many respects 
it is the example, or area, in which much of Hartshorne's theoretical 
work is manifest. For, as we shall see, God, as knower, knows 
absolutely - i.e. with certainty and complete adequacy in respect to 
what there is to be known. Yet, as such a knower, he is supremely 
relative to all that is to be known. Omniscience, then, may be 
interpreted as a mark of God's essential relatedness, of the supreme 
relativity of divine becoming. 
In connection with the reversal of cognitive relation Hartshorne 
notes the supportive historic argument: "whereas our knowledge is 
'measured' - as to truth - by its objects, God is his own and the 
30 
ultimate measure of truth". However, Hartshorne argues that the 
basis upon which it may be claimed that God "is the measure of truth" 
is simply because "he and only he is able to establish a perfect 
correspondence between his knowing and what he knows, or between 
what he knows it to be and what it is".31 Furthermore, 
this correspondence implies relativity and contingency 
on the divine side regardless of whether it is exclusively 
God who causes things to conform to his knowledge, or in 
part also things which influence the knowing to conform 
to them. (32) 
Thus for Hartshorne God is not excepted from cognitive relation: he 
is, rather,the supreme instance of it. 33 God's knowing is a function 
30. op. cit. , p.12. 
31. ibid. 
32. ibid. 
33. cf. Whitehead's "chief exemplification", Process and Reality, 
p.521. 
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of his essential relationality. For neoclassical theism: 
To be is to know; to know is to be relative to other 
entities; no entity can rival the perfect being in 
relativity, for none can have greater perfection of 
experience than the omniscient . (34) 
It is the perfection of God's knowing - his 'omniscience' - that 
for Hartshorne sets the seal on God's relativity as against the 
classical tradition. Furthermore, against the tradition of unchanged 
fixity as the hallmark of any definitive attribute of God, Hartshorne 
argues 
there is no reason why perfect knowledge could not 
change, grow in content, provided it changed only as 
its objects changed, and added as new items to its 
knowledge only things that were not in being, not 
there to know, previously. (35) 
The commonplace awareness of the rapidity with which knowledge 
changes and, indeed, ' grows ' , poses no threat to a God for whom his 
omniscience is a mark of his superior relativity. One of the reasons 
for this concerns the use of the notion of "adequacy" . Indeed, 
Hartshorne speaks of "adequacy" as relational in as much as there is 
an adequate correspondence between knowledge and its objects. 36 
34. Gunton, Becoming, p . 27 . 
35 . Hartshorne, Man's Vision, p.14. 
36 . cf. Reality As Social Process, p . l21. See below for discussion 
of the relevant criticisms made by Neville. 
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"Onmiscience" refers to the relation of adequacy of knower to 
known . Thus God's "infallible, certain, distinct, and complete 
knowledge of reality is knowledge in which something corresponds to 
and implies each and every item of reality".37 The adequacy of 
omniscience means that God knows the actual as actual and the 
potential as potential. Now this has important implications with 
respect to taking omniscience as divine foreknowledge . The not-yet 
of the future is the realm of potential. It is by definition non-
actualised . Whilst God knows adequately all possibilities and 
potentialities, he cannot know which possibility will be actualised 
in advance of the present moment in which actualisation takes place. 
The future is the openness of potentiality, not a realm of determined 
'actuality ' that is waiting to ' happen', so to speak . The 'present' 
is the interface of potentiality and actuality. God knows the future 
omnisciently only in that he relates in cognitive adequacy to all 
possibility and potentiality as such. 38 
God encompasses the past in likewise cognitive adequacy for he 
knows the totality of all that is actual qua actualised. Abstractly 
and absolutely speaking, God's omniscience is the relationality of 
cognitive adequacy . In the concrete sense, the content of omniscient 
knowledge is relative to the range of the potential and the facticity 
of the actual. But there is no potential and nothing that is actual 
that lies outside the ken of divine omniscience. This is the sum of 
the adequacy of the cognitive relation. Thus Hartshorne remarks: "If 
37. Divine Relativity, p.9. 
38 . op . cit., p . 123. 
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God is not cognitively related effectively to the whole world, then 
surely nothing has such eminent relatedness".39 
The point would seem to be well made: omniscience is to be con-
ceived as the supreme, all-inclusive, cognitive relation. Of course, 
as Hartshorne notes, the classical viewpoint denied that the world 
was included within divine knowledge, just as "we as knowers do not 
literally include the known".40 However, he also points out that, 
on the one hand, human 'knowing' and divine 'knowing' are different 
and that, if, in the divine case, the known was totally external to 
the knower, then 'Reality' would consist of the known plus God. 
This would mean that God would be less than total Reality. And 
according to the doctrine of Surrelativism, this cannot be. 
With respect to our knowing things, there is a very real sense 
of independence or non-relativity in regard to what is possible for 
us to know, and this is acknowledged by Hartshorne. We may "not-know 
the knowable" but neither may we "claim to know what is in fact non-
41 knowable". But divine knowledge, as inclusive, cannot fail to know 
what is to be known, nor can it 'know' what is not there to be known. 
It is only thus that omniscience is infallible. 
The cognitive relationality of omniscience indicates a real 
sense of dependency within the Omniscient for the content of its 
knowledge. But even this is characterised by dipolarity: "The 
39. op. cit., p.123. 
40. Philosophers Speak, p.19. 
41. Divine Relativity, p.lO. 
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concrete knowledge is relative, the generic abstract property of 
being-aIl-knowing is strictly absolute".42 Omniscience is also 
referred to as infallibility of knowing. Is this totally undermined 
by the relational, or relative, interpretation of omniscience? 
Hartshorne comments that the infallibility of the omniscient God 
means that God is "to be actually in cogni ti ve relation to what 
actually exists, and potentially in relation to what could exist".43 
Not even the omniscient God could "know the possible but non-existent 
as existent, for this would be error, not knowledge".44 For example, 
Hartshorne asserts a "logical interdependence" between God's knowing 
that we exist and our actual existing. He states: "God cannot know 
this unless we exist, but (because of his infallibility) he cannot 
fail to know it if we do exist". 45 The infallibility of omniscience 
is the non-failure of the relation of cognitive adequacy. 
For Hartshorne there is no conflict between divine relativity 
and divine knowing: rather it is the former which renders the latter 
intelligible. 46 In part, at least, intelligibility is rendered by 
the inclusiveness of divine relativity. God is what he includes: his 
inclusiveness is itself relative and embraces all relativities. 47 
Peters comments that 
42. op. cit., p.ll. 
43. Creative Synthesis, p.234. 
44. ibid. 
45. C. Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity", · R~Met. XXI, 
December 1967:276. 
46. Divine Relativity, p.12. 
47. op. cit., p.76: "To include relations is to include their terms. 
Hence to know all is to include all ... the supreme being must be 
all-inclusive". 
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God's all-inclusiveness is then a function of his 
perfect cognition. Such cognition, since it means 
participation in the concrete life of things, is also 
perfect love . Far from being 'impassible' God is 
supremely sensitive and relative to all. (48) 
Omniscience, the cognitive relation, is not just something God 
has as a contingent attribute. Rather Hartshorne asserts that this 
relation is "constitutive of the knower" . 49 In like fashion to 
loving - which is not incidental to the lover, but constitutes the 
lover as lover - so with omniscience, the one who knows omnisciently 
is constituted by appropriate cognitive relations. Both the perfect 
loving and the perfect knowing of God are perfect relations. 
Hartshorne remarks: 
The purely absolute God was, by logical implication, 
conceived as a thing , not a subject or a person; as 
ignorant, not conscious or knowing; as indifferent, 
not interested in things and their relations . (50) 
As the divine cognizer God has cognitive relationality as constitut-
d " " b' 51 ive of the 1V1ne e1ng . "Nothing is so variously relative, 
dependent, as the knower".52 In similar fashion Hartshorne wants to 
say the Omniscient, as divine mind, must be the most relational and 
relative of all . 53 Hartshorne ' s understanding of God is in marked 
48. E.H. Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics, pp.86f. 
49. Divine Relativity, p.17. 
50 . ibid. 
51. op . cit . , p. 123 . 
52. op . cit . , p . 8 . 
53. ibid. 
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contrast to classical thinking, particularly that of Aristotle, whose 
god "does not even trouble to notice what is going on in the world".54 
Hartshorne's God is not so limited as to be merely engaged in "think-
ing about thinking". Rather, Hartshorne's God is dependent, relative -
related to all. The surrelativity of the cognitive relation is 
expressed in the "little noticed truth" to which Hartshorne draws 
attention, viz: 
to be known by all subjects is fully as distinctive 
a status as to know all objects ... Only God can be so 
universally important that no subject can ever wholly 
fail or ever have failed to be aware of him ... Thus the 
unique status of object-for-all-subjects is to be 
correlated with the more commonly recognized one of 
subject-for-all-objects. The difference between them 
is that the latter means 'having relations to all 
objects', and thus implies universal relativity; the 
former means that all subjects have relation to the 
one object, without the latter having relation to them. (55) 
We have seen ample evidence of the fact that, in Hartshorne's 
thinking, cognitive activity is relational activity . In the act 
of knowing, the cognizer relates itself to the known, the thing 
. d 56 cogn1ze . In God's perfect knowing of creation lies his perfect 
relation to it. In our knowing of him lies our relation (in part 
54. Logic, p.ll9. 
55. Divine Relativity, p.70. 
56. cf. Creative Synthesis, p.224. 
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at least) to him. In this twofold knowing there is found the 
fundamental "epistemic relation,,57 in which, through mutual knowing, 
the two relators meet: two-way relationship is established. For 
Hartshorne, "only a being who knows things in principle, without 
contrary possibility could, it seems, be omniscient".58 And such 
a being is the God who is divine relativity, who is perfectly -
adequately - related to all, knows all. 
III. CREATIVITY: THE CAUSAL RELATION 
In the previous section we saw how, in Hartshorne's understanding, 
God's omniscience signifies cognitive relationality. I conclude from 
this that, as the Omniscient, God is to be conceived as embracing 
this relationality as a constitutive ontological element. I turn now 
to a similar discussion of another 'key' attribute or motif of God, 
that of creativity. 
Now/as a category, 'creativity' is of central importance to the 
process perspective. For Whitehead creativity is "the underlying 
b '1 ., ,,59 f I' su stant1a act1v1ty 0 rea 1ty. In many respects creativity is 
60 
a principle or "metaphysical ground" under which the being of God 
, b 61 1S su sumed. Thus God has a role in creation, (where 'creation ' is 
understood as ongoing process), as provider of "initial aims" for each 
"actual occasion".62 However, the process of "creative advance", as 
57. Aquinas, p.lO. 
58. Philosophers Speak, p.14. 
59. J. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p.149. 
60. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.494; cf. Cobb, op.cit., p.167. 
61. cf. Whitehead, op.cit., pp.9, 27, 28 etc. 
62. cf. Cobb, Natural Theology, pp.203f. 
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63 such, is also, at least in part, self-directed and self-caused. 
All of reality, all that is, is caught up in "becoming" as the process 
64 
of "creative advance into novelty". As Williams comments, "creativ-
ity is at work in a11 things".65 The primordiality of God in respect 
of this process is that he "elicits novelty and self-creativity". 66 
The Whiteheadian perspective on creativity holds that it is the sine 
qua non of entitative reality: "Creativity is the actuality of every 
t 1 . II 67 ac ua ent1ty. Creativity is intrinsic to entitative status. 68 
Whitehead's stress on creativity, especially in reference to the 
creative advance into novelty as denoting the fundamental processive-
ness of 'becoming' ,69 is important to Hartshorne and a significant 
factor in the development of his thinking. However, whereas for 
Whitehead it forms a super-eminent principle of reality, extra to 
the reality of God, for Hartshorne the principle is at one with the 
creator of God. 70 
Now in the broad experience and expression of the Christian faith, 
God is pre-eminently referred to as Creator. His relationship with 
creation is generally recognized as that of ongoing creativity. The 
63. cf. Process and Reality, p.118. 
64. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.3l4. cf. Cobb, Natural Theology, 
pp.2l0f.; cf. P. Hamilton, The Living God and the Modern World, 
London: Hodder and Stoughton 1967, p.52. 
65. D.O. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, New York: Harper 
and Row 1968, p.135. 
66. Hamilton, The Living God, p.166; cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 
p.487. 
67. Natural Theology, p.2l0. 
68. Process and Reality, p.302. 
69. Note, however, the development and limitations of Whitehead's view 
as discussed, for example, by Cobb, A Christian ·Natural ·Theo1ogy, 
pp.203-214, and R.C. Neville, Creativity ·artdGod, New York: 
Seabury 1980. 
70. Divine Relativity, p.79; cf. Gragg, Charles Hartshorne, p.90. 
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traditional understanding of God assumes his perfect knowledge which 
is usually taken to mean that such knowledge is absolute and non-
related. But Hartshorne asks what analogy this view could have "to 
what is commonly meant by knowledge, which seems to be nothing without 
such a relation".71 On the one hand, the usual answer is that "God 
knows all things through his own all-causative essence, and, therefore, 
his cognitive relation is self-relation, and implies no relativity", 
on the other hand "'causative' seems to mean related to effects. And 
either a cognitive relation is established, not just to the cause but 
72 also to the effects, or these are not known". 
Knowledge involves the relation of the knower to the known. God's 
knowing is his engagement in the cognitive relation. Traditionally 
God's knowledge and relationality has been wholly internalised in terms 
of his causative essence. This has contributed to the denial of 
external relationality as essential to the being of God. But for 
Hartshorne there is a relationality that holds between cause and 
effect just as, in like fashion, there is a relation holding between 
God and World. Such a relation 'binds' each term to the other as, for 
example, knower and known are bound together in the cognitive relation. 
Thus, as with the cognitive relation, the causal relation forms a 
part of, or element in, the being of God. 
The classical tradition holds that "since God's essence is cause 
of all things (though not related to them), the divine self-knowledge 
. 73 
must 1nclude knowledge or all that can be caused by the essence". 
71. Divine Relativity, p.116. 
72. ibid. 
73. op. cit., p.117. 
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That is, God's self-knowledge is inclusive of cognitive relation to 
possibility only. But Hartshorne argues that either the "actual 
being-caused of the world" is part of that essence, or it is not. 
If it is, his point is that to know the essence of God's causality 
is to know the actuality of the world with the corollary that each 
is as equally necessary as the other. If the 'being-caused' of the 
world is not part of God's causal essence, then on the traditional 
premise cited above, God can not know the world as caused. 74 But this 
is to engage in a reductio ad absurdum. Therefore the conclusion to 
be reached must be that the caused reality of the world is of the 
essence of God. In tandem with God's relation to the world as Divine 
Knower, so, as Divine Causal Essence, God exists in assymetrical 
causal relation with the world. From this may be argued the specific 
corollary that for God such causal relationality per se is a necessary 
ontological component. 
Now, for Hartshorne, God is "the supreme power in existence, the 
causal influence superior to all others".75 But does such superiority 
imply a simply one-way causal activity, that is, an activity which 
knows neither reaction nor interaction? This is the question Hartshorne 
himself poses, and he suggests that "perhaps the supreme action is 
. ., 76 
also, necessarily, the supreme 1nteract1on '. In discussing the 
meaning of the term 'cause' in theology, Hartshorne notes that a cause 
is "something whose existence is requisite for, implied by, inferable 
74. op. cit., p.118. 
75. Man's Vision, p.26. 
76. ibid. 
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77 from, the existence of its 'effect'''. He enquires as to the 
possibility of a converse relation: Does a cause require an effect 
in like fashion to an effect requiring a cause? To both these 
questions he would answer in the affirmative in contradistinction to 
the mainstream of theological tradition on this point. Thus for 
Hartshorne the world, as caused, points to its cause in God as 
indicative of a necessary relationality that holds between God and 
world. 
This entails for process theology that to call God 'Creator' 
implies an understanding that God "must have I a creation' in and on 
which He works creatively".78 The synthetic concept by which the 
diversity of the created realm is held together to produce the unitary 
whole is found in the theory of creativity. Creativity is the mark 
not only of the Creator but is also the fundamental element in the 
created world - the world of interrelated cause and effect, of a 
stream of moments of experience. Thus creation, or the world, may be 
thought of as experiential existence constituted by relational matrix. 
That is to say, there are numerous stimuli and other factors which 
interrelate as a multitude of causes in the production of any particular 
ff . 79 . e ect, or given moment of exper1ence. In 1ts universal applicability, 
creativity denotes the "social character of experience".80 
The premise of creativity for Hartshorne lies in the conception 
of concrete reality as creative in principle. 81 Furthermore, creativity 
77. Philosophers Speak, p.500. 
78. N. Pittenger, "Trinity and Process: Some Comments in Reply", 
Th.St. 32, June 1971:293 
79. See Creative Synthesis, p.5. 
80. op. cit., p.8. 
81. Hartshorne, Natural Theology, p.82. 
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is not just something God does: it is something which he is. 82 The 
relationality involved in creativity is a part of the essential being 
of God: it is constitutive of his ontological surrelativity. This 
means that whatever value God has is derived "from the contingent 
fact of creation".83 In both being and value God, in neoclassical 
thought, is to be understood in terms of his relationships ad extra. 
Against the traditional doctrine that holds that in all cause-
effect relationships it is the absolute or independent being which 
is final cause~4 ' Hartshorne holds that God, as cause is related.to 
the world. Indeed, we cannot know anything of God unless he is so 
related. 85 As cause God does not stand outside or beyond that which 
he causes: he is the inclusive reality, interacting with the product 
of his causal activity.86 Thus, whilst God is primordial cause, he 
nonetheless in his own existence takes back into his being the causal 
influence exercised upon himself as he interacts with creation. God, 
in Hartshorne's thinking, cannot be defined as uncaused cause, or 
impassible, or immutable. Such definitive terms are but "a mere 
abstraction from the contingent and caused actuality of the divine 
life".87 Rather, for Hartshorne, 
82. cf. Creative Synthesis, p.lO, where he argues: "It is untrue that 
the creator is in no sense or aspect uncreated; rather he is, in 
some aspect, a creature, a product - at least of his own making". 
See following discussion for exposition of Hartshorne's use of 
'creativity'. 
83. Divine Relativity, p.l31. 
84. op. cit., p.70. 
85. op. cit., p.lS. 
86. cf. Philosophers Speak, p.SOO. 
87. Natural Theology, p.44. 
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God is no such abstraction. He remains entirely free, 
in his full reality, to be receptive, enriched by his 
creatures, perpetually transcending himself, a genuinely 
active and loving subject, sympathetic companion of all 
existence. (88) 
In this freedom God is intimately related to "all existence", 
and not only as cause qua originative impetus, but also as con-
89 
sequent effect. Hartshorne is here referring to God's creative 
interaction with the world. God's experience of and relationship 
to the created order have a modifying effect - at least to the extent 
they precipitate God's responsive reactions to the world. For instance, 
God is said by Hartshorne to be caused grief by the sinful activity 
of humankind. Thus the causal relationality of creation embraces a 
two-way, though asymmetrical, relatedness. Hartshorne's understanding 
of the creator God embraces the relational reality of creation. God 
exists within relationship to his creation, and this is necessarily 
so because of his being Creator. 
There is a distinct similarity, or ontological parallelism, in 
the relational reality of both God and humankind. This is seen both 
in the essential structure of the being of each, and as reflected in 
the relational togetherness by which each is to be thought of as 
existing. On the other hand there is a real difference in that God 
is ontologically prior. There is nothing that can have any causal 
relation with, or influence on, the being of God which has not already 
88. ibid. 
89. See Man's Vision, p.l09. 
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been influenced, or engaged in relationship, by God himself. 90 The 
absolute pole in God's ontological structure does not imply "his 
nonrelationship to the creation as such, but only to the contingent 
alternatives of creation". 91 This means that 
Every creature may be contingent, in that some other 
creature was possible instead of it, but 'no creation 
whatever' may not be a possibility. In that case, 
God might be essentially 'creator', incapable of not 
creating, though perfectly capable of not creating 
this or that creature. (92) 
The principle of creativity unites contingency and necessity. 
Indeed, Hartshorne's God embraces contingency in his very being, 
rather than standing over against it. 93 In effect, Hartshorne holds 
that contingency, as a category, is itself necessary, and also that 
there is a sense in which it is more fundamental than the category 
'necessity,.94 Thus Hartshorne's God, in this respect, may be 
defined as that identification of "existential independence with an 
invincible power and will to achieve self-consistent adjustment to 
any change whatever".95 Rather than the absence of relativity, or 
the absence of any capacity to respond to others, God's "absoluteness" 
or necessary existence is conceived by Hartshorne as indicative 
90. Divine Relativity, p.30. 
91. op. cit., p.73. 
92. op. cit., p.74. 
93. cf. Natural Theology, p.5l; Peters, Hartshorne and 'Neoclassical 
Metaphysics, p.68. 
94. Hartshorne, Logic, p.ll. 
95. op. cit., p.136. 
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of God's "infallible power to harmonize relativities in Himself, to 
respond coherently to diverse stimuli".96 The conjunction of necessity 
and contingency in creativity means for Hartshorne that 
the very idea of God as creator implies that not only 
was this world so much as possible solely because of 
the creative power which produced it, but also 'other 
worlds' were or are possible only in that the same 
power would have been, or would be, adequate for their 
production. The divine power is thus conceived as, by 
definition, all-pervasive with respect to possibility. (97) 
Hartshorne's God embraces in his creative relationality the contingent 
and the possible. This is not to deny the rightful place of necessity: 
rather it is to give a fullness of meaning to God's necessary existence. 
. . 98 God exists in necessary relation to cont1ngent rea11ty. 
The being of God is, at heart, creative being. Creative being 
is eminently relational. The creator is not simply a cosmic agency 
of mere cause: the being of God is constituted by the necessary causal 
relations by which he creates. Hartshorne states: 
We know creativity only as a responding to prior stimuli, 
and if we refuse to allow an analogy between such 
96. ibid. 
97. op. cit., p.137. 
98. cf. Gunton, Becoming and Being, p.17: "Hartshorne accepts that if 
God is to be God, his existence must be necessary, but this is 
not to say that he is so in every respect ... If God is wholly 
necessary, then so are his acts of creation, and creation can in 
no sense be described as a free or contingent act". But surely 
it is the 'act' of creation that is so necessary; the content -
or 'acts' - is contingent. 
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ordinary creative action and the divine 'creating' of 
the cosmos we are using a word whose meaning we cannot 
provide ... God's creativity is his higher form of 
emergent experiential synthesis, or response to stimuli. 
He influences us supremely because he is supremely open 
to our influence . (99) 
God's creativity, as an expression of his causal or influential 
relatedness, is also an exercise of omnipotence. For Hartshorne, 
omnipotence is a matter of causal adequacy, by which also God main-
, h' l' 1 I' 100 ta1ns 1S re at10na rea 1ty. God's omnipotence - his power to 
motivate, cause or create - is not a pseudo-magical ability to do 
anything whatever. Rather, and especially as motivating power, 
omnipotence is the power which sets the parameters and conditions 
for activity within creation by co-creative agents. lOl Human being 
is such an agent, and this agency experiences true freedom and its 
own appropriate power to act or not to act. l02 Hartshorne's approach 
neither arbitrarily limits the power or scope of God's effective 
agency, nor does it subscribe to a divine carte blanche. Rather he 
states that "God can do everything that a God can do, everything that 
could be done by 'a being with no possible superior"'. 103 
99. Creative Synthesis, p.12. 
100. cf. Divine Relativity, p.134. 
101. op. cit., p.13S. 
102. cf. Creative Synthesis, pp.6-9. Experience and creativity are 
themselves "free acts". "Freedom is limited only by acts of 
freedom already performed". 
103. Divine Relativity, p.138. 
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I have examined ways in which Hartshorne's understanding of the 
creativity of God manifests the concept of God as essentially 
relational. The mark of creativity is causal relatedness. God's 
causal relation parallels his cognitive relation. The world as 
created has itself a reciprocal causal implication for the being of 
God. Creativity embraces the categories of necessity and contingency, 
as well as preserving within the being of God both effect and cause 
as elements of his being. Thus God's creativity - his causal relation-
ality - reflects both dipolarity and surrelativism, whilst at the same 
time providing a particular development in the exposition of the 
relationality of God which lies at the heart of Hartshorne's thinking. 
IV. GOD TRANSCENDENT AND IMMANENT 
The analysis of Hartshorne's doctrine of God thus far has been 
primarily expository. In presenting Hartshorne's neoclassical theism 
my concern has been both to discern the nature and extent of its 
inherent relationality and to elucidate a comprehensive picture of 
Hartshorne's concept which may fruitfully be placed alongside that 
of Macquarrie. Particular points of comparison, along with detailed 
critical discussion, will be drawn out in Chapter Six. In the 
present section I shall raise the same questions as were examined 
in the investigation of Macquarrie's thinking about God, viz, how 
this thinker accounts for the 'marks' of otherness and presence in 
his thinking about God. 
The rationale for including the mark of "otherness" in the 
ontological constitution of a relational entity has been discussed 
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above. 104 The issue here is to discern whether and to what extent 
Hartshorne admits "otherness" in the concept of God. Prima f acie .. 
otherness, as denoting transcendence, falls under the abstract pole. 
Yet as "relational entity" God must not only 'include' otherness in 
the dipolar sense, he must also manifest otherness as an element of 
ontological identity as such. In other words, "otherness" must 
denote an aspect of God viewed as a whole, as it were, and not just 
an element or 'part' of God's being to be included along with other 
parts. In order, therefore, to ascertain whether or not the neo-
classical concept of God admits of God as "other" in this holistic 
sense I will discuss Hartshorne's view on five aspects or attributes 
that are usually ascribed to God, viz, infinity, incomparability, 
absoluteness, omnipotence and sovereignty. 
God's transcendence necessarily implies immanence, according to 
Hartshorne. The otherness of God is not remote identity but rather 
the necessary component of relational presence. So I shall consider 
"immanence", the motif of presence, in his understanding of God, by 
examining his treatment of the attributes of love, omniscience, and 
holiness. 
(a) The Otherness of Divine Becoming 
The "otherness" of God is reflected in the notion of God's 
infinity. For Hartshorne this means "God is infinite in what he 
could be, not in what he is; he is infinitely capable of actuality 
104. See above,pp.62ff and l26ff. 
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105 
rather than infinitely actual". The infiniteness of divine 
becoming is relative to possibility. The divine potentiality is 
the limitless possibility of becoming. In this context the being 
of God is infinite in its potential to become - the potential for 
self-surpassability. God is infinite to the extent infiniteness 
106 denotes "unsurpassable excellence". It is as 'other-than ' finite 
actualised creation that God is infinite. 
The otherness of God is also expressed in the traditional view 
by reference to God's "incomparability". Now Hartshorne argues: 
It is clearly nonsense to declare an entity wholly 
incomparable and yet compare it to all others as their 
superior. And if not superior, it is not worshipful. (107) 
If God is to be perceived as worshipful because of his superiority -
his unsurpassability with respect to all save himself - then this can 
only be so on the basis that, in comparison to all else, he is per-
ceived to be so superior. God may have no 'equal'. but he is not 
beyond comparability as such. Indeed, it is by virtue of the 
comparability that illumines his superiority that he receives the 
ascription 'incomparable'. Thus incomparability denotes otherness 
in God, but not by virtue of signifying distance or severance from 
all other relata. On the contrary, 'incomparability' is an ascription 
of the superiority of the relational 'other', of deity in the context 
of its relativity. 
105. Natural Theology, p.2l. 
106. C. Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept of Prehension". 
I.P.Q. XIX, September 1979:262. 
107. Natural Theology, p.3S. 
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The category of "absolute" has already been discussed with 
d t d Ol h 0 h 108 Y "b 1 regar 0 1pO ar t e1sm as suc . et a so uteness"is a facet 
of transcendent ' otherness'. By very definition it is "indifferent 
t l OOt" 109 o 1m1 s . However, such "indifference" does not indicate 
inapplicability of limitation with respect to God's absolutness. 
Rather it denotes that God is not 'bound' either by limits, or to 
ignore limits. For Hartshorne argues that 
We may say that God limits himself, but it is God, 
not the mere absolute form in God that does so. 
Furthermore it is misleading to say that even the 
concrete God 'limits himself', if by that is meant 
that limitation in God is in no way due to anything 
other than God. (110) 
The self-limiting of God does not compromise the sense in which he 
is appropriately absolute: rather it is indicative of the true nature 
of God as sur-relative, inclusive of the absolute, but not'bound ', or 
excluded from, real relation by it. The absoluteness of God denotes 
his otherness as the One who is free in respect of limits . 
Omnipotence, discussed already in terms of manifesting causal 
111 
adequacy is also another index of otherness . Indeed as an 
attribute it has had many claims made upon it with respect to the 
debate concerning theism. Such claims have been overstated according 
to Hartshorne. He argues: 
108. See above pp . 9lff. 
109. Divine Relativity, p . 145. 
110 . op. cit., p.146. 
Ill. See above for discussion of omnipotence in Hartshorne ' s thinking, 
p.269 . 
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God's power or influence must of course be worshipful, 
unsurpassably great; but to identify this unsurpassability 
of power with its sheer monopoly, a control by which all 
concrete details of existence are determined, leaving 
the creatures with nothing to determine for themselves, 
no genuine options of their own, is to burden the divine 
worshipfulness with a logical paradox of our own making. (112) 
God's power to exercise control is a feature of his omnipotence. For 
example, Hartshorne examines the claim that God controls human minds. 
Given that "A mind is influenced by what it knows, by its objects", 
then, "If God can alter the object of our awareness, he can alter our 
113 awareness, alter us". And God alters the object of our awareness 
by altering himself, for he is the supreme object and thereby exercises 
a unique power of persuasive influence. 
This means we change in response to the initiative taken by God 
himself. However, "the exact manner of this response cannot possibly 
be compelled or determined by God".114 The omnipotence of divine 
becoming is thus the power to change in order to invite appropriate 
response. Omnipotence is not sheer tyrannical power, but rather 
persuasive - and pervasive - lure of the divine in the context of the 
relationship that holds between the divine and that toward which such 
lure is directed. 
God's sovereignty is addressed by Hartshorne by way of God's 
governance or lordship over the world. The mode of this sovereignty 
112. Natural Theology, p.119. 
113. Divine Relativity, p.139. 
114. ibid. 
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is that of divine persuasion or lure. Thus 
God can rule the world and order it setting optimal 
limits for our free action, by presenting himself as 
essential object, so characterized as to weight the 
possibilities of responses in the desired respect. (115) 
Such 'rule' is not exercised by one way action, whether mediate or 
immediate. Rather such a God exercises rule responsively: the 'lure' 
is in terms of his 'moulding' of himself with the aim of influencing 
creation. 116 
In various ways, then, Hartshorne admits a sense of God's 
"otherness". The neoclassical God is transcendent, but certainly not 
in the classical sense. "Otherness" for Hartshorne does not denote 
the Thomistic "complete otherness from creation: deus non e st in 
genera"; nor "in being what the world is not".117 The process pers-
pective reverses the priority of transcendence over immanence, but 
Hartshorne modifies even this to speak of a reciprocity of immanence 
which, according to Gunton, means that 
as the world is within God, so God, in his relations 
with the world, is immanent. He performs his functions 
in relation to the rest of reality not 'from outside' 
but from within. (118) 
115. op. cit., p.142. 
116. For further discussion on 'sovereignty', see Section yea) below. 
117. C. Gunton, "Transcendence, Metaphor, and the Knowabil i ty of God", 
~.Th.St. ns XXXI, October 1980:503. 
118. op. cit., p.509. 
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In other words, Hartshorne validates the transcendence of God by 
virtue of the doctrine of panentheism - that all reality exists 'in' 
God, and that he is both this reality - or the "sum or system of 
119 dependent things or effects" - as well as being identifiably 
independent of, or other than, this reality.120 
Gunton remarks that there is "a coinherence, a perichoresis, of 
God and the world in which the two are separable ontologically but 
not in any way spatially".12l Now Gunton is critical that Hartshorne's 
G d k d d h f 'd d 'd ' 122 o lac s transcen ence, an t ere are 1n epen ent 1 ent1ty. But 
he has missed the point. God's identity is not simply that of wholly 
otherness, and certainly not that of occupying identifiably different 
spatio-temporal location. God's being "to an infinite degree what 
h f " f" 1 ,,123, 1 tt f " t e rest 0 real1ty 1S 1n1te y 1S ess a rna er a quant1at1ve 
or spatial relatedness as it is a matter of, as I would call it, an 
ontological-relatedness. Surrelativity yields ontological identity 
within the context of essential relatedness. 
To the extent that God is related to all else, he is a relational 
"other". His identity is transcendent to the reality to which he is 
essentially related, and in his essential relatedness he is also and 
thereby supremely immanent. 
(b) The Presence of Divine Becoming 
The presence of God may be thought of primarily in terms of love, 
The association of 'love' with 'God' is not simply an exercise in 
119. Divine Relativity, p.90. 
120. cf. Hamilton, The Living God and the Modern World, p.165. 
121. C. Gunton, "Transcendence ..... ", J.Th.St. nsXXXI, p.509. 
122. ibid. 
123. op. cit., p.SlO. 
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philosophical juxtaposition. Love is the prime hermeneutical term 
in any Christian understanding of the divine reality. "Love" is not 
the name of a remote abstract quality, but is a present concrete 
reality, a reality experienced within the existence of the created 
world. How, then, does Hartshorne perceive divine love in terms of 
his concept of God? 
Love is clearly no quality which any individual may claim as an 
exclusive posseSSion, not even the supreme individual. Love is, by 
very definition, a quality of relationship. There is no love unless 
there is a lover and a beloved: no loving relation unless there is 
a subject who loves and an object to which the love reaches out. 
It is a mark of genuine concern-ful interaction. Thus, 
.. • love is more than goodness, wisdom and power, it 
is also happiness as partly arising from sympathy with 
the joys of others . This happiness will of course 
change with changes in the joys of others . . . For to 
love is to find joy in the joys of others, and sorrow 
in the sorrow of others, and thus to depend partly 
upon them for one's joy and sorrow. (124) 
For Hartshorne love means appreciating the other, manifesting 
genuine care for the other. l25 On the one hand, human beings love -
i.e . both give and receive appreciation and care - yet do so within 
real limitation : that of the condition of "fallenness". On the other 
hand, "God appreciates the qualities of all things •.. He wishes all 
124 . Hartshorne, Reality, p.158. 
125. Logic, p.14l. 
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creatures well ... He cares about their weal and woe - there is no 
. 1 l·f· . f ." 126 materla qua 1 lcatlon 0 negatlon . 
As a value the divine love is perfect love, defined as "absolute 
adequacy to the object".127 Such love is the supreme reali zation of 
128 
"the effort to act upon adequate awareness of otherness". It is 
the loving of the supremely Relative, the God whose being is to be 
in relation. On the ontological significance of love, Hartshorne 
comments it is "the distinctive character of 'being' itself".129 
Of course traditional theism does argue that, for God, the exercise 
of love is a necessary component of the being of God: but not as a 
mark of external relations. However, Hartshorne argues: 
The Trinity is supposed to meet the requirements of 
giving God an object of love which yet agrees with his 
absolute self-sufficiency, and also an object of love 
'worthy' to be loved with so perfect a love as the 
divine. This is done by making the lover and the 
beloved identical - yet not identical. But whatever 
the truth of this idea ... it leaves the essential 
problem of the divine love unsolved. For either God 
loves the creatures or he does not. If he does then 
their interests coritribute to his interests, for love 
means nothing more than this. If he does not, then 
the essence of the religious belief in God is sacrificed, 
126. op. cit., p.142. 
127. Man's Vision, p.16S. 
128. ibid. 
129. op. cit., p.267. 
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and one still has the question, How then is God related 
to the creatures' interests? (130) 
For Hartshorne God's love is nothing if it is not his immanence 
in loving relationships - his presence in ad extra relationality. 
Creature and Creator God stand to each other as relational entities 
whose identity embraces the loving relation that holds between them. 
Thus God's loving the creature is an expression of his "becoming", 
for his reality is modified (it becomes) relative to the loving 
relationship and the object of love within that relation. Individual 
identity , as such, has meaning only against a background of change in 
relationship. Relational change is no necessary threat to ontological 
identity . 
Although love is given pride of place in a discussion of the 
presence of God, omniscience may also be perceived as a mark of the 
131 presence of God . God's knowing is his comprehensive awareness 
adequate to the situation or object known. Such awareness embraces 
outcome: the future of any given object or situation is knowable to 
the one whose knowing is so comprehensively aware. 132 Hartshorne 
states : 
divine or adequate awareness cannot ... escape the identity 
of knowing and valuing . While virtue and abstract 
knowledge has little of the values of concrete reality, 
actual and concrete knowledge has all the values and 
130 . op . cit . , p . 166. 
131. cf. Discussion on omniscience above, pp . 25lff. 
132 . cf . Divine Relativity, p . 12S. 
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cannot fail to respond; for the ability to be aware 
and the ability to respond are identical. One can 
only be aware in responding. (133) 
Omniscience implies awareness, which in turn implies responsivenes s , 
each of which is appropriate measure to the supreme being. From the 
neoclassical perspective, omniscience is thus indicative of the 
immanent relationality of God. Knowledge involves necessary mutual 
interrelationship. Omniscience is indeed a function of God's 
immanence : it implies his supreme relational presence to all of 
reality. 
The third and final motif I shall consider in the discussion of 
Hartshorne's understanding of the presence of God is that of 'holiness '. 
For Hartshorne, 'holiness' is the necessary counterpart of omniscience. 
Adequacy of knowledge, or supreme awareness, is to be matched by 
, , f I' , ,134 h' adequacy of motIvatIon, 0 actua IZlng capacIty . Esc eWIng the 
notion of the holiness of God as a divine amalgam of justice and 
mercy, Hartshorne views it in terms of God's "single aim at the one 
primary good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies 
of living, and pour this richness into the one ultimate receptacle 
of all achievement, the life of God" .135 Clearly the motif of 
holiness indicates, for Hartshorne, the focus in God of relational 
existence: the being of God undergirds such existence and is indeed 
reflected in it. The purpose and the will of God are summarized by 
133. op. cit., p.126. 
134. op. cit., pp.124ff. 
135. op. cit., p.127. 
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this term: God's holiness wills for the creature that life which 
will contribute to the self-surpassing fullness of the divine. 136 
In Hartshorne's thinking, the intimacy of God's love, the adequacy 
of his omniscience, and the purposiveness of his holiness, all indicate 
divine immanence or presence. The relativity of this immanence denotes 
also the sense in which God, as relational entity, "becomes". The 
re1ationa1ity of God on Hartshorne's terms, is the becomingness of 
the divine being who is at once other and present in his essential 
relatedness. As relational entity God is transcendent and immanent: 
he is an Other who is yet Present in his relating. The otherness and 
presence of the divine becoming is integral to Hartshorne's concept 
of God. 
V. GOD IN ACTION AND INTERACTION 
God's action is interactive: his activity is responsive. This 
is the thrust of Hartshorne's view of God-in-action. It has emerged 
as implicit in much of the foregoing discussion. The surrelative 
deity is a God of relational activity. His creativity embraces 
causal activity in the context of responsive relatedness. The 
ontological description of such a God is implicitly that of relational 
entity. So to conclude the particular focus on Hartshorne's view of 
those aspects of God which I have claimed are 'marks' of relational 
entity, I now address the theme of activity and responsiveness in the 
divine becoming. How is the action and the interaction of the neo-
classical God understood? 
136. op. cit., p.133. 
282 
(a) The Activity of Divine Becoming 
The reality of the activity of God is fundamental to process 
137 thought. Indeed, that God acts within and upon creation is a 
basic tenet of Christian faith . But such action may be viewed as 
that of a benign deity who, whilst essentially aloof from his creation, 
yet chooses to tinker with it from time to time. Or it may be seen to 
be expressive of the God who participates dynamically within his 
creation. This latter view is that of Hartshorne. By virtue of 
his omniscience God is said to participate in the experiential 
138 
reality of the world. This is also a mark of his surpassabi1ity 
over all else. Part and parcel of this participation is the fact 
that "He surpasses all this in extrinsic value, by sustaining laws 
of nature without which nothing could be useful to anyone".139 God's 
action is principally that of the ontological sustainment of creation, 
but it is a sustainment marked by real participation. Such partici-
pation is indicative of the relational reality of God himself. For, 
as Peters states: 
Where real relations are lacking there is obviously 
no participation: things are in no sense members one 
of another. And with participation goes interest, 
concern, enjoyment, love, suffering, and knowledge -
unless they are wholly self-directed. (140) 
137. cf. D.O. Williams, "How Does God Act?" in Reese and Freeman (eds) , 
Process and Divinity, Illinois: Open Court 1964, p.l64. 
138. cf. Creative Synthesis, p.262. 
139. ibid. cf. Discussion of Whitehead's view of God as sustaining 
the creative process in J. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, 
p.150. 
140. Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics, p.10S. 
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Hartshorne's view echoes that of Whitehead. 141 Williams' notes 
that for Whitehead God "acts by being".142 That is to say: 
God presents the individual occasions in the world 
with the possibility of participating in the society 
of being, which involve elements of decision and 
novelty, but also strict conditions of limitation. 
Nothing is, for Whitehead, except by participation. (143) 
In terms of the Whiteheadian dipo1arity, God acts primordially by 
"being presented to the creatures as the integrity of the order of 
possibility by virtue of which there can be a world" 144 in the first 
place, and consequently "by being concretely apprehended in feeling 
in such a way that God's specific response to the world becomes a 
. . f . . the world" .145 It' '" const1tut1ve unct10n 1n nterac 1ve part1c1pat10n 
is at the heart of the process perspective of the activity of God . 
Th · . . h H h 146 1S 1S no less so W1t arts orne. 
As participative interactive agent, the divine being is an 
acting personality, one whose action, whose influence and rule, are 
expressed in personal terms. As ' actor' - or acting agent - God is 
'ruler' over creation. Now Hartshorne comments that: 
A 'ruler' is the eminent influence in his society, 
but not in any sense the sole influence. And the 
141. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p.150. 
142. Williams, "How Does God Act?", p.17!. 
143. op. cit., p.172. 
144. op. cit., p.178. 
145. op. cit., p.179. 
146. I note here also John Macquarrie's stress on participation. See, 
e.g. his Principles, pp.232f. 
284 
better the ruler, the more sensitively he responds to 
significant influences coming to him from the ruled. 
Ruling is interaction, not mere action. (147) 
As the supreme ruler, God is supremely sensitive and responsive on 
Hartshorne's account. 
Hartshorne ' s view of God as responsively active finds an echo 
in Whitehead and other process thinkers. Process theology views 
the activity and influence of God "as a necessary constituent of 
h · h ." 148 everyt 1ng t at 1S . Thus the activity of God is a necessary 
component of the becoming process . In each moment or occasion of 
process God acts by entertaining purpose and motivating novelty. 
As the "source of novelty", and also the "lure" to the actualizations 
embodying that novelty, "God is the One who calls us beyond all that 
h b h . h b" 149 we ave ecome to w at we m1g t e. 
Whiteheadian process theology understands God ' s provision of an 
"initial aim" as the originative and evocative motive for every 
occasion. It is identified as the "principle of concretion". This 
means that, as Williams puts it, "there must be an order of partici-
pation in an actual world with a definite presentation of this order 
b f h b . ,,150 e ore t ere can e a new occaS1on . This is therefore one facet 
of God's activity: he acts by being the principle of concretion, or 
147 . Hartshorne, Natural Theology, p . 97 . 
148. Hamilton, The Living God and the Modern World, p.6. 
149 . J. Cobb, God and the World, Philadelphia: Westminster 1969, p.82. 
150. Williams, "How Does God Act?", p.174. 
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the principle of limitation, in so far as he offers "an initial aim 
to each creature thus making its concretion in a new actual occasion 
possible".15l The means of the provision of initial aims is a function 
of God's primordial "ordering of eternal obj ects", that is, the "time-
less envisagement of possibil i ties", for "the ordering is such as to 
specify the initial aim for each new occasion". 152 
Thus the process perspective of God's activity involves the action 
of antecedent selection, existential restriction, and ontological 
particularity with respect to the participative presentation of initial 
aim. 153 But the activity of God does not stop at originative, or 
initial, aim for the process of becoming. The activity of Divine 
Becoming embraces also the eliciting of novelty and self-creativity 
"as the process of becoming of an entity".154 
Williams notes the danger of a surreptitious determinism inveighing 
its way into the process perspective. This is on the grounds that 
God's activity in the world is chiefly that of the principle of con-
cretion, viz, "the metaphysical function by which a definite outcome 
is secured from the ambiguous and indeterminate possibilities which 
hover over every concrete matter of fact".155 Nonetheless the accent 
on self-creativity, or the responsive activity of the creature in its 
occasions, should guard against the threat of determinism. Indeed, 
151. op. cit., p.175. 
152. J. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p.155; cf. also p.248. 
153. cf. op. cit., pp.140ff. 
154. Hamilton, The Living God and the Modern World, p.166. 
155. Williams, "How Does God Act?", p.174. 
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the process perspective views God as interactive - as responsive 
in his creative activity. His desire is to elicit co-creativity. 
His surrelativism means he is open to influence and relational 
change. Thus, 
If God is understood to provide different initial aims 
to each occasion, and in each case just that aim that 
is ideally suited to it, then God seems, in the provision 
of the initial aim, to be taking account of the world 
in all its change. This effect of the world means God 
is an essential part of the process whereby God functions 
as the principle of limitation. (156) 
In general terms, then, God's activity in process perspective 
is intimately bound up with the "becoming" process. It also stresses 
the inter-activeness of God's action: God's activity occurs within 
the horizon of responsiveness. 
(b) The Responsiveness of Divine Becoming 
For Hartshorne the consideration of 'action' leads inexorably 
to interaction. For example, in propounding four conditions for a 
"rational concept of God"ls7 Hartshorne in effect proffers an argu-
ment for a relational concept of God based on the premise of inter-
action. ls8 Briefly, he holds that it is the defining characteristic 
of individuality. For ordinary - i.e. non-divine - individuals 
156. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p.167. 
157. See Hartshorne, Natural Theology, p.37. 
158. op. cit., p.40. 
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interaction occurs in the surpassable mode. But the divine individual 
must be "an unsurpassab1y interacting being". Classical theism 
" . . b 1 . ,,159 h k' cannot use InteractIon, ut on y one-way actIon, w en spea Ing 
of God as active agent. But for neoclassical theism a defining 
characteristic of the divine becoming is that God is the "universal 
f . ." 160 agent 0 InteractIon . For the being of the divine personality -
just as for the being of the human personality created in the image 
of the divine - both action and reaction are necessary components. 
Action is tied to interaction. But interaction is not to be taken 
as a weakening of the concept of God as contrasted to the use of 
action simpliciter. Rather the reverse is the case: 
It was held that while ordinary individuals interact, 
God's superiority is that he acts only, and does not 
interact . Unfortunately this destroys all analogy 
between God and creatures, and it contradicts the 
very meaning of worship and related religious ideas. (161) 
Hartshorne argues that the centrality of interaction as a 
definitive characteristic of existing individuals is an "excellent 
ground for taking universal interaction to be the most positive 
feature in the divine mode of action".162 He relates this to the 
dipolar concept of God by stating that 
The divine interaction is strictly or 'absolutely' 
universal . However, the concrete content of this 
159. op. cit. , p.4l. 
160. op. cit. , p.163. 
161. op . cit . , p . 134. 
162. op. cit. , p . 70 . 
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absolute universality must be relative, varying with 
the actual world. (163) 
In the interactive relationship God and world are mutually influential. 
Traditional theism of course denies this, holding that God acts , but 
is not to be acted upon. Thus interaction is usually ruled out. But 
Hartshorne criticizes this in that "no attention was paid to the 
apparent impossibility of making sense out of an acting agent which 
cannot interact, or of an individual which cannot relate itself to 
other individuals".164 For Hartshorne God and world require each 
other, but not in quite the same way. "God requires ~ world, but 
not the world. By contrast, what the world requires is not simply 
a God but the one and only possible God, the Worshipful One".165 
The relationship that holds between God and World is not sym-
metrical, but it does embrace a reciprocity of interaction and 
responsiveness. Thus for Hartshorne the interactiveness and 
responsiveness of God paves the way for seeing the relation between 
the individual believer and God as highly intentional. Clearly for 
Hartshorne the concept of deity embraces the awareness of the reality 
of this relationship. In plumbing the philosophical depths of the 
concept of God he is concerned to take account of the broader 
religious significance of the way in which God is conceived and 
spoken of. The theological denial of interaction, and thus responsive-
ness, on God's part, amounts to a betrayal of religious faith. 166 
163. ibid. 
164. op. cit., p.69. 
165. op. cit., p.64. 
166. cf. op. cit., p.132; also Creative Synthesis, p.221. 
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It is interactive responsiveness in the notion of Divine 
Becoming that allows the process perspective to place positive 
stress on the nature of God's activity on and within the world as 
that of persuasive, not coercive, agency.167 Hartshorne's stress 
on interaction derives from Whitehead's insight "that God and the 
168 
world each affect and are affected by the other". Indeed, 
Whitehead holds "an idea of God as something individual for his 
own sake, and as the fellow-sufferer who understands" in the context 
of 
a real interaction between this fellow-sufferer and a 
changing world so that God's actions arise out of his 
primordial love yet are kept relevant to our actual 
situation by the consequent effect that the world has 
upon him. (169) 
Now the concept of immutability would be one of the chief 
definitive attributes classically ascribed to God in opposition to 
170 any suggestion of God as interactive agent. God's changelessness 
is one of the aspects of his being which is considered a prerequisite 
of his worshipfulness. However, Hartshorne comments in respect of 
biblical references to God's changelessness that "the context makes 
clear enough that the writer was concerned ... with the fixity of 
God's ethical character, with his lack of fickleness, his fidelity 
171 
or constancy of benevolent purpose". Such constancy and 
167. cf. Hamilton, The Living God and the Modern World, pp.150ff. 
168. op. cit., p.167. 
169. op . cit., P .178. 
170. See above, pp.169-l7l for complementary discussion with respect 
to Macquarrie on immutability. 
171. Hartshorne, Man's Vision, p.112. 
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faithfulness in reality complements the sense of God as personal 
being whereby God is seen to necessarily have relations and relata, 
"and he must actually and effectively have these" . l72 
Immutability is often considered a mark of the absolute. But 
Hartshorne claims that it is necessary to distinguish between these 
two terms. 'Absolute' denotes for Hartshorne "the most real, 
inclusive, or concrete being" whereas "the immutable can only be an 
173 abstract aspect of God". Thus, for example, the condition per Be 
f b ··, bl 174 o surrelative ecomlng IS Immuta e. It is an immutable element 
contained within the complete phenomenological description of the 
being of God: God's non-surpassability by another. But in his 
concrete relativity God cannot be immutab1e. 175 
Immutability has also been traditionally associated with trans-
cendence. However, Hartshorne argues that "there can be a transcendent 
capacity for novelty as well as for stability" in the being of God. 176 
Thus, "to change in and through all changes is as tmique a property 
as to be changeless through all changes" . 177 Again the association 
of immutability with perfection, derived from Greek thought, has been 
very prominent in traditional thinking about God. But for Hartshorne: 
God's perfection is his ideal form of perfectibility. 
He is not absolutely tmsurpassable and hence immutable; 
172 . Divine Relativity. p.92. 
173. Man's Vision. p.239. 
174 . So also other "abstract aspects" such as 'overall divine purpose' 
would constitute elements of God's 'immutability'. 
175. cf. Hartshorne. Natural Theology, p.127 . 
176 . Creative Synthesis, p.236. 
177 . ibid. 
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rather he is in certain aspects surpassable, but by 
himself only . Unsurpassability by another ... is the 
religious idea of perfection. There can be no rival 
to deity . Immutability in some respects, but not in 
all, follows from this. (178) 
Thus divine becoming includes an immutable factor but cannot, by 
definition, be dominated by it. If God were, in fact, purely and 
wholly immutable he would be "an abstraction from process" . 179 Such 
a conclusion is inadmissable for Hartshorne : as divine becoming God 
is the supremely relational entity, one who is supremely responsive, 
who in his activity is interactively engaged. Divine becoming 
embraces the capacity for change in a wholly positive way.180 
Now the being of human beings is that of individuals for whom 
to interact with, and thereby to influence, one another is a necessary 
component of their existence . "Thus they form one another's Mi twel t,,~8l 
The process perspective holds also that likewise the being of God is 
formed in '~twelt'. God, as the supremely interactive relational 
individual , is open to ontological influence with respect to the 
content of his being . For example, Hartshorne notes that: 
178 . 
179. 
180 . 
181. 
op . 
op . 
In deciding to do this, not that, I decide that God shall 
know me as actually doing this, and not know me as 
actually doing that . I decide the content of divine 
cit . , p . 277 . 
cit. , p . 17 . 
Philosophers Speak, p.509. 
Natural Theology, p . 133. 
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knowledge ... omniscience is the measure of reality, and 
if it is not affected by our decision, nothing is 
affected. (182) 
In Whiteheadian terms, "the creatures enter into the constitution 
of God's experience as he prehends them".185 Thus is God responsively 
influenced . The corollary is that God acts by being prehended by the 
creature in the objectifying of his being for them. Thus responsive-
ness presupposes and entails God's presentational activity as provider 
of initial aim. 
As supreme individual God is supremely relative, i.e. supremely 
relational, in terms of his capacity to interact "with all others", 
to be "relevant to all contexts".l85 Thus, as relational entity, God 
is absolute in his relativity. However, in its traditional application, 
"absolute" means that "God is power divorced from responsiveness or 
sensitivity".186 Now according to Hartshorne this cannot be, for 
"power which is not responsive is irresponsible and , if held to settle 
11 . 1 . ,,187 a 1ssues, ens aV1ng . Such power is not that of Divine Becoming, 
of the God who is relational entity, who is relational being. 
182. Divine Relativity, p.146. 
183. Williams, "How Does God Act?", p.170. 
184. I note here the criticism made by R.C. Neville of the process 
view of the world's bearing on God: "The only things that exist 
to be prehended are the objectified satisfactions of the finite 
occasions. Their subjective processes of coming-to-be are not 
available to be prehended. Therefore God cannot know us ... 
in ... the subjective immediacy of our own concrescence". 
Creativity and God, p.14l. However Hartshorne himself rebuffs 
such criticisms. See "Three Responses to Neville's Creativity 
and God", Proc.St. 10, Fall-Winter 1980:93-97. 
185. Natural Theology, p.136. 
186. Divine Relativity, p.149. 
187. ibid. 
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My investigation of Hartshorne's process understanding of the 
transcendence and immanence of God, and of the activity and respons -
iveness of God, confirm and expands the claim that for neoclassical 
theism God is to be understood as relational entity, in the 'ad ex t r a ' 
sense of ' relational'. God's being is relational in both structure 
and content: God is necessarily engaged in interactive relations with 
others. He has self-identity as an 'other' over against creation, 
but this identity in otherness is not the totality of his being. His 
transcendent reality is rather expressed in his relational presence. 
He is engaged in action, yet this is not the exercise of a one - way 
activity but includes responsiveness. God is He who relates inter-
actively with the world, with created humankind. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Hartshorne's revisionary philosophical theology is far ranging. 
Relative to classical theism he propounds change by addition. 
Specifically this change is in response to the critique of traditional 
theism as 'one-sided'. In contrast to monopolar theism Hartshorne 
propounds a 'dipolar' theism. For Hartshorne there is a 'middle' to 
be included between atheism and pantheism as alternatives to theism, 
viz, "pan-en-theism". Inclusiveness is a key notion in Hartshorne's 
188 
concept of God. But there is still the nagging question: How is 
188. e.g. Robinson comments that for Hartshorne God is the "all-
inclusive reality" and he notes "As for the traditional view 
which distinguishes God from, as other than, His creation, 
Hartshorne is content to rest upon the dilemma that if God is 
not the all-inclusive reality He must either be less (which 
is absurd) or more (which is impossible)". Scot.J.Th. 21, 
September 1968:347. 
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this inclusiveness really understood by Hartshorne, and is such an 
understanding coherent? Also, is it potentially modifiable within 
the neoclassical frame of reference? 
Undergirding the various conceptual notions that attend 
Hartshorne's doctrine of God is his understanding of reality as 
process. The dynamism of "becoming" replaces static being as the 
fundamental metaphysical concept by which reality and God are to be 
comprehended. But what are the implications with regard to thinking 
of God? 
My contention is that Hartshorne's variegated approach may be 
best interpreted and understood by attending to the theme of 'relation' 
or 'relationality' that is so evident and inherent in his process 
perspective. 
1 . 1 189 re atlona . 
Indeed, his view of reality is that it is in essence 
For example, omniscience is interpreted such as to 
reveal God's essential relatedness: his "knowing" is itself a function 
of his relational being. Omniscience is conceived as the supreme, 
all-inclusive, cognitive relation. This relationality is indicative 
of dependency within the Omniscient for the noetic content. The 
cognitive relation is not itself a contingent possession of the 
Divine Becoming but a necessary element in the totality of God's 
relational being. The content of God's knowledge is thus contingent 
at least in part, but that he knows, and how he knows, and that such 
knowing is expressive of his essential relatedness, is not. 
189. "Hartshorne has spoken of 'societal realism' to stress that there 
is a plurality of real entities intimately related". J. Cobb and 
D.R. Griffin, Process Theology, Philadelphia: Westminster 1976, 
p.7. 
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R.C. Neville argues that "God knows only the objective reality 
of things, not the things in themselves as subjects".190 Thus on 
the neoclassical concept, God is only externally related to all else. 
Neoclassical theism "limits divine knowledge to mere data, not to 
the processing realities themselves".191 Neville would disallow any 
relational interpretation of the neoclassical view of omniscience. 
But, as Peters notes, for Hartshorne it is axiomatic that "the 
known is contained in the knower".192 This axiom underlies his 
concept of God. In the cognitive relation the object 'felt' or 
prehended by the subject "becomes a constituent and hence a cause of 
the subject ll • 193 The reversal of the fundamental cognitive relation -
external to known, internal to knower - in the case of deity is a 
false implication of the postulate of God's existential independence . 
Omniscience is not predicated on independence but on essential related-
ness. As omniscient, God exercises the adequacy of his cognitive 
relatedness: that is, adequate correspondence between knower and known. 
Thus relationally comprehended, omniscience is a constituent of the 
being of God, not an attributive possession. 
The relatedness of Divine Becoming is also revealed in the 
analysis of creativity as causal relation. It is of the essence of 
God to be creator, i.e. to be in causal relation with the world. 
190. Neville, Creativity and God, p.90. 
191. op. cit., p.9l. 
192. Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics, p.llS. 
193. ibid. 
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The world, as caused, points not only to God as causal origin, but, 
in so far as the world as created involves ongoing process - it is 
not a 'finished' product - then the fact of the world points also 
to the God who continues to engage in causal relation with the world. 
But God is also final and sufficient cause: therefore it is not the 
world which demands of God he continues in such a relation, but 
rather such relatedness is expressive of the being of God. It is 
this that is made manifest in the actual causal processes that occur 
within the world. But this is not to diminish the reality of inter-
action and reciprocal influence. While yet, as divine becoming, God 
is the "ground" of creative process, he also in his being relates to, 
and thus alters with, the processes of his own creation. Creativity 
is a defining mark of both God and world. The relatedness involved 
in creativity belongs to both. 
Creativity is a necessary constitutive factor of Divine Becoming. 
As creative cause God does not stand outwith or beyond that which he 
causes. He continues his causal activity as interactive agent, 
relating to all of creation. The being of God is thus expressed 
within the relational reality of creation and is also, in part, 
constituted by relation-to-creation. Thus in the process perspective 
God is perceived as that which genuinely interacts and inter-relates 
because such relational activity is essential to it. The relational 
being of God is the ground of both cognitive and causal adequacy. 
Divine Becoming embraces transcendence and immanence in complement-
ary and creative juxtaposition. The transcendence of God, his 'otherness', 
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together with his 'imrnance', or 'presence' within creation, is the 
guarantee of the relationality ad extra of deity. 
That God is relational is further elaborated with reference to 
action and interaction: the activity and responsiveness of the Divine 
Becoming. God's activity is that of ontological sustainment of the 
creation, but it is not a kind of 'remote control'. In so far as 
God is relational, then he participates in and with his creation. 
His action is participatory, the vehicle for genuine interest, concern 
and love. And such action is, in fact, interaction: it is action-in-
response, as much as action-in-initiation. God and world are thus 
mutually influential and influenced within the context of interactive 
relationship. Hartshorne argues: 
Since an object always influences, but cannot dictate, 
the awareness of itself, we influence God by our 
experiences but do not thereby deprive him of freedom 
in his response to us. This divine response, becoming 
our object, by the same principle in turn influences 
us, but here, too, without removing all freedom. (194) 
Ogden notes that for Hartshorne "God's action is to be under-
stood by strict analogy to the action of man".195 This is largely 
taken to mean that the "interaction between God and the world must 
be understood analogously to (the) interaction between our own minds 
194. Divine Relativity, p.141. 
195. S. Ogden, The Reality of God, p.177. 
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and bodies".196 This particular analogy is not the most felicitous. 
It is more helpful, I contend, to stick with the analogy of inter-
action between human beings rather than introduce the mind/body 
analogy, with all its attendant problems, as the model of interaction. 
The strength of the former is that it allows for the identification 
of two or more identifiable entities who relationally interact, and 
are, therefore, co-responsive. This provides a clearer model for 
explicating the reality of God's interactive and responsive relating 
than that of the analogy of the mind/body re1ationship.197 
An exploration of Hartshorne's understanding of the 'marks' of 
a relational entity, and the implication of such with respect to his 
doctrine of God, adds weight to the conclusion that in essence 
Hartshorne speaks of God as relational entity. Various 'attributes' 
are so understood as to reveal the surrelativity of the divine. 
However, it would be a mistake to categorise all attributes as refer-
ring to either the 'abstract' pole of deity, or to the concrete pole, 
only. To do so would be to turn Hartshorne's philosophical framework 
into a theological procrustean bed. Rather, those attributes which 
denote some facet of God as relational may themselves be subject to 
the law of dipolarity. For example, omnipotence, in denoting trans-
cendence, falls prima facie under the 'abstract' pole: yet in denoting 
the essential relatedness of God it reveals itself as coming under the 
'concrete' pole. Similarly with omniscience: it denotes not just one 
aspect which needs to be held in correative union with other aspects, 
196. op. cit., p.178. 
197. Note, however, this view is contrary to that of Hartshorne. 
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but rather, in itself, signifies the diverse facets which together 
indicate relational being. In other words, dipo1arity is not a 
matter of a hard-line quantitative division of attributes into one 
polar category or the other. It is rather a categorea1 indicator of 
the necessary contrasting correntive elements of relational being. 
H.P. Owen claims that Hartshorne both maintains that God includes 
and penetrates the world, and also that God and the world "are 
b '11 d' t' t" 198 su stant1a y 1S 1nc . Whilst Kaufman acknowledges that much 
can be learnt from Hartshorne's view of the relation between God and 
the world, he speaks nonetheless of a principal difficulty in that 
"God's effective initiative and autonomous agency are rendered highly 
problematical". 199 But is this really so? The concept of God as 
'Divine Becoming' is a concept of a pre-eminently relational entity. 
The divine entitative identity is distinct, yet not wholly or non-
relatedly so. The becomingness of God is exercised in terms of 
essential relatedness: initiation, agency, and responsive relatedness 
are hallmarks of the relational reality of Deity. 
Contrary to the tradition of taking 'becoming' as secondary and 
inferior to 'being', Hartshorne affirms with Bergson that "becoming 
is reality itself" 200 The relationality of Divine Becoming means 
that God has real relations ad extra. He is thus ontologica1ly 
constituted by the relatedness whereby he has particular relations. 
He is modified in his existence by the content of actual relationships, 
198. H.P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, p.76. 
199. G.D. Kaufman, God the Problem, p.129. 
200. Creative Synthesis, p.13. 
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but he does not have his identity finally determined by them. 201 
Hartshorne states: "God changes us by changing himself in response 
to our previous responses to him, and to this divine response to our 
202 
response we subsequently respond". This is the necessary mutuality 
of relational influence. 
The values of the relations within the created world, by virtue 
of the doctrine of inclusion, contribute to the overall relational 
value of the deity.203 The essential relatedness of deity means 
that God is of necessity engaged in external relations: to the extent 
that God exists "in relation" he exists in "relation-to-something" 
other than himself. 204 Thus the term 'Divine Becoming' means, in 
fact, that God is relational qua ontological structure. 
Furthermore, relatedness is two-way: God and humankind - creator 
and creature - are interrelated. As God's creatures we relate to him, 
both receiving and contributing. Thus, 
Very literally we exist to enhance, not simply to 
admire or enjoy, the divine glory. Ultimately we 
are contributors to the ever growing divine treasury 
of values. We serve God, God is not firstly means . 
201. The muta1ity and reciprocity that holds between God and the 
world is by no means symmetrical. "Something in God may 
depend upon the creature without his very existence or 
eternal essence being thus dependent. God may have accidents 
as well as essence, and with respect to the latter, but not 
the former, he may be assymetrically independent of the actual 
world" . Hartshorne, Aquinas,p.12. 
202. Creative Synthesis, p.277. 
203 . Logic, p.135. 
204. cf. Man's Vision, p.295. 
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to our ends. Our final and inclusive end is to 
contribute to the divine life. (205) 
For Hartshorne, we exist "in" God, thus in our being we contrib-
ute to the divine being. This means that: "Man's awareness of God 
is no mere contingent extension of his awareness of himself, but is 
rather an indispensable element in that awareness".206 This sense 
of mutual interrelatedness is focussed in the comment: "If God can 
be indebted to no one, can receive value from no one, then to 
., . d l' . ." 207 speak of serving h~m ~s to ~n u ge ~n equ~vocat~on . 
The relationality of Divine Becoming embraces genuine ad extra 
two-way relatedness. The deity 'becomes' in the manifold relations 
with creation through which it is also expressing the relationality 
of its being. 
205. Aquinas, p.43. 
206. Creative Synthesis, p.156. 
207. Divine Relativity, p.l58. James, The Concrete God, p.124, 
comments that: "Adding to concrete history is the same as 
adding to God, who is partly constituted by what man does". 
PART THREE 
TOWARD A RELATIONAL THEOLOGY 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BEING AND BECOMING: THE RELATIONAL REALITY OF GOD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I have examined the thinking of John Macquarrie and Charles 
Hartshorne with respect to the doctrine of God. In so doing I have 
demonstrated that each has a particular understanding of God which 
nonetheless exhibits the common motif of relationality. Yet each 
of these two thinkers discusses the concept of God from a different 
perspective. My concern now is to do two things: First, to address 
various criticisms made of Macquarrie's and Hartshorne's perspectives, 
and also to adumbrate my own critique of their views on God. This 
will complement the foregoing examination which, whilst it includes 
some critical discussion, it is primarily an effort in analysis and 
interpretive exposition. 
The second task will be to draw together the work on these two 
perspectives in order to show how,together andcornplernerttarily, 
these two approaches lead to a particular "ontological-relational" 
understanding of God. Such an understanding is already implicit to 
a greater or lesser extent in both perspectives. Nonetheless I 
seek a formulation which, with respect to a description of the 
reality of God, arises out of the complementary combination of 
existential-ontological theism and neoclassical theism, yet which 
"goes beyond" them. 
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Macquarrie describes the structure of human existence and uses 
this to derive his understanding of God. This is more than simply 
an analogical procedure, for although God is distinguishable from 
human being, the being of God is nonetheless bound up in some pro-
found way with the being of human being. l Macquarrie's Holy Being 
is the "God with whom we enter into relation".2 
Hartshorne, on the other hand, begins with the acceptance of 
the classical view of God as the "supreme being" and focusses on 
the question of supremacy. He objects to the negations and denials 
of the via negativa. He looks instead for answers that can be 
couched in positive terms to such questions as the meaning of 
'perfection' in God. He is also concerned to question the nature 
of the relationship that holds between God and the world. 3 Although 
not pursuing an overtly ontological approach, Hartshorne is nonetheless 
concerned with giving an inclusive account of the structure of the 
divine: God is "constituted by relationships".4 
The reality of the divine Being is to be found in processive 
Becoming: the metaphysical dynamism of divine Becoming is encompassed 
in the relationality of the Divine Being. S The theological perspect-
ives of Being and Becoming lead to a conception of God as "relational 
entity". 
1. See Chapter Two above. 
2. R. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, London: Collins 1970, p.l06. 
3. See Chapter Four above. 
4. Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p.x. 
" 5. cf. Jungel's suggestive title: God's Being Is In 'Becoming, Grand 
Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans 1970. But note this is 'not an example of 
the process approach. 
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II. JOHN MACQUARRIE: CRITIQUE AND DISCUSSION 
In the thinking about God down through the ages there has been 
an underlying association of the idea of God with the idea of 'Being'. 
This stretches back into biblical thought and has emerged in varying 
degrees of explicitness in the process of the development of traditional 
theism. For Macquarrie this association has culminated in his own 
existential-ontological theism . Now Macquarrie ' s own theological 
stance is conciliatory6 and much of his developed philosophical 
standpoint is derived from the later Heidegger,7 although not 
exclusively so.8 
Macquarrie comments that although Heidegger "talks of being in 
a religious or quasi-religious language, he has always made clear 
that being is not God" . 9 He notes, too , that the tendency in theology 
to think of God as ~ being rather than to think of God in ontological 
terms, as such, is a manifestation of the "forgetting of Being" which 
. h' . f W 10 Heldegger has analysed as c aracterlstlc 0 estern culture. However, 
Macquarrie claims that in Heidegger ' s thinking it is apparent that 
Being does , in fact , tend "to replace God and draws to itself the 
attributes traditionally assigned to God". 11 
6. Macquarrie is said to follow a "kind of via media AngZiaana" . See 
Editorial Review, Exp .T. 78, June 1967. 
7 . cf . W.J . Hill, "God-Talk: Review Article", Thomist .XXXII, June 
1968: 120££. 
8 . cf . J .H. Gill, who comments in respect of God~Talk that Macquarrie 
"seeks to construct a synthesis from the thought of Ian Ramsay and 
Martin He ide gger" . In terp, Apri 1 1968: 240 . 
9. Macquarrie, Principles, p . llS. 
10. op . cit., p.116 . 
11. ibid . 
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Thus we may see how it is that Macquarrie himself, whilst on 
the one hand disclaiming that 'God' is a term equivalent to 'Being', 
yet nonetheless slips into a mode of discourse where 'Being ' - with 
or without the qualification 'Holy' - takes on the appearance of God. 
Language and ascriptions belonging to the theological term 'God' are 
transferred to the ontological term 'Being'. Thus theological termin-
ology is ontologically translated. God is 'holy': Being becomes "Holy 
Being" in order to acceptably substitute for God. Indeed Macquarrie 
remarks that "it makes sense to recognize the holiness of being, and 
to take up before it the faith-attitude of acceptance and commitment". 12 
But does this not suggest that 'holiness' is a property or quality 
residing in Being itself, and that therefore by implication Being is 
such as to have properties ascribable to it? Or is it the attitude 
which is taken up towards Being, in response to awareness of it as 
relational that constitutes "holiness"? Macquarrie seems to vacillate 
between the two views. In his thinking of God in terms of Being there 
is an oscillation between a non-entitative comprehension of Holy Being 
as existential, and so relational, 'ground' of the beings, and an 
entitative understanding of Holy Being such that Being is that which 
"lets be" the beings. For this Being is other than that which is 
let-be; nor is it identifiable with the letting-be process or' ground ' . 
Hill notes that Macquarrie's use of Heidegger may be objected to 
on the grounds that Heidegger himself insisted "that Sein, while 
transcending the antic order, is totally immanent to the world".13 
12. op. cit., p.lIS. 
13. Hill, "God-Talk: Review Article", p.121. 
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For Heidegger Being is nothing apart from the beings. Thus Hill 
suggests that the proper question to ask is whether or not "the 
being known phenomenologically by Heidegger" is "so necessarily 
immanent to the world that any identification of it with God would 
involve a denial of the Christian understanding of God's utter 
14 transcendence". However, Hill's qualification of 'transcendence' 
betrays preconceived parameters of understanding: the question is 
perhaps not such a technically 'proper' one after all. I would 
rather say the real issue Macquarrie attempts to address is that of 
the understanding of God's transcendence and immanence in terms of 
Heidegger's "Being", which itself has both transcendent and immanent 
aspects. Hill does, indeed, acknowledge this. lS 
Nonetheless Hill's question draws attention to criticisms and 
apparent weaknesses of Macquarrie's approach. For example, 
Macquarrie's virtual identification of the term "Holy Being" with the 
term "God" allows him to effectively side-step the question of the 
existence of God. In Tillichean fashion, he claims that God is not 
'a' being: God, qua being, "is not, but rather lets be".16 That is, 
there is a primordiality of 'letting-be' as such over any "being 
which is", i.e. has been "let-to-be". This primordiality has been 
ascribed to God. The denial of particular 'being'-ness is a denial 
of existent entitative status. Thus the reality of who God is is not 
that of ~ being, even if unique as far as beings go. It is rather of 
a more onto1ogica1ly profound and prior order than that. 
14. ibid. 
15. op. cit., p.122. 
16. Principles, p.119. 
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To further explicate this understanding of God, Macquarrie 
turns to the work of Rduolph Otto, of which he states: 
The myBterium refers to the incomprehensible depth of 
the numinous presence, which does not fall under the 
ordinary categories of thought but is other than the 
familiar beings of the world. The tremendum stresses 
the otherness of holy being as over against the 
nullity and transcience of our own limited being; it 
points to the transcendence of being. The faBoinanB 
points to what we have already called the 'grace' of 
being which has unveiled itself so that we understand 
that it gives itself to us, that it is the source of 
our being and strengthens our being with its presence. (17) 
On this analysis there is, firstly, the sense of "presence" of 
something which is not itself identical with existence as such 
because, and secondly, it is also the sense of an "otherness" . That 
which is experienced as present can only be experienced as such if 
it is also "other-than" that which it engages in the experience. 
Thirdly, the "other" that is also "present" is experienced as 
"gracious". That is to say, it is not experienced as a mere given, 
but as an active presence, indeed a vital presence, a presence 
which is fundamentallybeneficent toward the experiencing human 
existent. 
The analysis of human existence reveals the ' being' of human 
being as the relational structure of "being-in" and "being-with". 
17. op. cit . , pp.87f. 
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Relatedness within community, and location within a world, are 
fundamental components of human being. It is from that existential-
ist starting point that Macquarrie pursues the question of being 
and thence the understanding of God. I would argue that it is from 
this existential finding of constitutive relationality that we may 
comprehend "Being" in relational terms, and likewise conceive the 
being of God as relational. For it would seem that if Being is 
knowable within the parameters of an experienced relationship, then 
Being itself must be such as to be able to engage in relationship. 
Being must be some thing'that 'relates'. 
Macquarrie reveals his true colours when he comments that 
our final analysis of being as the incomparable that 
lets-be and is present and manifest, is strikingly 
parallel to the analysis of the numinous as mysterium 
tpemendum et fascinans. (18) 
The parallel would seem to be too striking. Surely he is not suggest-
ing that 'Being' amounts to, or is even synonymous with, Otto's 
'numinous'? Yet in many respects he does. For, in the end, Macquarrie 
is engaged in a theological exercise of symbolic reinterpretation. 
That is to say, he engages in an exercise of conceptual translation -
from traditional to a new, philosophically derived, terminology. 
Thus the association of the term 'Being' with 'God' is pregnant with 
peculiar meaning and subtlety. Not only the everyday usage of the 
word 'being', but more particularly the accepted theological usages, 
18. op. cit., p.llS. 
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are stretched and infused with nuance and suggestion so as to convey 
the conceptual content asked of it by Macquarrie. 19 
Now God may not be ~ being, that is, one among other like beings 
which exist in a particular spatio·. -temporal location. Nevertheless, 
if "letting-be" is phenomenologically descriptive of God, as 
Macquarrie affirms, then it must imply that 'God' refers to an 
identifiable entity of some sort. That is to say, God must be such 
as to be, in fact, phenomenologically describable, at least in 
principle. Macquarrie states: "We must look for God in the world-
process itself, ... this process has its psychical as well as its 
20 physical aspect throughout". Apart from the affinity of approach 
that this suggests with the process perspective, I do not believe 
Macquarrie is here advocating that God is to be ontically or materially 
identified with the "world-process". 'God' is not merely a name for 
this process: rather Macquarrie is affirming the propriety of created 
existence as the locus for discerning the reality of God. This 
propriety is determined on the presumption that, indeed, the reality 
of God is not radically other than that of the created order. It 
may be identifiably other, but nonetheless there is an intimacy of 
relationship between the being of God and the beings of the world. 
Hence the phenomenological determination of the being of the creature 
yields, for Macquarrie, insight into the being of God. 2l 
19. op. cit., p.178. 
20. J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.273. 
21. Farley notes: "For Macquarrie ... Husserl 's phenomenology enables 
an initial description of the phenomenon, but it is with 
Heidegger's help that fundamental theology really occurs". 
Ecclesia1 Man, Philadelphia: Fortress 1975, p.263. 
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Whilst the "God of supernaturalism" is no answer to the "basic 
theological problem" of the nature of the reality "behind" theological 
language and concepts,22 it is not necessarily the case that the 
23 designation of 'God' in other terminology overcomes the problem. 
Now Macquarrie disclaims that 'God' and 'Being' are synonyms. Rather 
he argues that 'God' "is the religious word for Being, understood as 
gracious" 24 But how can anything be referred to as gracious unless 
it is such as to exercise 'grace': that is, to relate as one relating 
entity to another such entity in the mode of graciousness? Despite 
the disclaimer Macquarrie goes on to state that "'Being' can be 
equated with 'God' only if Being has the character of grace and is 
. ,.. 1 d' " 25 responslve to man s eXlstentla pre lcament . 
Clearly Macquarrie is bringing to the discussion of Being as 
the apposite hermeneutic for God a presupposition about that which 
'Being ' is to interpret and illuminate. Furthermore, the presupposit-
ion of graciousness and capacity to respond imply relational entity. 
God is not just symbolised by 'grace' and 'response': he must be such 
as to exercise graciousness and responsiveness. Thus 'Being' is to 
be comprehended as theologically apposite only in so far as it also, 
and contiguously, manifests these relational activities. Of course 
Macquarrie acknowledges that the question of God involves "pre-
22. cf. A. Kee, The Way of Transcendence, Middlesex: Penguin 1971, p.23l. 
23. e.g. Herzog comments: "The encounter with being raises the problem 
of articulation: Does being mean anything?" Understanding ·God, 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1966, p.132. 
24. J. Macquarrie, "How is Theology Possible?" in Robinson and Edwards 
(eds), The Hones~o God Debate, London: S.cJM. 1963, p.188; cf. 
Macquarrie, Studies, p.ll. 
25. "How is Theology Possible?", p.189. 
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understanding". 26 It is a religious question. Its context is 
theological, its structure existential, its import ontological. But 
significantly for Macquarrie the question of God is also the question 
"about the character of Being" . 27 His approach to the question of 
character implies an entitative pre-understanding of God in terms of 
the relationality of Being. For it is only so that he could pre-
determine by what criteria "Being" is the appropriate hermeneutical 
term for God. 
Geoffrey Wainwright charges that "The continuum from 'being' 
through ' Being' to ' holy Being' and 'gracious Being' does not clearly 
leave us with the addressable God of the Christian tradition" . 28 On 
the basis of this analysis Macquarrie claims that a "religious person" 
has "faith in being" because of the experience of being as gracious . 29 
But is this the case? The existential awareness of the "gracious 
presence" which is "other than" is but one way of speaking of the human 
experience of God. Has Macquarrie made too bold an assumption by moving 
from an existential analysis juxtaposed with his understanding of 
revelation, to his assertion that faith is faith in being? "Being" 
is not the intentional content of faith . The intentional content of 
faith is known by a name, viz, 'God'. In the faith situation in which 
grace is experienced there is an awareness of an "Other" who is in 
relation to the recipient of grace: indeed, "grace"itself denotes one 
of the modes of relation between this "Other" and humankind. Thus 
26 . cf. Studies, p.lO. 
27. op . cit., p.ll. 
28. G. Wainwright in Exp .T. 89, December 1977:89. 
29. Principles, p . 88 . 
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Wainwright's concern is that Macquarrie loses the sense of the 
identifiable entitative otherness of God. The concern is a valid 
one. Macquarrie rejects the notion of God as individual subsisting 
entity or "~being". But he wishes to retain all the relational 
attributes and hallmarks of the understanding of God that is inherent 
in the Christian tradition. 
We have seen that, for Macquarrie, the name 'God' does not just 
label some thing called "Being", rather it refers to that relational 
complex which comprises Being, along with our response to, and part-
icular apprehension of, this Being. Cooper points out that for 
Macquarrie, "God is not an entity, however exalted, rather he is the 
indispensable condition for the existence of every particular entity". 30 
This condition is none other than that Being "in which the self, like 
31 
all other beings, has its ultimate ground and end". Being, in its 
primordial sense of letting-be, necessarily finds expression in the 
beings which thereby necessarily manifest letting-be and so stand in 
intimate reciprocal relation with Being. 
It would then appear that, on Macquarrie's terms, that which 
'relates ' to us is not 'that which' or 'He-Who', may be called God as 
such - that is, not some thing which itself is an identity that relates -
but rather that ' wider being' or ' total existence ' (what I have called 
the "relational matrix" of existence) in which we stand as existent 
beings. Thus it would seem the term 'Holy Being' simply denotes the 
30 . B. Cooper, Review of Principles of Christian Theology by J. 
Macquarrie in Theo1. 70, November 1967:515. 
31. S . Ogden, Review of Principles of Christian Theology by J. 
Macquarrie in Union S.Q . R. 22, March 1967:264. 
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ontological-relational ground of existent reality. 
Yet Macquarrie does wish to say that Holy Being is 'Being that ... ' 
demands, judges, sustains and so on. He would reject any suggestion 
that Holy Being is wholly immanent. Holy Being is, at least implicitly, 
such as to engage in particular modes of relating. Indeed the term 
'Holy' indicates the relationality by which Being is existentially 
apperceived as that which engages in relationship. So despite the 
analysis of Holy Being as non-entitative existential-ontological 
ground, there is an inescapable entitative dimension to Macquarrie's 
understanding of "Holy Being". 
Now, against Macquarrie, Ronald Gregor Smith argues that God can 
not be described as ~ being, neither can God be "adequately described 
as Being, not even 'Holy Being,,,.32 For Gregor Smith the concept of 
God is bound to the understanding of Christ, and indeed, the relation 
that holds between 'God' and 'Christ'. The kind of being that this 
implies is personal being. God is not reducible to a being within 
the world, one among other objects. Neither is he reducible to the 
being-itself of the world. Macquarrie's definition of God as Holy 
Being is inadequate as far as Gregor Smith is concerned. He acknow-
ledges it is Macquarrie's intention, in denoting God as 'Holy Being' , 
that this terminology is to be understood as referring to the meaning 
f G d · l' I 33 o 0 1n re at10na terms. However, with respect to Macquarrie's 
speaking of God "as Holy Being, or as 'Being understood as gracious', 
32. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.80. 
33. op. cit., p.106. 
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or as ' letting-be ' " the question to ask is "Why does the believer, 
or the theologian, wish to qualify being in this kind of way?,,34 
Gregor Smith suggests these qualifiers are themselves the terms 
descriptive of the way in which the transcendent reality of God is 
encountered within the experience of human existence. They are 
transferred to the language of being because this language of 
necessity takes us to the relationality of reality . Thus is emphasis-
ed t he truth that whether spoken of as ' God' or as ' Being ' , the 
reality of the divine is relational and is encountered as such . 
Gregor Smith himself asks: 
What is it we are trying to say , when we call God 
Being , or Being-itself, or the ground of being, or 
Holy Being? Surely we are speaking first and last 
of the way God comes to us. The key word is 'comes ' ; 
not ' is '. (35) 
Whilst to concur that "Being" can only be comprehended by way of 
attending to the being of human (and, indeed, other) beings , 36 he 
nevertheless finds the use of ' Being ' , especially when prefaced by 
'Holy ' , an awkward, if not superfluous, mode of discourse about 
God . 37 The methodology of speaking of God may parallel the method-
ology of determining t he meaning of Being, but it is the World of 
34 . op . cit. , p . I07. 
35 . ibid. 
36 . op . cit. , p.163 . 
37 . op . cit . , p . 164 . 
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God and the historicity of God in Christ which take conceptual 
pride of place for Gregor Smith. 
However, Gregor Smith's focus on the biblical understanding of 
God as being is indicative of the possibility of a relational inter-
pretation, such as I am suggesting emerges by way of the analysis of 
Macquarrie and Hartshorne. For example, he notes that the biblical 
perspective does not embrace an understanding of God "as one who is 
for himself and of himself". 38 The name of God is given in terms 
of, and within the context of, "his relation to and his historical 
39 
movement towards his people". The later classical philosophy of 
being cannot be deduced from the tetragrammaton. God, for Gregor 
Smith, is a "caring"God. The encounter with God in history is 
relational in character; it implies the reality of God as itself 
relational. It would seem that Gregor Smith's basic critique is 
that Macquarrie has not gone far enough in exploring and expounding 
the relational theme. 
By contrast, Hebblethwaite is critical of Macquarrie because of 
the relational implication of his approach which Hebblethwaite finds 
f ' d' 11" bl 40 CI " h ' con uS1ng an un1nte 191 e. a1m1ng t at Macquarrie's analog1es 
do not serve "to express the creator/creature relation in an intel-
ligble way", he argues: "If the distinction between creator and 
38. op . cit., p. 82; cf. p .175: "I cannot subscribe to any conception 
of God's being-for-himself as the leading or dominating concept-
ion for Christian faith". 
39. op. cit., p.98. 
40. B. Hebblethwaite, "A Comment on Macquarrie", Theol. LXXV/626, 
August 1972:403-405. 
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creature is to be maintained at all, then the being of the beings 
41 in the world is created being, and God is its uncreated source." · 
Macquarrie upholds the ontological distinction between God - as 
that which 'lets-be' - and the beings which are so 'let'. But then 
he affirms an intimacy of relatedness between Being and beings such 
as to blur the distinction between God's being and the being of 
created entities. Hebblethwaite rightly reflects a confusion of 
relational identity that is inherent in Macquarrie's understanding 
of God. On the one hand the being of God, understood as "letting-be" 
as such, amounts to the immanence of Being in the beings; on the 
other hand God, qua Being as gracious and responsive, is other-than 
the beings who experience this grace, and to whom God responds. Yet 
God may not be denoted as 'a' being, or 'a' anything for that matter: 
hence the confusion over entitative status which prompts Hebblethwaite's 
criticism. 
H.P. Owen has taken Macquarrie to task over a number of points. 42 
He notes, firstly, Macquarrie's failure "to distinguish between Being 
in the sense of essence and Being in the sense of existence - between 
what a thing is and that it is".43 However, I think Macquarrie has 
made the distinction, viz, in denying that God is ~ being he is 
referring to the existential use of 'being', but when he speaks of 
God in terms of 'Being' as such - e.g. as Holy Being - he is here 
using the term in an essentialist sense. What Macquarrie has failed 
41. op. cit., p.404. 
42. H.P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, pp.138ff. 
43. op. cit., p.138. 
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to do - or has confused - is to differentiate the use of 'being' 
with respect to entitative ontological description and its use in 
abstract ontological theorizing as such. Owen's distinction is 
encompassed by the former. Macquarrie's difficulty is that he 
begins consciously with the latter, but increasingly takes up the 
former - all the while continuing to assume the latter: he oscillates 
between abstract and entitative ontological language of God. But 
having denied the existential entitative status of God as ~ being 
he fails to clarify how it is he then assumes an entitative mode of 
speaking about God. 
Owen's charge that Macquarrie fails to distinguish between the 
idea and its instantiation is of a similar nature to the failure to 
distinguish between entitative and non-entitative ontological dis-
course, though not quite so. Here Owen overlooks the fact that the 
reality of God is assumed by Macquarrie: the debate is to do with 
conceptual understanding and ontological description of this reality, 
not the question as to whether or not God exists as such. Indeed, 
the conceptual denial of God as ~ being harnessed with the conceptual 
development of God in terms of 'Being' indicates this is so. 
Macquarrie denies that God exists as a being, but also holds that God 
does not not exist either. The question as to existential instant-
iation is rendered redundant by the identification of God with Being. 
But at the same time, the particularity, or entitative identity which 
the existential question sharpens, is most certainly obscured and 
vague in Macquarrie's deliberations. 
This confusion is indicated by Owen by way of his criticism that 
"Macquarrie's use of 'being' as a term through which to signify both 
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God and finite entities obscures the truth of God's transcendence".44 
Owen's critique is little more than a stating of the obvious from 
the classical point of view. The point is that Macquarrie wishes to 
overcome the "wholly otherness" of transcendent deity without falling 
prey to pantheistic immanence. Entitative confusion arises when 
Macquarrie defines God in terms of "letting-be", whilst at the same 
time denying particularity to God as existent entity. Owen charges: 
Macquarrie's application of 'Letting-be' to being in 
general is both ontologically and logically illicit . 
It is ontologically so because only one being (God) 
can 'let be'. It is logically so because it implies 
that a neutral analysis of finite beings must lead to 
the idea of their divine ground. (45) 
But Macquarrie's 'neutral analysis' is the phenomenological enquiry 
of the existential-ontological analytic. This leads to a phenomen-
ological description of the ontology of finite (human) being which, 
following Heidegger, yields an understanding of Being as such. To 
that extent, Macquarrie embraces no illogic. Any ontological 
illicitness relates to the hesitancy to grant clear entitative 
status to God in terms of the Holy Being that lets be. To that 
extent Owen is right - some 'thing' must actually 'let-be', and if 
this ontological motif is ascribed to God, then God must be 'some 
thing' 'and not simply the letting-be process itself. Macquarrie 
does not intend the latter; but neither does he clearly uphold the 
former. 
44. op. ci t., p. 139. 
45. op. cit., p.140. 
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Finally, Owen notes accusingly that for Macquarrie "change and 
becoming must be predicated of God". 46 Now whOilst Macquarrie is not 
a process theologian as such, he certainly has some affinity with 
that perspective. Owen ' s comment is not so much a criticism as a 
statement of principle that Macquarrie seeks to uphold . It provides 
a point of contact between Macquarrie ' s existential-ontological 
theism and process theism . This 'contact ' will be explored further 
below . 47 
Alistair Kee is another theologian critical of Macquarrie ' s 
48 
stance . He claims that Macquarrie ' s "reformist solution" is unable 
to achieve its aims,49 and indeed he states quite clearly that he is 
50 
unable to accept Macquarrie ' s "onto-theology", although he is not 
dismissive of the theological need for "an examined ontology" as such. 
Kee charges that Macquarrie "has not found a new and viable way to 
. 51 
speak of God" . This is because Macquarrie insists on beginning the 
theological task with Natural Theology - a procedure that is nowadays 
largely discredited. 52 Macquarrie sees his "New Style Natural 
Theology" as affording a solid philosophical base for theology - in 
particular, for understanding God . His intention is to contribute 
positively to dogmatics by virtue of supplanting traditional symbols, 
language and concepts with material drawn from this new philosophical 
base . 
46. op . cit., p.141. 
47. See below, Section IV. 
48 . Kee, The Way of Transcendence, especially pp . 45-64. 
49. op. cit . , p . 139. 
50. op. cit. , p.234. 
51. op. cit . , p.45. 
52. op. cit . , p . 46. 
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The problem that Kee discerns is that the philosophical theology 
from which the systematic theology is to be constructed is itself 
only as good or as useful "as the original philosophical position 
53 
allows". In other words, in Macquarrie ' s case, Christian theology 
is conceptually delimited by Heidegger. Kee would question the 
appositeness of using Heidegger as theological resource. Heidegger 
is undeniably enigmatic and by no means universally accepted as 
offering key insights applicable to the task of theology. But that 
he has been nonetheless influential, if not seminal, for much 
also 
twentieth century theological thinking can/hardly be denied . So far 
Kee seems to be doing little more than airing prejudice and stating 
preference. This assessment tends to be strengthened by the way Kee 
discusses the existential approach as both culturally and theologically 
. 1 54 1rre evant . His cultural critique of the existential analytic misses 
the point: it is one thing to look to the existential approach with 
regard to theological discussion of sin, grace, and so on in the con-
text of the dynamics of existence; it is quite another to see the 
existential analytic in the context of its ontological corollary and 
the over-arching concern with the question of Being . Kee's concern 
for relevance of language is commendable, but it has tended to give 
him tunnel vision in his viewing of Macquarrie . There is more at 
stake than simply a culturally relevant vocabulary and linguistic 
framework . 
To be fair, though, I concur with Kee ' s criticism that Macquarrie 
exhibits a tendency to too easily "drop into the use of terms which 
53. op. cit . , p.47 . 
54. op . cit., pp.48ff. 
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already have connotations prejudicial to the process by which we 
try to find a secular way to speak of the existence of God".55 I 
noted in my own analysis that in many respects Macquarrie is engaged 
in an exercise of conceptual interpretation. But it is not only a 
matter of finding a new philosophical language with which to speak 
of God: he is inclined to interpret the philosophical terms themselves, 
and indeed infuse them, with terms and meanings drawn from traditional 
theistic language and concepts. In particular, Kee is critical of the 
way in which Macquarrie's 'Being ' takes on "a certain character by the 
language of personification".56 He echoes the criticism that 
Macquarrie, having disclaimed entitative status for Being, nonetheless 
slips into an entitative mode of discourse. He expresses concern 
about the way in which being, undefined, has been 
gradually referred to in ways which make it ripe 
for some kind of identification with God. (57) 
Thus Kee makes reference to what I have called the 'entitative 
confusion' in Macquarrie. He also asks: 
55. op. cit., p.5l. In this regard Kee rightly criticizes Macquarrie's 
identification of "religious faith" with "faith in being". He 
states: "This begs the whole question and makes nonsense of the 
procedure of establishing a Philosophical Theology before pro-
ceeding to Symbolic Theology. If religious faith and faith in 
being can be identified so early in the argument, then it must 
already be possible to identify God and being. This is in general 
the conclusion to which Macquarrie wishes to come. Are we then 
involved in circular reasoning, when the conclusion becomes an 
assumption?", p.52. 
56. op. cit., p.53. 
57. ibid. 
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Is the word 'being' used in some way that suggests 
it is not identical with things that have being? . . 
It seems that being is regarded as somehow active . . . 
the suggestion is that being is discriminating: being 
assists fulfilment. (58) 
"Being" as used by Macquarrie denotes active relational agency 
or agent . It implies "relational entity" . The entitative confusion 
entailed by the denial of singular entitative being on the one hand, 
coupled with the admittance of implicit entitative language on the 
other, is exacerbated by the "tendency to use terminology which pre-
disposes us to accept a religious view of reality" . S9 The term ' Being ' 
becomes the acceptable synonym for God by virtue of the transference 
f d · . d' d'b 60 o 1V1ne pre 1cates an attr1 utes. 
Whilst Kee has raised some salient critical points, his connecting 
of Macquarrie's use of ' being' with the "classical Kantian objection,,61 
and indeed his virtual assumption that the term 'being' is synonymous 
f 
' 
. , 62 b l' h' . d f M . or eXIsts e les 1S own Ina equate grasp 0 acquarrie ' s purSUIt 
of an ontological description of God . Yet a phrase or notion such as 
"more truly beingful" , if it is not to be forever hidden in its 
enigmatic character , requires further metaphysical categories to 
58. op . cit . , p . 52. 
59. ibid. 
60. op . cit . , p . S3 . 
61. op . cit . , p.54 . 
62. ibid. 
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illuminate its meaning. It is not so much a case that Macquarrie 
63 
"has confused himself by the phrase 'holy being'" on the grounds 
this implies an admittance of degrees of being: rather "holy" is the 
summary predicate whereby Macquarrie transfers to "Being" all that 
is intended by the Christian tradition as applicable to God. That, 
in my judgement, is a fundamental weakness of Macquarrie's position. 
To return to the thematic critique of entitative confusion, Kee 
notes that for Heidegger "Being" does not play an active role in the 
affairs of human being. 64 Heidegger's 'Being' is not itself an 
active agent, although it is interpreted in terms of relational 
activity.65 But for Macquarrie, Being, qua Holy Being, does play an 
active role. As such Macquarrie's ' Being ' has the stamp of entitative 
being-ness upon it . Yet it is also that in which all beings (i.e. 
existent entities) participate : it is their ontological fundament. 
Now Kee rightly notes that "participating in being implies that 
h . h· h . .., 66 being exists apart from t e ent1ty w 1C 1S to come 1nto eXlstence' . 
This is not the case for Heidegger: it is necessarily the case for 
Macquarrie. To that extent Macquarrie is transposing conceptual 
language, not rethinking the fundamental ontology of God. 
If there is no entitative status to Macquarrie ' s 'Holy Being' 
67 then Kee's criticism of the non-priority of Being over beings stands. 
63. op. cit . , p.SS. 
64. op . cit. , p.56. 
65 . See discussion of the ontological-relational hermeneutic above, 
pp.45-S0. 
66. Kee, op . cit . , pp . 56f. 
67. op. cit., p.S7. 
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On the other hand, Macquarrie's understanding of being is most 
certainly not that of substantival quality "bestowed upon an entity 
. d k·· II 68 ln or er to rna e lt eXlst . In as much as 'Being' is that which 
'lets be' then Being is by implication something other than what is 
let-be. It may indeed be of the nature of Being that it has no ontic 
existence of its own as one thing among other things. But that is 
not to say that Being, especially in the form of 'Holy Being', has 
no entitative status whatsoever. As Kee rightly observes, 
Throughout Macquarrie's argument Being has become 
increasingly autonomous, inviting, claiming, judging, 
disclosing and giving of itself. Being somehow seems 
to control whether entities come into being or not. (69) 
Clearly Macquarrie's Holy Being has some identifiable status: the 
question is, what is the nature of this status? 
Despite his obvious cognizance of the breadth of Heidegger's 
work Macquarrie has, I suggest, limited his use of Heidegger as a 
theological resource. 70 This results in a subtle shift in usage of 
the term 'Being' and the consequent problems noted above. 
Heidegger's own ontological understanding of 'Being' is unmistakably 
relational. Macquarrie's adaptation of it to the theological field 
yields an implicit entitative sense. The potential resolution that 
68. ibid. 
69. op. cit., p.S8. 
70. I refer here to the ontological-relational hermeneutic with its 
illuminating of the meaning of Being as such, as the key to 
understanding the being of God, in contrast to Macquarrie's 
transposition of the term 'Being' - albeit as informed by 
Heidegger - to the theological field so as to supplant the 
term 'God'. 
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presents itself is to argue the case that the question of the nature 
of God's entitative status is answered by the relational understand-
ing of Being, and the consequent application of this understanding 
to the being of God. 7l Such a reappraisal of the use and interpret-
ation of Being within existential-ontological theism may both 
resolve the entitative issue and allow Macquarrie's symbolic and 
linguistic reinterpretation to truly illumine the reality of God. 
Now for Macquarrie faith is itself a relational activity . It 
embraces relationship between two relating entities, the 'object' of 
faith and the 'holder' of faith: viz, God and Humanity. Thus: "The 
essence of religion ... is the self-manifestation of Being as this is 
received and appropriated in the life of faith".72 He speaks of 
different religions as, at least in part, denoting ' variations ' in 
the self-disclosure of Being. 
From the Christian perspective Being "reveals itself as both 
transcendent and immanent, and this is implied in the central idea 
f . ." 73 o l.ncarnatl.on. Religious symbols provide an understanding of 
the ontological symbols, which in turn are used to illuminate 
religious concepts. Thus Macquarrie argues that "a11 religions can 
be seen as variations on a fundamental theme - the impinging of holy 
Being upon the being of man". 74 But the question may be raised: HoW 
71. This will be argued more fully below. 
72. Macquarrie, Principles, p.161. 
73. op. cit., p.165. 
74. op. cit., p.170. 
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really is 'Being' used and understood here? Given the repeated 
disclaimer that Being is not ~ being, what is the import and 
implication of talking in terms of Being disclosing its self? 
Is it enough to claim that Being, though not something that can be 
spoken of directly, may yet require the use of the language of 
beings? How yet may we gain an understanding of 'Being' that will 
do justice both to the term itself and to its usefulness to theology? 
A clue is given by Macquarrie himself when he states: 
We are not compelled to make a disjunction, and to 
say that the religious question is either a question 
about God and the super-sensible or a question about 
man. In religion God and man are together. The Bible 
tells us of God in his dealings with man and of man in 
his relation to God . Does not the very word ' religion' 
according to one view of its ¢tymology, denote this 
'bond' or ' relationship' between man and deity? (75) 
Relationship is clearly the key to the understanding of religion in 
general :. 
Macquarrie also understands revelation as a relational event. 
But this raises questions such as: From whence has the revelatory 
initiative sprung? Is there not an entitative status inherent in 
the notion of a Revealer? Is not God a "revealing entity", which 
is to say a relational entity revealing itself as such? Macquarrie 
does not address such questions, and even the minimal entitative 
75 . Macquarrie, Scope, p.43. 
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status suggested by "relational entity" tends to be lost in his 
identification of existential-ontological context with revelatory 
76 
content. 
To the extent that Being or God "reveals itself", "impinges upon" -
i. e. in various ways "relates to" - then there is an implicit entit-
ative status in terms of being 'an other' that engages in such 
activity. It is on the basis of the application of the ontological-
relational hermeneutic that the nature of the entitative status is 
judged to be relational. This applies also, for example, to the 
question of comprehending the phrase: "the incomparable that lets-be". 
So the principal question to ask of Macquarrie would be: Is his 
concept of God a concept of a "relational entity" or not? Given the 
implicit relationality in his notion of Being and the relationality 
of his description of Holy Being, coupled with his obvious desire to 
avoid an immanentist impasse, then an affirmative answer seems inevit-
able. If it is not what he intended, it certainly appears implicit. 
Such a conclusion need not be unfaithful to his premise that God is 
not ~ being (qua one thing among other like things). The model may 
well be that of the person or the self, for both of these concepts 
are explications of relational entity.77 
To the extent that Macquarrie affirms a relational interpretation 
of being, and argues that God is not ens but esse understood as 
ontological process, then he expresses an implicit understanding of 
the ontological-relational context of created existence. But does 
76. See above, pp.7Sff. 
77. See above, pp.71ff. 
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the created order merely relate to its own context? Surely 
Macquarrie does not hold that 'God' simply is the name for this 
context or process, however transcendentally understood. 
The entitative question is all pervasive. Does Macquarrie wish 
to speak of God-as-Being, or is he speaking of the being-of-God? He 
appears to want to avoid the entitative implication of the latter by 
largely opting for the former. Yet in his ingenious discussion of 
the Trinity he assumes at least a minimal sense of entitative identity 
of God, and then proceeds to give a detailed ontological account of 
that. In the process he reinforces the observation that he does 
indeed hold a conception of God as some sort of 'real' entity. His 
interpretation of the trinitarian model is unmistakably relational: 
the Trinity is but a summary of the ontological-relational aspects 
of the one God. The ontological significance of the trinitarian 
symbols resides in the fact they denote relations between God and 
the world, humankind, and so on. 
Despite the fact that the relationality of God is acknowledged, 
the relational understanding of Being is indicated, and the relation-
ality of reality is affirmed, there has not been any real penetration 
by Macquarrie to an understanding of the being of God, as itself 
relational in the ad extra sense intended by the ontological-relational 
hermeneutic. Instead of developing an ontological hermeneutic such 
that 'Being' is interpretive of God, Macquarrie effectively transposes 
the two terms. Thus his treatment of 'Being' raises questions such as, 
Can "Being" actually disclose itself? Has it a 'self' to disclose? 
Is it, or how is it, such as to be able to 'take the initiative'? Is 
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the way in which Macquarrie talks of 'Being' a misuse of the active 
voice? That is to say, can he really and sensibly talk of 'Being ' 
as if it were a distinct centre of activity, a self-determining 
agent? Does this even do justice to 'Being' - or is it but the 
traditional way of talking of God, only substituting the word 'Being ' 
instead? 
The various criticisms made of Macquarrie in respect of his 
concept of God come to focus in the question of the entitative status 
of God or Holy Being, together with the criticism that he has not so 
much re-thought or re-conceived the doctrine of God as simply trans -
lated it into another symbolic language. He attempts to reconcile 
Heidegger's philosophy with traditional Christianity, yet without 
. . h 78 
necessarily doing justIce to elt er. "Holy Being" would appear 
to be a concept embracing entitative status as a transcendent relating 
other. This rendition of 'Being' is by no means Heideggerian. But 
neither does "Holy Being" render a clear presentation of the dynamic 
God of biblical faith and witness. 79 On the one hand Macquarrie is 
criticised as unfaithful to the biblical concept of God. On the 
other hand Fawcett suggests Macquarrie is too cautious in his use 
of symbolism and symbolic re-interpretation. 80 
My own contention is that Macquarrie's use of "Holy Being" 
connotes "relational entity". But given that God is not a being, 
then it would appear that the term "entity" is contradictory. 
78. cf. e.g. D. O'Connor, "Some Remarks on Professor Macquarrie's 
Philosophy of Death", Exp. T. 83, July 1977: 309-311. 
79. cf. e.g. D.B. Knox, "John Macquarrie and the Principles of 
Christian Theology", Ref.Th.R. 31, May-August 1972:56-60. 
80. T. Fawcett, The Symbolic Language of Religion, London: S.C.M. 
1970. p.81. 
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However, I would further contend that to designate something as 
having a particular sort of entitative status is not the same as 
saying it is one of a class of existing entitie s . "Enti tati ve 
status" refers to identity and definition in general ontological 
terms. Thus to designate God as "relational entity" is not thereby 
to imply he is a subsisting entity, i.e. a-being as such. It is to 
determine that whatever else God may be, he i s identi f ied entitatively 
as relational. This would appear to be both the consequence of 
Macquarrie's existential-ontological theism and also the way to best 
interpret it. This assessment is supported by Macquarrie's own view 
that the relation between God and the world is best described in 
terms of the "organic model".8l The world and God are not materially 
identified (pantheism, animism) but they do exist - they have their 
being - in terms of mutual and intimate interrelation. 
82 M .. Despite some claims to the contrary acquarrle IS not a process 
theologian per se. However, his affinity with the process perspective, 
particularly with regard to the "organic model" of the God-World 
83 
relationship, is undoubted. Gregor Smith comments that in defining 
God as "Holy Being" Macquarrie understands God as One "with whom we 
. 1'" 84 enter Into re atl0n . Criticisms and entitative difficulties not-
withstanding, this remains the chief positive contribution of 
Macquarrie's work. In conjunction with the complementary work of 
Hartshorne, it leads to a possible reconstruction of the concept of 
God as "relational entity". 
81. J. Macquarrie, "God and the World: One Reality or Two", Theol. 
LXXV/626, August 1972:394-403; "Creation and Environment", 
Exp.T. 83, October 1971:4-9. 
82. cf. J. Phipps who identifies Macquarrie as a Process Theologian 
in Rel.Ed. 71, January-February 1976:102-106. 
83. cf. G. Wainwright, Doxology, p.350. cf. Section IV beloW. 
84. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.106. 
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III. CHARLES HARTSHORNE: CRITIQUE AND DISCUSSION 
The thrust of Hartshorne's work on the concept of God has been 
in response to the question: "What can most reasonably be meant by 
the religious term 'God,?,,85 His phenomenological starting point 
is the fact of worship. His concern is to formulate an understanding 
of God such that the sense of worshipfulness is retained - even 
enhanced - by proposing a viable alternative to the "standard meta-
86 physical position of the past". Hartshorne's approach is neo-
classical in that he wants to address himself to the same subject 
matter as classical theism, but does so within the framework of a 
new methodology. Following Whitehead, this methodology focusses on 
an understanding of the concept of God as "dipolar". 
The neoclassical concept holds that the reality of God embraces 
two polarities, or polar correlates, expressed primarily in terms of 
the sets absolute and relative, and abstract and concrete . The 
classical doctrine of God affirms attributes such as Absolute, Infinite, 
Oneness, Being, Independence, and so on, against their antonym -
Relative, Finite, Many, Becoming, Dependence . But for Hartshorne 
the reality of God encompasses both these sets of terms: the former 
applying to the abstract aspect of God, the latter applying to the 
concrete aspect . Neoclassical theism is not only simply a matter 
of change by addition, but rather a new understanding of the identity 
85 . Divine Relativity, p .v; cf . Man's Vision, p.86: Hartshorne attempts 
"to discover what God may be as the God of religion". 
86. Divine Relativity, p .vi; cf. Devenish, "Divinity and Dipolarity: 
Thomas Erskine and Charles Hartshorne on What Makes God ' God''', 
J.Rel. 62, October 1982, p.3S0: "Religiously God functions as the 
ontic correlate of the noetic human activity of worship . .. Thus ... 
the quality that makes God 'God' is his capacity to function to 
elici t worship". 
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of God as comprising a unity of two aspects, given the fundamental 
axiom that one aspect 'includes and exceeds'the other. Thus 
Hartshorne thinks of God as 
supremely relative, 'surrelative', although, or because 
of this superior relativity, containing an abstract 
character or essence in respect to which, but only in 
respect to which, he is indeed strictly absolute and 
immutable. (87) 
David Pailin rightly notes that attributes or ascriptions are not 
to be assigned to one or other pole, but rather each attribute is 
itself "to be understood in a dipolar fashion" 88 It is just such 
an observation that offers a clue to overcoming the problem of an 
incipient dualism in dipolar theism: dipolarity is aspectival. The 
ontological unity of that which is multi-faceted and aspectivally 
di-polar is assumed. 
The dipolar resolution to the question: How can God be both 
absolute and relative, abstract and concrete? holds that it is in 
different aspects of the being of God that He is on the one hand 
absolute, on the other hand relative, and so on. 
God has both concrete and abstract aspects to his 
reality. In his concrete aspect he is relative; if 
he knows the world, then he is related to it ... But 
if he is related to all of it then, abstractly speaking, 
he is absolutely related to it, and so in another aspect 
87. Divine Relativity, p.ix. 
88. D. Pailin in Exp.T. 90, March 1979:186. 
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of his being he is absolute in relation to the 
world. (89) 
Now the implication Gunton has rightly drawn from this is that: 
God is only absolute because he is relative to the 
whole of reality; in other words, his absoluteness 
consists in his all-embracing relativity; this is 
ontologically and logically prior, and the absoluteness 
is a necessary implication of the relativity. (90) 
Concreteness and relativity are not just included along with 
abstractness and absoluteness: they emerge as the prior terms. How-
ever, I contend that the term 'relation ' or 'relationality,9l is a 
more fruitful comprehensive descriptive term - and also more approp-
riately the ontologically prior term - than ' concrete' or ' relative'. 
This is because it is only the essential relationality of the being 
of God that could allow for dipolarity: the polar contrasts are in 
the first instance included, and in the second instance interrelated, 
within the being of God . 92 
Hartshorne ' s theism is premised on the axiom that God . 
has social relations, really has them, and thus is 
constituted by relationships and hence is relative -
in a sense not provided for by the traditional doctrine 
89 . C. Gunton, Becoming and Being, p.3l . 
90 . ibid . 
91. In the ontological sense adumbrated in Chapter One above. 
92. 7f . James , The Concrete God, p.62, with respect t~ the real 
1nterrelatedness of contrasting events or categor1es. 
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of divine substances wholly non-relative toward the 
world. (93) 
Thus the basis to Hartshorne's challenge to classical thei sm is that 
God is conceived as fundamentally relational. 
Another term for the doctrine of God espoused by Hartshorne is 
"Panentheism". By this is meant both that the Universe - that i s, all 
that exists - is "in" God, and also that God relates himself to every-
thing that is. This is not an ontological identification of God with 
everything that is (Pantheism). Panentheism s tresses a necessary 
ongoing relationship between God and World. It is the corollary to 
the dipolar understanding of God. God 'includes' within his being 
all that is (pan-en-theism) and this because he includes as constit-
utive of his being categoreal opposites (dipolarity). 
H.P. Owen is one who thinks this is no more than sheer self-
d ' . , 94 contra lctl0n. However, Hartshorne effectively overcomes the 
apparent contradiction because the categoreal opposites are, as 
constitutive of God's reality, ontological correlates. That is to 
say, the contradictory terms of the correlative couplets are not 
predicated of the same aspect or pole in the being of God. As 'supreme 
being' God 'includes' both poles or opposites. Nonetheless there is 
a general difficulty of comprehending the nature of the reality of 
God defined in such terms. Each pole requires, and is defined in 
reference to, its correlate. But is this mutuality merely conceptual 
93. Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p.x. 
94. H.P. Owen, The Christian Knowledge of God, London: Athlone," J1969, 
p.lOS. 
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and terminological, or symbolic and analogical? Or is it indicative 
of ontological reality in respect of its applicability to God? 
Hartshorne makes a good case for dipolar conceptuality: has he left 
open the prospect of bi-partite being?95 
Hartshorne does not espouse bi-theism. His dipolar metaphysics 
is an aspectival description of the being of God as such. The concept-
ual problem is to relate dipolar aspects to ontological unity; to 
comprehend how it is that the Supreme Being is ontologically constituted 
by the correlative conjunction of categoreal opposites. To this issue, 
and its resolution by the principle of double inclusion, I shall 
return below . But this is not the only issue raised by dipolarity. 
Another issue which could also be described as the articulation of 
the underlying ontological problem is that of God's entitative status: 
What sort of entity is it that on the grounds of one aspect of its 
being (the abstract/absolute pole) derives its self-identity, whilst 
by virtue of the other aspect (the relative/concrete pole) engages 
in real relationships and concrete interaction .96 The implication 
is that true entitative identity is to be found in terms of one 
' aspect ' only, and not in the whole that includes both. But this 
is not what Hartshorne wants. However, there remains the need to 
95. cf . J.E . Carraway , "A Preliminary Critique of John B. Cobb's 
Whiteheadian doctrine of God", Encount. 36, Spring 1975:101-111-
Carraway notes Cobb ' s criticism that Whitehead too often treats 
the primordial and consequent nature of God "as if they were 
genuinely separable entities". However, "Whitehead ' s insistence 
that God is an actual entity is an insistence on the unity of 
God". p.10!. 
96 . cf . e.g. James, The Concrete God, p.119, where he comments . 
"dipolari ty means that abstractly God must be above continge~c1es 
such as death in order to be himself, but concretely God he 1S 
involved in every death . .. If the concrete God could die He would 
not be God" . But does this not beg the question of a kind of 
ontological bi-theism? 
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97 explicate the relationship between the poles, and how that relation-
ship stands in respect of the unity and identity of God. 
Against the designation of the being of God as non-relative, 
Hartshorne argues the case for relativity as the superior motif 
descriptive of the reality of God. 98 God is, as a concrete whole, 
both abstract and relative. As such, God is "related to accidental 
things themselves".99 But how is it that God 'in his wholeness' 
manifests ad extra relationality when it is in his concrete or 
relative pole that he engages in relationship? The weakness of 
Hartshorne's work is that he lacks an explicitly ontological framework 
for his proposals concerning divine relativity. He has preferred to 
deal with formal ontological argument rather than ontological 
description as such. 
Hartshorne's interest in the ontological argument reflects his 
suggestion that it implies a "concrete" God. lOO The argument as such 
may be abstract and formal, but what it is about must, of necessity, 
be concrete - i.e. manifest concrete relational reality. The onto-
logical argument reasons to reality. Hartshorne's use of necessity 
or "necessary existence" as a major premise of his argument has been 
97. Devenish comments: "One may state the relation between the onto-
logical poles by means of a third principle, which I shall call 
the 'ontological principle of inclusive contrast"'. "Divinity 
and Dipolarity ... ", p. 347. 
98. Hartshorne, Logic, pp.138ff. 
99. Hartshorne and Reese, Philosophers Speak, p.Sll. 
100. cf. Man's Vision, p.23. 
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f . . . d 101 o ten cr~t~c~se . Nonetheless such critiques do not render 
redundant his conclusion of the necessary relationality of God's 
102 
nature. 
Hartshorne's neoclassical theism, and indeed, the process pers -
pective in general, is subject to a wide range of critical responses 
and reactions. Assessments and criticisms have also been made in 
relation to allied themes and fields of theological concern such as 
christology, theodicy, and even psychology.l03 Baltazar commends 
the theological application of process thought as compatible with 
both the "processive" outlook of the bible and the evolutionary and 
f h d ld ' 104 dynamic outlook 0 t e mo ern wor Vlew. On the other hand 
negative responses run from the casuistry of Curtin through the 
persistent polemics of Gunton and the dissentient dialectics of 
Neville, to a hostile conservative-evangelical critique that takes 
101. cf. A.C. Ewing, Value and Reality, London: Allen and Unwin 1973, 
pp .146ff. 
102. cf. op. cit., pp.268, 282. 
103. cf. e.g. T.W. Ogletree, "A Christo logical Assessment of Dipolar 
Theism" in Brown, James and Reeves (eds)~ProcessPhi16s6phy 
and Christian ·Thought, pp.331-346; G.B. Kelly, "The Nature of 
God in Process Theology: Basic Concepts and Christo logical 
Implications", I.T.Q. 46, 1979:1-18; N. Frankenberry, "Some 
Problems in Process Theodicy", Re1.St. 17:179-197. Note that 
Frankenberry comments that "these problems can be resolved 
only by rethinking ontoZogicaZZy the way in which 'creativity' 
as metaphysically ultimate, and 'God' as religiously ultimate, 
are related". p.196. (Italics mine); J.F. Haught, "Dipolar 
Theism: Psychological Considerations", Proe.St. 6, Spring 1976: 
43-50. 
104. E.R. Baltazar, "Advantages and Disadvantages in the Process 
Approach to God", I.T.Q. XLIV, 1977:30-38. 
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105 
a 'procrustean bed' approach. In his positing not just an alternative 
but in fact a corrective to classical theism, Hartshorne also elicits 
the attention of defenders of Thomism. l06 
Whilst Keith Ward affirms that "the doctrine of dipolarity is not 
at all contradictory" he nonetheless expresses uneasiness concerning 
107 Hartshorne's view of "the organic unity of the world and God". 
N.H.G. Robinson notes the apparent ambivalence of Hartshorne's view 
on God: on the one hand there is "no question about the reality of 
God" and that therefore the main concern is with proper character-
ization of that reality; but on the other hand he notes "the impression 
that what the argument is insisting is that the existence of order 
logically requires the reality of God, so that all that is given in 
108 
experience is an ordered world". Hartshorne's rationalist approach 
belies traces of Kant. Yet his is not the Kantian God: neoclassical 
theism's supreme Being is no divine metaphysical back-stop. 
105. M. Curtin, "Process Theology and its Metaphysical Implications", 
I.T.Q. XLIV, 1977:232-242; C. Gunton, Becoming and Being, etc; 
R.C. Neville, God the Creator, 1968; Creativity and God, 1980; 
C.F.H. Henry, "The Reality and Identity of God", Chr.T. XIII, 
March 14 and 28 1969. 
106. cf. D.B. Burrell, "A Philosophical Objection: Process Theology" 
in his Aquinas: God and Action, Notre Dame 1979, pp.78-79. 
The reviewer indicates that, oontra Hartshorne, Burrell argues 
that Aquinas does not fit the Hartshornian conception of a 
"classical theist", Proc.St. 11, Spring 1981:50-52. cf. W.N. 
Clarke (S.J.), The Philosophical Approach to God: A Neo-Thomist 
Perspective, Winston-Salem: Wake Forrest University 1979. 
107. K. Ward, "The Concept of God~ Exp.T. 88, December 1976:70. 
108. N.H.G. Robinson in Scot.J.Th. 21, September 1968:345. 
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Herzog comments that Hartshorne "does not want to infer God 
109 from something that is not God". Hartshorne does not begin with 
the given "being-ness" of the world as other-than God then extrapolate 
to the being of God as its necessary presentation. What he does do 
is begin with the giveness of the experienced relationship with God 
from within the context of worship and faith, and place that in the 
context of exploring what it could mean to be such a God. 
For Hartshorne God does have entitative status. Indeed he is 
critical of the Tillichean denial that God is ~ being. But the nature 
of his entitative status implied in Hartshorne's outworking of his 
concept of God indicates that, ontologically speaking, Hartshorne 
. . If db· ,,110 views God as "both belng-ltse an a elng. Thus God, for 
Hartshorne, is ontologically inclusive and entitatively identifiable. 
A.J. Kelly notes correctly that neoclassical theism "attempts 
essentially to establish the intrinsic relatedness of the divine 
Reality to man and his world".l1l Whilst he remains committed to 
Thomism, Kelly is nonetheless appreciative of the process perspective 
whereby 
God must be conceived as genuinely related to the world 
and as really affected by our actions. A purely external 
relation of reason cannot be sufficient, God must be 
related to the world with a real internal relatedness. (112) 
109. F. Herzog, Understanding God, p.37. 
110. M.L. Diamond, Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Thought, 
New York: McGraw-Hill 1974, p.380. 
111. A.J. Kelly, "God: How Near A Relation?", Thomist XXXIV, April 
1970:193. 
112. op. cit., pp.194ff. 
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However, his own view is that the Thomistic conception of the reality 
of the relationship between God and humankind, and the theological 
implication of this for comprehending the reality of God, has been 
misinterpreted by the process theists. Indeed, he suggests that the 
process perspective so elevates the category of "process" as itself 
the divine reality that it is itself inclusive of, and hence greater 
113 than, God. But Hartshorne would most assuredly refute this 
suggestion. 114 On the neoclassic perspective it is clear that God, 
. . h 11' l' l' 115 as supreme be1ng, 1S tea -lnc USlve rea 1ty. 
Hugo Meynell is another who, whilst finding Hartshorne's work 
impressive, nonetheless rebuffs its inherent critique of Thomism, 
. h' f h Th . . . 116 and also attacks neoclasslcal t elsm rom t e omlstlc perspect1ve. 
He summarises the differences between traditional theology and 
Hartshorne as having their base in a fundamental difference of pre-
supposition concerning the nature of the world. However, to categorize 
Hartshorne's view of the world as consisting of what God feels as 
opposed to what God makes and does is to introduce a false dichotomy. 
For clearly what the world is is identifiably other than God, even 
though included within his encompassing being. The world is not 
simply the passive locus of God's passion: it is that with which he 
117 interacts and to which he responds. The process view of God 
comes into clear focus against the background perception of the 
inherent relatedness of both God and world. 
113. cf. A.J. Kelly, "Trinity and Process", Th.St. 31, September 1970: 
393-414. 
114. cf. N. Pittenger, who does so directly in his "Trinity and Process: 
Some Comments in Reply", Th.St. 32, June 1971:290-296. 
115. See above, Part Two. 
116. H. Meynell, "The Theology of Hartshorne", J. Th. St. ns XXIV, 
April 1973:143-157. 
117. cf. above, Chapter Four. 
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The fundamental premise of Thomism by which Meynell sustains 
his critique of Hartshorne is that God's being eternal "entails that 
he envisages the world in a single sweep and so does not have to wait 
upon circumstances to implement his general plan",118 together with 
the corollary notion that God has an "eternal plan" for the world. 
Now whilst Hartshorne's concept of omniscience would be compatible 
with the sense of God's adequate and holistic envisagement of the 
119 
world as actual, he does not hold that this entails a notion of 
pre-determined future qua eternal plan, nor that it obviates change 
and response for the being of God. Meynell is representative of the 
view that denies to the being of God any sense of change or ability 
to be affected. It is just such a negative assumption that Hartshorne 
seeks to challenge. 
As a defender of Thomism against Hartshorne - indeed in his 
critique of Hartshorne from the Thomist perspective - Meynell occupies 
the other end of the theological see-saw. But he has not addressed 
the fulcrum around which the issues turn, viz, the formulation of a 
conceptually viable ontology of God. His ad hominem impugning of 
Hartshorne's observations concerning reciprocity of benefit and value 
conference reveals the limitations and conceptual rigidity of 
M 11 ' .. 120 eyne s pos1tlon. 
H.P. Owen acknowledges that Hartshorne's panentheism is subtle 
118. H. Meynell, "The Theology of Hartshorne", p.152. 
119. cf. above, Chapter Five. 
120. cf. Meynell, "The Theology of Hartshorne", p.155. Meynell 
wonders of Hartshorne's view "whether there is not latent in 
it a proud refusal to undergo the 'indignity' of receiving 
good from one too far exalted in goodness and power for us 
to confer it on him in return". 
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d .. 121 an IntrIcate. He also charges that Hartshorne's philosophical 
theology "is a self-contradictory piece of anthropomorphism".122 
However it is not the case for Hartshorne that divine personality 
123 is "a mere extension of its human copy". Also, whilst the notion 
of inclusion is difficult, it is understood by Hartshorne in the 
context of God ' s entitative otherness together with his surrelativity.124 
As with Meynell, Owen misses the point of Hartshorne's critique of 
traditional theism when he argues that Hartshorne ' s aims are met ~ 
1 . 1 h' 125 c aSSlca t elsm . Observations concerning Christian piety do not 
answer metaphysical questions and ontological issues. 
Owen ' s charge that dipolarism is self-contradictory is clearly 
somewhat of an overstatement. Nonetheless he does highlight the 
inherent difficulty of correlating conceptual opposites so as together 
. f G d 126 Ow f h h they are descriptive of the realIty 0 o. en urt er c arges 
that the concept of God as the self-surpassing surpasser of all is 
but nonsense. 127 However, his problem in his assumption of "excellent 
state" as the absolute superlative category to which any change or 
improvement thereto renders incoherent the notion of excellence as 
such. Again the issue is one of fundamental variance of basic 
assumption and conceptual application. For Hartshorne it is God ' s 
"supremacy" which is .the superlative term . "Excellence" is, after 
all, a relative term . God's supremacy guarantees his excellence: and 
121. Owen, Concepts of Deity, p.80. 
122 . Owen, Christian KnOWledge, p.107. 
123. ibid. 
124. cf. above, Chapter Four . 
125. Owen, Christian Knowledge, p .107. 
126. Owen, ConceEts, p . 82f . 
127 . op. cit., pp.83f . 
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this relative to all else. Thus that God is the "most excellent" 
is absolute; the substance of, or in what way, he is excellent is 
relative and subject to change . 
conceptual criticisms hinge on meanings and terms. Theologically 
they refer to radically different ways of understanding the reality 
of God. Adjudication requires a more radical penetration into the 
concept of the being of God. Owen's claim that 'response' implies 
no change l28 is sheer casuistry and misses the point of the essential 
relatedness of God which neoclassical theism propounds. Whilst Owen 
admits of some sense of responsiveness in God, he rejects the neo-
classical understanding of this responsiveness. Indeed he is 
entirely dismissive of Hartshorne ' s doctrine of God,129 and is so 
because he rigidly adheres to the conceptual standpoints Hartshorne 
130 himself directly challenges. 
In his Creativity and GOd,13l R.C. Neville launches a compact 
broadside against much process thinking and most process theologians. 
His primary contention is that, commencing with Whitehead, process 
thought separates God from creativity, making the latter the superior 
metaphysical category. In a critical discussion of Hartshorne ' s 
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Neville acknowledges 
Hartshorne ' s attempt at construing creativity as superior to being 
132 
"as the basic metaphysical category". But it would seem Neville 
128. op . cit . , p.87. 
129. op. cit. , p . 88 . 
130. op. cit . , p.89. 
131. R.C. Neville, Creativity and God, New York: Seabury 1980. 
132. op. cit. , p.50. 
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misreads Hartshorne, if not Whitehead also. Creativity is not 
'separated off' in any final sense. Rather process thought denies 
the exclusivity of creation as a function of God alone. Creativity, 
as an activity, is not just God's alone, although it is eminently 
his. Whether 'creating' is itself a "greater conception" than God 
is moot: Hartshorne would, I think, deny it is so. 
What Whitehead referred to as "prehension", Hartshorne speaks 
f d ' 133 o as memory an percept1on. However, Neville claims that whereas 
Whitehead showed how a theory of prehension renders a consistent 
theory of causation, Hartshorne does not, and this is a weakness of 
his system. 134 Neville would qualify Hartshorne's understanding of 
prehension by the reinstatement of the Whiteheadian doctrine of 
"perishing".13S The significance of this move, according to Neville, 
relates to the question of ultimate ontology. For Hartshorne ultimate 
ontology "is a monism in which the world is summed up in its achieved 
value", whereas by contrast for Whitehead it is "a fundamental dualism 
in which value-achievement is always contrasted with creative value 
h ' . ,,136 ac lev1ng . Clearly Neville prefers the platonic dualism of 
Whitehead to the monism of Hartshorne. His point against Hartshorne 
is that "the loss of immediacy of becoming is of essential signific-
h d I , , , ,,137 ance to t e ua lSt1C V1ew . Thus "If becoming stands in ftmdamental 
ontological contrast with being, then the rhythm of creating and 
perishing must be integrated with the rhythm of a many which becomes 
138 
a one". 
133. cf. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, pp.91f. 
134. Neville, Creativity, p.SO. 
135. op. cit., p.51; cf. Creative Synthesis, p.118. 
136. Creativity, p.S2. 
137. ibid. 
138. ibid. 
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Neville is also critical of the process claim of the interdepend-
ence of God and creation. He claims Hartshorne distinguishes 'creative' 
from 'sustaining ' ground and limits God to the latter. 139 He argues 
that: 
Hartshorne holds that creation means only that God 
continually influences a world that at no time in 
the past has not already been influenced by him ... 
the world takes on new features in virtue of the fact 
that its elements can prehend, that is, grasp and 
actualize, features previously exhibited by God as 
the world's potential ... But it seems unclear in 
Hartshorne where these new potentialities come from. 
That they are new, he would not deny. But then they 
would either come from nothing, and not out of some 
higher level potentiality in God, or they would come 
from some deposit of forms that has its integrity 
over against both God's abstract and necessary nature 
and his contingent, relative, and concrete nature. (140) 
But is this not a false dichotomy? Has Neville not made for himself a 
Platonic procrustean bed? Now Neville may be critical of the neo-
classical view "that something abstract can be contained in something 
141 
concrete". But is he right to say that the inclusion of abstract 
in the concrete amounts to, or ........ 
139. God the Creator, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968, p.78; 
cf. p.103. 
140. op. cit., pp.108-109. 
141. Neville, Creativity, p.S7. 
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equates with, the doctrine of dipolarity per se? I think not. 
Against the view that understands by the term 'abstract ' an 
"abstraction-from" the concrete, Neville suggests the abstract is 
that which is known as instantiated within the concrete. He goes 
on to ask: "In what sense is the universal contained in the part-
icular when the latter is an instance of it?,,142 And he details 
the two "realist" answers that are given, viz, the Aristotelian, 
which Hartshorne largely adopts, and the Platonic with which 
Whitehead is identified . On the former view novelty is emergent, 
not pre-determined or ' pre-existent', Therefore universals are 
correspondingly emergent. On the latter view, universals are the 
fixed forms or norms against which change, diversity and continuity 
are measured . 
Neville is critical of the dipolar theory. He notes that for 
Hartshorne, on the one hand, "the abstract nature of God consists 
in the a priori metaphysical conditions that would have to be exhibited 
in any possible world" . 143 On the other hand "there must be some 
existing actual entity exhibiting the metaphysical conditions, although 
how that necessary existence is actualized relative to the contingen-
cies of the other events in the world is itself a contingent matter,,~44 
However, the problem as Neville sees it is that given that each 
occasion in the divine life is an instance of necessary existence, 
"In what does the normative form of the necessity reside? ,,14S For 
142 . 0p. cit. , p . S8. 
143. op. cit. , p.63. 
144. op. cit . , p . 64. 
145. ibid. 
347 
Hartshorne any subsequent divine event prehends and exhibits the 
necessity in the antecedent divine event. But for Neville, "If 
the necessity is completely contained as an abstract part of the 
antecedent divine event, this is no means reason for there to be 
any subsequent divine event to prehend it".146 Rather, "Only if 
the abstract part of the divine nature is normative over possible 
divine events could these possible events be necessitated before 
they objectify the necessity prehended from their antecedents" and 
so "transcendent normativeness could not be 'contained'in any concrete 
divine event, only illustrated".147 
I suggest Neville's critique of Hartshorne is assurnptive. 
Abstract necessity is completely contained in the antecedent (concrete) 
divine states, with no transcendent normativeness. Hence there is no 
metaphysical reason, so far as Neville is concerned, to expect any 
subsequent events. Hence creativity is rendered redundant for the 
neoclassical God. Unless, of course, Hartshorne copes with trans-
cendence beyond the concrete sufficient to guarantee creative advance, 
in which case he would have to admit as "some divine eternal individ-
ual beyond the temporal divine career" 148 - a kind of 'God beyond 
God'. But for Neville this is avoided if platonic dualism is upheld, 
i.e. "a contrast between the sphere of actual things and the domain 
149 of norms as such". It would seem, however, that Neville's problem 
146. ibid. 
147. ibid. 
148. ibid. 
149. op. cit., p.65 . 
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is that he assumes Hartshorne's use of ' containment' obviates trans-
cendence and therefore vitiates any meaning to 'abstract' . Neville 
does give credit to Hartshorne for demonstrating "that events, not 
substances , are the basic individuals of the world".150 However, he 
is critical of Hartshorne ' s event-pluralism t heory of individual 
. . . 151 
contlnulty or entlty. 
With respect t o process and ontology, Neville states t hat 
Hartshorne shifts "the centre of gravity from a balance of creativity 
and God to a conception of God as totally inclusive of creativity .. . 
h . 1 ." 152 and of any other needed metap YSlca categorles . But this means, 
he argues, that "the conception of God as inclusive of the structures 
t hat provide the necessary divine nature cannot be made coherent" . 153 
He argues : 
At best God is dipolar in that the divine concrete 
nature contains instances of the normative principles 
that make God God, moment by moment. But the onto-
logical status of those normative principles can by no 
means be reduced to the set of instances contained in 
the actual concrete events of divine life. (154) 
He caricatures Hartshorne's God as "infinitely inclusive and old, bound 
by necessity in essential nature, obliged to pay attention to all the 
rest of us without the possibility of shutting us off, and limited in 
creativity to choosing between only those alternatives having equal 
maximal value".155 
150 . op. cit . , p.53 . 154 . op . cit . , p . 66 . 
151. op. cit . , pp .54-57. 155 . op . cit. , p.66f . 
152. op. cit. , p.139 . 
153 . i bid. 
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Neville seems to be little more than engaged in a polemic 
against Hartshorne's Aristotelianism and in favour of the platonic 
dualism of Whitehead. 156 His criticism of Hartshorne ' s view of 
a priori knowledge is done from the perspective of a subtle pseudo-
. . 1 .. 157 eXIstentIa crItIque. He concludes by admitting that he does not 
see "that Hartshorne has developed a coherent conception of God".158 
Perhaps one of the more hostile and persistent critics of 
Hartshorne's neo-classical theism in particular - and process theology 
in general - has been Colin Gunton. 159 However, the basis of his own 
h b . . . d 160 criticisms have t emselves een crItIcIse . Ogden judges Gunton's 
"sustained polemic" against Hartshorne a failure on the grounds that 
it both inadequately and incompletely presents Hartshorne's doctrine 
of God and it thus palpably . h' 161 mlsrepresents 1m. Gunton makes a 
generalised two-fold criticism of Process Theology as being both 
156. op. cit., pp.67ff. 
157. op. cit., pp.70-74. 
158. op. cit., p.7l. 
159. See especially, Gunton; 'BecciIilirtgartd 'Being; "Process Theology's 
Concept of God"; '~. 84, July 1973: 292-296; "The Knowledge of 
God According to Two Process Theologians: A Twentieth Century 
Gnosticism", Re1.St. 11, March 1975:87-96; "Transcendence, 
Metaphor, and the Knowabil i ty of God", J. Th. St. nsXXXI, October 
1980:501-516. 
160. cf. D. Pailin in Exp.T. 90, March 1979:186. "Gunton's denial 
of effective agency to Hartshorne's God, a denial which is 
fundamental to all his analysis and to which he does not recog-
nize that there may be a coherent alternative, is probably 
based on a misunderstanding of the logic of Hartshorne's dipolar 
structure". 
161. S.M. Ogden, "Christian Theology and Neoclassical Theism", J. ReI. 
60, April 1980:205-209. 
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"procrustean" and "necessatarian". That is to say, the process 
perspective renders unutterable "many of the things that Christian 
theology has wanted to say about God" and that it also "deprives 
162 the Christian gospel of its quality of free grace". These are 
sweeping criticisms. The proper retort to the first is to point to 
the ever increasing volume and range of theological issues being 
addressed by the process perspective, and, to the second, to say that 
the relational interpretation of the neoclassical doctrine of God most 
assuredly allows for grace freely given: indeed "grace" would be the 
hallmark of the initiating and responding relational activity of the 
supremely relative being. 163 Gunton's difficulty in understanding 
how "a God conceived as primarily passive and receptive can be shown 
1 .. 1 ." 164 b h . to be active at all, let a one pr1mar1 y act1ve , etrays 1S own 
inadequate grasp of the category of the "concrete" in Hartshorne's 
thinking. He does, however, reveal the need for an interpretation 
of the doctrine of God that will more felicitously express ontological 
unity, signify entitative identity, and manifest the essential 
relatedness of the being of God. 
Gunton is critical both of the understanding that God may change 
and alter himself,165 and also of the notion of "influence".166 
Such criticisms, I contend, are resolvable by the application of the 
relational interpretation of the God of neoclassical theism, as is the 
162. C. Gunton, "Process Theology's Concept of God", p.295; cf. R.C. 
Neville, Creativity and God. 
163. Pittenger, in rebutting Gunton's criticisms, notes the Process 
perspective holds that "God is primarily love-in-act".Exp.T. 
85, November 1973:57. 
164. C. Gunton, "Process Theology: A Reply", Exp.T.85, April 1974:215. 
165. Gunton, Becoming and Being, p.44. 
166. op. cit., p.145. 
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criticism that the neoclassical God is unable "to be anything other 
than a receiver of impressions". 167 Gunton has missed the point that 
dipolarity and surre1ativism are descriptive of the God whose being 
l'S to-be-l'n-re1atl'on.168 H d h h h k d'ff' 1 e oes, owever, ec 0 t e ey 1 lCU ty 
of rendering ontological unity to the being of God as conceptually 
169 described in terms of polar correlates. 
Gunton charges that Hartshorne's approach is limited on account 
of "the quantitative conception of divine perfection".170 Such a view 
. f h ' d d' f f ' 171 reveals a misapprehenslon 0 Harts orne s un erstan lng 0 per ectlon . 
He also claims that neoclassical theology reverses the usual categories 
by which God is described. 172 But the real thrust of the neoclassical 
perspective is conceptual change by addition: again it would seem 
Gunton has short-changed the motif of "inclusion". Basically he has 
missed the point that Hartshorne is endeavouring to describe the God 
whose being is "relational". It is insufficient to criticise 
Hartshorne's approach unless and until this relationality has been 
fully worked out. Gunton has not done so, and consequently he makes 
a prima facie comparison of Hartshorne with Spinoza and declares that 
167. op. cit., p.8l. 
168. See above, Chapter Four. 
169. cf. Gunton, Becoming and 'Being, p.112. 
170. op. cit., p.24. 
171. See above, pp.220ff. 
172. cf. Gunton, op. cit., pp.32f. Thus "God's necessity consists 
in his contingency ... His simplicity consists in the fact of 
his unique complexity ... His eternity consists in his supreme 
temporality". cf. also Gunton, "Reflections, Influence and 
Development: Hartshorne in the History of Philosophy", Proc.St. 
6, Spring 1976: 33-42. 
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both these philosophers Gods are "easily made redundant" . 173 His 
grasp of the ontological import of the preposition "in" with respect 
to the way neoclassical theism conceives of the relation of God to 
the world is weak in the extreme: 174 Gunton assumes it refers to 
spatio-temporal ' containment'. Admittedly, though, the ontological-
relational comprehension of the "in" needs to be discerned and 
expounded . 
Gunton has also fallen into the trap of assuming that dipolarity 
means that all attributes and ascriptions applicable to deity must 
be categorized into one or other pole. Thus he claims that for 
Hartshorne "concretely, God is potential, abstractly he is actual,,175 
and further that "if cause and effect are polar opposites, and if God 
as effect is concrete, then God as cause ... must be abstract" . 176 Thus 
by misapplication of the dipolar metaphysic with respect to ontological 
description Gunton concludes that Hartshorne intends a God wholly other 
than the relational entity that neoclassical theism in fact implies. 
Indeed Gunton ' s own interpretation of Hartshorne ' s understanding of 
the activity of God is self-contradictory. The misapplication of 
dipolarity coupled with the inability to determine the relational 
implication of surrelativism leads Gunton to conclude that action 
is ascribed to God in an abstract sense only, and thus God "influences" 
not by concrete action, but by being passively experienced. 177 God 
173 . Gunton , Becoming and Being, p.50. 
174 . op. cit. , p.51. 
175. op . cit. , p . 3S. 
176 . op . cit . , p . 39. 
177. op . cit. , pp.45f. 
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"acts" only in so far as the creature "experiences" God. But then 
Gunton concludes that "Hartshorne's God is not outgoing at all, since 
11 . h'" 178 a goes 1nto 1m. Thus God is all-receptive, but non-initiating, 
not even qua influence, for there is nothing from God that may influence, 
. 1 179 even pass1ve y. 
Clearly Gunton's antipathy to the process perspective has clouded 
his analysis and his interpretation. However, whilst I contend the 
difficulties he gets into would be averted by attending to the onto-
logical dimension and relational import of Hartshorne's view, it is 
nonetheless true that the results of such attention are by no means 
apodeitic, nor do they easily embrace the totality of the metaphysical V 
base upon which Hartshorne builds his concept of God. Gunton fairly 
notes that the subjectivity of God is important for Hartshorne, indeed 
that "the doctrine that to be is to be a subject and that the universe 
consists of experiencing entities, is the very heart of his philosophy,,~80 
Now on my own analysis of Hartshorne's doctrine of God I would conclude 
that the question of entitative status is resolved by the conception 
of God as, indeed, a relating "subject". In other words, that the 
reality of God is that of 'relational entity'. But this interpretation 
is not easily reconciled with Hartshorne's wider metaphysics of reality~8l 
178. op. cit., p.47. 
179. Gunton goes so far as to argue that God's being is derivative 
in that for neoclassical theism God is prehensively dependent, 
i.e. "God 'happens' only after the entities he perceives have 
happened". op. cit. 
180. op. cit., p.12. 
181. cf. e.g. Gunton's comments on the metaphysical preconditions 
for neoclassical theism. op. cit., p.2l6. 
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Hartshorne's doctrine of God arises out of his metaphysics. 
His principle of "dual transcendence,,182 denotes the metaphysic of 
inclusive dipolarity by which neoclassical theism understands God. 
Hartshorne, as one of the more "thoroughgoing and consistent realists,,183 
evinces an underlying concern to so understand and articulate reality 
that the concept of God does, indeed, fulfil the role of chief meta-
physical exemplar. To this extent he follows Whitehead and propounds 
an "organic monism". As a consequence Hartshorne's God "is the all-
inclusive organism for whom everyone and everything in their relative 
184 individuality have value". Hartshorne rejects materialism and 
dualism in favour of human experience as the "primary datum of 
h . ,,185 ontology or metap YS1CS . 
Psychicalism, the view that "all concrete individuals are sentient 
or experiencing subjects,,186 is another plank in Hartshorne's meta-
physics. Reality is to be understood in terms of panpsychism. 187 All 
constitutive elements of concrete reality "exhibit social characteristics,,~88 
The category "feeling,,189 is important in this regard, particularly to 
182. Hartshorne, Aquinas to Whitehead, pp.22f. 
183. J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.277. But 
Hartshorne is also to some extent an Idealist, cf. Gunton, 
"Rejection, Influence and Development". 
184. cf. Discussion of Hartshorne's "organic monism" in P.R. Clifford, 
Interpreting Human Experience, p.98. 
185. P . E. Devenish , "Divinity and Polarity ... ", p. 346. 
186. ibid. 
187. cf. Gunton, Becoming, p.63. "Process" means that, as interrelated 
whole, reality "is described not only as process, but as social 
process". 
188. L.B. Keeling, "Feeling as a Metaphysical Category: Hartshorne 
From an Analytical View", Proc.St. 6, Spring 1976:52. 
189. cf. T.R. Vitali, "The Peirceian Influence on Hartshorne's 
Subj ecti vism", Proc. St. 7, Winter 1977: 238-248. 
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Hartshorne's early metaphysics. Keeling ' s discussion highlights the 
need to distinguish the use of the term: Hartshorne does not refer 
to feeling qua emotional or psychological content, but rather some-
thing akin to what I would call "relational intent". 190 Reality is 
composed not of discrete entities but of mutually interrelating entities 
that become in the process of relating one to another. 
Hartshorne's process metaphysics holds that reality consists of 
d · 191 d h .. d h ... 1 192 ynamlc events, an t at creatlvlty enotes t e processlve prlnclp e. 
Concrete reality is determinate and definite actuality: entitative 
identity is thus determined or discerned in the becoming of the event. 193 
Indeed, as Gunton notes, "an entity, to be an entity, must be an event 
194 taking place within the universal process". This schema is not 
195 
without its problems, chiefly the apparent lack of transcendence, 
and hence independent entitative identity as such. This is particularly 
so with respect to determining the entitative status ascribed to God 
b 1 · 1 h' 196 Y neoc aSSlca t elsm. Indeed Hartshorne himself acknowledges 
that he has most difficulty with respect to the "problem of the unity 
190. cf. C. Hartshorne, "Why Psychicalism?", Proc.St 6, Spring 1976: 
67-72. 
191. cf. Creative SyntheSis, pp.175, 183. 
192. op. cit., p.166. Note in this regard D.M. Brahinsky's challenge 
to 'creativity' in "Process and "Generality; "Proc;St. 7, Winter 
1977:262-263. He chooses to stress, among other things, re1ation-
a1ity as a fundamental entitative motif. " 
193. cf. E.H. Peters, "Hartshorne on Actuality", Proc.St. 7, Fall 1977: 
200-204; S .0. Brenan, "Substance Within Substance"; "Proc;St. 7, 
Spring 1977:14-25, for a parallel Whiteheadian perspective. 
. s" 194. Gunton, "The Knowledge of God According to Two Process Theo10pan , 
p.94. 
195. cf. N.H.G. Robinson, in Scot.J.Th. 21, September 1968:347; alsO 
Gunton, "Transcendence,- Metaphor and the Knowabili ty of God". 
196. cf. e.g. H.J. Nelson, "Experience, Dialectic and God", Proc.St. 11, 
Fall 1981:153-167. 
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f h d · . 1'" 197 o t e lVlne persona soclety. As supreme example and embodiment 
of the principles of the process perspective, the neoclassical concept 
198 of God exhibits the problem of identity qua entitative status. 
Hartshorne thinks Whitehead amiss to conceive God as a single entity: 
G d · b tt . d 1 t . t fl" 199 o 1S e er concelve as ana ogous 0 a SOC1e y 0 actua ent1t1es. 
But this is even more confusing with respect to entitative identity. 
The difficulties inherent in determining the exact nature of the 
entitative status of God within Hartshorne's viewpoint is in many ways 
attributable to difficulties with the concept of the "self" as the 
locus of personal identity.200 Personal identity for Hartshorne is 
constituted as serial becoming : "the identity of a series of 'momentary 
201 
sel ves "' . Reali ty takes on a frame by frame quality, as in a film, 
as its ontological basis . The human self is the ongoing 'movie': a 
" . ." 202 A H . 1 . soclety" of actual occaSlons or entltles. s aml ton puts lt, 
Hartshorne "sees the fundamental entity not as the persisting 'self' 
of personal identity but as each successive 'self_now ll ,.203 The 
197. Hartshorne et aI, "Three Responses to Neville's Creativity and 
God", Proc.St., Fall-Winter 1980:96. 
198 . See, e . g. M. Suchocki, "The Metaphysical Ground of the Whiteheadian 
God", Proc.St . 5, Winter 1975:237-246; and cf. J. Cobb, 'God and 
the World, p . 7l, refers to God as "energy-event". cf . also E. L. 
Mascall; He 'Who ' Is, for comment on the entitative perspective and 
the issue of Whitehead ' s concept of God. 
199 . C. Hartshorne, "Whitehead in French Perspective: A Review Article", 
Thomist 33, July 1969:578; cf. P. Hamilton~ 'The 'Living 'God, p.88; 
and L.S . Ford, "The Non-Temporality of Whitehead ' s God"; ' r;p.Q. 13, 
September 1973:347-376. 
200 . cf. A. Shalom and J.C. Robertson, "Hartshorne and the Problem of 
Personal Identity", Proc.St. 8, Fall 1978:169-178. 
201. op. cit., p.174. 
202. R.B. Edwards, "The Human Self: An Actual Entity or a Society?", 
Proc.St. 5, Fall 1975:195-203 . 
203. P. Hamilton, The Living God, p . 28 . 
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problem is that whilst Hartshorne wishes to see God conceived in 
terms of human existence, the focus on the atomistic event-nature of 
process metaphysics detracts from the more signi f icant relational 
implications of this perspective, implications which come to the fore 
when Hartshorne discusses God without reference to the question of 
entitative status. However, when raising the question of entitative 
status of God, and thereby necessarily attending to Hartshorne's 
understanding of entity and reality as such, conceptual difficulties 
arise. Macquarrie is perceptive in his observation that Hartshorne 
more successfully explores the concept of God, per 8e~ than he treats 
of the identity of the human self. 204 Yet the relationality inherent 
in the process of being, or becoming, a self, is not absent from 
Hartshorne. 205 
The problem resides in the way in which relationality is accounted 
for in determining concrete identity. Hartshorne, as Hamilton notes, 
is at least consistent in his analogous application of the process 
conception of person as "an ordered sequence of entities" to his 
determination of God as personal. However, motivated by the axiom of 
immediate or essential relatedness that holds between God and every 
entity, Hartshorne suggests the mind/body relationship as the approp-
riate analogy by which to speak of the relationship between God and 
206 the world. The application of the analogy is not without its 
204. J. Macquarrie in Exp.T. 82, March 1971:186. 
205. cf. D. Breslauer, "Modernizing Biblical Religion: Abraham Heschel 
and Charles Hartshorne", Encotmt. 38, Autumn 1977:340. 
206. cf. Hartshorne, Man's Vision, Chapter 5; Hamilton, The Livin£ 
God, pp.170ff. 
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limitations and difficulties. Its value is in its indicating the 
intimacy and inclusiveness of God's relationship to the world: it 
signifies this essential relatedness as ontologically basic to the 
understanding of God. 
Hartshorne disputes Whitehead's view of God as actual entity; 
his own alternative view at least renders the entitative status of 
God consistent with the process metaphysic of reality.207 On the one 
hand this stresses the processiveness of 'becoming' as onto1ogica11y 
inherent to God; on the other hand it gives an incomplete designation 
of the entitative status of deity. The entitative identity of God 
transcends the seriality of occasions. For example, when Hartshorne 
poses the question "Is God constituted by his response to the world?" 
and then replies with "Not exclusively for he is also constituted by 
his responses to his own antecedent responses,,208 Hartshorne implies 
an understanding of the identity of God in ttn'ms of relational entity 
which is more than sheer responsiveness. That is to say: it is as 
relational entity that God may be deemed responsive in the first 
place. 
As with Macquarrie the pivotal metaphysical issue in Hartshorne's 
doctrine of God is that of entitative status. My analysis of his 
concept of God demonstrated its inherent relationality. The clear 
implication is that for Hartshorne God is, primarily, a relational 
207. Hamilton, The Living God, pp.168ff. 
208. C. Hartshorne, "Abstract and Concrete in God: A Reply", R.Met. 
XVII, December 1963:294. 
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entity: the being of God is that of relational being. This re1ation-
a1ity is thus a key principle in the exposition of theological issues 
f h . 209 rom t e process perspectlve. 
Hartshorne's view of God in terms of dynamic reality has informed 
210 the understanding of God as love . Hartshorne also claims that, 
from the neoclassical perspective, doctrines such as the Incarnation 
and the Trinity "acquire a new meaning" 211 However, his suggestion 
that "the new metaphysics implies a plurality of divine persons in the 
life of God" in the sense that 
if there is a divine becoming as weZZ as a divine 
being. then in some real sense God is a new being 
every moment of his life ... the succession of beings 
in God is in a sense a succession of persons (212) 
is puzzlingly confusing to say the least. Does he mean that the trans-
cendent inclusive category is the life of God? Or is it "God" of 
which such life may be spoken? Does this not reduce the notion of 
"divine being" to atomistic instantiation only? 
The endeavour to determine the ontological reality of God in 
terms of the neoclassical metaphysics of reality. however, results in 
209 . cf. D. R. Griffin, "Relativism. Divine Causation, and Biblical 
Theology", Encount. 36. Autumn 1975:342-360. Note his comments 
on the biblical context in which to perceive the reality of 
Jesus' identity is an acknowledgement of the relational matrix 
by which Christology is to be determined. p.355 . 
210. cf. N.F.S. Ferre. The Christian Understanding of God. London: 
S.C.M. 1952 . 
211. Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, p . 169 . 
212. ibid. (Italics mine). 
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an entitative conundrum: Is the entitative identity of God that of 
serial occasion of prehending actuality or that of supremely relative 
all-inclusive being? One tends to immerse the sense of transcendent 
identity in the immanence of process; the other is open to a trans-
cendent identity which embraces process and relationality as integral 
to its nature as being relational entity. Or perhaps the entitative 
status of God embraces both. 
The danger that needs to be avoided is to admit of a position 
that allows for a "God behind God" conceptually. This appears a 
possibility when the issue of God's entitative status is addressed 
in terms of process metaphysics, but not so when addressed from the 
perspective of neoclassical theism per se. Of course Hartshorne 
tries to resolve this conundrum by referring to God as a "personally 
d d o f dO ° 0" 213 or ere soclety 0 lVlne occaSl0ns . 
My observation of the inherent entitative difficulty of this 
position is confirmed by Ford's own analysis of the difficulties 
associated with the society model. He concludes that 
Strictly speaking, God cannot be conceived as an 
actual entity. As concrescent activity, he is 
actual in the sense of being active. But in the 
sense of being concretely determinate, he is not 
actual, for he never becomes an entity capable of 
objectification. (214) 
213. L.S. Ford, "The Divine Activity of the Future", Proc.St. 11, 
Fall 1981:169. 
214. op. cit., pp.178-l79. 
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However, Ford's stress on entity is misplaced: it should rather be 
on 'actual'. It is the final non-objectification of God which is 
the important affirmation. My point is that Ford's usage is not 
the sole application for the proper theological use of the term 
'entity' when speaking of God. Hartshorne has shown that in his 
concrete determination God is eminently related. The concrescent 
activity is relational activity. It is re1ationa1ity that in the 
neoclassical perspective is determinative of the entitative status 
of God. Thus God may not be actual entity: he is nonetheless, for 
H h . . 215 arts orne, re1at1ona1 ent1ty. 
For Hartshorne, relationship between the Divine and the Human is 
occasioned not only by worship, but also by service, or diakonia . 
This diacona1 motivation and expression which is an essential component 
of true religion means that, whilst God's existence as such is not 
dependent, there is nonetheless a genuine dependency within the being 
of God that validates the diakonia. 2l6 But how is it that God may be 
existentially independent whilst onto1ogica1ly dependent? Is this 
not a contradictory conclusion? The resolution is only by means of 
conceiving God qua relational entity: thus the question of existent 
instantation of the entity is independent of - i.e. not requiring as 
antecedent cause - any other existing entity. But it itself would 
not - could not - exist in sheer isolation, as it were, because the 
being of this 'entity' is re1ationa11y interdependent on - i.e. 
215. The term 'entity' is a cipher for the locus of ontological 
identity and reality; the qualifier 'relational' is the 
indicator of the nature of this reality and identity. 
216. cf. C. Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity", R.Met XXI, 
December 1967:274. 
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necessarily requires to relate to - other entities. Thus the diaconal 
motivation of religious faith reveals the relational reality of the 
focus of faith. 
Similarly, Hartshorne perceives the doxological motive as expres-
sive of the relational reality of deity.2l7 Relational activity or 
interaction is an indispensable element in the understanding of 
'Creator' .218 D.O. Williams has commented that: 
Process philosophy opens up for Christian theology 
a way of conceiving the being of God in historical-
temporal terms. What it proposes is akin to the 
existentialist search for radical freedom for man, 
and the acceptance of the risks of being; but 
process philosophy is closer than existentialism to 
the classical philosophies in its search for an 
intelligible metaphysics. It seeks the logo8 of 
being. (219) 
Ferre suggests that the process God may indeed be "~ congenial 
in formal structure to the God of the biblical model than was the 
220 
traditional theory". The fundamental challenge to the traditional 
manner of conceiving God has undoubtedly been the process focus on 
221 
taking account of the reality of relation into its concept of God. 
217. Ope cit., pp.278f. 
218. Ope cit., p.284. 
219. D.O. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, pp.l06f. 
220. F. Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, London: Geo. 
Allen and Unwin 1967, p.434. 
221. cf. W.J. Stokes, "Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic Realism", 
N.Schol. 38, January 1964:1-21. 
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The process perspective is proving increasingly applicable and stim-
222 
ulating in all areas of theology, and this in large measure because 
it is the perspective which does greater justice, it would seem, to 
this relationality. For instance, Norman Pittenger, who has been a 
dogged defender of process theology for many years, speaks of the 
relatedness of God in terms of a "metaphysics of love".223 His 
exposition of the process perspective highlights the centrality of 
h 1 · 1 . f hI' 1 h . 224 t e re at10na mot1 as t eo og1ca ermeneut1C. 
Ogden suggests that "Hartshorne's dipolar view of God provides 
a virtually exact counterpart to Heidegger's existentialist analysis 
of man". 225 If he is right then this suggests the possibility of 
positively juxtaposing Hartshorne's work with that of Macquarrie, who 
has intentionally modelled his thinking on that of Heidegger. It may 
be said of Macquarrie, as equally as of Hartshorne (at least in intent), 
that he offers "a precise philosophical conceptuality in which God as 
well as man can be appropriately spoken about in non-mythological 
terms" . 226 
222. cf. L. Gilkey, Message and Existence, New York: Seabury 1979, 
as an example of the creative interplay of process thought 
with other main approaches; W.A. Beardslee, A House For Hope: 
A'Study ' inPtocessand Biblical Thought, Philadelphia: Westminster 
1972, for an example of Christian faith interpreted in process 
terms; L.S. Ford, The Lure of God: A Biblical Backgrourtd For 
Process Theism, Philadelphia: Fortress 1978, for a broad ranging 
juxtaposition of process and biblical perspectives. 
223. N. Pittenger, "Process Theology: A Response to Criticisms", 
Exp.T. 92, June 1981:271; "Suffering and Love", Exp.T. 85, 
October 1973: 19-22; "Process Theology and the Fact of Evil", 
Exp.T. 83, December 1971:73-77. 
224. cf. e.g. N. Pittenger, "Refreshment and Companionship", Exp.T. 
84, November 1972:51-54. 
225. S. Ogden, The Reality of God, p.172. 
226. ibid. 
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Ogden labels as "crucial" the Hartshornian insight "that God 
227 is to be conceived in strict analogy with the human self or person" 
Interrelationship and dependency are constitutive ontological character-
istics of both human person, or being, and God. Ontological-relationality 
is the point of similarity between the divine and the human. Against 
this optomistic outlook, however, must be set the reality that when 
Hartshorne speaks of the being of God he uses an aspectival approach 
which has raised the entitative difficulties I have discussed above. 
Nonetheless the neoclassical stress of God's relatedness gives the 
clue to maintaining the ontological unity of that which is conceived 
. 11 228 aspectl.va y. Hartshorne reconciles monism and pluralism: God is 
"the inclusive whole .. . He is a personal being involved with his 
creatures".229 
I noted in the analysis above the key role played by 'inclusion' 
. H h ' h' k' G d 230 It' th b . t h ' d l.n arts orne s t l.n l.ng on o. gl.ves e asl.S 0 l.S un er-
standing of reality as panentheistic and God as internally related to 
all reality . 23l But panentheism denotes only one aspect of inclusive-
ness: not only is all included in God, but God is present, or included 
in, "all experience". God "is in some fashion a universal datum of 
experience" 232 Now this, I would argue, can only make sense on an 
227 . op. ci t . , p. I 75 . 
228. cf. Peters, Hartshorne, p.llO . 
229. Ford, Lure, p . 7. 
230 . See above, Part Two. 
231. cf . R.A. Oakes, "Classical Theism and Pantheism: A Victory for 
Process Theism?", Re1.St. 13, June 1977:167-173. 
232 . Hartshorne, Natural Theology, p.2. 
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understanding of God as relational. That is to say, rather than 
being "in" experience as a "spiritual" characteristic or mark, or 
as some kind of pervasive "substance", God can only be understood 
as "in" experience in terms of the ontological context of experienc-
ing entities. Thus the pervasiveness of Deity within existence is 
constituted by the fact of ontological relatedness as the framework 
and dynamic of experience. In terms of his essential relationality, 
God provides this framework and dynamic, and is thereby universally 
'present' in all experience. 
Hartshorne begins with the notion of God as He-Who-Is-Worshipped,233 
and then asks what it is that makes God so worshipful and, further, 
how it is that this object of worship may be related to the concepts 
of philosophical,theology.234 God is thus a "supreme being" who is 
. . h· If 1 235 worshlpped in love and who lS, lmse , ove. This primary focus-
sing of the doctrine of God upon the God of worship, rather than on 
the God of philosophical abstraction, underlies the prospect of basing 
an understanding of God upon the relational motif. For the God of 
worship - the God of love - is the God of relationship. The God to 
whom worshippers relate and who reciprocally relates in love, is the 
God who may be identified as a relational entity. It is by attending 
to this relationality that difficulties such as with ontological 
ambivalence of the dipolar conceptuality may be met. It is a mistake 
to ontologise the poles: they are but conceptual aspects descriptive 
233. op. cit., p.3; cf. Logic, p.3; Divine Relativity, p.l. 
234. Divine Relativity, p.2. 
235. cf. Natural Theology, p.12f. 
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of deity as relational entity. Entitative identity of God requires 
both the transcendent otherness and the immanent presence of relational 
being. 
IV. BEING AND BECOMING IN COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTUALITY 
The issue of the entitative status of God is a problem common 
to both Macquarrie and Hartshorne. Before proceeding in the next 
section to directly address this problem, I shall endeavour to 
juxtapose and compare elements of neoclassical and existential-
ontological theism. The object is to present the conceptual comple-
mentariness of these two perspectives. 
In accordance with the ontological-relational hermeneutic, God 
is constituted by the relations "being-in(-the-world)" and "being-with 
(-others)". The relationality expressed and revealed within particular 
relationships of fact, which I call "real" relationships,236 is itself 
the key ontological constituent of the reality of God. 
Now to speak in terms of the being of God is not to speak of 
something God has, qua possession. Rather the phrase 'being of God' 
denotes the reality of who God is, with respect to ontological 
structure. This comes to focus ' for Macquarrie in the concept of 
"letting-be". The creativity of God is the letting-be of the beings 
by Holy Being: it is the outcome of relational activity. This means 
that "all that is ~ ' participates in Being, and that God is understood 
as the locus of the relationality of Being. The relational reality of 
236. Note, "real" as distinguished from "apparent"; cf. "actual" in 
distinction for "potential" or even "theoretical". 
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God encompasses the transcendent and sustaining ontological framework 
of existence. God is not synonymous with Bei ng per se, but he i s, 
for Macquarrie, understood as that which is, ontologically, dynamic 
and relational. 
By describing God in terms of dipolar structure Hartshorne is 
also making an assertion about the being of God. Neoclassical theism 
is pregnant with ontological import. Indeed, the rel ational under-
standing of Being sheds light on the following statement: 
God must coincide with Being as such; for he cannot 
be without existence, and therefore equally existence 
cannot be without him, so that the very meaning of 
'exist' must be theistic ... God is the great 'I am', 
the one whose existence is the expression of his own 
power and none other, who self-exists - rather than 
is caused, or happens, to exist - and by whose power 
of existence all other things exist. (237) 
That is to say, if it is to be other than Pantheism (where, 
effectively, Being is equated with existent reality), or other than 
a theological reduction (such that the identity of God, as other-than 
the existential manifestation of Being, is lost, or compromised), then 
the coincidence of God with Being must be in terms of an understanding 
of God as the entitative locus of ontological-relationality as such. 
In this sense God 'cannot be without existence'. And because it is 
of the essence of existing reality to partici pate in the relationality 
237. Philosophers Speak, p.8. 
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of Being, Hartshorne is able to argue that existence requires God, 
that the meaning of 'exists' must be theistic. In other words, 
existence is theistic to the extent it manifests and expresses the 
ontological-relationality of God. The power of God's existence is 
seen in the relationality of reality, and his own 'self-existence' 
expresses his ontological priority to, though not his independence of, 
created existence. Self-existence refers to non-caused priority, not 
to putative non-relationality of the Supreme Being. 
Hartshorne's statement that "God is in some sense Being itself 
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while all other things participate in being through God" may also 
be comprehended by virtue of the ontological-relational hermeneutic. 
The sense in which God is Being itself is not that of material identity 
but ontological-relational expression. 'Participates' denotes the 
relational reality of existence whereby all that is created by God 
reflects and manifests the relationality of his being. 
Hartshorne's dipolar theism is itself a model of attaining a 
novel theological synthesis by way of a complementary conceptuality. 
Aspects of God which would fall under the category of the absolute pole 
are juxtaposed with aspects which would otherwise be rejected as 
inappropriate for application to the concept of God. Such aspects 
are grouped under the 'relative' pole. Furthermore, this group of 
aspects embraces the sense of relationality which, by virtue of the 
axiom of ontological inclusion-also a fundamental element in 
Hartshorne's thinking - implies the being of God as relational . 
238. Man's Vision, p.93. 
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Relativity and relatedness are not simply included'~lements alongside 
others: they are themselves the inclusive categories by which the 
traditional motifs of the doctrine of God are incorporated within the 
neoclassical concept. 
The relational reality of God means that the neoclassical dipolarity 
is neither artificial construct nor categoreal imposition. Rather it 
gives an inclusive account of the various veridical aspects of the 
understanding of God within a particular ontological framework. It is 
ontological-relationality which lies at the heart of Hartshorne's focus 
on the encompassing supremacy of God. The being of God is relational 
in its inclusiveness of diverse polar correlates. This gives the basis 
for the ontological relevance of dipolarity. 
It could be said that, for Hartshorne, the being of God is concrete 
relativity constituted by essential relatedness. Particular relation-
ships in which God stands are not perceived as ontologically indifferent. 
Indeed it is the relational activity of the divine that evidences the 
relational structure by which the being of God may be described. 
Hartshorne's metaphysical construct complements Macquarrie's 
existential-ontological analysis. Both espouse a relationality 
derived from different conceptual approaches to God. The relationality 
of the analysis of God in terms of the relatedness of 'being-in' and 
'being-with', together with the summary view of the ontological sus-
tainment of "letting-be" complements the relatedness of dipolarity and 
the summary view of ontological inclusiveness. Furthermore, there are 
specific points of complementariness of which I have analysed the 
following six. 
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(i) The Identity of God 
Although I am stressing 'relation' as the key hermeneutical term 
in the discussion of the ontological reality of God, I do not seek 
thereby to reduce the identity of God simply to relations as such. 
The name 'God' refers to an identifiable reality: the issue is to 
determine the nature of the identity in terms of the structural 
content of that reality. I am seeking to determine, that is, the 
structural reality of God as "One who engages in ad extra relation-
ships necessarily". Now although the nature of the 'self' or 
'identity' of God is ontologically described in terms of relationality, 
yet this 'self' or 'being' of God is not a reduction in the sense of 
a depreciation of the reality of God. It is rather the observation 
239 that in this focus I am denoting a theological "perspectival centre" 
for enunciating a concept of God. Therefore as part of this enunciat-
ing I ask the question: How is the sense of the identity of God 
maintained? 
For Macquarrie the self is a relational entity, and this conclusion 
is determined both from the analysis of the ontological structure of 
existence, and from the perception of a self as a temporal locus 
d f . f d 240 h whereby past, present, an uture are 1nter ace . To t e extent 
that God is a 'self' there is an identity to the self-hood of God 
which is distinguishable from the matrix of actual relationships in 
which the self is located, yet which is found formally only 'within 
this ontological-relational matrix of existence. 
239. H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, p.l86. 
240. See above, pp.7lff. 
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In complementary fashion, Hartshorne concludes that individual 
self identity is rendered constant through change by virtue of the 
241 polar contrasts. Thus the focus on constancy as the content of 
changelessness undergirds the integrity of self-identity whereby God 
maintains his essential and irreducible re1ationa1ity through changing 
relationships. 
(ii) The Context for God-Talk 
For Macquarrie the context of discourse about God is the encounter 
with Being "as it relates itself to us ... as we are embraced by Being 
d h . d' h l' " 242 an ave recognlze ltS 0 lness . The proper context for theo1og-
ica1 analysis and construction is the relational encounter. Theological 
language has its roots in the relational matrix denoted by the 
existential-ontological analysis. 
The proper context for discussing the concept of God for Hartshorne 
is indicated by his axiom that polar contrasts "require each other". 
Conceptual contrasts are perceived as real correlatives within the 
dipolar framework. Within the ontological unity of the being of God 
there is absolute reliability of relational integrity and abstract 
identity conceptually distinguishable from, though found only within, 
changing relational content. Correlative to this is the relativity 
which betokens essential relatedness and concrete participation in 
the world of changing relationships as also ontologically constitutive. 
241. cf. above, pp.246ff. Note, however, the difficulty with the 
metaphysical proposition that the entitative identity of the 
self is that of serial momentary 'selves': thus he holds that 
the self is a 'society' of these seriated moments. 
242. Macquarrie, Principles, p.127. 
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(iii) The Being of God 
For Hartshorne, God as "perfect being" is all-inclusive as the 
"self-surpassing surpasser of all" . Relativity is onto1ogically 
determinative. Perfection does not denote qualitative excellence 
with respect to attributes, possessions or features. Rather it 
denotes the supremacy of dynamic self-excelling and self-surpassing 
becoming. The God who 'becomes' genuinely interacts and relates. 
"Becoming" is thus the interpreter of "Being". 
At this point there is a complementary contrast with Macquarrie 
who holds that Being includes becoming as ~ of its chief character-
istics. 243 It is nonetheless one of the key features contributing 
to his conception of Being as 'letting-be'. Thus Hartshorne's 
surre1ativism is complemented by Macquarrie's "ontological providence". 
The being of God is expressed on the one hand by relational inclusion, 
and on the other by ontological "allowance". 
(iv) Analogy 
Both Macquarrie and Hartshorne explore the issue of the analogy 
of the human situation as somehow mirroring the divine. Hartshorne's 
conclusion is that reality is social; human existence is the supreme 
example of the social relatedness of the created order. Therefore 
God, the supreme Being, as creator of this order which is itself a 
relational reality 'in his image' must himself be supremely social, 
i.e. relational. 
243. cf. above, 79ff. Also cf. that Ogletree notes that 'Being' is 
necessarily conceptually bound up with 'Becoming' - "A 
Heideggerian Theology II", Interp., July 1967: 342. 
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Macquarrie deals with this issue more fully . However, his 
conclusion is really much the same. The fullness of being human is 
conceived as conformity to God's image qua plenitude of relatedness. 
Human being 'images ' Holy Being. The axiom of Imago Dei has a 
double ontological referent. On the one hand human being is grounded 
in the creative relationality of the letting-be of the Divine: the 
relationality of human being reflects the relationality of divine 
being. But also, on the other hand, God is conceived in relational 
terms as a consequence of analogical application of the Imago Dei. 
Cv) Divine Attribute per 8e 
Contrasting the analysis of Macquarrie's understanding of divine 
attribute and relation with Hartshorne's cognitive and causal relations 
gives a further point of complementary contact. Rejecting the view 
of attributes as possessions or properties ascribed to God as things-
in-themselves, Macquarrie espouses the view that an atttibute is a 
symbol which expresses the mystery of God. Attributes denote relation-
ships: they present God-in-relation - they express a facet of the 
relationality of God. Attributes are indicators of the multifaceted 
relationship that holds between God and the World. This is expressed 
summarily by the Creator-creation relationship. Within the context 
of this relation there is an assymetrical inter-dependency . The 
creature is dependent on the Creator as being to Being: yet Holy 
Being, or Creator, is dependent on beings - the creation, and in 
particular human being - to express and ' fulfil ' its self. That is, 
to actualise the relationality by which creative Being is ontologic-
ally constituted. 
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The result is comparable with Hartshorne's challenge that 
omniscience must be seen to involve an appropriate dependency of God 
upon creation as the content for his knowledge. God's knowing is a 
function of his relating. He does not know-in-isolation. Indeed 
omniscience is the all-inclusive knowability of that which supremely 
manifests adequate cognitive relationality: God relates cognitively 
to all that he creates. Cognitive relationality is one aspect of 
ontological-relationality. Similarly, creativity, as causal relation, 
is a facet of the relational being of God. As with Macquarrie, 
Hartshorne conceives God as Creator in terms of the relation that 
holds between God and the world, with the added implication that 
creativity is the concrete expression of causal relationality. 
Creativity is an expression of the essence of who or what God is. 
(vi) The Four Relational "Marks" 
To conclude this discussion of the conceptual complementariness 
of the ontological and process perspectives as I have analysed them, 
I shall take up the set of questions that were specifically asked of 
both thinkers with regard to those elements in the concept of God 
which constitute the marks of a relator, or relational entity. 
1. First, to what extent do their views on transcendence or the 
otherness of God yield complementary conclusions? Divine "otherness" 
is for Macquarrie reflected in the view that Being "is" transoendens. 
Being is logically prior to the beings: Otherness in God is the mark 
of ontological priority. Transcendence relates this priority to the 
actuality of creation by virtue of the ontological-relationality 
which itself issues in the relational matrix ........ 
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of the created world . Omnipotence denotes the potency and potential 
for engagement in actual relations. Otherness is also expressed by 
the motif of ' infinity ' which leads to the conclusion that God is 
non-limited in his capacity to relate authentically. Otherness 
denotes identity and is a necessary mark of relational entity: for 
Macquarrie there is such an otherness appropriate to Holy Being. 
It denotes the transcendence of ontological-relational priority; the 
omnipotence of relational capability; and the infiniteness of relational 
capacity . The otherness of Holy Being is indicative of the entitative 
identity of "that which" is so relational. 
Similarly for Hartshorne there is an appropriate otherness in his 
understanding of Divine Becoming . Expressed as "infinite" the trans-
cendent otherness of God is non-limited in potential for self-
surpassability and relational inclusion . Hartshorne's understanding 
of incomparability, absoluteness and omnipotence yields the surrelative 
relational surpassability of God . Otherness in neoclassical thought 
is perceived as a necessary element in the conception of God as 
relational entity. It denotes as "other" that which exercises onmi-
potently the influence of lure and persuasion; whose relational 
potential or capacity is infinite; for whom incomparability spells 
relational supremacy and adequacy. The absoluteness of this other 
is non-limitation of relational scope, and final self-determinacy of 
destiny and relational depth. The sovereigntyof this other is that 
of persuasive initiative in the context of sensitive and responsive 
authentic relating. 
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2. The second question, correlative to that concerning transcendence, 
is the question of immanence. How does the presence of God in 
Macquarrie's theism complement that of Hartshorne's? As the motif 
of presence, immanence is alluded to by Hartshorne by way of discus-
sions on love, omniscience and holiness as my analysis showed. Divine 
love is denoted as "absolute adequacy to the object".244 Such 
adequacy is that of being present in loving relationship . Divine 
Becoming is manifest in the caring compassionate concern of God: a 
relating of the concern-ful God within specific historical existences . 
The love of God is not an abstract 'quality ' but names the present 
and immanent relational reality of the divine. Love that denotes 
intentional presence-in-the-ad-extra-relating of God. Although 
omniscience received fuller treatment in the discussion of the cognit-
ive relation, it is relevant here too as an index of the presence of 
that which knows all through .the awareness implicit in its comprehensive 
relating to all. It suggests God as immanent in awareness and response. 
Finally, holiness implies for Hartshorne the quality of "fullness of 
life" which contributes properly to the life of God. It thus implies 
a necessary intimacy of relation between God and humankind. It is 
interpretive of the relationality undergirding human life and divine 
life. It connotes adequacy of motivation and actualising capacity as 
applicable to God. 
This relational perspective is complemented by Macquarrie's under-
standing of the presence of Holy Being in terms of the immanence of 
incarnation. 245 Incarnation is the focus of God's relating to the 
244. Hartshorne, Man's Vision, p.165. 
245. cf. Macquarrie, God and Secularity, p.133. 
377 
world: he "dwells" within the world, meeting it within the context 
of historical reality. Immanence thus expresses the "being-in" and 
"being-with" of God. The presence of Holy Being is seen in the 
manifestation of Being in the process of letting-be of beings. Put 
otherwise, the presence of God is by virtue of the participation of 
God within the ontological structures of the world. Holy Being 
sustains, by virtue of its essential relatedness, the beings that 
comprise the world. Concomitantly, beings participate in the Being 
that lets them be. Further, there is the particular relation that 
holds between human being and God which points to an intentional 
co-relating with respect to all other created being. But this is a 
comment on the qualitative variation of particular relations in fact: 
it does not alter the fundamental ontological-relational status of 
reality and God. 
3. The third question concerned the activity of God qua Holy Being 
and qua Divine Becoming. For Macquarrie the action of Holy Being 
is the initiating activity whereby it realizes its inherent relational 
intent. Creative activity has pride of place here. The immanent 
God is the creatively active God. God acts within historical and 
existential reality. The relationality of Holy Being emerges within 
the ontic realm. God's activity finds both christological and pneu-
matological expression. Expressive Being has its focus in the 
relational event and work of salvation; Unitive Being is itself the 
focus of relational engagement. The activity of God is the necessary 
concomitant and existential comportment of the ontological-relation-
ali ty of God. 
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For Hartshorne the activity of Divine Becoming is that of dynamic 
participation of the divine in the processes of creation. 246 It 
suggests participation as a rel ational quality, and personality expressed 
in terms of sensitive initiation and engagement. It r efers to the 
activity of God as source of initial aim and the lure to creative 
novelty. It is the activity implied by the principles of concretion 
and limitation. But the concern here is nonethe less to discern the 
ontological implications of neoclassical cosmological conceptuality. 
To that extent the activity of the divine Bei ng is supremely r e lational. 
Yet the action of God is also that of ontological sustainment: the 
intimate relatedness of the God who is "other" yet "present with". 
The perspective of Macquarrie is both similar and complementar y to th i s. 
God is active within the out-working of his creation: on the one hand 
in terms of the process of becoming, on the other hand in terms of the 
meaning of Being. Both are complementary aspects of the relational 
reality of God . 
4. The final question concerned interaction: To what extent does 
'responsiveness ' in Holy Being and Divine Becoming indicate the 
essential relationality of God? Hartshorne's Divi ne Becoming is seen 
to be responsive in its interactive relating within the processes of 
the world and mankind . Interaction and responsiveness denote the true , 
albeit assymetrical, mutuality that holds in the relation between God 
and the world. The challenge to this is the concept of God's immuta-
bility. Hartshorne understands this in terms of the fidelity of God's 
relational essence. There is a changelessness of purpose, or intent, 
and of self-surpassability, at the heart of deity. It does not, how-
ever, delimit the reality of God as relational agent. God responds to, 
246. Hartshorne does not develop this in terms of a Christology. 
However, such a possibility is by no means excluded. 
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and interacts with, and is thus influenced by, that with which he is 
engaged in relationship. This responsiveness denotes the divine 
interactiveness pep se. It is an inherent quality of the faith-
relationahip. The responsiveness of God is analogous to the inter-
active responsiveness of human relating: but it is also the means of 
God's exercise of persuasive agency. 
As with Hartshorne, so we find Macquarrie considering the inter-
action and responsiveness of God and meeting the challenge of 
immutability. As personal, Holy Being is relational: personal being 
is grounded in real interaction and responsiveness. In terms of love, 
Holy Being is both a "letting-be" and a "responding-to". Action is 
balanced by interaction; initiative by responsiveness. Such relational 
reciprocity is expressive of the essence of God's relational being. 
The love of God issues in the work of reconciliation, viz, the restor-
ation of relationship. As with Hartshorne, Macquarrie views immutability 
not as the mark of static non-change, but rather as the unchangeability 
of the essential relatedness of God. Immutability points to God's 
faithfulness to relate, to respond appropriately: a faithfulness born 
of his essential ontological-relational nature. 
I have drawn together the main threads of the findings on the 
existential-ontological and process perspectives in an attempt to 
discern the conceptual complementariness of Being and Becoming. In 
many respects the comparison of detail reveals not so much a comple-
mentariness pep se as a direct similarity. Nonetheless, my argument 
is that, on the one hand, Macquarrie's existential-ontological 
approach may be interpreted as inherently relational by virtue of the 
application of the ontological-relational hermeneutic. On the other 
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hand, Hartshorne ' s neoclassical approach is implicitly ontological 
in respect of its implications for a relational description of the 
being of God. Rather than being interpreted by the ontological-
relational hermeneutic directly, I would argue that the relationality 
of Divine Becoming clarifies and expands the understanding of the 
relationality of the Being of God. Together and complementarily 
Being and Becoming denote the essential relationality of the divine 
Reality. 
v. GOD AS "RELATIONAL ENTITY" 
The examination of the thought of John Macquarrie and Charles 
Hartshorne has revealed the question of the entitative status of 
God to be a key issue. Just what is the status, entitatively speaking, 
of "Holy Being", of the "Divine Becoming",of "Divine Relativity"? 
As a result of my analysis and expositions I interpret both 
Macquarrie's Holy Being and Hartshorne's neoclassical panentheism as 
expressing an understanding of God as "relational" in the "ad extra" 
sense: God is identifiable as that which, of ontological necessity, 
engages in relationships of a genuine ad extra and interactive nature. 
This 'necessity' does not refer to external coercion, nor does it 
imply an internal 'lack' or ontological deficiency that is met through 
particular relationships. Rather the 'necessity ' of relational 
engagement is the result of the ontological structure of God. So 
relationships as such do not themselves, separately or in sum, define 
the being of God. Rather they imply the formal ontological relation-
ality of God. They presuppose the relational entitative status of God. 
They suggest that, however else God is conceived, at base there is a 
conception of God as "Relational Entity". 
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Now Gollwitzer is one who is concerned that the being of God 
should not be wholly identified with relationship per se such as 
to obviate the possibility of making direct assertions about God. 247 
However, it is as inappropriate to deny a priori the possibility of 
making direct statements about the being of God as it is to assume 
that such statements can be made independently of the relational 
context in which God is apprehended. Gollwitzer's essential criticism 
is with the immanentism by which talk of God is limited, or reduced, 
to talk of human existence. But to talk of God in his relation to us, 
is, in terms of the ontological-relational perspective, to talk of 
God himself in contradistinction to merely identifying God-talk with 
fl ' h . 248 re ectlons on uman eXIstence. 
Gollwitzer's concern that the identity of God be not reduced to 
mere relations as such is matched by Campbell's concern for the 
'relational'self: relationships presuppose the identity of the self~49 
But again, it is not relationships as such which constitute the identity 
of the self, but the relational structure (or ontology) whereby a self 
is itself within, and only within, the context of actual re1ationships~SO 
Thus the identity of the self is relative to relationships, but not to 
be equated with them. 
247. H. GOllwitzer, The Existence 'of 'God. 
248. op. cit., p.48f. cf. K. Ward, The Concept 'of God, p.213: The 
Scholastics noted that God "cannot be known in himself, but 
only in his relation to the world". 
249. C.A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, p.79. 
250. cf. N. Pittenger, "On Becoming Human", Theol. LXXXIV/697, 
January 1981: 3-11. "Relationship is constitutive of each self . 
This does not imply that the self as self is unimportant; it 
demands only that se1fhood is with other se1ves ... Socia1ity is 
as much part of our humanity as biology". p. 8. 
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Now,to refer to God as the Divine "Real Relator", I suggest, 
could be a helpful summary means of denoting divine relational reality. 
God, qua relational Being, is the divine "Real Relator", the One whose 
Being is to-be-in-relation. The use of the term 'Real' refers to the 
sense in which such a Relator exists as 'entity', that is, as having 
entitative identity over against all other existing entities. Yet 
this "entity" is itself the ontological source of all other entities, 
therefore it is not one of the series of existing entities, nor does 
it form an alternative class. The use of the term ' entity' with 
respect to God, therefore, is qualified. But the point is that, in 
respect of identity, God is conceived as "Real Relator". That is, 
he is one who does in fact engage in relationships, and thereby may 
be said to have entitative status and identity. 
To refer to God as "Real Relator" attempts to hold together the 
sense of otherness and presence which, as marks of the being of God, 
are also elements of the reality of relational entity as such . To 
engage in relationship requires both otherness-from and presence-with. 
A "Real Relator" has the marks of initiating activity and responsive 
sensitivity. Thus relational entitative status is expressed by refer-
ring to God as Divine Real Relator: But can this term bear the 
conceptual weight that I would wish to place on it? 
Classical Thomism repudiates any relationship between God and 
the world other than that of reason alone: this is because God is 
conceived as "the sheerly existent One".25l The concept of God that 
251. A.J. Kelly, "God: How Near A Relation?", Thomist XXXIV, April 
1970:216. 
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is encapsulated in the term "Real Relator" is wholly opposite to this. 
Arising out of the analysis of the doctrine of God as espoused by John 
Macquarrie on the one hand and Charles Hartshorne on the other, it 
affirms the dynamic interrelatedness of God with the world. It contends 
that such interrelatedness is grounded in the very being of God. It 
is not the case that God is "intrinsically constituted as an absolute 
Being by an essential relation to what-is-not-God".252 Rather it is 
the case that, qua Being, God is relational (Macquarrie), and qua 
absolute he is the surrelative and all-inclusive (Hartshorne). 
Thus God is not non-related by virtue of the designation "Being", 
neither is he relationally exclusive of "what-is-not-God". He has 
entitative identity as an "other", but this otherness is not non-
relational "absoluteness". On the contrary it is simply the requisite 
otherness of self-identity. Ontologically, God is the creative source 
and ground of all reality: necessarily so to the extent that the being 
of God is conceived in terms of ontological-relationality, and to the 
extent that such relationality is understood as requiring expression in 
ad extra and mutually interactive relationships. 
As Kelly notes, "Classical theology ... has consistently pointed 
out that God cannot be 'really related' to the world. And this despite 
the fact that the world is 'really related' to God in the very definit-
. f ." 253 10n 0 creat10n . The view of God as relational entity challenges 
252. ibid. 
253. A.J. Kelly, "Trinity and Process", Th.Stud. 31, September 1970: 
411. 
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this tradition: it affirms reciprocity of relational influence and 
response between God and World, though this is not to imply necessary 
, lId 254 symmetr1ca re ate ness . 
Macquarrie resists ascribing entitative status to God, yet his 
existential-ontological theism implies a relationality such that, 
unless it is simply descriptive of immanent ontological process, it 
necessitates reference to a "that which" engages in relational 
activity. "Letting-be" is the ontological-relational denominator of 
the God of existential-ontological theism. By denoting God as "Real 
Relator" the weight of entitative status shifts from 'being' or 
'thing ' as the entitative category, to that of 'relational entity'. 
For such an 'entity' is one for whom to-be is to-be-in-relation. It 
is not one entity "alongside others": it can only be what it is in 
its relationship with others . In all other respects it may be quite 
unlike the others with which it relates. 
When Macquarrie speaks of God as denoting the "transcendent 
255 kId b' 1" , source of grace" he ac now e ges y 1mp 1cat10n an 1dentity of 
God which can best be spoken of as "relational entity" or "Real 
Relator". He remarks: 
If grace is to be found anywhere, it must come from 
beyond the world of things and the society of human 
beings; though it may indeed come through these. (256) 
254. Neither does it assume assymetry as in a relation which "is 
internal and constitutive of the creature, but external or 
accidental to God". D. Cupitt, "God and the World in Post-
Kantian Thought", Theol. LXXV/625, July 1972:344. 
255. Macquarrie, Studies, p . 9. 
256 . ibid . 
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For Macquarrie grace denotes the quality of relationship engaged in 
by the God who, though identifiably 'other' is nonetheless in intimate 
ontological relationship to that in and through which he exercises 
grace. The ontological priority of Holy Being does not imply relational 
independence. The relational presence of Holy Being does not imply 
non-identity in relational immanence. 
Although Gunton mistakenly interprets Hartshorne as holding a 
mere quantitative view of divine transcendence, he is right to suggest 
f G d ' l' l' 257 transcendence is indicative 0 0 s re at10na act1veness. The 
relational reality of God transcends the transcendence/immanence 
d· h 258 1C otomy. Gregor Smith states that "the doctrine of man provides 
the means of understanding the doctrine of God". 259 It is in the 
understanding of human being that the only viable approach may be made 
to understanding God . This is not to imply that transcendence is 
ruled out in favour of immanence alone . For the human being, under-
standing the being of God requires addressing the issue of the meaning 
of human being . This then leads to comprehending the being of God in 
its relatedness to the human being. This methodological programmatic 
parallels Heidegger ' s quest for the meaning of Being commencing with 
the analysis of Dasein . It is the programme adopted by Macquarrie, 
257 . C. Gunton, "Transcendence',' J.Th . St. ns XXXI, October 1980:5l0ff. 
258. cf . C.A. Beckwith, The Idea of God, p.269: "The immanent God is 
'The God of things as they are'; the transcendent God is the God 
of things as they are to become . Since, however, being is ever 
passing into becoming, God as immanent is not static but dynamic; 
and because becoming rises out of and fulfills being, God as 
transcendent is not detached from the actual" . 
259 . Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.IIO. 
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and it complements the rational approach of Hartshorne who addresses 
God's relativity. Hartshorne is not seeking to analyse God as pure 
transcendens but in the essential relatedness by which he is worshipped 
and experienced. 
So, it is as "Real Relator" also that God may be spoken of as 
all-inclusive; supremely and internally related to all else. Neo-
classical theism provides the relational description of the Supreme 
Being which existential-ontological theism determines as organically 
interrelated to created existence. 
Of Hartshorne's dipolar theism Brian Hebblethwaite comments that 
God relates himself to the world of time and history 
in a manner appropriate to the temporal and historical 
nature of his creation, without ceasing to be God. It 
is not a matter of 'dipolarity' in God. Talk of dipolarity 
arises out of the exigencies of general metaphysics on 
the one hand and anthropomorphic projection on the other. (260) 
That God relates himself appropriately is upheld by the ontological 
designation "Real Relator". There is no question whether such relating 
may imply God's ceasing to be himself. Dipolarity is a means of 
explicating this truth: it is a rational approach and it yields a 
relational metaphysic. It reflects the re1ationality of the existential-
ontological analysis of existent reality: it is not thereby simply an 
"anthropomorphic projection". Any difficulty dipo1arism suggests 
260. B. Hebb1ethwai te, "A Comment on Macquarrie", Theol. LXXV /626, 
August 1972:405. 
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regarding the ontological unity of God is resolved by the recognition 
that it is not itself an ontological description but rather a conceptual 
framework whereby polar correlative aspects are accounted for within 
the being of God. 
The ontological-relational interpretation of the being of God 
yields the possibility of adumbrating a new "anaZogia entia" as indeed 
an "anaZogia reZationis". God and creature share ontological status 
as relational entities. Ontological-relationality is thus the basis 
for analogical discourse. Yet it is also the basis for a more direct 
perception of theological verity, a conception which transcends analogy. 
Thus, for instance, the cognitive and the causal adequacy of the 
omniscient creator is an adequacy grounded not in analogical reasoning, 
but in ontological-relational conceptuality. The "containment" of the 
all-inclusive God is not that of a crude spatio-temporal type, but the 
supremacy and ontological intimacy of the divine "Real Relator". There 
is nothing that lies beyond the inclusive relatedness of God. 
The term "Real Relator" signifies relativity and relationality in 
f h d · ·, h bl 261 so ar as t ey are 1st1ngu1s a e. It denotes God as ontologically 
inclusive and entitatively identifiable. The identity of God as "Real 
261. Relativity is not a synonym for relationality. As the categoreal 
determinant of reality, 'relational' conceptually precedes 'relative'. 
' Relational' refers to the ontological nature of the reality of 
that which is referred to as itself 'relative'. Furthermore, the 
term 'relative' refers to one term in the context of its particular 
relationship with another, either potentially or actually. On the 
other hand, ' relationality' denotes the ontological basis for such 
relating in the first place. Thus 'relational' denotes general 
description of the ' thing-itself ' under discussion: 'relative' is 
a generalization from particular relating as such in order to 
denote a context of the thing-itself. 
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Relator" transcends the serial-event nature of the process interpre-
tation, thereby affording a sense of unity and continuity . The 
identity of God as relational entity is not reducible to atomistic 
instants of experience by which particular occasions occur. Rather 
it gives the basis and context of their occurrence. Similarly, the 
organic unity of God and World is the unity of relational intimacy, 
not a spurious entitative identification. Thus the relationality of 
God that has been determined on the one hand by attending to the 
motif of 'Being' and on the other hand by attending to the motif of 
'Becoming' is that ontological-relationality such that the term 
"Real Relator" is the apposite designation interpreting the entitative 
status of the being of God. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RELATIONAL RESOLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The conclusion to the study of the doctrine of God in the thought 
of John Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne is that dynamic relationality 
elucidates the ontological reality of God. "Real Relator" denotes 
relational entitative status: ontological-relationality marks the 
being of deity. In response to the question How may God be conceived 
as at once 'other-than' and 'prior' yet also 'present' and 'related', 
the answer of ontological-relationality places the definitive focus 
on ad extra relating as ontologically necessary. God is identifiably 
non-reducible: he is himself as a relating 'other'. But equally, with 
respect to identity, God is not isolated in his being: he is not 
relationally remote. Thus, entitatively speaking, God is conceptually 
and existentially distinguishable, yet also, and as such, essentially 
related. 
In this closing chapter I seek to address the issue of the 
Relational Problematic as raised and outlined in Chapter One. There-
fore I shall first discuss, in more general terms, the perspective of 
the resolution I am expounding, and then address, in turn, the 
specific issues raised by the notion of aseity and the doctrine of 
the Trinity. Finally, I shall give an indication of some future 
prospects for applying and developing this relational perspective. 
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II. THE RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The central proposition of my thesis is that the external 
relationships in which God is engaged are not merely gratuitous or 
superfluous but rather manifest the ontological reality of God. In 
other words, that the being of God is "relational" means that God 
relates outwardly from himself as a necessary expression and onto-
logical component of being himself. 
Now, it must be noted that the 'necessity' of which I speak is 
that whereby the being of God is structurally defined. The issuing 
of structural ontological-relationality in specific actual relation-
ships is contingent on there being other terms to effect relationships, 
e.g. the world, humankind . These terms themselves, or rather that 
which they denote, are contingent upon the creativity of God for 
their being brought to,and remaining in,existence. The manifesting 
of the Being of God remains clearly a function of the initiative of 
God. Priority of Will and Purpose remain with God in the exercise of 
his relational activity . 
That God must exercise relational activity, is, of course, not in 
itself a matter of 'choice': such exercise is the necessary corollary 
of the divine ontological structure. But nothing outside of God 
determines that he should be in a particular relation. Nonetheless, 
once God creates - humankind for example - as an expression of his 
own ontological relationality (i.e. his ontological "need" to be in 
an appropriate ad extra relationship consistent with his relational 
being, then to that extent God is indeed "determined". That is, 
' determined ' in as much as, within the context of particular relation-
'th 
ships he is influenced or modified as he responds to and interacts Wl 
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other "relators" or relational terms (in this case, e. g . humankind). 
For God to be God does not require humankind as such, but it 
does require the 'letting-be' of some equivalent relating entity. 
Now Berkhof,for example, appears to contradict himself when he asserts 
1 that God "does not need us", whilst equally he affirms that God "wants 
to be able to do nothing else than be our covenant partner". 2 
Language of "need" is misleading. Berkhof implicitly acknowledges 
the relationality inherent in the being of God. This relationality 
requires expression: it requires the creation of an other in order to 
be manifest. There is a 'need' in terms of ontological requirement 
for fulfilment: but there is an ontological priority for God such that 
the coming to be of such fulfilment - viz, humankind - is contingent 
upon his creative fiat. 
Put otherwise, that God needed to create a world is a necessary 
consequence of understanding his activity as Creator qua relational 
being. But his creating this particular world is a contingent and 
free act on his part. Thus, as Hartshorne writes: 
God's 'essential nature' or 'defining characteristic' ... 
will include his relation to creatures as such, but not 
to any contingent species of creature except by deduction 
from the essential nature plus the empirical fact that 
the species in question exists. Thus that God loves man 
is not in his essential nature, but that he loves all 
creatures whatever may be. (3) 
1. H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, p.I06. 
2. op. cit., p.122. 
3. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, p.261. 
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In other words, that God is in relation is necessary, but the 
particular relation he is in is contingent. 
Keith Ward speaks of creation "as a form of Divine self-giving, 
a love which goes out of itself to a freely responsive object".4 
Creation is the necessary expression of the creative activity of God, 
the arena of God's self-expressive re1ationa1ity.5 However, Ward is 
a little hesitant to give this relational affirmation the ontological 
grounding I would say it requires. He states: "One cannot say that 
God must necessarily create some world, on pain of failure to be God". 6 
But why not? If, as he seems to assert, God is known only as creative 
and relational, then surely there is here grounds for saying that God 
must, indeed, create that which will allow for the expression of his 
essential being. Ward ' s ambivalence on this point is highlighted by 
his next statement which is that "one can say that God can only determine 
his own being as self-giving love if he both creates and responsively 
relates to some wor1d".7 
A theology which takes ontological relatedness as the sine qua non 
of deity is not faced with such ambivalence. On this perspective, it 
is ontological1y necessary for God to create ~ world in accordance 
with his inherent relational nature . Now two things need to be said 
in consequence of this. First, it is not thereby the case that any 
given created world is of itself necessary. Second, the 'ontological 
necessity ' whereby God creates poses no threat to the freedom that 
4 . K. Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell 1982, p.83. 
5. cf. Ward, Rational Theology, p.BS; cf. G. Lampe, God As Spirit, 
London: S.C.M. 1983, p.207. 
6. Ward, op. cit., p.8S. 
7. ibid. 
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grace asserts is inherent in God's creativie activity. In other 
words, that God acts to create is seen to be necessary; the outcome, 
or content, of this act is itself quite contingent. 
Thus relational theology poses a third alternative to the dilemma 
that would see on the one hand priority of divine nature meaning that 
the divine will is necessary, and therefore so is creation, or, on the 
other hand, that if the divine will is prior, then divine creation is 
8 
not necessary. God acts necessarily to create the relational 'other' 
in order that he might engage in relationship. The substance and 
detail of what he creates, beyond the obvious minimum requirement that 
it be a relational 'other' to God, is quite open and therefore contin-
gent upon the free will of God in terms of what he chooses to actually 
fashion, or cause to evolve. In like manner, the artist may be said 
to create, necessarily, by virtue of the nature of being an artist: 
but the content of the artistic creation is a matter of free choice 
and decision. 
Philosophically, the construction of a concept of God has often 
been approached on the basis of ascriptive definition in respect of 
all properties possessing intrinsic value taken "to an imagined 
maximal state".9 On the other hand, the approach of the via negativa 
has been just as significant. Also, the formulation of a doctrine of 
God has been marked by "tension between biblical analogies and models 
on the one hand, and philosophical conceptions on the other".lO Creedal 
8. cf. R. Neville, Creativity and God, p.86. 
9. K. Ward, The Concept of God, p.l7l. 
10. R. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.S6. 
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formulations arising out of the patristic period are marked particul-
arly by this tension and the need to meet philosophically based 
critiques of belief-content. 11 Similarly with the creedal formularies 
of the early modern period, the doctrine of God they indicate is little 
12 
more than a "hotch-potch", a profusion of confused metaphysics and 
conceptual jostling. So Gregor Smith argues that "faith's own self-
understanding does not permit the straightforward acceptance of the 
traditional formulation of the doctrine of God".13 
The resolution to the relational problematic in the doctrine of 
God challenges the tradition whereby Christian doctrines are formulated 
"in terms of an ontology of being, which tends to be static and 
universal". 14 Relational enti tati ve status denotes dynamic particu1-
arity. This evinces a greater affinity with the biblical witness to 
the nature of God. Although Barr cautions against pressing the 
philological point too far, the dynamic overtures of the Hebrew "to 
be" implicit in the translating of 'YHWH' bespeaks the being of God 
d · d . . . 15 as ynamlcally an creatlvely lnteractlve. 
Now, in propounding my resolution to the relational problematic 
I am not wanting to suggest that relationa1ity is the sole key notion 
... \'" .. 
11. cf. G.C. Stead, "The Apostle's Creed", Exp.T. 91, October 1979:4-7; 
J.G. Davies, "The Nicene Creed", Exp.T. 91, November 1979:36-39; 
J. Macquarrie, "The Chalcedonian Definition", Exp.T. 91, December 
1979:68-72. 
12. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.56. See pp.54f. especially 
in reference to the Westminster Confession. cf. statements on 
God as contained in the Decrees of the Vatican Council and the 
Articles of Religion of the Church of England in W.R. Matthews, 
God in Christian Thought and Experience, p.89.--
13. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.51. 
14. K. Ward, Concept, p.190. 
15. cf. P. Clifford, Interpreting Human Experience, p.209. 
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upon which to formulate a doctrine of God. However, I would claim 
that it is both a significant and a necessary notion. Although 
16 different key notions produce different concepts, or models, of God, 
it should nonetheless be possible to discern those which are arguably 
the sine qua non for the concept of God. Such is the case, I suggest, 
with the notion of 'Relational Entity' or 'Relational Entitative 
Status'. That God is relationally active within the world, and that 
his activity is manifest in the inter-relatedness of human co-existence, 
is taken as self-evident. 17 The focus of my concern is to counter the 
assumption that, in order to preserve God ' s identity, relations he has 
with the world are rendered onto10gica11y vacuous so far as the actual 
concept of God is concerned. For instance, 'transcendence' is portrayed 
as the gulf by which God is wh011y-other,18 instead of being allowed to 
function in its relational or transitive capacity. For God to 'transcend' 
the world requires the world, and a relation between it and God. 
' Immanence ' denotes the intimacy of relationship that holds between 
God and the wor1d. 19 Yet immanence degenerates into pantheistic 
identification if the distinctive identities of God and world, implicit 
in the notion of transcendence, are not maintained. 
Now, the process perspective holds that "There is an unending 
interaction of God on the world, the world on God, each requiring the 
16. See, e . g. P. Gastwirth, "Concepts of God", Rel.St. 8, June 1972: 
147-152; R.H. King, "The Conceivability of God", Rel.St . 9, 
March 1973:11-22. 
17. cf . E. McDonagh, "On Discerning God's Action in the World", 
Theo1. LXXV/627, September 1972:449-462. 
18 . W.D . Hudson, "Transcendence", Theol. LXIX/549, March 1966:97-104. 
19 . See, e.g. H. Oppenheimer, "Immance", Theol. LXIX/549, March 1966: 
104-111. 
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20 
other for its own completeness". The mutuality of immanence implicit 
in this relational view raises the question: Does the relational con-
ception of God result in an immanentism such as to threaten the 
independent reality of God? The answer that has emerged in the course 
of this study is clearly negative: God's intimate relational presence 
to, and engagement within, the world express his reality as relational. 
But equally, relational entitative status preserves the sense of real 
identity as "other-than" that to which he is so intimately related. 
The terms 'transcendence' and i~anence' have long been viewed as 
correlative. Both transcendentalism (e.g. Deism) and immanent ism (e.g. 
pantheism) have been perceived as aberrations. The reality of God is 
that he is the Other who transcends differences in his immanent 
presence and indwelling of that to which he relates himself. 21 The 
sense of the transcendent, as indicative of an otherness which is 
quali tatively different from that of "another of the same sort", is 
a requisite element in the relational resolution. It is not so much 
22 
a "wholly" otherness that is beyond categories and noetic grasp, but 
rather the necessary otherness of entitative identity. The conjunction 
of transcendence and immanence denotes the mystery and holiness of God 
h · f' d 23 yet also 1S per ect10n an concreteness. 
H.P. Owen holds that God's immanence is "wholly inconceivable" 
and that his transcendence renders him "incomprehensib1e".24 He 
20. W.E. Stokes, "God for Today and Tomorrow" in Process Philo$ophl. 
and Christian Thought, ed. D. Brown et al,jp. 252 . 
21. cf. Matthews, God in Christian Thought and Experience, p.132. 
22. contra. D. Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, p.102. 
23. cf. C.G. Vaught, "Two Concepts of God". Re1.St. 6, September 
1970:221-228. 
24. H.P. Owen, The Christian Knowledge of God, pp.6ff. 
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allows for personality in God and for analogical discourse about him, 
however, he would not allow direct statements concerning the being of 
God, not even that of ontological-relationality. God may only be 
known indirectly and analogously - "Personal symbols do not tell us 
anything of God per Be; they merely indicate the mode of his relation-
ship to us".25 But Owen is trapped within a rigid view of God's 
transcendence and a wholly spiritualised immanence. The perspective 
of ontological-relationality challenges this viewpoint: relational 
mode reflects relational reality. For example, God ' s self-revelation 
is not simply a bare epiphany, a passive 'display' only, but brings 
with it active engagement and an entering into fellowship with his 
creatures. 26 God communicates and relates himself as Holy Love. 27 
In creating humankind in his image God creates an other who, by virtue 
of reflecting the ontological reality of God in its own being, is thus 
able in like fashion to create, to initiate, to respond . The creature 
. d' db' l' 28 1S create 1n or er to e 1n re at10n. Human being is created to be 
the relational partner of God. 
Now, the category of the personal emerges as conceptually prior 
and suggestive of relationality as the hermeneutic of "to be". The 
form of the personal is social and interactive. 29 The principle of 
interaction is indicative of the relational context of experience and 
25. op. cit., p.230. 
26. H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, p.105. 
27. op. cit., pp.ll8ff. 
28. op. cit., p.135. 
29. cf. M. Buber, Between Man and Man; cf. P. Clifford, Interpreting 
Human Experience, p.223. 
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knowledge. 30 Relationality is inherent in the experience of faith. 3l 
The biblical witness, particularly that of the Old Testament, is to 
a God who is intensely personal, one who addresses, and is addressed, 
within the context of interactive relationship. 
The universally acclaimed point of contact between human being 
and the being of the divine is in perceiving both as, in some sense, 
"personal". In particular, that the relationship that holds between 
32 God and humanity is itself "personal". The problem then lies in 
how "personal" is to be understood as ascribed to God. If the divine 
'person' is conceived on strict analogy to the notion of human person -
hood then the suspicion is aroused that this delimits the divine, 
b . t' h b' f G d . f h b' 33 su Jec 1ng t e e1ng 0 0 to categor1es 0 uman e1ng. But in 
the idea of humanity created in the image of God there lies the pos-
sibi1ity for discerning the meaning of personality as appropriately 
applicable to God. 34 
For the human being, creation in the divine image means "defined 
by our relation to God".35 It means, too, that we may legitimately 
seek to comprehend the personal being of God as defined in relation 
to the beings whom he has created in his own image. Imago Dei 
. asserts that human being represents and resembles the being of God, 
30. cf. Clifford, Interpreting Human Experience, p.117. 
31. cf. Gregor Smith, Doctr'ine of God, p. 72f.; K. Ward; 'The 'Concept 
of God, p.168; R. Swinburne, The 'Coherence of Theism, p.6. 
32. cf. L. Dewart, The Future of Belief, London: Burns and Oates 
1967, pp.188-189. 
33. cf. W. Pannenberg, "The Question of God", Interp. 21, July 1967: 
309. 
34. op. cit., p.3l0. 
35. G.S. Hendry, "On Being A Creature", Th. Today 38, April 1981:65. 
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either in terms of a universal and fundamental ontological "given", 
or, in specific christological application, as denoting a particular 
. I 36 representat10na sequence. 
In the history of theology the image has been depicted as a 
character or destiny lost by sin; or as the distinguishing character-
istic of rationality by which the human being is set aside from all 
other creatures. 37 Following Brunner, Cairns sees the Imago as "the 
essence of man's being in his responsible existence before God": the 
Imago Dei signifies the defining of human being in its essential 
1 . h' 38 . re atlons lp to God. But relationality is not one way. Imago De~ 
implies an understanding of God in relation to human being. For 
example, Process Theology holds that: 
if we seek to take the personal characters of God 
seriously, the God-creature relation must be viewed as 
internal in respect to God. What we do must have some 
bearing, or influence on God; it must in some way 
elicit a response from God. The response indicates 
not just a change in God as he (she) is to us but in 
the very being of God itself. (39) 
Karl Barth has interpreted the Imago Dei with his anaZogia 
reZationis by which he parallels the relationship between man and 
36. S.G. Wilson, "Image of God", Exp.T. 85, September 1974:356-361. 
37. D. Cairns, The Image of God in Man. 
38. op. cit., p.113; cf. pp.187ff. 
39. D. McKenzie, "Pannenberg on God and Freedom", J. ReI. 60, July 
1980:328. 
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woman with the relationship between man and God, and also that which 
holds within the godhead. The problem with the anaZogia re Zationis 
is that it takes a particular relationship within human existence as 
paradigmatic or determinatively illustrative. It does not address 
the issue of the ontological context of the being of human being as 
such : it rather "rests on the unlikely assumption that the sexual 
distinction is a manifestation of man's status as God ' s image".40 
Barth, of course, wishes to avoid direct ontological comparisons, 
although Lee has argued convincingly that there is a progression in 
Barth's thinking to the extent that anaZogia ~eZaDionis virtually 
l' • 41 .. presupposes an ana~og~a ent~8 . Relat1ona11ty is no mere analogy: 
it is ontologically constitutive. Indeed, according to Crawford, 
Barth acknowledges that human being is "a being-in-relation to God". 
This is an ontological relation for which the incarnation demonstrates 
42 
a reciprocity - "God is closely related to man". 
The Imago Dei signifies that human being images the divine being. 
It thus offers a theological warrant for the method of discerning the 
being of God by attending to the being of human being. This is an 
epistemological priority only, however. It does not signify any onto-
logical priority for human being. The ' equation' is not reversible 
such as to say that divinity is an "imago humanum". It means rather 
that the essential structure of human being is not just analogous to 
40. S.G. Wilson, "Image of God" , p.357. 
41. J.Y. Lee, "Karl Barth's Use of Analogy in His Church Dogmatics", 
Scot.J.Th. 22, June 1969:129-151. 
42. R. Crawford, "The Theological Method of Karl Barth", Scot.J.Th. 
25, August 1972 : 329. 
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the divine, but ontologically 'represents' and 're semble s ' the 
being of God. As the given imprint of God upon the being of his 
creature, the Imago Dei reflects the ontological reality of God in 
the ontologically constitutive relationality of human being . 
Relatedness between God and the world, and indeed any talk of 
God as such, has been understood as uniquely analogous. Relations 
that God has to anything other than himself have been largely under-
stood as analogical relations rather than as ontological relations 
per 8e~3 The most honoured analogy would be the analogia enti8~ which 
upholds the being of God as utterly distinct from the world yet, 
. . . 44 M . paradoxically, 1nt1mately present to 1t. acquarr1e notes: "the 
general ground for any possible symbolizing of Being by the beings 
l · . II 45 must be some ana og~a ent~8 . Such analogy has been variously and 
differently conceived and understood. He comments, 
Perhaps too often it has been interpreted as meaning 
that God is a kind of super-being who differs from 
us chiefly in that he is the cause of his own being, 
but who nevertheless is as a distinct being. (46) 
At times the analogy between man and God has been affirmed, at 
times denied. For some the way of analogy is seen to reduce the 
understanding of God to the human level, for others God's essential 
remoteness vitiates any analogy whatsoever. Macquarrie, ever the 
theOlogian of the via media argues that in his understanding of Being 
43. cf. A. Farrer, Finite and Infinite, p.96 and p.246. 
44. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p.140. 
45. J. Macquarrie, Principles, p.138. 
46. ibid. 
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we are enabled "to interpret the analogia entis in a way that will 
neither assimilate God to man nor yet put an unbridgeable gulf 
b h ,,4 7 etween tern ... 
If the Imago Dei is a warrant for the methodological approach of 
the relational perspective, the affirmation that God is Love is surely 
the seal on the validity of this perspective . For love is a matter of 
relationship: it is a relational intent and activity requiring two 
relators, lover and beloved. The loving intent of the lover finds 
fulfilment in the responsiveness of the beloved. Love is determinative 
of the being of God, thus "the very meaning of God's kind of being must 
be defined in terms of his totally related, self-giving , creative-
centred concern".48 Love is the sine qua non of the relational 
interpretation of the concept of God. 
D.O. Williams, noting the need for "a metaphysical doctrine in 
which we understand reality in the light of the existence of loving 
b . . h' . ,,49 ttl th t t . h elngs WIt In It sets au a ana yse e s ruc ures present In t e 
human experience of love, then to draw the implications of such 
reflection with regard to the doctrine of God. He discusses five 
categoriesSO which have the effect of fleshing out the meaning of 
ontological-relationality. 
The category of individuality which issues in taking account of 
individual otherness affirms the reality of self-identity together 
47. ibid. 
48. F. Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, p.415. 
49. D.O. Williams, Tfie Spirit and the Forms of Love, p.lll. 
50. op. cit., pp.144ff. 
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with ad extra relationality. The category of freedom allows for 
genuine commitment and intentionality as well as mutuality and open-
ness to risk. It is the category that undergirds self-integrity within 
relational context. The third category, that of action and suffering, 
denotes activity and responsiveness: love implies transformation of 
personal being "through the relation to the other".51 The capacity 
to suffer denotes the reality of sensitivity and interaction. Causality 
is that category implying mutual persuasive and influential efficacy 
commensurate with freedom and concern. Finally the category of 
" Impartial Judgement in Loving Concern for the Other" denotes the 
relationality of commitment, responsibility, and valuation of the other 
as an other . 
In short, Williams' categories are the categories of relational 
being . They characterize relational entitative status, the essence of 
"Real Relator" . Indeed, Williams argues for a "revolution in ontological 
thinking" in speaking of the being of God. 52 Such a revolution requires 
taking the categories of love as having ontological import for the 
being of God. This results for Williams in a modified aseity: "God 
does not corne to be or pass away, but he can be involved in the changes 
in a world where there is corning into being and passing away" 53 
Williams' own analogous application of the first four categories of 
54 love to God yield a picture of God as "Real Relator" . As individual, 
51. op . cit. , p.ll? . 
52. op. cit. , p.l23 . 
53 . op. cit. , p .l 24. 
54 . op. cit. , pp . 126ff. 
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God is a relational entity who relates and interacts in freedom and 
genuine reciprocity and responsiveness: Love denotes relational 
involvement. 
Emil Brunner speaks of human being, the "being of man as person" 
as " responsive actuality" . 55 The being of human being is relational 
being. It is relational by virtue of the necessary relationship that 
holds between creature and God, who is himself self-communicating 
love and personal being. The truth of human being is that it stands 
in the relationship of encounter with God: and relational being is 
"of the essence of faith" . 56 More specifically, such relationali ty 
is also applicable to the understanding of the being of God. God and 
humanity are not perceived, ontologically, in isolation one from the 
other as far as the Bible is concerned. "The God of the Bible is 
always the God of man . .. man in the Bible is always the man of God". 57 
The content of the biblical narrative involves the manifold outworking 
of this interrelationship . But for Brunner there is nonetheless a 
distinct ontological ranking: "The relation of God to man is always 
first, that of man to God second and consequent upon the first".58 
There is a necessary reciprocity of relationship between God and man-
kind, but not an interchangeability as if each were the equal terms 
of a symmetrical relationship. 
The relationality of God which issues in the relationship between 
God and humankind is analysed by Brunner in terms of "Lordship" and 
55. E. Brunner, Truth as Encounter, London: S.C.M. 1964 , pp .19ff. 
56. op . cit. , p . 28 . 
57 . op. cit. , p.88. 
5S. op . cit . , p.89 . 
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"Fe110wship".59 The being of God involves lordship "over" and "of" 
humanity whom he creates as relational being. The will to fellowship 
of the relational God issues in actual fellowship as, and only as, 
th 1 · 1 d' 1 . h 1 60 e re at10na creature respon s, meet1ng ave W1t ave . Thus 
Brunner is able to conclude that 
Since God's being as the Bible reveals it to us in 
no sense is being as such ( An-siah-Bein) but will to 
lordship and will to fellowship, therefore it is 
essentially a related being - a being related to man, 
the creature who knows, acknowledges, obeys and loves ... (61) 
Here there is more than merely a suggestion of a relational approach to 
understanding God . Brunner clearly acknowledges ad extra re1ationa1ity 
as a very real element in the conception of the being of God. Theologies 
of encounter implicate a relational perspective. 
R.P. Schar1emann identifies three ways of comprehending the 
statement "God Is".62 In the first instance it denotes subsistence: 
"There is someone or something that is God" . The truth or otherwise 
of this sense of ' God Is ' is a matter of correspondence of word and 
fact. In the second instance, "God Is" is that of "the ascription 
of the action of being to an agent whose essential act is to be" . 63 
God is what he does: the meaning of being is activity per Be. This 
59. op. cit., pp . 93ff . 
60 . cf . Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p.IOO . 
61. op . cit., p . 101. 
62 . R.P . Schar1emann, The Being of God, New York: Seabury 1981, 
pp .57-58. 
63 . op . ci t ., p .58 ; cf . A. Farrer, Finite and Infinite . 
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viewpoint is verified in the active "be-ing" of entities. 64 Thus he 
concludes that "it is God who 'is' in the be-ing of all enti ties,.,65 
Thirdly, the statement "God Is" may be taken as an assertion "that 
God is someone without specifying more exactly who or what he is".66 
Thus the statement is an incomplete predication inviting completion. 
This third sense is the form of ostensive definition and "its purpose 
is to point out where that which is thought of as God makes an 
67 appearance" . 
How does the notion of God as relational entity measure up to 
these three existential statements? Firstly, the use of the word 
'entity ' does not automatically imply a subsisting 'something' as such. 
It refers to identity and context of the being of God, not to an object-
ive subsistence or hypostasis. Qua "relational", the notion of God as 
entity bears some approximation to Scharlemann's second sense of "God 
Is" . In so far as God's action and engagement is relational then the 
meaning of his being is the relationality of his 'doing'. But onto-
logical-relationality is more than activity as such. Thus it is the 
third sense, that of ostensive definition, which best accommodates the 
relational perspective : "relational entity" or "Real Relator" are the 
summary terms indicative not so much of ascribable predicates but of a 
total perspective for understanding. Relational entitative status 
locates the resolution to the relational problematic in the understand-
ing of relational identity and context. 
64. cf. Scharlemann, The Being of God, p.65 . 
65. ibid. 
66 . op. cit . , p.S8. 
67. op . cit., p.78. 
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Thus the essence of conceiving God in terms of relational entit-
ative status is to frame an ontological view which embraces the reality 
of relational context and relational identity. This approach addresses 
the tradition of conceiving the context of the being of God in terms 
of aseity, and the identity of the being of God in terms of inner-
trinitarian relations. 
III. ASEITY AND RELATIONAL CONTEXT 
The doctrine of aseity undergirds the traditional concept of God. 
It is also the primary element in the relational problematic. 68 It 
is by virtue of aseity that God is conceived as Infinite, Perfect, 
wholly independent, the Absolute, Immutable, non-knowable Other, and 
so on. It affirms the conception of God as uncreated, unoriginated, 
having no beginning and owing existence to none. 
The relational problematic of aseity is concerned about the 
presuppositions and that logic whereby God is conceived as wholly non-
related, having no 'need', in any sense, to relate to that which "is 
not himself". Thus the perfections and the attributes of God are pre-
sumed to be of a non-relational kind, discernible only by analogy from 
their embodiment in "the infinitely lower mode of dependent being". 69 
Traditionally, the aseity of God means that existence is bestowed 
'0 
"on contingent beings by Absolute Being, who Himself simply 'is' and 
68. See above, pp.17ff. 
69. E.L. Mascall, The Openness of Being, p.122. To be sure, Mascall 
allows an ontological relation between God and creature, but it 
is one of "limited, obscure and mysterious" manifestation. The 
ontological relation is muted and knowable only by analogy. Yet 
the possibility of any direct ontological relation is ruled out 
a priori by the assumption of aseity. 
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. d ' ., f . . b . . ,,70 1S un er no necess1ty 0 caus1ng cont1ngent e1ngs to eX1st . 
Without the notion of aseity there would seem to be no firm ground 
for postulating the causal and sustaining source of the contingent 
world. The case for aseity is succinctly put by Keith Ward: 
It is a presupposition of the intelligibility of the 
universe that there is a being which is both self-
explanatory and fully explanatory of everything other 
than itself ... a self-explanatory being must be logic-
ally necessary ... !t must be uncaused and immutable; 
it can depend upon nothing other than itself for its 
existence. Therefore there can be only one being 
from-itself (a se); and, since it must exist in every 
possible world, we have a logically unique identifying 
description for God. (71) 
However, the question to be answered is: Need the 'necessary 
ground' of existent reality, in the sense of a "that which" calls it 
into being, sustaining it in its existence, and engaging it in con-
cernful and caring relatedness, be conceived as completely a se? 
Or, to put the question differently, need the self-existence of 
aseity also imply total (i.e. ontological) self-sufficiency? Without 
diminishing the reality of God, how is it possible to overcome the 
problem that aseity, in maintaining God's absolute independence and 
apparent self-sufficiency devalues and calls into question the nature 
of God's relation to the created world, and the world's relation with 
him? 
70. D. Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, p.172. 
71. Ward, Rational Theology, pp.23-23. 
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The real problem for those who cling to aseity at all costs is 
the assumption that unless this notion is the sine qua non of the 
concept of God then "the very existence of the temporal, finite and 
dependent world becomes altogether inexplicable and unintelligible tl • 72 
In the end it is as explanation of the being of the world, rather than 
as faithfully representing the being of God, that aseity is held so 
73 dearly. Categoreal assumptions are thus taken as precluding authentic 
interrelatedness and genuine ontological interconnectedness. 
Now the nub of the relational problem of aseity is expressed in 
Farrer's comment on self-sufficiency as meaning that God "is in real 
relation to nothing in the sense that nothing outside Him conditions 
H· .." 74 1S act1v1ty . The term "condition" is strong and does not do 
justice to the subtleties and nuances of any real relationship - i.e. 
a relationship between two relators who each have their integrity of 
identity, and who exercise, in the measure appropriate to each, response 
and responsibility to the other. Hartshorne has of course challenged 
the assumption that God is not in real relation with his creation. 
Macquarrie's approach implicitly challenges that assumption likewise. 
And the implication of the relational perspective drawn from their 
views is that the necessary ad extra relatedness of the being of God 
rules out the classical interpretation of aseity as denoting the 
self-sufficiency of God . 
72. Mascall, The Openness of Being, p . l73. 
73 . cf . E. L. Mascall, He Who Is, pp.9Sff. 
74 . A. Farrer, Finite and Infinite, p.S8. 
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So it is not the case that the notion of aseity must needs be 
rejected in toto . Rather, in the light of the relational perspective 
of the being of God, it stands in need of corrective re-interpretation, 
or re-conceptualisation. For instance, Keith Ward comments: 
the Christian will want to assert some necessity with 
regard to the being of God, as creative ground of the 
world - perhaps his necessary existence, as necessarily 
holy, omnipotent, omniscient reality. But the admission 
of some features of necessity in God does not entail 
the complete exclusion of contingency from God. (75) 
A distinction needs to be drawn between the aetiological meaning 
and the ontological interpretation of aseitas. In its pristine form 
aseity simply denotes self-existence qua uncaused or non-originated 
being. Nothing causes God to exist in the originative sense. How-
ever, the term has taken on certain ontological connotations in its 
theological usage and application, chiefly assuming that self-existence 
necessarily implies self-sufficiency in an on-going existential and 
ontological sense. But such an assumption of the nature of the 
existence or being of God, as distinct from, although following on, 
the origin of God, is strictly a theological non sequitur. 
The result of my deliberations on the relational problematic in 
the doctrine of God, in the light of the examination of existential-
ontological theism and neoclassical theism, has been to affirm that 
God's Being is relational; God's existence is interactive; God's 
Becoming is in responsiveness; and God's relativity is in his inter-
75. K. Ward, The Concept of God, p.146. 
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dependency. Aseity denotes strictly ontological aetiology as wholly 
independent. The analysis of the nature of God's Being and Becoming -
the 'How' of God's existing as God - suggests interpreting aseity in 
terms of unoriginative beginning as the aetiological context of 
relational being. 
Put otherwise, nothing determines that God exists, yet the inherent 
relational nature of the existence of God suggests that God's self-
existence simply sets the inchoative context of divine relational being. 
Ontologically, this means God is self-existent but not self-sufficient. 
Aseity needs to be reconceived as expressing the aetiological unique-
ness of God as the foundation of the relational context of the being 
of God: God's existence is both necessarily a se and necessarily 
expressive of ad extra relationality. 
K. Surin claims that neoclassical theism shares with classical 
theism the ascription of aseity as an essential divine attribute. 76 
Prima facie he is right in as much as Hartshorne affirms God's self-
existence as such. But that is not the end of the matter for Hartshorne: 
indeed Surin acknowledges that God's aseity "does not entail his 
complete independence from his creation, which, after all, is a part 
of himself".77 In other words Hartshorne has no difficulty with aseity, 
to the extent it denotes the ontological priority of God as self-
existing. But in his existing God is relationally engaged. Indeed, 
as Neville notes, Hartshorne argues persuasively the case "for the 
76. K. Surin, "The Self-Existence of God: Hartshorne and Classical 
Theism", Sophia 21, October 1982:17-33. 
77. op. cit., p.20. 
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greater excellence of relativity over independence". That is to say, 
he rejects the notion that "self-sufficiency, the ability to be com-
plete by oneself, is the greatest kind of excellence. Rather, the 
greater excellence is in being sensitive and responsive to the elements 
. h . " 78 ln t e enVlronment . 
Aseity is thus an inadequate notion with which to speak of the 
fullness of God's being. This would also be the position of John 
Macquarrie: Holy Being has ontological priority: ontological "fullness", 
however, is in relational engagement, e.g. in the activity of "letting-
be". For Hartshorne, of course, an attribute such as "aseity" is 
accommodated by ascribing it to the abstract pole in God. That is 
certainly not the intent of the classical mode of ascription, which 
asserts that God is wholly and in essence a se. But for Hartshorne 
self-existence and self-sufficiency are abstract ascriptions: in his 
concrete reality God exists in real relationship to his creation. 
Now the unity of God is assured by Hartshorne by way of "double 
inclusion". Nonetheless, that does not itself meet the need to challenge 
and revise the notion of aseity: it is insufficient to "polarise", even 
inclusively, and assume conceptual justice has been done. The dipolar 
answer does not satisfactorily resolve the issue of aseity as a 
relational problematic. However, the relationality inherent in the 
neoclassical approach does lend support to the ontological-relational 
resolution. 
78. Neville, Creativity and God, p.53. 
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In his non-caused originative self-existence God creates the 
world as the 'other' requisite for relational engagement in the 
expression of his being. It is by virtue of the ontological intimacy 
of creator and creation that it may be said that the world is "in" 
God. Thus the "sense in which created reality is in God,,79 is not that 
of pseudo-physical containment but of necessary ontological relatedness. 
Now as Shutte notes, "the relation between Creator and created reality 
80 is most clearly exemplified in the creation of persons". The part-
icipation of personal being in the being of God is the conclusion also 
of Imago Dei: the implication is that the being of God is appropriately 
conceived by attending to the being of human being. But this is not 
to define God in terms of humanity, for the corollary notion to that 
of ontological participation is that of "coinherence" or "indwelling". 
That personal being not only "participates" in the being of God, but 
does so by virtue of the being of God indwelling it expresses "a 
fundamental characteristic of the creature who is the image and like-
ness of a properly personal God, and of God's relations with it".8l 
Shutte denotes the mutual interrelatedness of human being by the term 
"intersubjectivity". He states: 
An investigation of intersubjectivity reveals the 
personal relation of persons to be mutually creative 
in some sense. Might it not be, as the notion of 
indwelling suggests, that God's relation to his 
79 . A. Shutte, "Indwelling, Intersubjectivity and God", Scot . J.Th. 32, 
June 1979:203 . 
80. ibid. 
81. op. cit . , p.207. 
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creatures is simply the limiting and perfect case 
of such 'intersubjectivity'? (82) 
I do not think, as Shutte does, that this is indicative of a 
relation of "strict analogy" obtaining between God and creature. 
Rather intersubjectivity is a conceptual tool which assists in under-
standing the nature of the relationship that holds between God and 
human being, and also that needs to be taken into account with re spect 
to examining the question of God's aseity. Intersubjectivity is 
premised on the ad extra relationality of God as expressive of his 
ontological reality. To that extent God is not self-sufficient: his 
reality as relational being means there is an ontological necessity 
to engage in relations with others. But such others are ontological1y 
dependent: the existence of God is prior - and in that sense, a se . 
Aseity, therefore, may be properly conceived as a limit-notion to the 
understanding of God as Person. 83 It cannot, however, be applied in 
any sense which diminishes the reality of God's relational - or 
personal - being. 
On the ontological-relational perspective aseity can in no wise 
connote a limitation of the capacity of God to respond, to initiate, 
or to interact. Hence, in the manner appropriate to that which is 
supreme relational entity, it cannot delimit the capacity to change 
and be modified with respect to the exigencies of the exercise of any 
particular relationship. The point is that the notion that God could 
82. op. cit., p.214. 
83. cf. H. Ott, God, Edinburgh: St Andrew 1974, pp.5lff. 
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or did exist in and of himself, un-en gaged in relation to anything, 
is conceptually nonsensical. The being of God is r elational being. 
"Being" and "Becoming" separately and complementarily denote the 
relational concept of God. 
I drew a distinction above between aseity understood as self-
existence only, and aseity taken to include self-sufficiency. Ward 
1 d "1 d' . . 84 H th t h th f a so raws a S1m1 ar 1st1nct10n. e argues a w ereas e ormer 
must be rejected of God, the latter is the appropriate interpretation 
of aseity. The juxtaposition of the fully explanatory, self-subsistent 
being required to fulfil the demands of rational intelligibility, 
with the Eternal locus of value, purpose and meaning required by the 
demands of worship, results in an incoherent, unintelligible, notion 
of God. 8S Furthermore, the purported self-sufficiency of God calls 
. f ' 86 1nto question the reasons or creat10n. Self-sufficiency leads to 
an impasse wherein on the one hand any real relationship between God 
and world is problematic, and on the other hand any suggestion that 
the world is included within the self-sufficiency of God is likewise 
fraught with problems. Ward expresses it thus: 
The basic notion which has controlled the development 
of traditional doctrines of God is the notion of self-
sufficiency. The primary, all-explaining being must 
be self-sufficient, since it must be wholly self-
explanatory. The difficulty which arises at once is 
that though the self-sufficient being is postulated 
84. Ward, Rational Theology, p.147. 
85. op. cit., pp.5Iff. 
86. op. cit., p.73. 
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precisely in order to account for the existence of 
the finite, changing and complex entities of the 
universe, once one has a self-sufficient being, the 
existence of anything other than it seems to be 
unnecessary and superfluous. If God is distinguished 
from the world, opposed to it as simple to complex, 
eternal to temporal, immutable to changing and 
infinite to finite, then it is extremely difficult 
to see how such a God can be related to the world 
at all. But if God is said to include the world in 
his own being ... it is equally difficult to see how 
there can be any freedom or contingency in the 
uni verse. (87) 
Ward 's solution is to resoundly reject self-sufficiency. By doing 
this he claims God's self-existence and self-determination are 
preserved: I would add they are enhanced. Indeed, there is no 
a ppiopi difficulty with aseity to the extent it affirms that it 
is not "a matter of chance that God happens to exist and be the kind 
of being which he is".88 
The rejection of self-sufficiency as a proper ontological desig-
nation of God is a consequence of the inherent ad extpa relationality 
h . . . d b d' . .. 89 t at IS ImplIe y Go s creatIve actIvIty. Ward asserts: "God 
has created. So, when we speak of God, we do so in terms which relate 
87. op. cit., p.8l. 
88. R. Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, p.25S. 
89. Ward, Rational Theology, p.86. 
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him to this creation; we speak of him as creator, not as self-
sufficient being".90 He also points out that "A self-sufficient 
being can give no rationale for creation, and a necessary being 
cannot give rise to a world of contingent, free creatures".9l 
Coming from a different perspective Ward nonetheless arrives at the 
same conclusions as the relational perspective I have endeavoured to 
expound. Ontological relationality, understood as inclusive of ad 
extra relationality, denies the ascription of self-sufficiency to 
God. Aseity affirms that God's existence as such is not externally 
caused: it thereby sets the context for the exercise of God's relation-
ality expressed pre-eminently by creativity. 
Further, creativity is not an impersonal force or causative 
agency. The denial of self-sufficiency is to be seen in conjunction 
with the affirmation of the relational category of 'person' to God. 
Again the perspective of a relational theology finds an ally in Keith 
Ward: 
Co-operative and sharing love is one of the greatest 
values, as it is only in transcending self and relating 
to others that one truly becomes a person, a developing, 
self-expressive being discovering itself in the forms 
of its social relationships. Thus God can become a 
person, in this sense, only as he creates some commun-
ity of rational agents in relation to which his own 
perfection can be expressed. In creation God determines 
his own being as interactive; in doing so, he actualizes 
90. op. cit., p.140. 
91. op. cit., p.2lS. 
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his own nature as the one who is love, in particular, 
contingent ways. (92) 
The relational problematic of aseity is resolved by distinguishing 
self-existence from self-sufficiency and asserting the former as the 
strictly correct interpretation. In this way the aseity of God may 
be understood as the provision of the fundamental rel ational context 
for understanding the being of God: that God exists out of himself 
implies an existing toward other; that God requires nothing prior in 
order to exist, yet manifestly does not exist in isolation as it were, 
implies his self-existent being issues in relational activity. 
IV. TRINITY AND RELATIONAL IDENTITY 
The traditional perspective on God's relationality has been to 
say that God is relational only within himself, i.e. that he is onto-
logically constituted in terms of the relations that hold between the 
three 'persons' of the Trinity. God's relating as such to the created 
world is wholly gratuitous, being, at best, expressive or reflective 
of the inner-trinitarian relatedness. Thus the only relations that 
are real - i.e. ontologically significant - for God are these inner-
trinitarian relations: it is they which form the primary reality of 
the ontology of God. Any relations ad extra are wholly external and 
hence 'non-real' as far as the being of God is concerned. 
Of course the advent of Jesus the Christ, whether thought of as 
God's special self-revelation, or in terms of exalted humanity, 
strikes a blow against this view. To the extent Christ does manifest, 
92. op. cit., p.l4l. 
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within the historical world of human existence, the real love of God 
for that world, then there is an implicit challenge to those views 
which seek to maintain that God's reality lies outwith the relatedness 
manifest by Christ. For according to such views the love that exists 
within God himself is not only prior to the love that creates and 
redeems the world, it is, in effect, the only "real" love in which 
God himself is engaged. 
Relatedness within the Godhead is assumed to be the only proper, 
ontological locus of love for God. Even where the relationship of God 
toward the world is held to be of some intrinsic value to God, it is 
still premised on the notion that God's 'real' relations are within 
himself. Priority of inner-trinitarian relations is taken as the 
guarantor of the secondariness and derivative nature of ad extra 
relationships. "The intrinsic Trinity assures the aseity of the 
divine life".93 Thus in himself God does not need the world nor human-
kind in any sense whatsoever. God is self-sufficient in inner-
trinitarian relatedness. Thus do aseity and Trinity delimit the being 
of God: together these concepts form the relational problematic. 94 
However, I have argued for a modification of the understanding 
of aseity such that it really denotes existential priority only. It 
is a necessary feature of the relational context by which the being of 
God is conceived, but it is not the final authoritative and determining 
ontological criterion. That the Christian identity of God is to be 
found in the conception of the Trinity goes without saying. That this 
93. P. Sponheim, "Transcendence in Relationship", 'Dialog. 12, Autumn 
1973:267. 
94. See above, Chapter One; cf. R. Nicole "The Meaning of Trinity", 
in One God in Trinity, P. Toon and J.D. Spiceland (eds), London: 
Samuel Bagster 1980, pp.1-9. 
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identity is of a relational nature has also always been the case, albeit 
limited, by virtue of aseity, to inner-relational nature only. However, 
if the assumption of ontological self-sufficiency is removed, then so 
too is the limitation of identity to that of inner-trinitarian related-
ness. The ontological-relational perspective sugges ts a revised 
trinitarian conceptuality: Is it not possible that the reality of God, 
understood in trinitarian terms, is inclusive of external re1ationality, 
rather than exclusive of it? Indeed does not the affirmation that God 
"reveals himself as Lord" suggest the possibility of conceiving the 
being of God as inclusive of ad extra relating? God is Lord over that 
which he has created: as Lord he continues in intimate relationship 
with that over which he exercises his Lordship. 
' God is Love ' : but love is not a quality or property belonging to 
an individual entity . It is rather a particular kind of relation that 
holds between two or more entities, or is indicative of the intention 
for such relationship that one entity may hold for another. Love is 
pre-eminently relational in the ad extra sense. The capacity for love 
is indicative of the relational reality of that which loves. 
Now one of the more interesting of the modern discussions of the 
Trinity has been that of James P. Mackey's The Christian Experienc~ 
f G d T ·· 95 o 0 as rlnlty . Mackey sets the contemporary question of the 
Trinity within the context of interfaith dialogue . 96 In his magisterial 
discussion of the development of the classical doctrine he notes the 
popularity of the 
95. James P. Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity, 
London: S.C.M. 1983. 
96 . op . cit . , p . 36 . 
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preference for conceiving of the Trinity in terms 
of a set order: the Father first as the origin and 
content of revelation, the Son second as the 
historically objective, and the Spirit third as 
the inwardly subjective forms of revelation. (97) 
In the history of the Trinitarian doctrine simplicity and immut-
ability have been paramount, together with, in some cases, an 
assumption of 'levels' or 'grades' of divinity. The 'lower' levels 
allow for accidents, motion, change and relationship ad extra: thus 
the Son is at a 'level' different to that of the Father. Therefore 
the Trinity, in its threefold fullness, embraces change as well as 
immutability, non-relativity as well as relatedness. 98 But the price 
of the apparent inclusiveness is the admittance of gradations of being 
within God, and thus questions as to the validity of the divinity of 
the persona that represent them. Thus, for example, there are the 
inherently subordinationist schemas which nonetheless successfully 
d · . . h h h 99 1st1ngu1s t e tree persons. On the other hand, as Mackey suc-
cinctly points out, success with homoousious created difficulty with 
the maintenance of distinctions between the persons or hypostases. 
"Opera ad extra could not really sustain these distinctions" .100 
Jenson rightly states that "The chief theological task is the 
identification of God".lOl He argues that the Trinity means that 
97. op. cit., p.42. 
98. cf. Mackey, Trinity, pp.124ff. 
99. op. cit., p.170. 
100. op. cit., p.171. 
101. R.W. Jenson, "Three Identities of One Action", Scot.J.Th. 28, 
February 1975:1. 
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there are three identities - or hypostases - in 
God ... three discrete sets of names and descriptions, 
each sufficient to specify uniquely, yet all identi-
fications of the same reality. (102) 
But what then is the identity of this 'reality' which is so variously 
identified, yet still the 'same'? There may indeed be three sets of 
descriptive names and terms, they may indeed all refer to the one 
reality, but they are not in themselves separate identities as such. 
They are rather aspectival relational identifications of the one 
identity. To assert otherwise is to implicitly posit entitative 
status to each of the three trinitarian motifs and still leave unresolved 
the identity of the common reality they supposedly express. 
Fortman points out there are two elements involved in trinitarian 
theology, viz, "numerical tmity of nature and real distinction of the 
103 three Persons". Depending as to which element is treated first then 
different formulas are forthcoming. Either way they may be equally 
orthodox - and equally fraught with particular difficulties and 
dangers. Either way the crucial issue is the identity of God. 
The doctrine of the Trinity has, of course, attracted much attention 
its 
aimed either at explicating the conceptual paradoxes/expression involves, 
or at affirming its centrality and necessity as an irreducible though 
paradoxical dictum of faith. Barth's exposition, for example, falls 
more in this latter category. For Barth the doctrine of the Trinity 
102. op. cit., p.6. 
103. E.J. Fortman, The Triune God, London: Hutchinson 1972, p.140. 
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104 is theologically prior and hermeneutically necessary. He eschews 
the language of 'person' preferring instead to speak of Father, Son 
and Spirit as three "modes of existence", or "modes of being" of the 
one God. Thus they are three modes of relationship, although of a 
limited and particular sort, viz, that of the internal relations within 
the Godhead: the Trinity "is a self-enclosed circle". 105 
God the Father is for Barth that mode of God's being that is 
106 
expressed in God's ontological priority as Creator and as origin-
ative source of the other two modes of his being. l07 Thus fatherhood 
signifies priority within the Godhead. 
As the Father, God procreates Himself from eternity 
in His Son, and with His Son He is also from eternity 
the origin of Himself in the Holy Spirit, and as the 
Creator He posits the reality to all the things that 
are distinct from Himself. (108) 
But there is a distinction between "fatherhood" and "creator-ship". 
For pre-eminently the Father is Father of the Son, and it is through 
the Son that the Father is Creator. So there would seem to be a 
paradox: God is both directly and wholly, yet also indirectly and 
partially, engaged in the relations of creation and reconciliation. 
Now the reason for this apparent paradox derives from the fact that, 
104. cf. Barth, CD 1/1, pp.339ff; cf. A.B. Corne, An Introductiort to 
Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers, London: S.C.M. 1963, pp.90ff. 
105. Barth, CD 1/1, p.436. 
106. op. cit., pp.44lff. 
107. cf. Barth, CD 1/1, p.4Sl; III/I, p.49. 
108. Barth, CD III/I, p.49. 
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on the one hand, Barth is speaking of relations within the being of 
God, together with the sense that it is as "Father" that God is 
originative source. On the other hand he tries to take account of the 
obvious relation between God and the world as such - although this 
latter is governed by Barth's prior commitment to the essential aseity 
of God. Thus whereas the concept of creatorship as announced through 
the bible illuminates the relations between God and creation, such 
relations are compromised once a differentiation is made between creative 
activity within the being of God, and that which issues from God as such, 
together with the presupposition that the reality of who God is in 
himself lies more with the former than the latter. 
That the creature requires a Creator goes without saying : that God 
could, as God, just as 'happily' exist without creation of any sort and 
still be God is moot, and certainly cannot be assumed with equanimity 
as Barth tends to do. 109 Creation is indeed wholly dependent on the 
will of the CreatorllO but the contention I wish to argue is that it is 
of the 'will' of God to be Creator. God, as God, is Creator. The 
trinitarian father-motif bespeaks a relationality that inheres to the 
being of God and which issues in the relationship that holds between 
the world and God. 
Mutality and reciprocity are part and parcel of the relationship 
in which Creator and creature stand one to another. III This has far 
109. op. cit., p.7. 
110. cf. K. · Ward, The Concept of God, p.178. 
111. H.U. von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston 1971, p.IOO. 
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reaching implications, not only for the understanding of the nature 
f . d . 11 h . . h k· 112 a creatl0n, an especla y t e capacltles open to uman lnd, but 
also with respect to understanding the reality of God. The nub of the 
trinitarian doctrine of the Father is expressed by Barth in his comment 
that: 
God alone, as He whom He is by Himself, i.e. as the 
eternal Father of the eternal Son, is properly and 
adequately to be called Father. (113) 
So we are returned to the way in which the reality of God, in terms of 
who he is in himself, is governed by the assertion of aseity. Father-
hood means for God an element within the divine being, in Barth's 
account, rather than an element of the divine being. "For Barth the 
primary reality of God is in God's relationship to himself, that is, 
in his intra-trinitarian being". 114 
Although Barth's stress on aseity is undeniable, and he appears to 
equate 'Father' with God proper, as it were, yet his trinitarian theology 
is too complex and subtle to allow for any neat summation. For example, 
in his depicting the three modes of the being of God as Revealer, 
Revelation and Revealedness, he both explicates the relational self-
sufficiency and self-containment of God whilst holding that the operative 
activity of the latter two is itself the way whereby God is really 
1 d b · ,., d" h' h' ,115 re ate qua elng ln an Wlt lS creat1on. Thus it would appear 
that implicit in Barth's thinking is the possibility that in terms of 
112. op. cit., p.113. 
113. Barth, CD 1/1, p.45l. 
114. Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, p.87. 
115. cf. A.B. Come, An Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers, 
pp.90ff. 
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the relations ad extra~ the trinitarian modes are not simply analogies, 
mirrors, or 'expressions' of the otherwise "real" relationships that 
exist within the life of the Godhead. Rather, there is the possibility 
of perceiving the trinitarian motifs as expressive of real modes of 
divine relating ad extra. 
Certainly Barth does not hold that the reality of God is wholly 
remote, and to the extent that it is relationally present, it is so by 
virtue of these trinitarian modes of being. However this relational 
structure by no means signifies that God's being is itself a dynamic 
1 . 1 'b ., 116 or re at10na ecom1ng. The identity of God is fixed firmly in 
the trinitarian self-sufficiency. The Trinitarian motifs function to 
convey this relationa1ity in the gratuitous activity of the threefold 
God within the world. 
For Moltmann Barth's priority of the Trinity is supplanted by 
eschatology.117 Mol tmann distinguishes "Trinity of origin" from 
"Trinity in sending", although the 'Father' motif is prior for both 
perspectives. However, the order is reversed with respect to the 
"eschata1ogica1 unity of God". Here priority is given to the Spirit 
f d · . .. 118 T···· h as the source 0 1V1ne act1v1ty. r1n1tar1an un1ty is thus t e 
eschata1ogica1 goal of the divine activity informing and directing 
that activity. Moltmann's infusion of a dynamic element into the 
116. cf. E. Junge 1, The Doctrine of the Trinity; J. J. 0' Donne 1, "The 
Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent German Theology", Hey.J.XXIII, 
April 1982:153-167. 
117. cf. R. Bauckham, "Jurgen Moltmann" in One God in Trinity, Toon 
and Spiceland (eds), pp.111ff. 
118. J. Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God", Theol. LXXVIII/666, 
December 1975:639f. 
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concept of the Trinity takes on more distinct shape with his focus on 
the crucified Christ. 119 The ability to love is the openness to 
ff ' 120 h f 11 f G d' b' . su er1ng; t e u ness 0 0 s e1ng love 1S the fullness of 
potential to suffer . Hence Moltmann's attempt to begin from, and take 
full cognizance of, "Christ's being forsaken by God". 121 
Now there is a double significance here: that of Moltmann's 
orientation as such, and that of implicit differentiated identity between 
God and Christ. But whilst this suggests plurality of entitative status -
on the one hand that of the abandoning God, on the other of the abandoned 
Christ - Moltmann nonetheless seeks a trinitarian mode of discourse that 
will resolve the apparent identity differential within a revised trini-
tarian construct. 122 God's ontological identity is in the unity of the 
event of the cross as the focal co-operative act of the three persons . 
Theology of the Cross and the doctrine of the Trinity are necessarily 
123 interrelated and mutually presupposed . 
As Bauckham notes, Moltmann is endeavouring to take seriously the 
idea "that God's involvement in the temporal experience of human history 
is real experience for God" 124 This concern comes to full fruition in 
his The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. Here the relationality of love 
119. Bauckham, "Jurgen Moltmann", pp.1l5ff. See also J. Moltmann, "The 
'Crucified God ' : A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross", ' Interp . 
XXVI, July 1972:278-299. 
120. cf. D.O. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of ' Love. 
121. Moltmann, "The 'Crucified God': A Trinitarian Theology of the 
Cross", p.290. 
122. op. cit., pp.294ff. 
123. cf. J. Moltmann, The Crucified God, London: S.C . M. 1974, p.24l. 
124. Bauckham, "Jurgen Moltmann", p.120. 
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holds the key. The influence on theology of the social reality of 
human existence is allowed to play its full part. However, not unlike 
Bracken, Moltmann holds that 
The three divine Persons exist in their particular 
unique natures as Father, Son and Spirit in their 
relationships to one another, and are determined 
through these relationships. It is in these relation -
ships that they are persons. (125) 
Thus God is not so much ~ person as a society of persons: inner-
trinitarian relations constitute the relational identity of God for 
Moltmann. 
However such identity is not relationally remote, i.e. bound by 
aseity: the self-existent God engages, as the suffering God, in real 
ad extpa relationships. The relationality of the Trinity issues in 
the relationality of the Kingdom of God. Moltmann is grappling with 
the doctrine of the Trinity as the given conceptual basis for the 
doctrine of God. Perhaps that "givenness" needs to be challenged in 
order to resolve the conceptual issues. This is implicitly the case, 
for example, when the Trinity is considered from the process perspective. 
Hartshorne's work on the doctrine of God is singularly monotheistic: 
he offers no christology and considers the doctrine of the Trinity 
spoilt by the lack of ad extpa relationality it implies to the being of 
God. 126 In the epilogue to Man's Vision of God Hartshorne suggests his 
125. J. Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, London: S.C.M. 
1981, p.l72. 
126. Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, p.24. 
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concept of God may be summed up by the phrase "Transcendent Relativity, 
or reflexive universal transcendence" . 127 The essence of this concept 
. d t l' l' 128 d H h 1S a ex l'a re at10na 1ty, an arts orne suggests that "Reflexive 
Transcendence throws some light .. . upon the idea of the Trinity".129 
In a limited way it does: but it is one thing to identify the 'person' 
with elements of the dipolar schema, it is another to determine the 
issue of the identity of God in respect of the three 'persons'. Do the 
trinitarian persons express "self-states in God", or are they onto1og-
ically "distinct,,?130 Hartshorne's brief acknowledgement of the 
Trinity serves to remind us of the centrality of the issue of the 
entitative status of God that emerged in the course of the analysis of 
his neoclassical theism. 
Although Hartshorne has done little more than allude to the issue, 
process theologians have made various attempts at adumbrating a process 
trinitarianism. Ford131 draws attention to the Whiteheadian schema 
that the Logos, or Son, and the Spirit reflect respectively the primordial 
and the consequent natures of God . The 'first person ' is loosely 
identified with originative creativity. Ford cqncludes that the process 
view is one of "an ultimate triunity of principles defining the divine 
l "f" 132 1 e . Spiceland133 holds that the trinitarian formula makes sense 
127. Hartshorne, Man ' s Vision of God, p.349. 
128. op. cit., p.350. 
129 . op . ci t ., p. 351. 
130. ibid. 
131. L. Ford, The Lure of God, pp.99ff. 
132. op. cit . , p.110. 
133 . J.D. Spiceland, "Process Theology" in One God irt 'Trirtity, Toon 
and Spiceland (eds) , pp.148ff . 
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within the context of the process understanding of experience and 
becoming - although it is to be noted that his overall conclusion is 
that process philosophy is "an inadequate conceptual framework for 
134 the work of theology". 
The Trinity reflects the threefoldness of the Christian experience 
of God which may be interpreted in tems of God as "ultimate source 
or cause" giving to each entity its initial aim; as providing in the 
Son a pattern for the fulfilment of the aim, which provision is also 
a self-expression of the divine reality; and as the energizing or 
enabling power whereby appropriate response is generated with the 
Christian 1ife. 135 Spiceland's focus of the trinity of experience 
avoids the vexatious question of the status of the trinitarian person. 
Joseph Bracken sketches a process trinitarianism based on a 
136 
radical re-understanding of divine person. He proposes that "the 
divine persons may be conceived as three personally ordered societies 
whose unity as one God is the unity of a democratically organized 
t d ·" 137 s ructure soclety. The Whiteheadian assumption that societies 
exercise agency is a key to Bracken's proposal. Thus he contends that 
'God' is a generic term denoting "three personally ordered societies 
who act as a corporate reality both in their internal relations and 
134 . op . cit., p. 156 . 
135. op . cit., p. 151 f . 
136. J.A. Bracken, "Process Theology and Trinitarian Theology", Proc.St. 
8, Winter 1978:217-228; see also "Process Philosophy and 
Trinitarian Theology II", Proc.St. 11, Summer 1981:83-95. 
137. Bracken, "Process Philosophy and Trinitarian Theology II", p.83. 
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. . h. . 138 V1S a V1S t e1r creat10n. The question of the entitative status 
of God is thus apparently resolved as the corporate togetherness of 
the personally ordered societies. Bracken goes on to say that the 
"activity of interrelating" is the nature of God. Thus each of the 
'persons', or 'societies' has entitative status by virtue of its 
relation to the other two. Given the conjunction of nature and person 
in speaking of God, he then concludes that 
The very being of God ... must be the activity of 
interrelating, and the three divine persons are 
the necessary terms for the activity itself to 
exist. (139) 
But such a resolution still leaves that relatedness of God trapped in 
a trinitarian self-sufficiency. 
Finally, Schubert Ogden, in addressing the doctrine of the Trinity 
f . 140 ff' h· h G d· h rom the neoclassical perspect1ve a 1rms t e V1ew t at 0 1S t e 
one eternal individual "whose own reality constitutes reality itself 
or as such". He goes on to denote ' Father' as the divine individuality, 
and 'Holy Spirit' as the divine subjectivity as such. He states: 
On the neoclassical view, it is God himself who is 
related to others, not simply God the Son or God the 
Holy Spirit in distinction from God the Father. Hence 
God's relatedness is just as primordial and underived 
138. op. cit., p.84. 
139. ibid. 
140. S. Ogden, "On the Trinity'; Theol. LXXXIII/692, March 1980:97-102. 
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as his absoluteness, and the three divine persons 
are equally relative and equally absolute. (141) 
The various process perspectives do not effectively address the 
issue of the identity of God in trinitarian context. They rather 
proffer various re-interpretations of aspects of the doctrine of the 
Trinity: Spiceland of the economic Trinity in experience; Ford of an 
immanent Trinity of divine life principles; Bracken a revised social 
analogy and Ogden a triunity of aspects. However, the strength of the 
neoclassical perspective is its acknowledgement of the real relatedness 
of God. Until the issue of God's entitative status in the light of 
that is resolved, the doctrine of the Trinity will continue to be 
problematic for the process perspective. 
Perhaps, however, there is a clue which may yet yield a possible 
answer. Ford notes that the trinitarian persons derive from the 
"three roles God plays", and that further "these roles are not arbitrary ... 
but are rooted in the very being of God".142 And Moule notes that in 
the binatarian antecedents to trinitarianism there is "a tacit recog-
nition of the character of the Deity as involving reciprocity and 
dialogue".143 Now the 'roles' Ford alludes to are the different ways 
in which God interacts with, or relates to, creation. Reciprocity and 
dialogue are relational activities requiring two relators. It may be 
properly said of a single relational entity that it has the propensity 
141. op. cit., p.lOl. 
142. Ford, The Lure of God, p.lOl. 
143. C.F.D. Moule, "The New Testament and the Doctrine of the Trinity": 
A Short Report on an Old Theme", Exp. T. 78, October 1976: 17. 
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for such engagement. However, except by strained analogy, it cannot 
be said to engage in reciprocity and dialogue purely with itself. 
Thus if there is a claim that such activity occurs within the deity 
it can only be on the grounds of plural entitative status: there must 
needs be at least two relational entities to so relationally engage. 
For relationships as such do not subsist: they are the 'between' 
that binds two or more relating entities together in the context of 
their existence. Relationship as such is the necessary corollary of 
relational beings. Therefore, when speaking of inner-trinitarian 
relations either this entitative status of the centres of relational 
being is upheld, which results in the charge of tri-theism, or the 
relationality is upheld within the context of the paradox of a singular 
identity embracing, ontologically, relational triplicity. 
Now, from the perspective of classical trinitarianism, God's being 
is not so much one as 'three' - albeit three-in-one. As 'one' God the 
category 'personal' is understood in terms of the relational being of 
personhood. But God is also three 'persons': the being of God is 
constituted by the tri-unity of three identifiable relational distinct-
ions - Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus the problem of the identity 
of God is whether or not the ontological determination of relational 
entitative status is meant to accommodate a threefold personhood, or 
whether the three 'persons' of the Trinity are to be reconceived in 
the light of the identity of God qua single relational entity. 
As a trinity of "persons" the question of the identity of God 
involves the difficult exercise of establishing the ontological unity 
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of three apparent centres of relational entitative status. However, 
if reciprocity and dialogue is indicative of the relational mode of 
God's ad extra roles, then the doctrine of the Trinity denotes the 
relational tri-unity of such modes. God is One: as "Real Relator" he 
is relationally engaged by way of three modes of relating which are 
symbolically represented by the trinitarian motifs. 
In other words, I am suggesting that the ontological-relational 
concept of God, by placing priority on ad extra relationality as con-
stitutive of the being of God, and not as a consequence of his existing 
as such, may offer one way of elucidating the intelligibility of God's 
trinitarian identity. In the first place, by conceiving personal being 
in terms of constitutive ad extra relatedness personal being is affirmed 
of God only in the sense of the relationality manifest in ad extra 
relations. Thus the motifs of 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' are 
not to be conceived as 'persons' in the sense of a differentiated 
personal being constituting personality in God. They are not themselves 
individual units of identity but rather motifs of the singular relational 
being of God. To grant them independent relational entitative status is 
to beg the question of tri-theism. 
Yet even as 'motifs', the three 'persons' are normally held to 
denote the being of God as in fact relationally constituted - i.e. by 
the relations that hold between them. But is this ontologically 
coherent? I would suggest that the three trinitarian 'personae' are 
to be conceived as motifs of the relationality of the one God: their 
own "interrelatedness" is but the relativity of one relational motif 
or type with respect to another. Now this would seem to approximate 
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orthodoxy, but the traditional perspective argues that at least for 
two divine persons, Father and Son, there are grounds "for the 
144 Such discernment of an ontological relation of 'reciprocity II'. 
discernment is based on recognizing in Jesus a locus of personal being 
as other than, though nonetheless intimately related to, the being of 
God. It also interpOlates into the being of God Jesus' distinct 
identity defined in terms of familial relations. 145 God is thus both 
'Father' and 'Son', entitatively and substantially. 
The real issue of the doctrine of the Trinity concerns whether the 
identity of God is found in the relations between the three persons in 
146 their being within the 'Godhead', or whether the identity of God as 
relational entity is logically prior to the motifs of relationship that 
are symbolised and, indeed, brought to focus by the terms 'Father', 
'Son', 'Spirit'. Joseph Bracken suggests a development of the social 
analogy as a way of affirming the former mode of identity. 147 He 
attempts to describe the Trinity as a society of persons on the basis 
of "unity-in-community" . He accords superior ontological status to 
unity of "persons-in-community" over the personal unity of the individual. 
Thus in himself God is not individual but a social reality - a community 
of persons. His 'being' is thus "communitarian". 
144 . C.B . Kaiser, "The Discernment of Triunity", Scot.J.Th. 28, 
October 1975:454 . 
145. As Hebb1ethwaite notes, "it was the conviction of the divinity 
of Christ that in the first place necessitated the postulation 
of real relations in God". Theol. LXX/676, July 1977:258. 
146. And does this not imply that there is no God as such in the 
singular sense of monotheism, but in reality a 'Godhead' which 
is little more than a euphemism for 'triumvirate'? 
147. J.A. Bracken (S .J.), "The Holy Trinity as a Community of Divine 
Persons, I", Hey.J. XV/2, April 1974:166-182; see also "The 
Holy Trinity as a Community of Persons II, Person and Nature 
in the Doctrine of God". Hey.J. XV. July 1974:257-270. 
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This "communi tarian unity" is maintained on the basis that "The 
community as such is an ontological totality greater than the sum of 
its operations".l48 But such a concept is not that of personal identity 
in terms of individual persons-in-community. In other words, Bracken 
takes the perception of the relational context of personal being then 
derives from that his presumption that the relational context itself 
(community) is ontologically prior and determinative. Hence, by 
applying this to the concept of God, he makes "community" the ontological 
ground and the locus of divine identity. But he is still left with the 
question of the ontological status of the three person-identities of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To argue that "their common nature as 
God is to be a community and their self-definition as individual persons 
. . d h h' 1 . h' h' . t " 149 . . d 1S 1 entical wit t e1r ro e W1t 1n t 15 commun1 y 1S to S1 e-step 
the issue. 
The community is not itself a person, nor does it definitively 
denote personal being as such. God cannot be identified in terms of 
personal being for Bracken, but only as three personal beings acting 
150 
collectively and in complete harmony. In the end Bracken is left 
with the problem of reconciling the existence of three relational 
entities with the affirmation of the oneness of God. Furthermore, 
Bracken's postulate presumes at least an equality of order with respect 
t th th t t th 1 . 1 t d" 151 o e ree persons, con rary 0 e c aSS1ca ra lt1on. Either 
way, however, the problem of the identity of God is not resolved 
148. Bracken, "The Holy Trinity I", p.171. 
149. op. cit., p.180. 
150. op. cit., p.181. 
151. cf. R.C. Neville, "Creation and the Trinity", Th.St. 30, March 
1969:19. 
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because the sense of divine personal identity is fractured. It has 
ever been the concern of a monotheistic faith to avert such fracturing, 
whilst yet maintaining a sense of separateness-in-identity of the 
'parts' . 
Traditionally speaking, singularity in God has been couched in 
terms of 'substance'; 'ousia' or 'essence' that undergirds and provides, 
the identitative 'commonness' to the three persons or hypostases. Thus 
the 'persons' are particular identities standing out from within the 
one identity, yet intimately interrelated to each other and also to 
that which is the unity of their collective identity. Thus, in terms 
of identity, trinitarianism implies four, not three, discrete relating 
identities. Traditional trinitarianism effectively ends up with four 
'entities': the three persons of the Trinity, and the One God whom 
they together comprise. 
The only way out of this conundrum is to take the relationa1ity of 
God in its full and proper ad extra sense. Trinitarian motifs must be 
seen to be expressive and affirmative of the ad extra relationa1ity 
of God. For the Trinity is also the God of Love. As Kearney notes: 
"A self who loves participates as fully and completely as he can in 
his own being and in the being of others".152 The God whose bei!1g is 
love is just such a self. This being is expressed by the incarnation: 
it does not thereby imply that it is fulfilled 'within the being of God. 
The reality of God is this kind of re1ationa1ity: it is not ontologically 
153 
remote. God is as he appears, only because he is in his appearance. 
152. S. Kearney, "The Reality of Our Relationship to God", Encount . 34, 
Summer 1973:217. 
153. cf. L. Dewart, The Future of Belief, p.142. 
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The experience or 'appearance' of Trinity is an experience of the 
relationali ty of God, not a reflection of a "behind the scenes" onto-
logical structure. To speak of the reality of God as "a living 
movement of self-giving love which liberates human life and creates 
human liberty,,154 is to speak of the relatedness of God in the ad extra 
sense. It is to speak directly of the being of God. It requires no 
supposition that the 'real' being of God is only mirrored in this 
relatedness; that the real self-giving is only an occurrence between 
intra-trinitarian identities. Self-giving and self-relating are 
relational movements from one relational entity to another. 
John McIntyre, in discussing the love of God, distinguishes attrib-
. . d 1" f 155 ut~ve from operational interpretat~ons an app ~cat~ons 0 love. In 
speaking of love in terms of concern, commitment, communication, 
community, involvement, identification, and response and responsibility, 
McIntyre embraces a full and wide-ranging discussion of the necessary 
inter-relatedness of God's loving relationship to and with the world of 
his creation. Love that goes out from God is not dispassionate, not 
indifferent. It is a love that elicits, even demands, a response. And 
the God who so relates values - even 'needs'-the answering responsive 
love in all its nuanced fullness. 
The conception of personal being as relational in the sense of 
implying "responsiveness df the person to the environment and the 
response of the social environment to the person",156 would not itself 
pose a prima facie threat to the Trinity. Thus when thinking of God 
154. D.L. Migliore, "The Trinity and Human Liberty", Th. Today, July 
1980:488. 
ISS. J. McIntyre, On the Love of God, London: Collins 1962, pp.28f. 
156. W.R. Matthews, God in Christian Thought and Experience, p.194. 
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as the "completely personal being" it is rightly recognized that such 
a being "in whom personal existence achieves the highest quality, must 
be a being for whom there exists a responsive object adequate to 
himself".157 But rather than moving from this recognition of relational 
reality to examining the implication of the created order for the under-
standing of the being of God, the traditional assumption is to conceive 
the relational reality of God solely in terms of "a plurality within 
the unity of the Godhead" couched in various ways as a "conception of 
a reciprocal relatedness of active and conscious centres".158 The 
problem is that it proposes an ontological structure in which the 
essential identity of God as personal being is judged, rightly, to 
require a relational 'other', but that this 'other' is ontologically 
incorporated within the essential identity. But this is both logically 
absurd, and, ontologically, devalues the recognition of the reality of 
relationship as a motif of personal being. 
Creation provides for God the real 'other' as relational counter-
part to whom he gives himself and to whom he looks for responsive 
self-giving. The basis of fellowship and community is not isolated 
within the being of God, but is found within the relationships 
engendered by the relationality of the being of God. As Scharlemann 
comments, "what it means to be God ... is to be able to relate oneself 
to one's other. But to be God is to be other than the process of 
relating oneself to one's other".159 God's entitative status is as 
one who is so able, and does, relationally engage with others. Thus 
the issue of what trinitarianism means, and ....... 
157. ibid. 
158. ibid. 
159. R. Scharlemann, The Being of God, p.88. 
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the basis for the comprehension of it, is that "for God to be God is 
to relate himself to what is other than himself".l60 The trinitarian 
persons are thus not themselves relational entities, but manifest the 
real relatedness of the entitative status of God. They are expressive 
of the ways in which God is "Real Relator". 
The trinitarian challenge to the individualistic conception of 
personhood is not so much that it defines God as the community of 
"mutual love of Father, Son and Spirit,,161 for such internal reflex-
ivity is not, in fact, a model of community. Rather the challenge 
emerges only as the ad extra relationality of personhood is applied 
to the understanding of the being of God as personal. This re1ation-
a1ity is not the self-reflexivity of a complex ego, but openness to 
the entitative 'other' in the context of ad extra relationship. 
Ziziou1as notes that a person "can not be conceived i n itself as 
a static entity, but only as it relates to".l62 Now in conceiving the 
being of God in terms of the self-fulfilment of inner-trinitarian 
relations, the necessary relationa1ity of personhood is apparently 
maintained, but at the price of the identity of God as simple relational 
entity. Thus it would seem that it is not 'God' who reflexively relates 
as such, but the 'Father', the 'Son' and the ' Holy Spirit', each as 
active conscious centres of re1ationality, each in their identity as 
relational entities, who, in their relating to each other, constitute 
"God". 'God' thus denotes a society of relational entities, whose 
relating one with the other is a complete and sufficient exercise. So 
160. op. cit., p.92. 
161. D.L. Migliore, "The Trinity and Human Liberty", p.494. 
162. J.D. Ziziou1as, "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological 
Exploration of Personhood", Scot.J.Th. 28, October 1975:408. 
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does this mean that the being of God, as relationally conceived, is 
really the relatedness of a divine society? The problem would be 
that such a society of relational entities, or 'persons', would 
constitute not a unity - or an ontologically singular identity - but 
a collectivity. Zizoulas rightly notes that 
the doctrine of God is based normally on the 
assumption that God is personal because he first 
'is' and then 'relates' - hence the classical 
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity and the 
problem of intelligibility it has never ceased 
to present. (163) 
C.C.J. Webb, in aligning himself with the Hegelian tradition in 
holding that "a person, to be a person, must stand in relation to 
other persons~6is suggestive of the relational resolution I am propos-
ing. The Boethian definition, though widely adhered to, has been 
165 limiting with respect to the term 'person'. Since the third 
century personality in God has been affirmed, but not personality of 
God. 166 To refer to God as personal is usually taken to infer the 
possibility of personal relationship between the individual and God, 
that is, that God is such as to accommodate such relationships toward 
h " If h" d 1 167 ~mse as wors ~p, trust, an ove. Webb concludes: "we should 
not speak of a personal God, unless we supposed that we could stand 
163. op. cit., p.4l6. 
164. C.C.J. Webb, God and Personality, London: Geo. Allen and Unwin 
1918, p.52. 
165. op. cit. , pp.47f. 
166. op. cit. , p.65. 
167. op. cit. , p.70. 
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. 1 l' . h h' " 168 1n persona re at10ns W1t 1m. Noting that '~ersonal relations 
are conceived as constituting the inner life of the Supreme Reality" 
Webb suggests that "the intercourse of the worshipper with God Cis) a 
" . . th' l' f " 169 part1c1pat10n 1n 1S 1 e . Thus his focus on the relationality 
of person or personality that is within God leads to an openness to 
the possibility that God ' s relationships ad extra may yet be onto-
logically significant for God. 
Webb affirms that ad extra relationality is the sine qua non of 
170 the personal God. He also acknowledges that inter-relationship 
implies relational 'others', which by virtue of their relating to 
each other in the context of contrasted identity from each other, are 
h .. . ,,171 w at I have termed "relat10nal ent1t1es . Despite the high value 
Webb places on the ad extra relatedness of God172 he attributes the 
relational entitative distinction in God to the inner life of the 
Trinity . 173 His own solution to the problem of the self-sufficiency 
of the Trinity is gained by identifying the life of the Spirit with 
the life of the Church . 174 Thus the mutual interrelatedness of God 
and humanity is the means whereby the life of the creature participates 
in the life of the Creator. However, this is unsatisfactory from the 
168. op. cit., p.73; cf . Divine Personality and Human Life, London: 
Geo. Allen and Unwin 1920, p . 2l: "a God with whom personal 
relationship is possible for his worshippers" is the definition 
given for a 'personal God' . 
169 . Webb, Divine Personality, p.18. 
170. C.C.J. Webb, Problems in the Relations of God and Man, London: 
171. 
172. 
173. 
174. 
Nisbet 1924, p.222; cf. p . 225. 
op. cit. , p . 234. 
op . cit. , p.246. 
op. cit. , p . 235. 
op. cit. , pp . 248f . 
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relational point of view: it leaves open the prospect that ad extra 
relatedness is secondary, and the primary ontological relatedness for 
God is nonetheless that of inner-trinitarian relations. 
Now Ward has neatly pointed out that : 
God on his own cannot · be self-giving love; for there 
is nothing to give himself to . To say that he gives 
one part of himself to another part of himself splits 
him into parts in an unacceptable way. Nor can one 
think of a solitary God as freely creative; for again, 
without any creation, he obviously cannot make anything . (175) 
Any suggestion that the doctrine of the Trinity issues in a triplicity 
of relational entities is to be avoided . The true inter-relating 
divine 'society ' is that of the Creator with, and in, his creation. 
Again Ward seems to sum it up succinctly: 
If one cannot be content with a society of gods, or 
a God who is some sort of society, the only alternative 
seems to be that the one and only God must freely 
bring into being other centres of awareness, which can 
be given such a degree of autonomy as is necessary for 
them to constitute, with God, a society of interacting 
personal beings. (176) 
Relatedness and person-hood are of the essence of trinitarian 
175. K. Ward, Rational Theology, p.l38 . 
176. op. cit., p.86. 
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formulations and theology. In this context, Driver remarks that "It 
is not possible simply to be a person. One can only become a person, 
f ' . h d 'P ,. f 1 ' ,,177 never InlS e ... erson IS a way 0 re atlng . Driver is on the 
way to a Relational Theology, but his conclusion that the 'Trinity' 
amounts to "two divine figures related in a contextual field that is 
, If d' , ,,178, l' k Itse Ivlne IS gross y mlsta en. Here, in developing the 
celebrated Augustinian pattern, he has fallen into the trap of trying 
to conceive the 'persons' of the Trinity as possessing relational 
entitative status. Thus he ends up with a bi-partite identity together 
with its necessary contextual ground as the essence of the doctrine of 
the Trinity. Such a conclusion leaves more questions raised than 
answered. Driver is right in his focus on the central significance 
of relationship, but he has not taken cognizance of the entitative 
issue that is raised by the relational problematic, hence his confused 
trinitarianism. 
Segundo expresses the trinity of God's relationali ty as "God before 
" "G d . h " "G d Wl'thl'n us" .179 us; 0 WIt us; 0 The one God relates himself 
out of the relationality of his being in these three modes: each is 
named and thus symbolized by the personal terms ' Father', 'Son' and 
'Holy Spirit'. Thus the fact and significance of "Threeness" follows 
from the experience of relationship to God ~ Father, Son and Spirit. 
Segundo notes: 
177. T.F. Driver, Christ in a Changing World, New York: Crossroads 
1981, p.102. 
178. op. cit., p.lOS. 
179. J.L. Segundo, Our Idea of God, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis 1974, 
pp. 24ff. 
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In the difference of names we cannot possibly look for 
an indication of any difference that might be attributed 
in itself to the being or to the activity of the Father, 
Son and Spirit. (180) 
However, the non-differentiation of ontological identity here affirmed 
by Segundo quickly gives way to a view of God as, indeed, a society 
within himself and as revealed as such. 18l Segundo succumbs to the 
ascription of entitative status ascribed to each of the 'persons' of 
the Trinity . 
Segundo notes the basic options which the development of the doctrine 
of the Trinity sought to avoid were that of modalism on the one hand and 
subordinationism on the other . 182 The latter is the outcome of the 
granting of distinct entitative status to each of the divine persons, 
yet wishing to avoid tri-theism. Given that there can be only one 
divine entity, the presumption is to identify the 'Father' motif with 
this and consequently subordinate in various ways the other two. 
The former difficulty, modalism, is not unlike the kind of concept-
ion I am trying to adumbrate except for one important difference: I am 
not speaking of different modes of operation, whether serially or co-
temporaneously executed, by a single entity. Modalism is premised on a 
view of God's activity as one way only: it is not a category of the 
relationality of God. For tri-theistic identity to be avoided, the 
180 . op. cit., p.6l. 
181 . op. cit . , p.66 . 
182. op. cit., p.lOO. 
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relationality of God, if it is to be conceived as at all consonant 
with the reality of the experience and revelation of God, must be 
such as to allow for expression within the context of three distinct-
ive relational patterns. These patterns are symbolised and identified 
by the trinitarian construct . The names 'Father', 'Son' and 'Spirit' 
thus denote not modes of activity per Be, but three patterns or 
contexts in which the ontological-relationality of God is expressed 
and engaged. 
The traditional affirmation of the doctrine of the Trinity as a 
paradoxical mystery, begs an apparent dichotomy between the being of 
God/ and GOd-in-ad-extra-relationship. Classical trinitarianism holds 
that there is a relationality only between, and of, the three persons; 
in himself God does not enjoy ad extra relations. Yet by virtue of 
the economic Trinity God does, nonetheless, relate to the world. This 
'mystery' of God must not be used to sanction conceptual confusion. 
The suggestion which emerges in terms of a relational resolution is 
that the determination of God as relational entity means comprehending 
the being of God within the ontological context of relationality and 
with a relational identity expressed in a threefold pattern. 
Geoffrey Lampe, in affirming that by 'Spirit' is meant "God as 
active and related to personal beings",l83 is saying that it is God 
who relates; not some department of deity; not a part of God, or 
merely a facet of God, but fully God. Thus in terms of a relational 
theology, Lampe would appear to be affirming that there is one divine 
relational entity only. 'Spirit' does not denote a distinct relational 
183. G. Lampe, God as Spirit, p.208. 
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identity within God, nor a distinguishable relational entity in its 
own right. 'Spirit' refers to God as much as, and co-equally with, 
the terms 'Father' and 'Son'. Thus, Lampe states, "We use 'Spirit' 
language in order to speak of the experience of communion with the 
personal, active, presence of God himself".184 Thus to talk in 
terms of the inner-trinitarian relations as constituting the essential 
life of God, or as descriptive of God's being, is to ontologise a 
fundamentally symbolic construct which has been derived from the 
diversity of the human experience of God as testified in scripture, 
and is designed to avoid the suggestion that such diversity is 
evidence of tri-theism. 
The classical axiom that "the operations of the divine persons 
ad extra are inseparable" implicitly supports the relational perspect -
ive I am seeking to propound, for, in effect, it asserts the non-
divisability of God's ad extra relatedness. Distinctiveness of 
relationship in regard to anyone of the three 'persons ' is thus dist -
inctiveness of particularity in God's relational activity: there is 
no need to presume any other relational identity is responsible for 
the particular relational type, even a relational identity "within" 
God. 18s 
God is One, and the being of God is inclusive of ad extra 
re1ationa1ity. These two axioms of a relational theology therefore 
inform the approach that is to be taken to the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Given that aseity does not equal self-sufficiency but 
184. op. cit., p.219. 
185. cf. E. Hill, "Our Knowledge of the Trinity", Scot.J.Th. 27, 
February, 1974:9. 
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simply the existential grounding of self-existence, then there is no 
need to account for the relatedness of God by recourse to a wholly 
internal model. Therefore the Trinity, as expressive of the being 
of God only in terms of inner-relations, is redundant. Undivided 
operations do not emerge from a divided source, because the source 
admits of no divisions. Rather the ontological possibility that is 
now presented for the doctrine of God is that the Trinity denotes 
the ontological-relational pattern, or the relational identity, of 
God. 
On the basis of the relational perspective I am seeking to 
expound, aseity was interpreted in terms of relational context, viz, 
that the being of God is self-determined relatedness to other. 
Trinity correlates to this in terms of denoting the identity in 
thre~fold expression of the one relational God. 
V. RELATIONAL THEOLOGY POSSIBILITY AND PROSPECT 
The perspective of "Relational Theology", I suggest, contributes 
to the contemporary search for a conceptuality which affirms the 
reality of God's engagement with and within the world of human exper-
ience and history, whilst at the same time not losing sight of the 
motif of transcendence. By referring to God as "Real Relator", or 
conceptually described as "relational entity", this two-fold criterion 
is met. For it is of the essence of a relational entity to have self-
identity comprising both transcendental otherness and immanent 
presence-in-relation. 
Whilst this contemporary search may find a touchstone in the con-
struction of such a theism, the prospect for this approach goes beyond 
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the formulation of the doctrine of God as such. The acknowledgement 
of "God's involvement in the fabric of human life and history", 186 
which has emerged in a variety of theological writers, is given 
metaphysical form and ontological substance by this perspective. 
Thus theological anthropology, for instance, serves to illuminate the 
reality of the being of God as well as that of human being. 187 
According to Gilkey, Calvin held that God and humanity "are only 
to be understood in the light of one another, when the two are, so to 
.. .. d. ." 188 speak, set 1n Juxtapos1t10n an 1n un10n If human being is to be 
understood aright only in the context of its relation to the divine 
being, then in similar - though not identical - fashion, the being of 
God is to be understood in the context of its interrelatedness with 
human being. This is the springboard for a relational theology. 
Gilkey is one who has begun from the process perspective to develop 
his own theological stance. He notes that in any discussion of God as 
source or ground, as creator arid providential ruler, "we are dealing 
with God's universal and necessary relations to all things".189 Thus, 
for example, the prospect of a relational perspective for 'providence' 
stands on the veracity of Gilkey's claim and holds a view of "provident-
ial rule" from within. The providential God does not act upon the 
world from without, but indwells the world, acting within and through 
186. A. Carr, "The God Who Is Involved", Th. Today 38, October 1981: 
315. 
187. Carr notes the various reformulations of the doctrine of God 
arising out of the theological anthropology of writers such 
as Gilkey, Ogden and Tracey. ibid. 
188. L. Gilkey, Message and Existence, New York: Seabury 1979. 
189. op. cit., p.69. 
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its operations. 190 God, for Gilkey, is a transcendent participator: 
a "Real Relator". 
I noted in the Introduction the link between theology and ethics 
as a motivating element for exploring a relational approach to theology.19l 
In some recent writings on christology the prospect for an ontological-
relational perspective is also firmly suggested. 192 For example, as 
Preston notes, T.F. Driver in developing his christological thinking, 
"begins with God in relation to his creatures". 193 In expounding his 
method for an ethical christology Driver states "We start with the 
existing relation ... All we can ever know about Jesus and any other 
persons is hal>' they affect us in relation ... Relation ... is prior to 
identity". 194 He states also that "christological formulation requires 
understanding existence as relationship. Nothing exists, not even God, 
except in relation to something else: Nothing has its existence alone".195 
The ontological reality of God's essential relatedness is funda-
" mental to all areas of theological reflection. Kasemann notes that 
from the Christian perspective both love and truth have as their content 
h . " 196 "Christ in his relations Ip to man . Terms such as 'love', 'truth', 
'grace', and ' reconciliation ' expressing the verities of Christian 
faith take on a new dimension of meaning from the ontological-relational 
190. cf. op. cit., pp.92ff. 
191. See above, p.4f. 
192. cf. T. Driver, Christ in a Changing World. 
193. R. Preston, "The Christ of Relativity", Exp .T. 93, May 1982:250. 
194. Driver, Christ in a Changing World, p.15. 
195. op. cit., p.25. 
196. E. Kasemann, "Love Which Rejoices in Truth", Colloquium 14, 
October 1981:46-53. 
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viewpoint. For they are understood not as denoting quasi-spiritual 
possessions or agency, but aspects of the interrelatedness of God 
with created existence. They yield conceptual form to the relational 
content of the being of God. 
Furthermore, aspects such as suffering and repentance, which have 
traditionally been difficult to ascribe to God without implying some 
sense of deficiency , are enabled to take on fresh potency and illuminate 
the existentially experienced reality of the relational God . Kuyper 
notes that the history of interpretation of the suffering and repent-
ance of God basically denied any reality to these as predicates of the 
being of God . 197 Kuyper himself firmly asserts that "The concept of 
God must take into account declarations about His unchangeability and 
His changeability" . 198 This unchangeabili ty "assures us that we are 
not in the hands of caprice or irresponsible power" and changeability 
, 'h" h H' 199 
"manifests God in vItal relatIons Ip WIt IS people". Kuyper is 
arguing for conceiving God as dynamically responsive, as One for whom 
to be is to be in authentic relationship with an other about which he 
cares, and which he has created out of the necessity of his relational 
being and for the purpose of relating in fellowship. 
This present work is but the first step in moving toward a relat-
ional theology as such. Relationship is a key motif in the expression 
and the experience of Christian faith, as well as in its reflection 
and intellectual formulation . The study of Macquarrie and Hartshorne 
197 . L.J . Kuyper, "The Suffering and Repentance of God", Scot.J.Th . 22, 
September 1969:257-277 . 
198. op . cit., p . 268. 
199. op. cit., p.269. 
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is both illustrative of the potential of the ontological-relational 
approach as hermeneutic and corrective; and also validates the approach 
with reference to the understanding of God qua Being and qua Becoming. 
The prospect which could develop from all this is, on the one hand, to 
explore the relational motif within biblical theology, and on the 
other, to examine further the relational perspective with respect to 
other doctrinal areas, e.g. atonement, incarnation, salvation and so 
on. But these are matters for future reference. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to do two things: to address the issue 
of the relational problematic in the doctrine of God, and, in respect 
of that, to examine the doctrine of God in the thought of John 
1 Macquarrie and Charles Hartshorne . The result of the latter has been 
to provide conceptual resources that contribute to the resolution of 
the former . Further, the development of the relational perspective 
has suggested conceptual correctives with respect to particular 
deficiencies of both existential-ontological theism and neoclassical 
theism. 
Now it is a basic tenet of Christian faith that the divine activity 
within creation is supremely the activity of reconciliation : of estab-
lishing, and re-establishing, authentic relationships. This thesis 
attempts to conceptually undergird that tenet by addressing the 
ontological and theological conditions necessary for it to be, in fact, 
1. At the time of completing this thesis Professor Macquarrie was in 
the process of delivering his Gifford Lectures at the University 
of St Andrews . The focus of these lectures I understand to be 
"Dialectical Theism". Being privy only to a copy of the outline 
of his lecture series, provisionally entitled "In Search of Deity", 
I am unable to take account of this most recent development in 
Macquarrie ' s thinking on God. However, it would appear he shares 
some of the concerns I have attempted to address herein and he 
attempts a resolution that, although doubtless consonant with his 
previous work, nonetheless moves more clearly in the direction of 
greater affinity with the views of Charles Hartshorne. Whereas 
Hartshorne ' s panentheism issues in dipo1arity, Macquarrie states 
the essence of Dialectical Theism as the coincedentia oppositorum 
of God. God is discussed in terms of "being and nothing, unity 
and multiplicity, as the incomprehensible that makes itself known, 
as the furthest in his transcendence and the nearest in his 
immanence, as eternal and temporal, impassible and passible". 
Copy of Lecture Series Outline "In Search of Deity" by John 
Macquarrie, per courtesy of D.W. D. Shaw. 
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the case. The primary issue around which the discussion has turned 
has been that of taking adequate conceptual cognizance of ad extra 
relatedness. By attending to a particular facet of the early Heidegger, 
"ontological-relationality" emerged as a prime hermeneutical key by 
which to assess and develop the relational perspective on the doctrine 
of God. As a consequence it was argued that the problem for compre-
hending the reality of God is resolved only when conceptual primacy 
is accorded to ad extra relatedness as expressive of the ontological 
reality of God: all else is to be assessed and, if need be, modified 
in the light of that. 
The resolution of the relational problematic - that two-fold 
challenge to the reality and efficacy of God's ad extra relating 
posed by the notion of aseity and the doctrine of the Trinity - is 
found in the concept of the "relational entitative status" of God. 
By denoting God as divine "Real Relator" this entitative status is 
given particular focus: it refers to the way whereby full and formal 
cognizance is taken of divine ad extra relating. It is a way of 
expressing the veracity of God's relational being: that the ontological 
sine qua non in our understanding of God is God's relating to others. 
Therefore such relationality is not to be understood in the limited 
sense of internal relations of the three persons of the Trinity, but 
rather in reference to the relatedness that holds between God and that 
which is other than, though albeit created by, God. The suggestion 
that God could exist in complete relational isolation is ontologically 
spurious. Paradoxically, the doctrine of the Trinity has implicitly 
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recognised this is the case, and has endeavoured to meet the situation 
by positing internal relatedness in conjunction with an insistence on 
the reality of God as a se . However, aseity and Trinity together lie 
at the base of a theological conundrum: Christian faith and experience 
bear witness to the reality and veracity of God's relating himself to 
the world, yet aseity and Trinity affirm that such ad extra relations 
are of no ontological consequence to God. 
The resolution of this conundrum requires a radical reinterpretat-
ion of the notion of aseity and the concept of the Trinity. So it was 
argued that, on the one hand, aseity simply denotes the existential 
priority of God without prejudice to the question of ontological-
relational sufficiency, and, on the other hand, ' Trinity' denotes the 
relational identity of God vis a vis the modes or patterns of God's 
ad extra relating. 
Both the context and the identity of God are relationally deter-
mined and expressed . Thus it is necessary that God be in relation to 
that which is not identically or identifiably himself, but which is, 
for him, a relational 'Other'. In this regard Keith Ward comments: 
the perfection of the Divine nature lies, not in its 
infinite self-satisfaction, but in its self-giving love .. . 
may not God bring into being that which, being other than 
him though always wholly dependent upon him, can be the 
object of his love and sharer, by participation, in his 
own nature? (2) 
2. Keith Ward, Rational Theology, p.82. 
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Therefore the creation of a world, or more appositely, an 
appropriately 'relational Other' from God's perspective, is neces-
sary for God. Hence the primary context for any conceptualizing of 
God involves the relationship in which God and World, or God and 
Humanity - i.e . Creator and creature - stand one to the other. The 
experience of faith is the experience of relationship with the Other 
we call 'God'. We 'encounter' God, and name him as such - and, 
indeed, use the personal pronoun - only in the context of his relating 
himself to us. It is the Christian view that God is known only, and 
as, the One who relates himself to, and seeks reciprocal relation from, 
that which he has created "in his image". As Geoffrey Lampe remarks, 
" . .. the work of God has corne to involve a real two-way relationship 
between himself and free, responsive, creatures".3 
The relational perspective that has evolved out of this study of 
Macquarrie and Hartshorne, and in discoursing on the relational problem-
atic in the doctrine of God, results in the prospect of an "ontological-
relational theism", or a "Relational Theology" . This perspective, I 
suggest, resolves the entitative question that is inherent in both 
existential-ontological theism and neoclassical theism. The relational 
perspective concerns the possibility of conceiving the being of the 
creator God as ontologically prior, but not ontologically dissimilar, 
to the being of creation. For the being of God is discerned in the 
context of relational reciprocity with creation. The 'Being' and the 
'Becoming' of God are manifest in divine ad extra relatedness. 
3. G. Lampe, God As Spirit, p . 207. 
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